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DOI: [https://doi.org/10.34625/issn.2183-2705\(36\)2024.ic-1](https://doi.org/10.34625/issn.2183-2705(36)2024.ic-1)

Secção I

Investigação Científica*

* Os artigos presentes nesta secção foram sujeitos a processo de revisão segundo o método *blind peer review* / The articles in this section have undergone a blind peer review process.

The Impact of Migration Processes on Crime Rates

O Impacto dos Processos de Migração nas Taxas de Criminalidade

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ABSTRACT: The aim of the study is to assess the impact of migration indicators on the crime rates in selected countries. The research employed cluster, correlation and regression analyses as the main methods. The analysis established that the impact of migration on crime in different countries differs significantly in terms of strength and direction. In particular, it was found that the increased share of refugees in the population of Egypt, Mauritius and the USA is associated with the decreased Crime Index. The obtained results indicate that the degree and direction of the influence of migration on crime depends on the specific situation in the country, which covers various aspects of social, political, economic and other dimensions. The conclusions of the research can be useful for shaping migration policy and preventing bias in this process.

KEYWORDS: migration; crime; refugees; forced migrants; geopolitical situation

RESUMO: O objetivo do estudo é avaliar o impacto dos indicadores de migração nas taxas de criminalidade em países seleccionados. A investigação utilizou análises de agrupamento, correlação e regressão como métodos principais. A análise estabeleceu que o impacto da migração na criminalidade em diferentes países difere significativamente em termos de força e direção. Em particular, verificou-se que o aumento da percentagem de refugiados na população do Egito, das Maurícias e dos EUA está associado à diminuição do Índice de Criminalidade. Os resultados obtidos indicam que o grau e a direção da influência da migração na criminalidade dependem da situação específica do país, que abrange vários aspectos das dimensões social, política, económica e outras. As conclusões da investigação podem ser úteis para a definição da política de migração e para a prevenção de preconceitos neste processo.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: migração; criminalidade; refugiados; migrantes forçados; situação geopolítica

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1. Introduction

Crime is a global problem caused by a complex of interdependent factors, because no process in society can exist independently^{6,7}. The migration process can be one of the significant factors influencing the crime rate in countries, but the direction and degree of such influence is still the subject of active discussions among the researchers^{8,9}. Different views on this problem are explained by differences in perceived and actual levels of crime, prejudices that exist in society, different geopolitical situations in countries, etc.^{10,11}. The forgoing proves the relevance of further study of the impact of migration on crime, taking into account updated data and a wider sample of observations.

In general, the impact of migration on the economic, social, and technological development of countries is generally recognized¹². Migration processes are receiving special attention against the background of the aggravation of various global processes - military-political and ethnic conflicts, economic crises, etc. These processes stimulated the growth of the number of refugees and forced migrants¹³, which reflect in other dimensions of social life. Increasing crime rates are often associated with the influx of migrants into a country, and many countries have expressed national security concerns about

⁶ OLIINYK, Olena, et al. Economic security through criminal policies: A comparative study of Western and European approaches. *Revista Científica General José María Córdova*, 2022, vol. 20, no. 38, pp. 265-285. <https://doi.org/10.21830/19006586.899>

⁷ REZNIK, Oleh, et al. Results and perspectives on policing as part of the national security sector. *Relacoes Internacionais no Mundo Atual*, 2023, vol. 3, no. 41, pp. 332-344, e-5849. Available from <https://essuir.sumdu.edu.ua/handle/123456789/86772>

⁸ ULLAH, Ahsan, et al. Migration and security: Implications for minority migrant groups. *India Quarterly*, 2020, vol. 76, no. 1, pp. 136-153. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0974928419901199>

⁹ MA, Tain. Theorizing migration and crime in China. In *Contesting Cimmigration in Post-Hukou China*. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022, pp. 21-38 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07674-9_2

¹⁰ FERNÁNDEZ-BESSA, Cristina, BRANDARIZ GARCÍA, Jose and GARCÍA ESPAÑA, Elisa. Current debates on immigration, crime, and penalty: An introduction. *Revista Española de Investigación Criminológica*, 2020, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 1-16. <https://doi.org/10.46381/reic.v18i2.565>

¹¹ CHICARELLI MARQUES, Renan. Forced migration and violent crime: Evidence from the Venezuelan exodus to Brazil. *SSRN*, 2023, 4615478. <https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4615478>

¹² SMOKOVA, Liudmyla, ZHYLIN, Mykhailo and PUZANOVA, Antonina. Factors and causes of migration processes of Ukrainians: Gender aspect. *Balkan Social Science Review*, 2023, vol. 22, no. 22, pp. 251-271. <https://doi.org/10.46763/bssr23222251s>

¹³ ISHCENKO, Yevhenii, et al. Psychological and pedagogical aspects of adaptation of students who received temporary shelter to the educational environment of another country. *Journal of Higher Education Theory and Practice*, 2024, vol. 24, no. 1. <https://doi.org/10.33423/jhetp.v24i1.6766>

this process^{14,15}. The answer to these fears is the introduction of a tougher migration policy¹⁶, which affects not only legal aspects, but also the possibilities of integration of migrants into society. At the same time, the “threat” of migrants can only be a manifestation of the perceived level of aggravation of various social problems, including crime¹⁷. This means that the perception of migrants and related fears may not reflect the actual state of affairs, and the real threat is much lower or absent. However, such an opinion should be supported by empirical data regarding the dynamics of the crime rate in connection with the migration indicators.

The aim of the study is to assess the impact of migration indicators on the crime rate in the selected countries. Research objectives:

- Determine the sample of countries for the research using cluster analysis based on the Crime Index;
- Determine the strength of the connection between migration indicators and the crime rates in the selected countries;
- Assess the influence of migration indicators on the crime rate in the selected countries.

2. Literature Review

The impact of migration processes on the dynamics of crime is a relevant topic for numerous studies. However, the context in which these phenomena are considered in the works differs significantly, so the studies can be divided into three main groups. In the first group, researchers found empirical evidence of the impact of migration on the growth of crime. The second group finds no effect of migration on crime, but the work has often indicated that it affects crime-related problems. In particular, on the perception of migrants by local residents. The third group is characterized by the opinion that the increase in crime is not influenced

¹⁴ BÖHMELT, Tobias and BOVE, Vincenzo. How migration policies moderate the diffusion of terrorism. *European Journal of Political Research*, 2020, vol. 59, no. 1, pp. 160-181. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12339>

¹⁵ HELBLING, Marc and MEIERRIEKS, Daniel. Terrorism and migration: An overview. *British Journal of Political Science*, 2022, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 977-996. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123420000587>

¹⁶ AMELUNG, Nina. “Crimmigration control” across Borders. *Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung*, 2021, vol. 46, no. 3, pp. 151-177. Available from <https://www.istor.org/stable/27075121>

¹⁷ CANTAT, Céline, PÉCOUD, Antoine and THIOLLET, Hélène. Migration as crisis. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 2023, 00027642231182889. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00027642231182889>

by migration itself, but by the context or conditions in which migrants find themselves. In particular, these are the conditions that hindered the integration of migrants into society.

The researchers of **the first group** found a positive connection between migration and the increased crime rate. At the same time, this group is the smallest in number and contains research using the example of individual countries of the European Union. In particular, Adamson¹⁸ noted that in recent years, Sweden has experienced a marked increase in the crime rate, which was accompanied by an influx of migrants. The work analyses the relationship between these two phenomena, distinguishing between seven categories of crimes and the same number of regions of origin. Dehos¹⁹ studied the relationship between migration and crime in Germany. The researcher studied two types of migrants: asylum seekers and recognized refugees.

The second group includes a number of studies, which used the examples of immigration from Venezuela (to Trinidad and Tobago, Colombia, Chile, etc.), from Syria to Turkey, as well as immigration in general to Chile, the United States, and European countries. These works show that there is no connection between migration and crime in host countries.

In particular, the large-scale migration of more than 5 million Venezuelans to other regions has prompted a number of studies on how this phenomenon has affected host countries²⁰. Anatol and Kangalee²¹ examined the real and perceived impact of increased migration from Venezuela to Trinidad and Tobago on crime growth, taking into account the amnesty for undocumented migrants from Venezuela. Knight and Tribin²² also examined the impact of immigration

¹⁸ ADAMSON, Göran. Migrants and crime in Sweden in the twenty-first century. *Society*, 2020, vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 9-21. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12115-019-00436-8>

¹⁹ DEHOS, Fabian. The refugee wave to Germany and its impact on crime. *Regional Science and Urban Economics*, 2021, vol. 88, 103640. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2020.103640>

²⁰ BAHAR, Dany, DOOLEY, Meagan and SELEE, Andrew. Venezuelan migration, crime, and misperceptions: A review of data from Colombia, Peru, and Chile. 2020. Available from <https://policycommons.net/artifacts/4141117/venezuelan-migration-crime-and-misperceptions/4949936/>

²¹ ANATOL, Marlon and KANGALEE, Quinnelle-Marie. Crime in Trinidad and Tobago: The possible impacts of increased crime due to migration from Venezuela. *Migration and Development*, 2021, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 260-272. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21632324.2020.1809281>

²² KNIGHT, Brian and TRIBIN, Ana. Immigration and violent crime: Evidence from the Colombia-Venezuela border. *Journal of Development Economics*, 2023, vol. 162, 103039. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2022.103039>

from Venezuela, focusing on the immigration wave to Colombia that was caused by the closure and reopening of the border in 2016.

Kayaoglu²³, Kırdar²⁴ and Akbulut-Yuksel et al.²⁵ studied the impact of immigration on crime using the example of the influx of refugees from Syria to Turkey. The researchers analysed whether the increase in the number of Syrian migrants fleeing the civil war in their homeland has led to an increase in the crime rate in Turkey.

Leiva et al.²⁶ and Ajzenman et al.²⁷ examine the impact of immigration on crime in Chile. The latter work also focused on the study of the perception of crime in the country, which has experienced a significant increase in the number of immigrants in ten years.

Boateng et al.²⁸ studied the relationship between immigration and crime using data from 21 European countries. The researchers analysed different groups of migrants and different types of crimes.

Chouhy and Madero-Hernandez²⁹ studied the relationship between immigration and crime in the United States during the presidency of D. Trump regarding the importance of immigration control and the perception of immigrants in a negative light. Light et al.³⁰ compared the crime rate of legal immigrants, US citizens, and undocumented immigrants using Texas as an example.

²³ KAYA OGLU, Aysegul. Do refugees cause crime? *World Development*, 2022, vol. 154, 105858. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2022.105858>

²⁴ KIRDAR, Murat, CRUZ, Ivan and TÜRKÜM, Betül. The effect of 3.6 million refugees on crime. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 2022, vol. 194, pp. 568-582. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.11.014>

²⁵ AKBULUT-YUKSEL, Mevlude, MOCAN, Naci, TUMEN, Semih and TURAN, Belgi. The crime effect of refugees. *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, 2024, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 472-508. <https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.22537>

²⁶ LEIVA, Mauricio, VASQUEZ-LAVÍN, Felipe and OLIVA, Roberto. Do immigrants increase crime? Spatial analysis in a middle-income country. *World Development*, 2020, vol. 126, 104728. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2019.104728>

²⁷ AJZENMAN, Nicolás, DOMINGUEZ, Patricio and UNDURRAGA, Raimundo. Immigration, crime, and crime (mis) perceptions. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 2023, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 142-176. <https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20210156>

²⁸ BOATENG, Francis, PRYCE, Daniel and CHENANE, Joselyne. I may be an immigrant, but I am not a criminal: Examining the association between the presence of immigrants and crime rates in Europe. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 2021, vol. 22, pp. 1105-1124. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-020-00790-1>

²⁹ CHOUHY, Cecilia and MADERO-HERNANDEZ, Arelis. (2020). "Murderers, rapists, and bad hombres": Deconstructing the immigration-crime myths. In F. Cullen & A. Graham (Eds.), *Crime and Justice in the Trump Era*. London: Routledge, 2020, pp. 94-123. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003023302>

³⁰ LIGHT, Michael, HE, Jingying and ROBEY, Jason. Comparing crime rates between undocumented immigrants, legal immigrants, and native-born US citizens in Texas. *Proceedings*

The third group contains works that emphasize the importance of the context in which migrants find themselves. If an increase in crime was recorded, the reason for this is not migration in itself, but the conditions that could push migrants to commit crimes.

Livas et al.³¹ studied the development of criminal activity in Greece, in particular offences committed by nationals and migrants. Furthermore, the study revealed the likely influence of undocumented migrant flows and economic conditions on crime.

Singha³² explores in depth the relationship between migration and crime in India. The researcher attached special importance to the context in which migrants find themselves. The author assumes that migration becomes a significant factor influencing crime because of this context, in particular, the structural organization of society.

Some studies consider the influence of internal migration only on security aspects in the country. Awasthi³³ also uses the example of India and proposed to form a separate discourse that would be focused on urbanization leading to migration and threats to national security. Qi³⁴ studied the impact of internal migration in China on crime. The researcher defines migrants from rural areas as the main problem of society in the context of social stability and health.

The literature review contains three different points of view on the relationship between migration and crime, so the views of scholars on this issue are not consistent. This determines the relevance of further research in this direction, especially those that include the analysis of not one, but several countries based on common indicators. This approach will make it possible to

of the National Academy of Sciences, 2020, vol. 117, no. 51, pp. 32340-32347. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2014704117>

³¹ LIVAS, Christos, KARALI, Nansy and TZORA, Vasiliki. Migration and crime in Greece: Implications for entrepreneurship, financial literacy and social marketing initiatives. *Journal of Identity & Migration Studies*, 2022, vol. 16, no. 1. Available from https://www.iims.e-migration.ro/Vol16_No1_2022/JIMS_Vol16_No1_2022_pp_67_81_LIVAS.pdf

³² SINGHA, Bappi. Migration and crime: Sociological contextualization of colonial history. *Journal of Crime and Criminal Behavior*, 2024, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 181-192. <https://doi.org/10.47509/JCCB.2024.v04i02.02>

³³ AWASTHI, Soumya. 'Hyper'-urbanisation and migration: A security threat. *Cities*, 2021, vol. 108, 102965. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2020.102965>

³⁴ QI, Ziwei. Rural to urban migration, crime, and sentencing disparities in Guangdong, China. *International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice*, 2020, vol. 63, 100421. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlcrj.2020.100421>

compare the impact of migration on crime in different regions, and the inclusion of several observations (countries) will increase the reliability of the results.

3. Methods

3.1. Research design

The research design involved the implementation of a number of interrelated and consecutive stages. Figure 1 presents the research stages in general.




Figure 1. Research design

3.2. Sample

The preparatory stage of the study provided for the collection of secondary data on the Crime Index³⁵, Net migration³⁶ and Refugee population by country or territory of asylum³⁷, as well as their structuring and standardization for 128 countries. These indicators were chosen for analysis because they most comprehensively describe the studied phenomena and processes — crime and migration — for a large sample of countries, which increases the reliability of the results. It is worth noting that the Crime Index indicates the real crime rate, not

³⁵ WORLD POPULATION REVIEW. Crime rate by country. 2024. Available from <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/crime-rate-by-country>

³⁶ THE WORLD BANK. (2023). Net migration. 2023. Available from <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.NETM>

³⁷ THE WORLD BANK. Refugee population by country or territory of asylum. 2022. Available from <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.REFG>

the perceived one, because it takes into account the number of crimes committed per 100,000 people. At the main stage, the sample was reduced by dividing the countries into clusters according to the Crime Index. After the division, a cluster, which included Ukraine and 12 other countries, remained. These countries are similar in terms of the Crime Index, which subsequently made it possible to compare the impact of migration processes on a group of countries with similar results in terms of the crime rate. The choice of the cluster, which included Ukraine, is determined by the recent intensification of war-related migration processes in the country. Therefore, the analysis of the impact of such processes on crime in the country in wartime is an important research objective. A comparison with other countries with a similar crime rate made it possible to identify differences in the impact of migration processes on this indicator in regions with different geopolitical situations.

3.3. Methods

The research employed cluster analysis for 128 countries that are included in the Crime Index rating. The analysis covered the period from 2014 to 2023 and resulted in ten clusters. The quality of the distribution was checked using mean plots, which demonstrated marked differences between the identified clusters. This method made it possible to reduce the sample and focus on the analysis of 13 countries with similar crime rates. Correlation analysis was conducted for these 13 countries included in the same cluster. Correlation analysis was aimed at identifying links between the Crime Index the Net migration and Refugee population by country or territory of asylum indicators. Correlation analysis between the specified indicators was carried out for each country separately, which made it possible to reveal the impact of migration processes on crime, taking into account the peculiarities of each country. A regression analysis was conducted in addition to the correlation analysis, which enabled confirming the results of the previous method. Regression analysis also made it possible to describe the influence of migration indicators (or the free term, that is, variables not included in the analysis) on the crime rate. In the course of the regression analysis, the Crime Index was the dependent variable, and Net Migration and Refugee population by country or territory of asylum was the independent variable.

4. Results

Based on the results of the cluster analysis, the studied countries were divided into 10 clusters based on the Crime Index. Ukraine and 12 other countries were included in Cluster 5.

The average graph (Figure 2) shows the high quality of the cluster analysis. With the exception of Cluster 3, the clusters are quite clearly separated from each other. The graph for Cluster 5, where Ukraine belongs, has intersections with Clusters 1 and 6, but during the period it differs in the direction of the dynamics of the averages. Therefore, it is quite appropriate to consider this cluster separately.




Figure 2. Graphs of averages for Clusters 1-10

The results of the analysis of variance are presented in Table 1. These results indicate the significance of the differences observed between the clusters.

Table 1. Results of variance analysis for identified clusters

	Between SS	SS	Within SS	SS	F	p-value
2014	22051.57	9	3303.305	101	74.9151	0.000000
2015	22964.33	9	2392.756	101	107.7046	0.000000
2016	23833.09	9	1644.688	101	162.6207	0.000000
2017	25506.55	9	1425.621	101	200.7828	0.000000
2018	22755.77	9	1554.479	101	164.2803	0.000000
2019	24145.32	9	1659.509	101	163.2798	0.000000
2020	24654.46	9	1348.291	101	205.2064	0.000000

2021	21114.97	9	2260.875	101	104.8076	0.000000
2022	20600.48	9	2326.493	101	99.3698	0.000000
2023	20110.81	9	2632.842	101	85.7203	0.000000

The results of the analysis of variance, in particular, the F test and p-value, indicate a high statistical significance of the differences between the identified clusters. High values of Between SS and relatively low values of Within SS indicate significant differences between the detected clusters and, at the same time, sufficiently high homogeneity within the clusters.

The countries that entered the cluster together with Ukraine according to the results of the cluster analysis on the Crime Index are presented in Table 2. The table also contains the distances to the centres of the clusters.

Table 2. Countries included in the cluster together with Ukraine according to the Crime Index

Country	Distances to cluster centres
Egypt	3.771481
Ghana	3.016892
Iran	2.443810
Iraq	2.821258
Ireland	2.765979
Lebanon	1.565771
Mauritius	2.248697
Morocco	2.435671
Pakistan	5.795028
Panama	3.334398
Ukraine	1.810385
United States	1.793857
Vietnam	2.205949

Descriptive statistics for clusters can provide information about the dynamics of the studied indicator during the period. Table 3 contains descriptive statistics for Cluster 5, where Ukraine belongs.

Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the studied cluster

	Mean	Standard deviation	Variance
2014	51.36428	5.238850	27.44555
2015	51.85000	4.096668	16.78269
2016	51.58571	3.120123	9.73517
2017	50.26429	2.816601	7.93324
2018	48.37143	3.081316	9.49451

2019	47.36428	2.776718	7.71016
2020	46.54286	2.406950	5.79341
2021	46.72857	2.483926	6.16989
2022	46.16429	2.736817	7.49017
2023	45.72857	2.753858	7.58374

The dynamics of the average value shows that the Crime Index is decreasing for representatives of the cluster during the studied period. However, this characterizes the general dynamics, and trends may differ for individual countries. The standard deviation and variance values also mostly tend to decrease, which may indicate a decrease in variability. In other words, the data are becoming more and more homogeneous.

Furthermore, the changes in the migration indicators and Crime Index for representatives of Cluster 5 during the studied period are illustrated below (Figures 3-5). This will allow a deeper understanding of the country-specific situation.




Figure 3. Crime Index dynamics for cluster countries

So, the studied cluster is characterized by a gradual decrease in the Crime Index during the studied period. The values of the Crime Index of the studied countries vary from approximately 42 to 50 at the end of the studied period.




Figure 4. Dynamics of the share of Net migration relative to the total population for the countries of the cluster

The share of Net migration in the population of the cluster countries fluctuates, for the most part, near zero throughout the entire studied period. The exceptions are Lebanon and Ukraine. The relatively high value of Net migration for Lebanon in 2014 is associated with a significant influx of refugees from Syria. A sharp decrease in the indicator in 2022 for Ukraine is caused by the beginning of a full-scale invasion of the country, when many Ukrainians left the country.




Figure 5. Dynamics of the share of Refugee population by country or territory of asylum relative to the total population for the cluster countries

The share of Refugee population by country or territory of asylum in the total population for the cluster countries is not high, except for Lebanon. In Lebanon, this indicator is almost a quarter of the total population during the studied period,

which is caused by a large number of refugees from Syria and other states in the country.

The results of the correlation analysis carried out for each country are presented in Table 4. Each of the given values is a correlation between the Crime Index of the corresponding country and the indicators of Net Migration or Refugee population by country or territory of asylum.

Table 4. Results of the correlation analysis between Crime Index and Net Migration / Refugee population by country or territory of asylum for the cluster countries

Country	Correlation between Crime Index and Net Migration	Correlation between Crime Index and Refugee population by country or territory of asylum
Egypt	-0.380889	-0.927220
Ghana	-0.051054	-0.022704
Iran	0.714912	-0.204308
Iraq	-0.320756	0.306981
Ireland	-0.713382	-0.181113
Lebanon	0.136858	0.199846
Mauritius	-0.655150	-0.677408
Morocco	0.128422	0.381004
Pakistan	-0.943596	0.340875
Panama	0.533246	0.160331
Ukraine	0.676604	0.259412
United States	0.631459	-0.787791
Vietnam	0.397287	N/A

* The indicated correlations are significant at the level $p < .05000$

As Table 4 shows, the results for different countries differ significantly. In particular, a close correlation between the Crime Index and Net Migration is characteristic of Iran, Ireland, Pakistan and Ukraine. A close correlation between the Crime Index and the Refugee population by country or territory of asylum was recorded for Egypt, Mauritius and the USA. For other countries, no significant correlations were recorded between the Crime Index and migration indicators.

The direction of the correlation deserves special attention. All significant correlations between the Crime Index and Refugee population by country or territory of asylum are negative. A decrease in one indicator is accompanied by an increase in another and vice versa. So, the increase in the share of refugees in the population of Egypt, Mauritius and the USA is accompanied by a decrease in the Crime Index. In particular, this may indicate successful policies implemented by countries to integrate refugees into society, or significant

dependence of refugees on the host country, which hinders their willingness to commit crimes.

Ireland and Pakistan also show a close and negative correlation between the Crime Index and Net Migration. So, the increased number of immigrants is accompanied by a decreased crime rate. However, Iran and Ukraine are characterized by a close and positive correlation between these indicators. This means that migration in these countries may be associated with increased crime rate.

The results of the correlation analysis should be supported by a regression analysis, in which the Crime Index was the dependent variable, and Net Migration and Refugee population by country or territory of asylum — the independent one (Table 5).

Table 5. Results of regression analysis

	BETA	Standard error BETA	B	Standard error B	t	p-value
Egypt						
Free term			107.0	8.633	12.39531	0.000017
Net Migration	-0.196702	0.134103	-2926.4	1995.109	-1.46680	0.192797
Refugee population	-0.886344	0.134103	-23277.2	3521.817	-6.60943	0.000577
Ghana						
Free term			48.173	3.052	15.78476	0.000004
Net Migration	-0.051453	0.407661	-358.470	2840.140	-0.12622	0.903684
Refugee population	-0.023575	0.407661	-387.316	6697.620	-0.05783	0.955763
Iran						
Free term			50.3957	1.0620	47.45209	0.000000
Net Migration	0.700296	0.283791	377.8740	153.1311	2.46765	0.048612
Refugee population	-0.116291	0.283791	-25.0025	61.0148	-0.40978	0.696197
Iraq						
Free term			30.99	21.804	1.421540	0.204991
Net Migration	-0.308774	0.367860	-1127.87	1343.692	-0.839380	0.433420
Refugee population	0.294415	0.367860	2571.06	3212.439	0.800345	0.454025
Ireland						

Free term			52.24	1.6249	32.14753	0.00000
Net Migration	-0.856684	0.238444	-1211.56	337.2190	-3.59280	0.011465
Refugee population	-0.452447	0.238444	-290.69	153.1967	-1.89750	0.106539
Lebanon						
Free term			0.2101	108.7433	0.001932	0.998521
Net Migration	-0.229457	0.917162	-23.8190	95.2067	-0.250182	0.810793
Refugee population	0.406580	0.917162	196.6226	443.5409	0.443302	0.673084
Mauritius						
Free term			49	1.9	26.39877	0.000000
Net Migration	-0.445533	0.279009	-1516	949.5	-1.59684	0.161414
Refugee population	-0.484749	0.279009	-213738	123021.7	-1.73740	0.132988
Morocco						
Free term			47.865	1.805	26.52100	0.000000
Net Migration	-0.047688	0.419466	-67.215	591.231	-0.11369	0.913195
Refugee population	0.401900	0.419466	6540.733	6826.608	0.95812	0.374999
Pakistan						
Free term			14.68	10.930	1.34311	0.227809
Net Migration	-0.915417	0.099656	-1939.79	211.172	-9.18581	0.000094
Refugee population	0.227482	0.099656	3742.78	1639.636	2.28269	0.062569
Panama						
Free term			40.505	4.467	9.068454	0.000101
Net Migration	0.521621	0.345390	3125.302	2069.413	1.510236	0.181727
Refugee population	0.099212	0.345390	178.606	621.785	0.287247	0.783585
Ukraine						
Free term			46.68	1.98	23.57469	0.000000
Net Migration	0.723121	0.266508	14.44	5.32	2.71332	0.034951
Refugee population	0.354341	0.266508	41552.48	31252.49	1.32957	0.231972
USA						
Free term			55.81	5.148	10.84094	0.000036

Net Migration	0.133016	0.358426	159.07	428.626	0.37111	0.723306
Refugee population	-0.691978	0.358426	-8120.30	4206.093	-1.93060	0.101759
Vietnam						
Free term			50.999	1.406	36.27942	0.000000
Net Migration	0.397287	0.346856	5683.724	4962.238	1.14540	0.289691

The results of the regression analysis confirm a statistically significant influence of migration indicators on the Crime Index for the same countries as the results of the correlation analysis, except for Mauritius and the USA. At the same time, the statistically significant effect of the free term for these and some other countries may indicate an effect on crime of other variables not included in the model. Some countries (Iraq, Lebanon) are characterized by the absence of a statistically significant impact on crime either by migration indicators or by variables not included in the model. This may indicate a complex impact of various factors on crime, the extent of which is difficult to detect or requires additional approaches and methods.

5. Discussion

The research results give grounds to note that the impact of migration on crime differs significantly for the studied countries. At the same time, the studied countries are characterized by very similar results and dynamics of Crime Index values. Migration can have both a positive and a negative effect on crime or no significant effect at all depending on the geopolitical factors affecting the situation in the country. These results should be compared with the conclusions of other researchers on the example of other countries. This will be used to determine whether the author's conclusions are valid in other contexts.

According to the results of the literature review, the works of researchers can be divided into three groups depending on the main results. The first group includes researchers who found a positive correlation between migration and the level of crime. In particular, Adamson³⁸ found that 58% of reasonable suspects in a total crime in Switzerland are migrants. For the Murder, Manslaughter and

³⁸ ADAMSON, Göran. Migrants and crime in Sweden in the twenty-first century. *Society*, 2020, vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 9-21. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12115-019-00436-8>

Attempted Murder category, this indicator is 73%, for Robberies — 70%. Moreover, the study found that undocumented migrants are involved in approximately 13% of crime overall. Dehos³⁹ found no causal effect of asylum seekers in Germany on crime. At the same time, the researcher recorded a positive relationship between the percentage of recognized refugees and the crime rate caused by fraud and non-violent property crimes. Although the majority of researchers, whose works are discussed below, do not find a significant correlation between the influx of migrants and the increase in crime rates, the author's work confirms the conclusions of Adamson and Dehos. The author's study confirms that migration processes can be closely and positively related to the increased crime rate and influence it using the example of Iran and Ukraine.

The researchers of the second group do not find a correlation between migration and crime. Anatol and Kangalee⁴⁰, investigating the impact of migration from Venezuela on crime in Trinidad and Tobago, concluded that the increase in crime cannot be unequivocally linked to migration processes. In other words, the lack of statistics hinders comparing the criminal activity of Venezuelans and local residents and to attribute the increase in crime to migrants. However, the study found the spread of suspicion and paranoia about Venezuelan immigrants. It can be noted that the perceived impact of increased migration on increasing crime rates is significant, while the actual impact is difficult to confirm based on available data.

Similar conclusions were obtained by Bahar et al.⁴¹ based on data from Chile, Peru, Colombia. Moreover, Knight and Tribin⁴², examining the case of immigration from Venezuela to Colombia, found that the increase in the number of homicide victims was caused by Venezuelan victims. In this case, the migrants themselves, and not the local residents, faced the risks associated with migration.

³⁹ DEHOS, Fabian. The refugee wave to Germany and its impact on crime. *Regional Science and Urban Economics*, 2021, vol. 88, 103640. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2020.103640>

⁴⁰ ANATOL, Marlon and KANGALEE, Quinelle-Marie. Crime in Trinidad and Tobago: The possible impacts of increased crime due to migration from Venezuela. *Migration and Development*, 2021, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 260-272. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21632324.2020.1809281>

⁴¹ BAHAR, Dany, DOOLEY, Meagan and SELEE, Andrew. Venezuelan migration, crime, and misperceptions: A review of data from Colombia, Peru, and Chile. 2020. Available from <https://policycommons.net/artifacts/4141117/venezuelan-migration-crime-and-misperceptions/4949936/>

⁴² KNIGHT, Brian and TRIBIN, Ana. Immigration and violent crime: Evidence from the Colombia-Venezuela border. *Journal of Development Economics*, 2023, vol. 162, 103039. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2022.103039>

Kayaoglu⁴³ and Kırdar⁴⁴ found that Syrian refugees do not have a causal effect on increasing crime rates in Turkey. Moreover, the studies revealed a negative impact of this indicator on the crime rate per capita (with the exception of smuggling). In turn, Akbulut-Yuksel et al.⁴⁵ found an additional 75-150 thousand crimes per year for 2012 to 2016, when there was an influx of Syrian refugees to Turkey. However, the researchers noted that it is impossible to determine the distribution of such crimes between local residents and refugees.

In their works, Leiva et al.⁴⁶ and Ajzenman et al.⁴⁷ found a null effect of immigration on crime in Chile. The latter of these works recorded a significant positive impact of immigration on crime-related problems, as well as on certain behavioural reactions of society. In particular, these are preventive reactions aimed at strengthening one's security, which was reflected, for example, in the growth of investment in housing security⁴⁸. This indicates that the perceived level of crime growth is higher than the actual situation. Boateng et al.⁴⁹ find no relationship between immigration and crime for 21 European countries on the following indicators: the percentage of immigrants, the percentage of stateless immigrants, and the share of refugees on the one hand, and three types of violent crime on the other. Chouhy and Madero-Hernandez⁵⁰ found that immigrants in

⁴³ KAYAOGU, Aysegul. Do refugees cause crime? *World Development*, 2022, vol. 154, 105858. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2022.105858>

⁴⁴ KIRDAR, Murat, CRUZ, Ivan and TÜRKÜM, Betül. The effect of 3.6 million refugees on crime. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 2022, vol. 194, pp. 568-582. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.11.014>

⁴⁵ AKBULUT-YUKSEL, Mevlude, MOCAN, Naci, TUMEN, Semih and TURAN, Belgi. The crime effect of refugees. *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, 2024, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 472-508. <https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.22537>

⁴⁶ LEIVA, Mauricio, VASQUEZ-LAVÍN, Felipe and OLIVA, Roberto. Do immigrants increase crime? Spatial analysis in a middle-income country. *World Development*, 2020, vol. 126, 104728. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2019.104728>

⁴⁷ AJZENMAN, Nicolás, DOMINGUEZ, Patricio and UNDURRAGA, Raimundo. Immigration, crime, and crime (mis) perceptions. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 2023, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 142-176. <https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20210156>

⁴⁸ SHCHOKIN, Rostyslav, SOLOVIOV, Oleksii and TANTSUURA, Ihor. Strengthening cooperation between the civilian and military sectors in the context of state security: Benefits and challenges. *Revista de Cercetare si Interventie Sociala*, 2023, vol. 83, pp. 155–170. Available from https://www.rcis.ro/images/documente/rcis83_11.pdf

⁴⁹ BOATENG, Francis, PRYCE, Daniel and CHENANE, Joselyne. I may be an immigrant, but I am not a criminal: Examining the association between the presence of immigrants and crime rates in Europe. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 2021, vol. 22, pp. 1105-1124. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-020-00790-1>

⁵⁰ CHOUHY, Cecilia and MADERO-HERNANDEZ, Arellys. (2020). "Murderers, rapists, and bad hombres": Deconstructing the immigration-crime myths. In F. Cullen & A. Graham (Eds.), *Crime and Justice in the Trump Era*. London: Routledge, 2020, pp. 94-123. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003023302>

the US (both undocumented and in general) do not differ in more criminal behaviour than native residents. The researchers noted that while the threat posed by immigrants is not supported by empirical data, the implications of such perceptions are very real. Light et al.⁵¹ found that undocumented immigrants have significantly lower crime rates than documented immigrants and US citizens.

In particular, US citizens were twice as likely to be arrested for violent crimes, two and a half times as likely to be arrested for drug-related crimes, and four times as likely to be arrested for property crimes. As in the mentioned works of researchers of the second group, the author's study includes countries for which the impact of migration on crime is absent or even negative (an increase in migration rates is associated with a decrease in crime rates). However, unlike some works, the author did not study the perceived impact of migration on crime, because the research was focused on studying actual data.

The third group of researchers testifies that migration itself does not affect crime, but the conditions in which migrants find themselves can cause the spread of crime among foreigners. Livas et al.⁵² studied the data from Greece and noted that a certain relationship can be observed between the growth of migrant flows and the increase in criminal behaviour of foreigners over a ten-year period. At the same time, the researchers suggested that this state of affairs can most likely be explained by unsatisfactory living conditions and lack of integration into society for migrants. The researchers suggested strengthening efforts in the field of migration management, in particular, with regard to social marketing initiatives, entrepreneurship development, and increasing the financial literacy of foreign citizens in order to improve the situation.

Singha⁵³ concluded that crime is not influenced by migration in itself, but by the context in which migrants find themselves, i.e. social, economic and other conditions. The integration of migrants is influenced by political decisions,

⁵¹ LIGHT, Michael, HE, Jingying and ROBEY, Jason. Comparing crime rates between undocumented immigrants, legal immigrants, and native-born US citizens in Texas. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 2020, vol. 117, no. 51, pp. 32340-32347. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2014704117>

⁵² LIVAS, Christos, KARALI, Nansy and TZORA, Vasiliki. Migration and crime in Greece: Implications for entrepreneurship, financial literacy and social marketing initiatives. *Journal of Identity & Migration Studies*, 2022, vol. 16, no. 1. Available from https://www.iims.e-migration.ro/Vol16_No1_2022/JIMS_Vol16_No1_2022_pp_67_81_LIVAS.pdf

⁵³ SINGHA, Bappi. Migration and crime: Sociological contextualization of colonial history. *Journal of Crime and Criminal Behavior*, 2024, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 181-192. <https://doi.org/10.47509/JCCB.2024.v04i02.02>

legislation, and social attitudes. The states themselves can create such conditions that stimulate increased discrimination against migrants, creating conditions for the growth of crime on their part. Studying crime of internal migrants, Qi⁵⁴ concluded that the majority of rural migrants who committed offences were undereducated and underemployed. At the same time, internal migrants usually received more severe punishments than local residents for the same types of crimes. The researcher sought to show how informal mechanisms of social control and socio-economic inequality are related to crime. The work of Awasthi⁵⁵ also focuses on the problems of migrants from rural areas in cities, in particular, related to the refusal of integration, which gives rise to more global problems. The author's work contains some confirmations of the mentioned views. In particular, it was noted that favourable conditions for the integration of migrants were most likely created in countries where there is a significant negative correlation between migration indicators and crime.

Therefore, the author's conclusions are consistent with the works of other authors, which confirms their reliability. At the same time, the study gives a new vision of the problem due to taking into account several countries from different regions of the world, but with similar crime rates. The impact of migration on crime exists, but it can be both positive and zero or even negative. The direction of influence depends, first of all, on geopolitical conditions, in particular, the policies of countries regarding the integration of migrants. It is also worth assuming that important factors are cultural, economic, social and other conditions — both in the host country and in the donor country for migrants. Identifying the influence of such factors can be a research prospect.

6. Conclusions

The conducted correlation analysis gives grounds to state that the impact of migration on crime can have different strength and direction or be virtually absent depending on the specific country under research. It should be noted about the countries considered in the study that all statistically significant correlations

⁵⁴ Qi, Ziwei. Rural to urban migration, crime, and sentencing disparities in Guangdong, China. *International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice*, 2020, vol. 63, 100421. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlci.2020.100421>

⁵⁵ AWASTHI, Soumya. 'Hyper'-urbanisation and migration: A security threat. *Cities*, 2021, vol. 108, 102965. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2020.102965>

between the Crime Index and Refugee population by country or territory of asylum have a negative value. This indicates that the increase in the share of refugees in the population of countries such as Egypt, Mauritius and the United States is associated with a decrease in the Crime Index. Ireland and Pakistan have a strong negative correlation between the Crime Index and Net Migration, meaning that increased number of immigrants is also associated with decreased crime rate. Only Iran and Ukraine are characterized by a close and positive correlation between the Crime Index and Net Migration, which may indicate a connection between the increased crime rate and the influx of immigrants.

The results of the regression analysis support the previous findings for all observations except Mauritius and the USA. In these countries, a statistically significant effect on crime is recorded only for the free term —the variables not included in the model, and not for migration indicators. No statistically significant effect of either migration rates or free membership on crime was found for Iraq and Lebanon. Further research may take into account the comparison between the perceived and real level of crime in the studied countries and clarify the reasons for the discrepancies.

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Data de submissão do artigo: 05/07/2024

Data de aprovação do artigo: 11/09/2024

Edição e propriedade:

Universidade Portucalense Cooperativa de Ensino Superior, CRL

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