

ETHNIC AND CONFESSIONAL RELATIONS IN CROSS-BORDER REGIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BASED ON SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH

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Abstract

The study deals with the issues of confessional issues (religiosity), freedom of conscience, state-church relations, interethnic relations, cultural identity, and language use in cross-border regions of Ukraine. The purpose of the article is to find common features in the relations between different nationalities and representatives of the multi-confessional environment of the two cross-border regions of Ukraine and to identify the specifics of each of them in solving the most important life problems of inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations. The method of sociological research is a survey that contains 44 questions of mixed type. The research was carried out by the Center for Sociological Research of Yuriy Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University. The principle of research is random selection of respondents according to social-age groups. About 1,500 respondents were interviewed. The data analysis method is SPSS electronic system (Statistical Package for the Social Science). The results of the comparative analysis were obtained.

Keywords: ethno-confessional relations; cross-border regions; sociological research; Ukraine.

Introduction

Ukraine is territorially a large country. Some parts of the country have taken different historical paths and have distinct regional features. Therefore, there are significant differences in language use, cultural identification, inter-ethnic relations, denominational issues (religious issues), freedom of conscience, and state-church relations. At times, even nearby regions show significant differences.

The two regions of Ukraine we selected to study—Northern Bukovina and Eastern Galicia—have a number of similarities, but also many specific differences. Common patterns include the common historical roots of both territories and their transboundary character. For a long time, the regions were a field of intersection and confrontation of economic, political, national, and religious interests of different countries (Russia, Poland, Romania, Moldova, Austria-Hungary). This was often manifested in territorial claims as well as in the serious influence of foreign religious centers (Europe, Russia, and USA). All this resulted in a colorful confessional palette of Galicia and Bukovina, their multi-ethnicity and multiculturalism. At the same time, regions differ in size, population, national composition, structure of religious network, etc.

The purpose of the article is to find common features in the relations between different nationalities and representatives of the multi-confessional environment of the two cross-border regions of Ukraine and to identify the specifics of each of them in solving the most important life problems of inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations.

1. Literature review

A great deal of research is devoted to the interaction of religion and society. So, Nick Perham raises the fundamental question “Why are people religious?” He states that only 16% of people worldwide are not religious, but this still equates to approximately 1.2 billion individuals who find it difficult to reconcile the ideas of religion with what they know about the world.¹

The role of religion, by definition of the World Economic Forum, concerns matters such as its impact on social movements, global development, conflict and peacebuilding, religion in ethics and law, gender norms and roles.²

According to Ashley Crossman’s vision, since religion is such an important part of societies around the world, sociologists are very interested in studying it. Sociologists study religion as both a belief system and a social institution. As a belief system, religion shapes what people think and how they see the world. As a social institution, religion is a pattern of social action organized around the beliefs and practices that people develop to answer

¹ Nick Perham, “Why are people religious?” (2019), available at <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/01/why-are-people-religious-a-cognitive-perspective>.

² Role of Religion. Global Issue, *World Economic Forum*. Co-curated with Georgetown University (2018), available at <https://toplink.weforum.org/knowledge/insight/a1Gb0000000pTDcEAM/explore/summary>.

questions about the meaning of existence. As an institution, religion persists over time and has an organizational structure into which members are socialized.³

The constituent society is the economic system as a type of social system. Economics deals with the relationship between the various agencies and institutions and focuses on the behavior and interactions of economic agents, so the relationship of economics and religion is logical. Thus, Frank J. Lechner believes that Adam Smith may well be the founder of the sociology of religion. Drawing on the theoretical arsenal of contemporary economics, one group of scholars, united under the banner of “rational choice,” propose that religious activity is inherently rational, which is a close kinship not just with Smith’s approach but also with the substance of his arguments. On the other hand, the twin ideas that for individuals religion is a rational choice and that in society religion takes the form of an economy are at the core of a “new paradigm” for the sociology of religion. According to its advocates, rational choice offers to replace a hodgepodge of ideas with a more coherent theory that accounts for all the important facts of religious life.⁴

In his paper “An economic theory of religious belief,” Holger Strulik considered how individuals allocate their time between church attendance (and other religious activities) and secular leisure activities. Moreover, individuals use a cognitive style, which is either intuitive-believing or reflective-analytical. The author-built model predicts that, *ceteris paribus*, wealthier individuals, and individuals with higher cognitive ability are more likely to abandon the intuitive-believing cognitive style. A sufficiently large negative shock, however, initiates the gradual secularization of society.⁵

Many studies have shown the positive impact of religiosity on economic growth, especially Christianity. For example, this conclusion is consistent among different estimators for China and robust with stability over time.⁶ China’s example also suggests that the religious diversity has positive and significant impacts on regional development in general.⁷

³ Ashley Crossman, “Sociology of Religion” (2019), available at <https://www.thoughtco.com/sociology-of-religion-3026286>.

⁴ Frank J. Lechner, “Rational Choice and Religious Economies” (*The SAGE Handbook of the Sociology of Religion*, James A. Beckford & N. J. Demerath III (eds). London: SAGE Publication, 2007), doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781848607965.n5>.

⁵ Holger Strulik, “An economic theory of religious belief”, *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 128 (2016): 35-46, available at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.04.007>.

⁶ Qunyong Wang, Xinyu Lin, “Does religious beliefs affect economic growth? Evidence from provincial-level panel data in China”, *China Economic Review*, 31 (2014): 277-287, available at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2014.10.006>.

⁷ Zheng Ying, Shibao Liu, Shuming Bao, Jianbo Zhou, “Religious diversity and regional development in China”, *China Economic Review*, 46 (2017): 1-9, available at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2017.08.003>.

However, not all assessments are unequivocal. Thus, studies Anil Rupasingha and John B. Chilton indicate that the religious adherence in general is significantly greater than zero and not beneficial for US county income growth.⁸ Nevertheless, religion, moral attitudes and economic behavior are closely linked. Religious people are less accepting of unethical economic behavior (e.g., tax evasion, bribery) and report more volunteering.⁹

There are numerous studies of the impact of cultural characteristics on economic systems and different types of markets.¹⁰ It is interesting that these results are consistent for developed markets but mixed for emerging markets.¹¹ Many publications are devoted to the connection between religiosity and economic risk perception.¹² Research suggests a link between individual religiosity and risk aversion. This relationship also influences organizational behavior. Firms located in counties with higher levels of religiosity display lower degrees of risk exposure.¹³

In addition, religious culture plays a positive role in restraining officials' corruption since religion has influence on political preference and work ethic.¹⁴ The formation of high-level public rejection of corruption is also actual for Ukraine. As for Ukraine, there is a vision that the country is diverse in many ways. One of them is religion. Solidarity and fragmentation take place in this field as much as in politics.¹⁵

⁸ Anil Rupasingha, John b. Chilton, "Religious adherence and county economic growth in the US", *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 72, Issue 1 (2009): 438-450, available at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.05.020>.

⁹ Isadora Kirchmaier, Jens Prüfer, Stefan T. Trautmann, "Religion, moral attitudes and economic behaviour", *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 148 (2018): 282-300, available at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.02.022>.

¹⁰ Daniel L. Chen, Daniel M. Hungerman, "Economics, Religion, and Culture: A Brief Introduction", *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 104 (2014): 1-3, available at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.04.008>;

Michael Etgar, Dalia Rachman-Moore, "The relationship between national cultural dimensions and retail format strategies," *Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services*, 18, Issue 5 (2011): 397-404, available at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jretconser.2011.06.001>.

¹¹ Clara Maria Verduch Arosa, Nivine Richie, Peter W. Schuhmann, "The impact of culture on market timing in capital structure choices," *Research in International Business and Finance*, 31 (2014): 178-192, available at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2013.06.007>.

¹² José María Díez-Esteban, Jorge Bento Farinha, Conrado Diego García-Gómez, "Are religion and culture relevant for corporate risk-taking? International evidence," *BRQ Business Research Quarterly*, 22, Issue 1 (2019): 36-55. Available at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2018.06.003>; Lei Gao, Ying Wang, Jing Zhao, "Does local religiosity affect organizational risk-taking? Evidence from the hedge fund industry," *Journal of Corporate Finance*, Volume 47 (2017): 1-22, available at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.08.006>.

¹³ Gilles Hilary, Kai Wai Hui, "Does religion matter in corporate decision making in America?," *Journal of Financial Economics*, 93, Issue 3 (2009): 455-473, available at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.10.001>.

¹⁴ Xixiong Xu, Yaoqin Li, Xing Liu, Weiyu Gan, "Does religion matter to corruption?," *China Economic Review*, 42 (2017): 34-49, available at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2016.11.005>.

¹⁵ Tymofii Brik, "Religious Regulations and Orthodox Competition in Ukraine," *Wilson Center. Focus Ukraine* (2018), available at <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/religious-regulations-and-orthodox-competition-ukraine>.

Regarding religiosity in Poland, according to Irena Borowik, their religiosity is very selective, although it is accompanied by deep ritualism. The main topics of interest in the sociology of religion in Poland are religiosity, its various indicators, and in the world context, it is spirituality.¹⁶

Romanian researchers Ioan Hosu and Sandu Frunza believe that the relationship between religion and the public space has turned into a high interest topic under the pressure of two phenomena: on the one hand, secularization is part of everyday life, as an inherent value of modern life and of the processes of political and social democratization; on the other hand, the strong reaction of fundamentalist movements to secularization phenomena—and particularly to the globalization of Western values—leaves us with no other choice than to reevaluate how religion can adjust its position in the public space in a nonviolent manner.¹⁷

2. Methodological Approach

In his book *Metodologia badań społecznych* [Methodology of social research], Stefan Nowak states that the attempt to define clearly the principles that make it possible to distinguish sociology from other social disciplines is doomed to failure. The methodology of social research is not specific to sociology, but deals with social economy, cultural anthropology, political science, and social psychology. In a more indirect way, almost all social disciplines are concerned with social issues or social systems, or forms of collective life.¹⁸ Therefore, the research methodology is similar for many social disciplines.

The method of sociological research we used in our work is survey, which contained 44 questions of mixed type carried out by the Center for Sociological Research at the Philosophy and Theology Faculty of Yuriy Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University.¹⁹

The research covers the period from 2015 to 2017 and is carried out within the framework of the program of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine 71.800 on the project 0115U003229, section of philosophy, history and political science, subsection

¹⁶ Irena Borowik, "Religious face of Poland in Europe," *Religious Studies*, 3 (2012): 14-26, available at <https://istina.msu.ru/download/21194716/1dPF5X:PpfOe2TP4LxuCtZx3hPgVOIcIaU>.

¹⁷ Ioan Hosu, Sandu Frunza, "Religious Affiliation and Social Action in the Public Space," *Revista de Cercetare si Interventie Sociala*, 43 (2013): 240-254, available at http://www.rcis.ro/images/documente/rcis43_15.pdf.

¹⁸ Stefan Nowak, *Metodologia badań społecznych* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2019).

¹⁹ "Ethnic and religious relations in cross-border regions," Materials of empirical sociological studies conducted in Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Ternopil and Chernivtsi Oblasts" (2017), available at [http://www.sociology.chnu.edu.ua/index.php?page=ua&data\[3715\]\[id\]=5610](http://www.sociology.chnu.edu.ua/index.php?page=ua&data[3715][id]=5610); Vatalii Dokash, "Religiosity of Ukrainian society: social dimensions and factors of change," *Religion and Socium*, Chernivtsi National University, 3 (19) (2015): 113-120; Serhii Yaremchuk, "Methodology for the Study of Religiosity of the Population of Ukraine (Based on the Results of the Fourth Wave of the 'European-Social Study')," *Scientific papers. Sociology*, 144 (2011): 10-15, available at http://nbuv.gov.ua/UJRN/Npchdusoc_2011_156_144_4.

“Religion in the modern world.” The title of the scientific project is “The role of ethno-confessional relations of the cross-border regions (Bukovina, Galicia) in the European integration processes: social and practical dimension.”

The principle of research is random selection of respondents according to social-age groups. So, 1,500 respondents were interviewed: 1,100 in Eastern Galicia (Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Lviv oblasts) and 400 in Northern Bukovina (Chernivtsi Oblast), taking into account the population of the studied areas. The method of data analysis is SPSS electronic system (Statistical Package for the Social Science). The results of the comparative analysis were obtained.

Regarding the difference between points and percent, the main part of the questions for the respondents presupposed the choice of one answer from the proposed options. For such cases, the proportion of share (in %) of those who chose one or another answer was calculated. In fact, these are relative values of the structure. But in other cases, in order to deepen the results, respondents were asked to evaluate their attitude (preference) to a particular position of the questionnaire. Evaluation was offered on a scale in points from zero (minimum) to 10 (maximum). From the obtained results, average values were calculated, which are given in the article.

Similar surveys are conducted by the Razumkov Center Sociological Service²⁰ using an analogous methodology. Among the large-scale studies we should mention the materials “Features of religious and church-religious self-determination of Ukrainian citizens: trends 2010-2018.”²¹ These information materials were prepared with the assistance of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (Ukraine Office).²²

3. Conducting Research and Results

3.1. Historical Roots of Formation of National and Confessional Population of the Studied Regions

Bukovina and Galicia are two historical and geographical regions of Eastern Europe, most of which are part of Ukraine now. Both regions were originally part of Kievan Rus, called Galicia and Galicia-Volyn principalities. However, after the decline of the latter, for a long time their fate was to be dispersed. Galicia became part of the Polish Kingdom (1385-

²⁰ Razumkov Center Sociological Service. <http://razumkov.org.ua>.

²¹ “Features of Religious and Church-Religious Self-Determination of Ukrainian Citizens: Trends 2010-2018,” Razumkov Center. In collaboration with Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (Ukraine Office) (2018), available at http://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/article/2018_Religiya.pdf.

²² Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (Ukraine Office). <https://www.kas.de/en/web/ukraine>.

1569), Commonwealth of Poland (1569-1772), Crown of Galicia and Lodomeria of the Habsburg Monarchy (1772-1804), Austrian Empire (1804-1867) and Austria-Hungary (1804-1918), the West Ukraine People's Republic (1918-1919), the Ukrainian People's Republic (1919), and the Polish Republic (1919-1939). After the Second World War, the territory of Galicia was divided into the western (in Poland) and the eastern (in the USSR, and since 1991 Ukraine) parts. Eastern Galicia includes Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil oblasts of Ukraine.

Several cultural and ethnic regions are identified in Galicia. The religious composition of Galicia's population is also varied, although most of the region's population professes Catholicism and Greek Catholicism. Orthodox, Protestant, Jewish and other denominations are much smaller. Among the national composition, although it is also multi-ethnic, Ukrainians clearly dominate (over 90%). Galicia is a specific ethnographic and ethno-confessional region, where high religiosity and traditional ritual are manifested in everyday life, crafts, folk customs, oral folk art, literature, music, education, fine arts, and architecture.

The territory of Bukovina is also an original Slavic region. However, after the collapse of the Galicia-Volyn principality, the lands of Bukovina also belonged to a number of foreign states at different times. From the second half of the 14th century, the territory of the Shipina and Berlad lands was part of the Principality of Moldavia. It was at this time that the name of the region—Bukovina (30 March 1392)—was first mentioned in the certificates of the Moldovan master Roman I. After the Russo-Turkish War (1768-1774), the territory of Bukovina became part of the Habsburg Empire, becoming its province (until 1786). Subsequently, the region of Bukovina was reorganized into the Bukovina district of the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria (until 1849), when the fates of Galicia and Bukovina were reunited. From January 1849, Bukovina became the crowning land of the Duchy of Bukovina. During the First World War, the territory of Galicia and Bukovina was captured by Russian troops. Then the Galician-Bukovina Governorate-General (1914-1917) was created. After the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the formation of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic, the two historic regions were briefly reunited. Later, Bukovina (South and North), under the Saint-Germain Peace Treaty (September 10, 1919), became part of Romania (1918-1940). In 1940, the Chernivtsi Oblast was formed, which included the territories of Northern Bukovina and Khotyn region as part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The long assignment of the region of Bukovina to different states also contributed to the specificity of the region in ethnic, cultural, and confessional dimensions. Thus, currently

in the territory of Chernivtsi Oblast, there are representatives of 76 nationalities and about 30 denominations are in operation. However, the Ukrainian population (75%) and Orthodox religious communities (about 50%) do prevail in this region.²³

Thus, together with their similarity, the studied regions are quite different from each other. First, they are completely different in area, which clearly influences all the other indicators of ethno-confessional relations. The area of East Galicia is 49,582 square km, where at the beginning of 2019 lived 4,941,152 inhabitants. Within modern Ukraine, this makes up 8.2% of the area and 11.7% of the population. On the other hand, Chernivtsi Oblast is the smallest in Ukraine by area (8,096 sq. km, or 1.3% of the whole country) and by population (904,374 people or 2.1% of the country population).²⁴

These regions and the structure of the religious network differ significantly. As of January 1, 2018, there were 6,441 religious communities operating in the Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil oblasts, accounting for 17.8% of the total network of Ukraine. Only 1,341 religious communities (3.7% of all Ukrainian communities) functioned in the Chernivtsi region. These are not only quantitative indicators, but also excellent quality markers. For example, in Galicia there are 88.2% of the completely religious network of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and 58.5% of the religious communities of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. However, only 1.8% of all religious organizations of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate operate in the region, ranging from 2.3% (Lviv oblast) to 6.7% (Ternopil oblast) of the religious network of the respective oblasts. On the other hand, the position of this church in the Chernivtsi Oblast is quite strong, with 3.5% of all organizations of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which makes up 33% of Bukovina's religious network. Protestant denominations (Baptists, Pentecostals, Adventists), whose religious communities account for almost one-third of the entire religious network of the region, are widely distributed in Bukovina, while in Eastern Galicia their number does not exceed 1% to 3%.²⁵

The national composition of the inhabitants of Galicia and Bukovina also differs significantly. Thus, among the population of Chernivtsi Oblast, Ukrainians make up 75%, Romanians 12.7%, Moldovans 7.3%, Poles 0.3%, Belarusians and Jews 0.2% each. The

²³ State Statistics Service of Ukraine, Official web-site (2019), available at <http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua>.

²⁴ State Statistics Service of Ukraine, Official web-site (2019), available at <http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua>.

²⁵ "Statistics of religious organizations of Ukraine," Religious Information Service of Ukraine (2018), available at https://risu.org.ua/ua/index/resources/statistics/ukr_2018/70440. See also: "Religious network, its personnel and material support: main trends, dynamics of change, prospects for development" (2013), available at <https://monitor.cn.ua/ua/monitoring/12463>.

picture in the East Galicia region looks different. Here, the percentage of the Ukrainian population is the largest among all regions of Ukraine and reaches over 90%.²⁶

Summarizing, both Galicia and Bukovina have historically been in the Western cultural sphere of influence. However, the role of the "Ukrainian window" to Europe was played by the Galician lands. Lviv has long been the center of Ukrainian culture, from where the cultural and national-political revival of all Ukrainian people began.

Thus, having characterized the historical roots of the formation of the national and religious composition of the population of the two Ukrainian regions, we will carry out a comparative analysis of the ethno-confessional relations of their inhabitants based on conducted sociological surveys.

3.2. Socio-Demographic Block of the Study

Comparing the socio-demographic parameters of the studied regions of Eastern Galicia and Northern Bukovina, we can state the following:

3.2.1. Respondents in the Chernivtsi Oblast by gender were as follows: 42.7% women and 57.3%, while in Eastern Galicia slightly more women (56.5%) participated in the survey. Moreover, this is natural, since the region has a higher percentage of women.

3.2.2. The respondents' age is more or less correlated with the exception of the age group of 17-22 years, which percentage is significantly higher in the Galician Region (39.1%) compared to Chernivtsi Oblast (29.0%) due to the higher number of higher education institutions. The number of students among the respondents is 40.1% and 28.0%, respectively.

3.2.3. The answers for the language questions were according to the nationality of the respondents. As many as 98.3% of those polled in the Galician Region consider Ukrainian as their native language, but speak it in everyday life a little less (97.1%). That is, other languages here account for less than 2 to 3%. In Chernivtsi Oblast, 74.7% of respondents consider Ukrainian as their mother tongue. Almost one-sixth of Bukovina's residents (15.3%) consider Romanian as their mother tongue, 6.1% of respondents speak Russian, Moldovan 4.4%, and Polish 0.6%. In addition, 0.6% Jews consider Yiddish as their mother tongue, **although they do not use it to communicate in everyday life.**

3.2.4. Quite interesting were the answers to the question "How do you feel about the multilingualism (bilingualism) of Ukrainian society?" which are often used by political

²⁶ State Statistics Service of Ukraine, Official web-site (2018), available at <http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua>.

parties during election campaigns. The data are significantly different. While in Chernivtsi Oblast as many as 27.8% of respondents support the idea of legislative approval of multilingualism, in the Galician Region, such supporters are almost three times less (10.9%). Approximately the same number (39.7% and 42.7%) admits that multilingualism can only be positively perceived at the household level. A larger percentage of those polled in the Galician Region favor the monolinguality of Ukrainian society (15.2%) compared to 10.8% in the Chernivtsi Oblast.

Almost identical picture is reflected in the answers to the question "What language (s) should be taught in Ukrainian educational institutions?" The overwhelming majority of respondents in the Galician Region are convinced that should be only Ukrainian (84.5%), while in the Chernivtsi region only 65.3% of respondents believe this. Also 4.3% and 12.3% consider teaching both Ukrainian and Russian according to the regions. About 8.0% and 14.8% wish to choose a language by the majority of students. Supporters of other languages in education (Romanian, Moldovan, and Polish) were less than 2%.

3.2.5. Similar is the situation with regard to the cultural identification of the interviewed residents of the cross-border regions, where 96.3% of Galicians consider themselves of Ukrainian cultural identity, while only 76.4% of Bukovinians think so. Among Bukovinians, 13.1% identify themselves with Romanian, 5.3% with Moldovan, 1.4% with Jewish and 1.9% with Russian culture. Among the respondents from the Galician Region, less than 1% of them belong to other cultures. In both regions, there are also some respondents who already consider themselves to be of European cultural identities (1.4% among Bukovinians and 0.6% among Galicians). Thus, the sample presents different segments of the population of the studied regions, which increases the representativeness of the assessment.

3.3. The Confessional Part of the Research

A block of the questionnaire was about confessional issues. As a result, the peculiarities of both regions were revealed; the historically formed parameters were confirmed in regard to the degree of religiosity, peculiarities of the confessional network, the attitude of the laity to the Church, and the level of tolerance in interreligious relations. Comparing the survey data, we state the following:

3.3.1. Religion of the population of the studied regions is quite high (much higher than the national one). Compared to the national index (74%), religiosity in the regions is estimated to exceed 93%.

3.3.2. Because of historical differences religious affiliation of Galician and Bukovina respondents proved significant. In the oblasts of the Galician Region, almost half of the respondents consider themselves Greek Catholics (47.2%); more than a third (35.7%) are Orthodox; 6.5% are Catholics; 2.1% are Protestants. In the Chernivtsi region, 72.0% of those polled declared religious affiliation to Orthodox Christianity, only 6.5% to Greek Catholicism, 3.3% to Catholicism, and 5.3% to Protestantism.

3.3.3. Study participants attend religious services in approximately the same amount in the religious community (80.6% in Bukovina and 78.5% in Galicia). However, there is a noticeable difference in the answers to the regular attendance of worship services. Despite the slightly higher level of religiosity of Galicia residents, the percentage of respondents who regularly and systematically attend liturgical events and are active members of the community and attract new members to it is lower (37.2%) than in the Chernivtsi Oblast (42%). We attribute this to the widespread presence of Protestant denominations in the Bukovina region, which are most active in missionary and educational work, and are almost required to attend worship services.

Even more striking were the differences in the answers of the respondents from the two regions to the question "Do you attend worship services of only one religious denomination?" 67.8% of believers in Chernivtsi Oblast turned out to be faithful to their confession, compared to 54.1% in the Galician Region. However, the Eastern Galicia showed a slightly higher level of tolerance, since almost 30% of them in some cases met their religious needs in temples of other close denominations, and in Bukovina, there were only 19%.

3.3.4. More than three-quarters of Galicians (76.4%) believe that worship in religious communities should be conducted only in the state language. In the Chernivtsi Oblast, however, less than half of the respondents (43.8%) prefer the state language of worship, 42.5% are for the language spoken by most parishioners of the community. The presence of more than 400 parishes of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate resulted in a commitment of 9.8% of respondents to the Old Slavic language, which is a worship service language in this denomination, and the operation of several synagogues caused 1.5% to support Hebrew worship.

3.3.5. Quite interesting were the answers to the questions "Whose participation in the worship of religious denominations, other than your own, does not contradict your beliefs on a scale from 0 to 10)?"

It is worth noting that 46.7% of Galician respondents did not give any estimates, and noted other answers to this question: "I would not join anything but my own, because I consider it a sin" (27.7%); "Would be involved in the worship of any community" (11.5%); "I do not attend worship at all, even for sightseeing purposes" (7.5%). Galician respondents give priority to national churches, Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (8.3%), Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (7.3%), Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (6.9%), and Roman Catholic Church (6.8%). Protestant denominations received a rather low score in the Galician Region.

In the Chernivtsi Oblast, the picture is significantly different, almost half of the respondents gave other answers: 31% consider attending worship services of another denomination (there is a propaganda role of clergymen of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate), 7% would join any liturgical service, do not attend worship at all. There is no such sympathy for one of the churches as in the Galician Region for the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, although the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate stands out (6.4). Usually, the positions of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (6.0), Catholics (4.5), the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (4.5), and in general Christian denominations (4.4), and Protestant denominations (2.2 to 2.7 points), are strong here.

3.3.6. Of the 13 listed religious organizations that are most widely represented in Ukraine, respondents rated on a 10-point scale their closeness to them based on their beliefs and basic values. Thus, 27.3% of Bukovinians surveyed showed great tolerance (we do not want to think that they are indifferent), stating that their religious affiliation is not important in principle.

In the Galician Region, the picture is similar, although only a fifth of those surveyed (19.7%) have no important denominational affiliation, and sympathies with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate are only rated at 3.8 points.

The results of this study indicate that confessional aspects, including the degree of religiosity and particularity of the confessional network, differ between the regions of Eastern Galicia and Northern Bukovina, as compared to the situation in Ukraine as a whole, which imposes a peculiar imprint on ethnic confessions.

3.4 Interethnic Relations in the Studied Regions

A block of questions related to international relations has become quite important for determining the level of tolerance and outlook of the inhabitants of the cross-border regions.

3.4.1. The first question is, on what grounds should a person's nationality be determined (among the proposed options). Respondents here showed almost complete unanimity in both regions. More than 40% of those polled in the Galician and Bukovina regions believe that nationality should be determined by the ethnic origin of both or one parent (39.2% and 46.6%, respectively). More than a quarter (26.8% and 30.1%) chose the option of "their own choice or self-determination." A significant difference is observed in the answers "at the place of residence" (16.8 and 10.6%, respectively), "in a language that a person considers to be their mother tongue" (5.5 and 8.5%), "in a language that is spoken daily" (4.2% and 6.3%) and almost similar results "belonging to a particular confessional community" (2.9 and 3.6%).

3.4.2. It is extremely important to solve the problem of social cohesion, its unity before external danger, and the willingness of citizens to defend the gains of the Orange Revolution and the revolution of dignity, European values, and priorities towards a united Europe. Likewise, this is important because of the internal crisis of Ukrainian society, the annexation of Crimea, and Russia's open aggression in eastern Ukraine. Therefore, one of the priority questions of this bloc was the question "Do you consider yourself a patriot of Ukraine?" In addition, it is precisely in response to this question that the specificity of the regions studied is most clearly demonstrated.

The results confirmed the historically formed patriotic attitude of the Galicians, of whom 60.5% unambiguously consider themselves Ukrainian patriots, and together with those who answered "rather yes," it reaches almost 96%. In the Chernivtsi Oblast, in our opinion, due to a significant percentage of Romanian, Moldovan, and other ethnic groups, far less than half (40.3%) consider themselves to be patriots of Ukraine. However, another 41.5% said "rather yes."

3.4.3. Another confirmation of the greater "Ukrainianness" of the Galician Region was the answer to the question whether the national passport should indicate the nationality of its owner. Almost two-thirds of respondents in Eastern Galicia (65.1%) believe that this should be done. Only 15% said it was superfluous, 14.7% did not care. In the Chernivtsi Oblast, only more than half of the respondents (52%) agree with the need to record their nationality in the passport. However, more than a fifth (21.3%) was against it, 18.3% were indifferent. This fact is explained by a rather pragmatic reason: a considerable part of Bukovinians (by the way, regardless of nationality) already has a Romanian passport, i.e. they are citizens of two countries, which is officially prohibited by Ukrainian law.

3.4.4. However, there are issues within the sphere of national relations, to which the inhabitants of both regions have a similar point of view. For example, answering the question "Which of the 15 nations do you consider to be the greatest friends of Ukrainians?", both Galicians and Bukovinians named Poles (7.1 and 6.3 points, respectively, on a 10-point scale). With regard to other nationalities that the Galicia and Bukovina regard as their friends, the priorities were somewhat different. The former issued scores from 5.9 to 5.0, respectively, to the Crimean Tatars, Georgians, Belarusians, Slovaks, Lithuanians, Romanians, Latvians, Moldovans and Hungarians. Instead, Bukovinians rated from 6.2 to 5.1 points friendly relations with Romanians, Moldavians, Byelorussians, Crimean Tatars, Bulgarians, Georgians, Slovaks, and Lithuanians. Nevertheless, Galicians esteemed the "friendship" with the Russians at 2.2 and Bukovinians at 3.3 points, which is 1.5 to 2 times lower than other nationalities.

3.4.5. The guarantee of peace and effectiveness of the development of any society has always been tolerant relations between nations and denominations. This is especially true of multiethnic and polyreligious societies, since the most vulnerable to them are conflicts on national and confessional grounds. Conflicts are especially dangerous for cross-border regions. Therefore, in our study, the level of tolerance of society and the factors of conflict prevention were given special attention. Thus, we started the inter-denominational and family-based relationship with the question "If you (or your children) started a family, what kind of nationality would be the most important and desirable marriage?" (on a 10-point scale).

Among the Galicians, 68.6% of the respondents did not rate, but noted "that with nothing but their own" (34%) and "nationality in matters of marriage is absolutely unimportant" (32.6%). Therefore, the Galicians prefer the Polish (6.4) and other European nations (from 4 to 5.2 points).

Among Bukovina citizens, only 22.5% want to marry only with representatives of their nation, and 40.5 percent do not recognize nationality as an obstacle to family formation. Among other nations, priority is given to representatives of the Romanian (5.4), Moldovan (4.7), and Polish (4.5) points.

The results show that more than a third of Galicians and 40% of Bukovinians do not see any obstacles in the creation of international families. In addition, if we add here a third of those respondents who rated the priority of such marriages, we can speak about a rather high level of tolerance in inter-ethnic relations at family level in the studied regions of Ukraine.

3.4.6. An almost identical situation is observed when answering the question of which religious community would you prefer and prioritize your marriage (or your children). Here, 37% of Bukovinians and 31.5% of Galicians do not see obstacles in marriage due to different confessional affiliations. 28.8% of respondents from Chernivtsi region and 32.0% from the Galician Region want to marry representatives of their own confession. Instead, out of a third part of those surveyed who answered the question; Galicians favor Greek Catholics (8.6 points), believers in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (7.3), the Roman Catholic Church (6.8), and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (6.6 points). In addition, the least prioritized with Protestants (1.5 to 1.8 points), Charismatics and Muslims (1.3 points each).

In the Chernivtsi Oblast, marriages with representatives of Protestant denominations (from 2.1 to 2.7 points) as well as Orientalists and Muslims (1.8 points each) are also considered undesirable. The priorities are marriages with believers of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate (6.5 points), Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (6.4), Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (4.5), Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (4.4), and Roman Catholic Church (4.0 points), i.e., with representatives of traditional churches.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the level of tolerance in the inter-ethnic and inter-denominational relations in the studied regions is quite high, although there are inter-regional differences.

3.5. Issues of Freedom of Conscience and Freedom of Religion in the Studied Regions

In each historical era, the problem of freedom of conscience, freedom of religion was raised and solved depending on the content and nature of social relations, the level of development of society, the economy, the needs and historical tasks that confronted society, the interests and goals of a particular class, and even from the outlook of individual rulers. Of particular importance was the principle of religious freedom in those territories that were under foreign domination and were located in the cross-border regions to which Northern Bukovina and Eastern Galicia belong. Moreover, the level of freedom of conscience has always been an important marker of democracy and tolerance of society.

In this study, particular attention was paid to this problem. The analysis of the obtained data allowed us to generalize.

3.5.1. As for the implementation of the principles of religious freedom and freedom of conscience, which were proposed to be evaluated in a 10-point scale, only 18.7% of Galicians

and 12.3% of Bukovinians consider it to be the best. However, the scores from five to nine points (in our opinion, this is a high figure) were delivered by 74.2% of Galician and 77.6% of Bukovina respondents. Therefore, the principle of religious freedom in the Galician Region is being implemented more fully.

3.5.2. The preliminary conclusion is supplemented by the answers to the question "Have you experienced any manifestations of intolerance regarding ethnicity or religion?" About 57.1% of respondents from Eastern Galicia did not show any intolerance about ethnicity, 25.0% preferred "relatively little" and 6.2% answered positively. As to religious affiliation in Eastern Galicia, similar results were reported: 61.1% did not experience, 21.3% preferred "relatively little," or 5.2% of respondents answered positively.

Not so clear is the situation in Chernivtsi Oblast. Here, only 32.5% of respondents felt no intolerance about ethnicity, 30.3% "relatively little," but as much as 14.3% have experienced the manifestation of intolerance. The evaluation of manifestations of intolerance regarding religious affiliation showed the following results: 39.8% did not feel it, 32.5% "relatively little," 10.5% of respondents felt it. In our view, these results are strong signals for local authorities and communities to take action to increase ethnic and religious tolerance.

3.5.3. An important marker of social stability in society is tolerant relations between nations and representatives of different denominations in everyday life and at the domestic level. In this regard, we asked whether respondents encountered obstacles to employment because of their denominational or ethnic affiliation and whether they experienced intolerance in the context of everyday communication.

According to the results of the survey, about 90% of the interviewed Galicians and more than 78% of Bukovinians felt no or few obstacles to employment due to ethnic or religious affiliation.

Instead, the situation is somewhat different in everyday communication. Here, three-quarters of Galicians (76.7%) said "no" or "rather no," and 22.1% still felt intolerance about themselves during everyday communication with representatives of other nationalities. An even higher percentage (28.8%) of these is in the Bukovina environment. And that is the explanation. In Galicia, historically difficult relations between representatives of the Ukrainian and Polish nations were present, Greek Catholicism was the predominant denomination, not antagonistic to Roman Catholicism, and the Orthodox were nationally inclined. The negative attitude towards the conquerors (Moldovans, Romanians, Russians) and representatives of Jewish communities, which usually worked in the trade network of the region, was being formed for a long time in Bukovina.

Summarizing this section, it should be noted that in general the issues of freedom of conscience and freedom of religion are not problematic in the studied regions.

3.6. State-Church Relations in the Studied Regions

The largest block of questionnaires pertained to state-church relations in Ukraine and the studied regions.

3.6.1. Since in some countries of the world (including European ones), there are state churches that have the support of state power and certain advantages over other religious organizations, we included the question of whether such a practice would be appropriate in Ukraine. This idea turned out to be more acceptable for Bukovinians, most of whom (51%) fully or partially support this opinion, a third (33.6%) rejected it, and 15.4% of those who were unable to answer this question. Instead, only 39.7% of the Galician respondents surveyed supported the practice, 42.3% denied it and 18.0% had difficulty answering.

3.6.2. In answering the question of whether the Church should be nationally oriented, both the Eastern Galicia and Northern Bukovina showed greater unanimity. Two-thirds of Galicians (66.8%) and more than 55% of Bukovinians fully support this proposal. Instead, a quarter of respondents in the Chernivtsi region and almost a fifth of the Galician respondents (19.3%) denied it completely or answered "rather no."

3.6.3. Residents of both regions almost equally understand the causes of the conflicts that are taking place between representatives of different religious communities. About 26.1% of Galicians and 27% of Bukovinians consider church hierarchs to be the major cause of serious controversy. Claims of individual denominations for truthfulness are called by 19.7% and 19.1% respectively; for political nature of conflicts—17.6% and 19.8%, for property causes—11.5% and 10.9%; for lobbying of individual churches—3.8% and 4.7% of respondents.

3.6.4. There is no consensus on the principle of secular education in the country, both at the national level and among the representatives of the studied regions. Some respondents support it; others find it difficult to answer, while others strongly disagree.

The same diversity is observed in the respondents' answers to the question whether you would like your child to attend a general education institution founded by religious organizations. Although only more than a quarter of respondents from both regions wanted their children to attend these schools, more than a third depended on the level of teaching in such schools. However, many of those interviewed found it difficult to answer this question.

3.6.5. The level of religiosity of the studied regions had the greatest influence on the respondents' answers to the need to study religion in Ukrainian schools. The supportive proposal was the one that provides for the teaching of major religions, students in state educational institutions either electively or with the consent of their parents (50.4% Galician and 50.7% Bukovinian). Almost a third of respondents from the Galician Region (30.5%) and more than a quarter of Chernivtsi residents (25.9%) prefer compulsory study of religion in schools. Only 12.1% of those polled in Galicia and 13.2% in Bukovina are against its study.

3.6.6. Relations between the state and the Church must be formed based on certain democratic and tolerant principles. Respondents were offered a number of basic principles for such relationships. Half of the respondents from both regions believe that the state and the Church should not interfere into each other's affairs, but be partners in solving urgent problems. More than a fifth of respondents do not recognize Church and State interference in each other's affairs. In addition, 6-9% still suggests that the Church should not interfere in state affairs, but the state should control it. Finally, more than 12% of those polled believe that the two institutions should cooperate as equal entities.

3.6.7. During the half-century of Soviet power, the people of Western Ukraine have resisted efforts to turn them into atheists, including Galicia and Bukovina. Religious beliefs were stronger and more viable than repressive "machine" and "Soviet" atheist propaganda. The religious outlook continues to be a key priority for the residents of these regions. The following results were received on the question "Which of the following is most relevant to you?".

Respondents of the Galician Region were somewhat more tolerant in their beliefs, 47% of whom accept any religion that does not deny the ideals of goodness, love, charity, and does not threaten the life of another person. There were less than 40% of such people in Bukovina. The right to the existence of all religions, as well as the different paths to God, is recognized by 25.4% of the inhabitants of Eastern Galicia and more than 30% of Bukovina. Only about 10% of those polled in both regions give preference to only traditional religions for Ukraine.

3.6.8. The next question was whether the state should treat the churches differently according to whether they are "traditional" or "neutral" for Ukraine. More than 30% of Galicians and Bukovinians are convinced that "yes"; more than 40% see no need, and almost a quarter are unable to respond.

About the same result was shown as to the answers about whether the state should respond differently to the Orthodox churches according to whether they are churches of the

Kiev tradition or otherwise. Less than a third of respondents (27-29%) answered "yes," approximately 45% do not agree with this, and more than a quarter of respondents find it difficult to answer.

A somewhat different situation emerged in the analysis of data on the attitude of the state in legislative acts to the churches in accordance with their special role in the history, culture, and formation of the national identity of the Ukrainian people. Survey results show that more than 40% of Galicians are convinced that the state should celebrate and reckon with those churches that have played an important role in its history and culture. Among the Chernivtsi Oblast respondents there were only 36.2%. Instead, 39.1% of Galicians and 40.3% of Bukovinians deny such differentiation at the legislative level, and more than 20% have not defined their position.

3.6.9. Respondents from both regions have mixed responses with regard to the attitude of the state to "canonical" and "non-canonical" churches, although this formulation does not seem to us to be quite correct. It is best to use the terms "recognized" and "unrecognized" churches. Thus, 26.5% of the polled Galicians and 27.6% of Bukovinians support a different attitude towards such religious institutions. Respectively, 43.6% and 39.9% of respondents disagree with the differentiation of churches.

3.6.10. The questionnaire also contained a rather specific and pragmatic question: "Are you ready to change your religious (denominational) affiliation, provided that the leaders of your religious organization (community) demonstrate a clear anti-state position?" Several formulations were suggested regarding the attitude of the respondents to their religious (denominational) leaders. The data obtained looks like this. Paradoxically, the Bukovinians were more categorical, 14.3% who unambiguously said "yes," another 15.8% agree to change the denomination if the position of the leader undermines the foundations of statehood and independence of the country. About 7.8% and 19.3%, respectively, were among the Galicians. But as many as 42.5% of Galician respondents, compared to 28.5% of Bukovinian, said "no," because if denominational leaders criticize the state, this criticism is objectively justified and they agree with it. Moreover, one in 10 of those polled in both regions would not change their denomination, even if its leader's position is false, because it cannot affect the assessment of the religious organization itself.

Therefore, state-church relations in Ukraine need further development and improvement.

3.7. Interethnic and Intercultural Relations in the Studied Regions

The last block of questions concerned the inter-ethnic and intercultural relations of the inhabitants of Chernivtsi Oblast and the Galician Region. The task was to determine the level of legislative protection in Ukraine of the rights of national minorities, as well as at the educational, cultural levels and in the media.

3.7.1. In general, the respondents from the Galician Region feel much higher level of protection in all these areas because it is less multi-ethnic and, most importantly, do not have a compact and large number of ethnic minorities as in the Chernivtsi region (especially Romanians and Moldovans). The legal level of protection of the rights of national minorities is positively estimated by as many as 81.0% of Galicians compared to 69.3% of Bukovina respondents, although they are not satisfied in whole or in part—respectively 14.1% and 19.3%.

3.7.2. The protection of the interests of national minorities at the educational level is satisfied fully or partially by 79.6% of the interviewed Galicians and 75% of Bukovinians. About 15.4% of Galician respondents and 17% of Bukovinians are dissatisfied with the state's policy towards the national minorities at the educational level.

3.7.3. Almost the same results were obtained when assessing the policy of the state government on national minorities at the cultural level. However, there are more satisfied respondents in the Galician Region (79%) versus 75.6% in Bukovina. The number of respondents dissatisfied with the current level was 15.7% of Bukovinians surveyed and only 13.3% of Galicians.

3.7.4. A slightly smaller number of surveyed participants expressed their satisfaction with the state protection of the interests of national minorities at the media level. However, **the specificity of both regions is observed in the answers to this question. The reason for this lies in the historical and ethnic features we have defined earlier.**

3.7.5. Finally, we were interested in the question “Should the population of a region know the culture, national, and religious traditions and customs of other nations that live in it?”. It is in this component that the historical traditions of the multicultural Bukovina region are manifested. Almost 37% of those polled consider it obligatory to know the cultural, national, and religious traditions of other nations; 39% consider it desirable; another 20.5% say that such knowledge can be needed only in the presence of appropriate interest, and only 3.8% said it is superfluous. Accordingly, only 57.8% of the polled Galicians consider it obligatory or desirable to know the traditions of other nations; 6.9% think it is superfluous, and 35.1% only if there is a corresponding interest.

In general, the assessment of interethnic and intercultural relations in the studied regions does not show any significant problems, although is not so clear.

Conclusion

Thus, a comparative analysis of the results of a sociological survey, whose error is no more than 3%, made it possible to generalize certain patterns and to distinguish specific features in the development of ethno-confessional relations in the cross-border regions of Eastern Galicia and Northern Bukovina.

The common markers of ethno-confessional relations include the cross-border character of both regions, high level of religiosity, poly-ethnicity, sufficient tolerance, and patriotism.

The specificity of the Eastern Galician Regions is manifested in a much larger percentage of the Ukrainian population and the use of the Ukrainian language in everyday communication, cultural identification of themselves as Ukrainians, the absolute predominance of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, and the weak positions of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate and Protestants.

Distinctive characteristics of ethno-confessional relations in the Chernivtsi Oblast (Northern Bukovina region) are the more varied national structure of the region, strong positions of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate and Protestant organizations, significant influence on the situation of a considerable number of representatives of the Romanian and Moldovan population, and slightly less patriotic people. All this has influenced the assessment of Bukovinians on the protection of the interests of national minorities by the state at the legislative, educational, and cultural levels and the media.

Of course, the situation in the ethno-confessional sphere in Ukraine does not remain the same. Thus, the language issue became relevant in the context of the adoption of the language article of the Law of Ukraine "On Education." It also caused widespread international resonance, partial rejection by representatives of certain foreign countries, and misunderstanding by individual representatives of national minorities in Ukraine. Therefore, further areas of research should include analysis of data on language problems in the educational field.

The market of religious services has also undergone significant changes after receiving autocephaly and *Tomos*, the creation of the only local church in Ukraine. The Kyiv Patriarchate is legally liquidated, and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) is being

formed. The transition of both the parishes and the religious buildings of the ownership of the Moscow Patriarchate as well as the Kyiv Patriarchate to the OCU are currently underway. Of course, this affects the religious self-identification of Ukrainians, which requires a separate study.

Migration processes have become urgent for Europe and the European Union in particular in recent years. The Ukrainians, who are widely represented in the countries of Eastern Europe, are actively involved in this. The studied regions of Eastern Galicia and Northern Bukovina are actively involved in migration processes. Ukrainians change their place of residence and earn temporary wages. This changes the ethno-confessional situation in many countries, which serves as a basis for a separate line of analysis. The relevance of this will increase as Ukraine pursues its European integration aspirations.

The obtained results and conclusions will serve as a guide for representatives of state authorities and local self-government and leaders of religious communities and denominations in search of ways of understanding and establishing tolerant relations in polyethnic and poly-confessional cross-border regions. This will contribute to more rapid and painless entry of Ukraine in democratic European society.