

**CONTEMPORARY ISSUES
OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY
AND THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
IN ENSURING ITS DEVELOPMENT**

Collective monograph



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CONTENTS

SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE CITIES OF VOLYN IN THE GRAND DUCHY OF LITHUANIA: HISTORIOGRAPHICAL REVIEW Bortnikova A. V.	1
POST-ELECTION SITUATION IN UKRAINE: CHANGING FACES OR IDEOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATIONS? Kroytor A. V., Yakovlev D. V.	35
COGNITIVE-COMMUNICATIVE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PERSON IN THE CONTINUUM OF THE INTERNET NETWORK Kutsepal S. V., Yeremenko O. M.	64
MODERN ASPECTS OF EU REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY Palinchak M. M.	77
SIMILAR MENTALITY AND PERCEPTION IN THE CONTEXT OF CONTEMPORARY UKRAINE-POLAND RELATIONS Strilchuk L. V., Dobrzanskiy O. V.	99
COMPETITIVENESS AND ITS IMPORTANCE IN MODERN WORLD ECONOMIC PROCESSES Tsalan M. I.	125
HISTORY, HISTORICAL MEMORY, MEMORY POLICY: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ASPECT Yarosh Y. B., Kalishchuk O. M.	145
TRADITIONS AND INNOVATIONS IN THE ACADEMIC DISCOURSE OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN THE XIX-XXI CENTURIES (ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE KREMENETS REGION) Skakalska I. B.	165

SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE CITIES OF VOLYN IN THE GRAND DUCHY OF LITHUANIA: HISTORIOGRAPHICAL REVIEW

Bortnikova A. V.

INTRODUCTION

Local self-government is an integral attribute of modern Western democracy, which is characterized by a wealth of forms and mechanisms of the citizens' self-realization, their participation in the exercise of power at all levels – from national to local. The problem of the historical experience of local self-government in Ukraine studying becomes especially relevant during intensive practical work of the of political reform implementation in the country, depriving the center of its uncharacteristic functions, creating conditions for effective solution of local problems on the basis of subsidiarity and democracy.

In the late middle Ages, Volyn region was a very geopolitically important region of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Rus, and Samogitia (GDL). Volyn, given its location on the border between European Poland and the lands of the former Kievan Rus, was a kind of transit territory as for the perception and imitation of Western European cultural heritage, which was assimilated here on the basis of old Rus cultural tradition. The conflicts and wars of the neighboring with the Ukrainian lands nations and states for their conquest often took place in Volyn. But, in addition to the devastating consequences, it contributed to the consolidation of forces in the fight against the enemy, strengthening of the defense capabilities of the cities there, forced to gain experience in self-organization of their internal life. Therefore, the study of the history of Volyn and its cities in the context of the general history of Central and Eastern Europe is of great importance for the understanding the specifics of the historical process in this region on the whole.

In the 15th and 16th centuries the majority of the cities and towns of the Ukrainian lands that were part of the GDL were concentrated in Volyn, where the geographical factor was quite favorable for social development. Remaining as the centers of free labor in the domination of feudal relations, cities carried out strong influence on all spheres of medieval society, while adapting to the objective conditions of the existing socio-economic and political-legal environment with the existing institutions and forms of the state power organization. The liquidation of separate principalities in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was accompanied by the rise of the cities as the centers of socio-economic and political life, and the spread of Magdeburg law in them. The questions about the legal framework and the specifics of self-government in Volyn cities are of particular interest in this regard.

In the 15th and 16th centuries the cities of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were going through a difficult process of replacing the old customary law with the Magdeburg one. New conditions of production and the way of life required appropriate legal registration and exemption from the outdated legal norms and rules. Magdeburg law extended to Volyn cities from Germany through Poland and Lithuania, when appropriate socio-economic and political conditions similar to those of Western European cities were created. About 96 Volyn settlements, which were half of their total number have received Magdeburg law since the 15th century to the middle of the 17th century¹. At the same time, along with Magdeburg law, gentry self-government, self-government of rural, Jewish, Armenian communities with their own laws and customs functioned in Volyn at that time,

The aim of the investigation is to analyze the state of study of the problem of self-government in the cities of Volyn as part of the GDL on the basis of Magdeburg law.

1. Research of the problem by the end of the 19th century

The cities usually became centers of administrative management of the respective territories. The institutions of state and local

¹ Заяць А. Є. Урбанізаційний процес на Волині в XVI – першій половині XVII століття. Львів: Добра справа, 2003. С. 161.

government were concentrated in them. Therefore, the achievements of medievalists in the sphere of urban planning serve as a guide for identifying the whole set of socio-political relations, where the city played a leading role, including their subordination to the Grand Ducal government, clarifying the nature of interaction between state power and city government etc.

During the period since the time when the first historical researches of the cities of Volyn have appeared a significant number of works, in which with different completeness and depth, certain aspects of city life and the organization of city self-government are covered, have been accumulated to this day. For the convenience of the characteristics of this literature, it is expedient to systematize it chronologically as follows: editions of the 17th-18th centuries; first half of the 19th century; the second half of the 19th – beginning of the 20th century; 20th century – Soviet historiography; the end of the 20th – the beginning of the 21st century. Within each stage, the research which, according to the significance of the issues raised in them, the level of sources used, etc., touched upon the research topic, was singled out.

History of Volyn to the middle of the 14th century has been first considered in the works of Polish historians of the 17th and 18th centuries – M. Dogel, A. Narushevych and others. Source historian Matej Dogel has published a valuable source – “Diplomatic Code of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania”². Diplomatic acts collected by M. Dogel concern the history of Poland, Lithuania and other states, which in certain periods included Volyn and the Volyn cities. On the rich source base of the royal and magnate-noble archives, the Polish historian A. Narushevych prepared a seven-volume “History of the Polish people”, brought to 1386³. To write it, the researcher collected a huge number of sources, copies of which were published in 231 volumes,

² Codex diplomaticus Regni Poloniae et Magni Ducatus Lithuaniae in quo pacta, foedera, tractatus pacis... nunc primum ex archivis publicis eruta ac in lucem protracta exhibuntur / [ed.] M. Dogiel. T. 1, 4, 5. Vilnae, 1758–1759.

³ Naruszewicz A. *Historia narodu polskiego, od początku chrześcijaństwa*. Warszawa, 1780–1786; Londyn 1836–1837; Kraków, 1859–1860.

which made up “Narushevych's Folders”. The significant part of the materials concerns the history of Ukraine, and Volyn in particular. The work is based on a critical analysis of sources, which allowed the author to free the history of the country from the myths and legends of the past, which arose on the basis of unreliable testimony of some chroniclers. His ideal was strong royal power. At the same time, in the works of Polish historians the issues of organization of power and administration in Volyn and in the cities are touched upon in the context of the general history of Poland only in passing.

With the incorporation of Volyn into the Russian Empire after the division of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1795), there appears an increased interest in the newly annexed region. The consequences of this interest were topographic descriptions of the region and the first attempts to write its history (V. Askochenskyi, Y. Krashevskyi, I. Potockii, A. Przewdzetskyi, J. Perlstein, etc.) Information on the topography of Volyn cities, their ethno-national composition and the description of castles aroused some interest in the work of researchers.

In the first half of the 19th century there are works by such authors as M. Karamzin, D. Bantysh-Kamenskyi, M. Pogodin, S. Solovyov, M. Polevoy, S. Uvarov, M. Ustryalov, and others. The peculiarity of their research was that these scholars analyzed the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania mainly in the context of Russian-Lithuanian relations. New research methods were mastered, analytical literature was published, and the process of replenishing the source base for studying the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania continued during this period. In the absence of special scientific institutions, the main centers for the development of historical ideas and concepts were the Universities of Warsaw, Vilnius, Moscow and St. Petersburg. Accordingly, the process of the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Volyn development can be traced mainly through the works of professors who developed this problem (I. Lelevel, M. Pogodin, M. Ustryalov). Representatives of Russian and Polish historiography, especially after the uprising of 1830–1831, clarified the place of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the history of Western Russia. The research of historians of that time was significantly

influenced by political processes and events, including the incorporation of Polish lands into the Russian Empire and the Polish uprising of 1830. Therefore, it is at this time the “theory of official nationality” is gaining ground in Russia. The problem of self-government in Volyn cities was not adequately covered in the works of these authors.

From the second quarter of the 19th century in the context of the approval of the concept of “one and indivisible Russia”, the attention to the history of the cities of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania is intensified; the Temporary Commission for consideration of ancient acts starts its activity. Significant work in this direction was carried out by the Archaeographic Commissions of St. Petersburg and Kyiv. Established in 1843 Kyiv’s “Temporary Commission for the Analysis of Ancient Acts”, played a significant role in forming the source base of research on the history of Ukrainian cities. Its leading representatives – M. Maksymovych, V. Dombrovskiy, M. Ivanishev laid the scientific foundations for the study of the past of the Volyn region⁴. Thanks to the work of the scientists, this commission has managed to collect and preserve a huge array of ancient acts of local authorities and administration of South-Western Russia, which later formed the basis of many studies on the history of Volyn cities.

Corresponding member of the commission since 1845 has been an active Volyn local historian J. Perlstein, whose scientific work was the history of the capital of Volyn – Lutsk⁵. The scientist focused on the problem of the emergence of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the involvement of certain territories in the state formation, in particular Volyn, the importance of cities, their fortifications and castles, the introduction of local administrative management in the attached lands.

If at the early historiographical stage the characteristic feature of the local lore explorations were descriptiveness, acquaintance of the

⁴ Максимович М. А. Собрание сочинений. Киев: Тип. М. П. Фрица, 1876. Т. 1. 847 с.; 1876. Т. 2. 524 с.; 1880. Т. 3. 743 с.; Иванишев Н. Д. Сочинения, изданные изданием Университета св. Владимира. Отд. 1–2. Киев: Унив. тип., 1876. 463 с.

⁵ Перлштейн А. Луцк и его древности. *Временник Московского общества истории и древностей российских*. 1851. Кн. 9. С. 30–45.

reader with social life, geographical features of the region, customs, then from the second half of the 19th century the elaboration of the problem of involving Ukrainian lands in the GDL is being deepened, the attention is being paid to the history of cities and their self-government, which can be largely explained by the formation of the source base as a result of intensified work of the Temporary Commission members in Volyn.

The second half of the 19th – early 20th century is characterized by the changes in the socio-political conditions of life in Russia: serfdom was abolished, bourgeois reforms took place in various spheres of social life, and the censorship restrictions were relaxed. However, on Ukrainian lands, on the contrary, they have been intensified. The issues of the history of Right-Bank Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania, the interest in which grew as the result of the Polish uprising of 1863–1864, also became the subject of increased public attention. The topics of research were changed, there was a transition from the predominantly political history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to the study of economic, social and administrative aspects of its past. In the 60-70s of the 19th century two areas of research – historical and legal and historical and economic were formed. The researchers replenished the source base of the research through the use of regional material, in particular from the history of Volyn cities. Particular attention was paid to the issues of self-government of cities under Magdeburg law, the role of this law in the life of social and national communities.

The works of representatives of the “Western Rus law” school F. Leontovych, M. Vladymiskyi-Budanov, F. Taranovskyi, M. Yasinskyi are of particular importance for the study of the problem. The characteristic of the school was the active use of comparative-historical research method, increased attention to the history of the state and law of the GDL, Ukraine and Slavs in general with an emphasis on the use of a wide range of documentary sources. Thanks to the research of this school scientists’, the picture of the development of law in the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the 14th-16th centuries was reproduced. The main objects of research were the state and legal institutions that existed in the cities of Kyiv, Volyn and Podil lands. According to their

concept, ancient Rus law at the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania remained an important factor in the formation of legal institutions, including Magdeburg law. Thus, F. Leontovych, negatively assessing the role of this law in the life of the GDL, believed that “Magdeburg order” contradicted the principles of “Rus people's life” and “led to one result – the decay and economic decline of the urban community”⁶.

Famous researcher of the history of law M. Vladymyrskyi-Budanov in his work “German law in Poland and Lithuania”(1868) considered the system of governance on the basis of Magdeburg law of such Ukrainian cities as Kamyanets, Lviv, Kovel, Kremenets and others. He revealed the positive and negative features of the self-government of state and private cities system. The scholar has proved that the acquisition of Magdeburg law by cities did not make them truly free and they “have never completely freed themselves from the power of elders as civilian officials, from military commandants and economic tenants”⁷. A thorough analysis of the judicial system in the cities allowed him to conclude that Magdeburg law, as a rule, “provides the court in civil cases to the mayor and the council, and in criminal cases – to Vogt and Landvogt”⁸.

M. Vladymyrskyi-Budanov negatively assessed the role of Magdeburg law in the history of Ukrainian cities: “... The main reason for the decline of cities in the South-Western region was precisely this system of them, that is, German – Magdeburg law”⁹.

According to another connoisseur of the history of Magdeburg law F. Taranovskyi, it was one of the types of city law, which in the process of its development in the middle Ages formed a separate branch of specific rights of free German communities. The emergence of this law is due to the then needs of socio-economic relations, “the development of

⁶ Леонтович Ф. И. Очерки истории литовско-русского права. Образование территории Литовского государства. Санкт-Петербург: Тип. В. С. Балашева, 1894. С. 373, 376.

⁷ Владимирский-Буданов М. Ф. Немецкое право в Польше и Литве. *Журнал министерства народного просвещения (ЖМНП)*.1868. Ч. CXXXIX. С. 468; Ч. CXL. С. 519–586 ; 772–833.

⁸ Там же. С. 774.

⁹ Там же. С. 468.

industrial labor and trade caused the demand for freedom, and its satisfaction caused the right of free court and self-government of cities as shopping centers created a free community”, the scientist remarked¹⁰. In his famous study “Review of the Magdeburg Law Mementoes of Western Rus Cities” (1897) F. Taranovskiy set the task to resolve issues regarding the nature and sources of Magdeburg law, which operated in Western Rus cities in Lithuanian era, in particular the practice of using Groitskiy’s and Shcherbych’s collections. F. Taranovskiy proved that the whole process of Magdeburg law spreading in the south-western cities existed in the form of a special form of the foreign law reception, which developed not by law but by judicial practice through the assimilation of private popular legal collections.

In his work “Lithuanian Jews” (1883) historian-lawyer S. Bershadskiy revealed the legal status of Jews living in Volyn cities¹¹. Based on the involvement of the Lithuanian metrics, materials of the Kyiv and Vilnius Central Archives and others, he found out the factors that contributed to the enrichment of Jews in the GDL and the reasons for their accumulation of wealth. Analyzing the legal status of Jews, S. Bershadskiy raised the issue of relations between the great Lithuanian princes and the Jews of the cities, revealed the influence of the supreme power on the organization of the taxation system, collection of trade duties, their transfer for ransom, etc. Information on the activities of customs chambers in Lutsk, Volodymyr and other Volyn cities that were in the hands of Jews, gives a clear idea of the volume of trade in the region, the distribution of customs duties, including those among city officials.

The accumulation of a large number of materials on the history of cities had a noticeable progress in the study of the history of cities in the

¹⁰ Тарановский Ф. В. Обзор памятников магдебургского права Западно-Русских городов литовской эпохи. Историко-юридическое исследование. Варшава: Тип. Варш. уч. округа, 1897. С. 2.

¹¹ Бершадский С. А. Литовские евреи. История их юридического и общественного положения в Литве от Витовта до Люблинской унии: 1388–1569. Санкт-Петербург: Тип. М. М. Стасюлевича, 1883. 431 с.

15th and 17th centuries. Among the scientists, founders of the historical school at the University of Kyiv, there were M. Kostomarov, V. Antonovych, M. Hrushevskiy, O. Levytskyi and others. Their views on the “Lithuanian” period of the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands development sometimes differed fundamentally, but they were united by some methodological principles of research, the democratic, populist nature of the work. Researchers noted the noticeable influence of “Rus” state institutions, material and demographic resources, and spiritual culture on Lithuania. The formation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was influenced by the processes that took place in the regions, in particular in Volyn. Examining the impact of the Magdeburg law on the internal structure of the GDL, they generally negatively assessed its role in the development of Ukrainian cities, believing that this law was imposed on them and became an alien institution in Ukrainian life, as a result it could give them nothing but harm.

O. Levytskyi was one of the first to point out the importance of court books as sources for a comprehensive study of the past life of the western Russian regions. O. Levytskyi characterized the ancient act books of the grodski (castle) courts (state courts of first instance in large criminal cases), typical estates courts of the nobility, tribunal, magistrate and other courts as a precious heritage in the form of a colossal number of written monuments, an inexhaustible source of a long political coexistence of western Russian regions with the former Lithuanian state, and later – Poland. With the development of political life, especially from the second half of the 16th century, act books became a bright page of this life with its mental and political ferment of thoughts, parties, sects, etc., performing the same role that belongs to the press nowadays¹².

V. Antonovych, a researcher of the cities of Right-Bank Ukraine, made a significant contribution to the study of the history of Volyn cities. His “Monographs on the History of Western and Southwestern Russia”

¹² Левицкий О. И. О судьбе древних актов и собрания их в центральных архивах. Чтения в историческом обществе Нестора-летописца. Киев: [б. и.], 1896. Кн. 10. С. 11–14.

(1885), the preface to the publication of “Acts on Cities (1432–1798)” (1869) is important for the understanding of the Magdeburg law impact on urban self-government. The scientist deduced the level of freedom of the urban state in self-government from the degree of decomposition of the urban community, the differentiation of which can be seen in the privilege of Lutsk land in 1432, where certain states were defined – on the one hand: princes (“duces”), prelates (“praelati”), boyars (“boiari”), warriors (“milites”), nobles (“nobiles”), on the other – ckmets-peasants (“homines seu kmethones”)¹³. The researcher associated the disintegration of the urban community not with the spread of Magdeburg law, but with the separation of the noblemen from the community¹⁴.

The consequence of such a system of distribution of responsibilities between the bourgeoisie and the service class was the redistribution of land ownership in the rural district in favor of the polish landed gentry and the nobles with their subsequent withdrawal from the community. Having lost the rural districts in favor of the noblemen and having refused to bear arms, the communities retained the right of the court and self-government “under the guise of charters awarded to them by Magdeburg law: but this self-government had features of artificial origin after the external guarantee”¹⁵. All this, according to the historian, led to the loss of true self-governing, which the community gave. The instrument of such a loss was: 1) the appointment of individual city Vogts and the transfer to them the right to sue the city community by the princes; 2) the actual expansion of the elders’ power. V. Antonovych emphasized that in the conditions of full control over the city self-government by the owner in privately owned cities “The Magdeburg law only minimally guaranteed the independence of the city community”. In general, assessing the role of Magdeburg law in the history of the cities,

¹³ Антонович В. Б. Предисловие. *Архив Юго-Западной России, издаваемый Временной комиссией для разбора древних актов, учрежденной при Киевском, Подольском и Волынском генерал-губернаторе*. Ч. V. Т. 1. Акты о городах (1432–1798). Киев: Унив. тип., 1869. С. 1.

¹⁴ Там же. С. 144–145.

¹⁵ Там же. С. 151

he believed that this law “only slowed down the fall of the cities and prevented their complete disappearance”¹⁶.

In the fifth volume of the “History of Ukraine-Rus”, M. Hrushevsky showed the genesis of local government in Volyn cities, the peculiarities of the Magdeburg law spread there. The nature of self-government of Volyn cities determined, to some extent, the caste character of society, in particular such its peculiarity, as dependence on magnate landownership: “Volyn was the most manorial aristocratic province – the landed aristocracy completely took over the state. It was at the same time official: all senior positions were in the hands of rich families”, the historian wrote¹⁷.

M. Hrushevskyi connected the introduction of Magdeburg law in Volyn with the German colonization of the Volyn principality at the end of the 13th century. It was then that in the Ipatiev chronicle the name “mestichi” (the estate of the townspeople who received Magdeburg Law) was found in contrast to the traditional definition of the inhabitants of the city as “*grazhans*”. A few years later, in a letter from the Volodymyr city community to the community of Shtralsund, the Volodymyr consuls (councilors) are mentioned, which gave him reason to believe that Magdeburg law existed in Volodymyr, at least in part, in the first quarter of the 14th century. For the investigation of the chosen problem, M. Hrushevskyi's opinion that in Volodymyr and Lutsk certain elements of the city organization of Magdeburg law could be preserved since ancient times and be updated with later privileges is valuable, but “we do not have detailed information about them”¹⁸. M. Hrushevsky's coverage of the practice of Magdeburg law in other cities of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland, first of all, Lviv, as well as Kremenets, the privately owned city of Olyka and others, allows to

¹⁶ Там же. С. 165.

¹⁷ Грушевський М. С. Історія України-Руси. Т. V. Суспільно-політичний і церковний устрій і відносини в українсько-руських землях XIV–XVII ст. Київ: Наукова думка, 1994. С. 32, 34.

¹⁸ Там само. С. 32, 34, 224–225, 230.

determine its specificity in Volyn cities – Lutsk, Volodymyr, Kovel, Ostrozhets, to which M. Grushevskiy paid less attention.

M. Hrushevskiy noted that the set of rights and responsibilities of the headman inevitably led to his interference in the affairs of urban communities, “existence in the cities of the population under the judgment of the elder, and not the magistrate... gave the headman broad ingerentia (*interference* – A. B.) in urban affairs, and thus opened a wide way for him and his deputies, officials, etc. to overpower everyone”¹⁹ [239, p. 350]. Magdeburg law had a particularly negative effect on the lives of the “secondary cities” that had only a “needy parody of self-government.” The main disadvantage of Magdeburg law for the cities was that they were excluded from the parliamentary system, did not participate in the Seim and regional Seimiks, and the laws and even city taxes were adopted without their participation. Another factor that restricted the rights of urban communities was the existence in cities of numerous jurydyks, whose population was removed from the jurisdiction of cities, which generally turned cities “into a conglomeration of misunderstandings and anomalies and instead of development gave them only a painful existence”. According to M. Hrushevskiy, the introduction of Magdeburg law in Ukrainian cities had a negative impact on the fate of the bourgeoisie as a state, because, with some exceptions, “with local flashes of light and brilliance” it declines, and the reason is its dispersion “to an infinite number of small states, which, in principle, was every city community”. This thesis obviously hints at the density and democracy of the urban community, which ceased to exist due to historical circumstances.

In the work “State Economy of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania under the Jagiellonians” (1901) M. Dovnar-Zapolskyi brings the economic base under the entire system of public administration and local self-government of the GDL [260, p. 32]. The analysis of the system of state and local taxes and fees, including in Volyn, made by scientists, makes it possible to determine the essential characteristics of one of the

¹⁹ Там само. С. 350.

main activities of government officials at various levels – fiscal. No less important to understand the specifics of governance in the GDL, including cities, is the characterization of property relations, because the differences between “patrimony”, “length of service” and “holding” resulted in their duties to the state. According to the historian, only in the period between the first and second Statutes of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania there was a complete and clear separation of personal possessions of the Grand Duke from the state²⁰.

M. Dovnar-Zapolski's vision of the place and role of urban communities in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was fundamentally different, claiming that “Magdeburg privileges did not artificially create urban communities, but found ready-made ground there”. Denying Antonovych's position on the negative role of Magdeburg law in the fate of Ukrainian cities, he believed that Magdeburg law was not the cause of the destruction of the old Rus system; it “collapsed, turning into other forms of social life, depending on many reasons – a general reworking of social relations.” The researcher noted that historians “thicken the paint too much when discussing the wrong aspects of of the urban community life under German law”, moreover, it “contributed to the rapid economic growth of the city”. The population of large urban centers that moved to Magdeburg law was not homogeneous, and “the new law was the middle ground that could reconcile all citizens, because it really had the features of internationalism”²¹.

Famous researcher of the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania M. Lyubavsky revealed the identity of the Volyn lands at the time of their entry into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Poland, the specifics of self-government under Magdeburg law. In the fundamental work “Regional division and local government of the Lithuanian-Russian state at the time of publication of the first Lithuanian statute” (1892), M. Lyubavskiy paid much attention to the functional responsibilities of governors / elders,

²⁰ Довнар-Запольский М. В. Государственное хозяйство Великого княжества Литовского при Ягеллонах. Киев: Тип. император. ун-та Св. Владимира, 1901. Т. I. С. 137, 150.

²¹ Там же. С. 60, 275, 276.

including Lutsk and Volyn marshal, cornet, locksmith, city-provost and paver, etc. The scientist noted that in terms of its importance, the Lutsk headman “took the first place among the officials of the Volyn land, as their chairman and foreman”²². His work provides a thorough analysis of the estates of the Lutsk key and the Lutsk eldership, as well as the existing system of taxes and fees, from which the inhabitants of cities, such as “pomirne” and “kapshchyzna” (tax to the state treasury, tax in the 15th-17th centuries on the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, charged for the manufacture and sale of vodka, honey and beer from the townspeople, peasants and Cossacks) were not exempted. According to the scientist, land taxes, along with other payments and duties after receiving privileges for the Magdeburg law in the cities were often replaced by the total amount that the city had to pay to the ruler. A significant place in the monograph is given to the judicial functions of the headman and the castle government, the separation of their jurisdictions with the city courts under Magdeburg law. However, self-government in the cities of the GDL was generally ignored by the researcher.

This issue is to some extent covered in another of his monographs: “An Essay on the History of the Lithuanian-Russian State up to and including the Lublin Union” (1915). The work contains a generalized description of the cities of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania management under Magdeburg law. The historian believed that the great Lithuanian princes, in granting cities this right, were guided by the prevailing belief at the time that it contributed to the successful development of cities, increasing their population and improving welfare. Among the measures that contributed to the development of cities, the scientist named the release of burghers from joint duties with the peasants, providing cities with income for building the city, freeing them from the verdicts of elders, statesmen, and all rights and customs that violate Magdeburg law. The researcher determined the nature of city self-government, its

²² Любавский М. К. Областное деление и местное управление Литовско-Русского государства ко времени издания первого Литовского статута. Исторические очерки. Москва: Университет. тип., 1892. С. 211–213.

structure and the powers of officials, but without “linking” to the specific cities. But even in this general form, his study is valuable because it shows the essential features of the organization of self-government of the city on Magdeburg law.

The system of government in the Volyn cities, including those operating on the basis of Magdeburg law, were to some extent determined by the national privileges granted by the Grand Dukes of the Volyn. Therefore, the analysis of these legal documents, conducted by leading scholars of the late 19th – early 20th century is extremely important. The regional privileges guaranteed the property and personal rights of the inhabitants, consolidated the responsibilities of the Grand Dukes and, characteristically, did not interfere in the church affairs of the Orthodox lands of the GDL. The norms enshrined in the regional privileges originated from local customary law, and were also developed by administrative and judicial practice developed during the period when these lands became part of the GDL.

Scholar-lawyer and archeographer M. Yasinsky in the work “Charter of the Lithuanian-Russian state” (1889) was the first to devote a special study to the regional privileges of the Lithuanian-Russian state, defining them as “constitutional charters”.

A thorough analysis of national privileges, including Volyn, was made by another well-known expert on the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, jurist I. Yakubovskiy (“Zemskie Privileges of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania”, 1903). According to him, the Lithuanian Zemstvo Charter showed the desire of the legislator to combine a large amount of legal material that has been accumulated at the time of issuance of new privileges. Analyzing the regional privileges, he proved that each privilege contains “traces of a number of layers, so that a small priority letter grew to a fairly large size”²³.

At the end of the 19th century local lore studies, which supplement the history of Volyn cities with materials from written sources, have been

²³ Якубовский И. В. Земские привилегии Великого княжества Литовского. *Журнал министерства народного просвещения*. 1903. № 6. С. 246.

intensified. In the 80-90's of the 19th century the exploring of O. Andriyashchuk, P. Ivanov on the history of Volyn from ancient times to the fourteenth century were published. Among the books of local lore the works of the teacher of the Volyn Theological Seminary M. Teodorovych on the history of Volyn cities and counties – Kremenets, Zaslavl, Volodymyr, Starokostiantyniv, Slavuta, Kovel occupy the special place. M. Teodorovych examined their socio-economic development, trade, organization of guild crafts, provides biographical data of Volyn officials (“Vladimir city of Volyn province in the connection with the history of the Volyn diocese”, 1893, etc.).

Summing up the achievements of historiography of the XIX century, it is necessary to recognize that the research of scholars reproduced many aspects of the historical past of the GDL, legal and political history of Volyn cities, including cities with Magdeburg law.

2. The coverage of the problem of self-government of Volyn cities in the scientific literature of the 20th-21st centuries

After 1917 and in the following years none of the Soviet historians dealt with this issue virtually. Some researchers (M. Hrushevskiy, M. Dovnar-Zapolskiy, M. Lyubavskiy) quitted studying this topic under various circumstances. F. Leontovych and M. Vladymyrskiy-Budanov passed away. Many scholars went into exile (I. Lappo), and those who remained were repressed and died in the detention camps. According to the apt statement of the modern Ukrainian researcher V. Vasylenko, it was almost “lost time” for the mentioned direction of historical studies²⁴.

In 20s of the 20th century V. Druzchych was engaged in the problem of self-government in the cities of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, mainly Belarusian, on Magdeburg law²⁵. His analysis of the

²⁴ Василенко В. О. Політична історія Великого князівства Литовського (до 1569 р.) в східнослов'янських історіографіях XIX – першої половини XX ст. Дніпропетровськ: Нац. гірн. ун-т, 2006. С. 18.

²⁵ Дружчыц В. Магістрат у беларускіх местах з майдэборскім правам у XV–XVII сталецьцях. *Запіскі Аддзелу гуманіт. навук Інстытута Беларускае культуры*. Кн. 8. Працы клясы гісторыі. Т. 3. Мінск: [б. и.], 1929. С. 377–458.

structure of city government under Magdeburg law, the functioning of magistrates, the organization of the power of the Vogts, their legal powers and activities are valuable in a comparative analysis to study the history of Volyn cities.

One of the few works of this time, which deals with the socio-economic situation of Ukrainian cities, is the work of I. Krypyakevych "History of Ukraine" (1938). I. Krypyakevych departs from the negative assessment of Magdeburg law in the fate of Ukrainian cities in it. According to the historian, the bourgeoisie in Ukraine in the 15th-16th centuries reached a fairly high level of development, and cities became an independent factor in economic life due to self-government, which gave them German law. Larger cities, such as Lviv, Kyiv, Lutsk and others, were completely independent of the state administration and freely decided their internal affairs, "they were like small republics in their walls"²⁶. Smaller cities and towns were subject to their masters, but still the burghers themselves chose a leader, could show a fairly wide range of activities and feel free and independent people. Thanks to the self-government of the city developed various areas of industry and established extensive trade, reached a significant wealth and culture. Since the mid-20s to 40s of the twentieth century the specialist in the history and law of Ukrainian cities of the Middle Ages and early modern times V. Otamanovskyi has studied Vinnytsia as a type of Ukrainian city of the southern Right Bank of the 14th-17th centuries. The scientist raised the issue of the development of self-government in cities, in particular the influence of socio-economic factors, the evolution of the legal status of the Ukrainian city, the role of Magdeburg law in the life of the city. He concluded that the ancient cities of the 11th-13th centuries passed the same path of original development as Western European cities, and not the privileges of Magdeburg law determined the legal status of the city and forms of urban planning, but the level of craft and trade development of cities and the degree of its separation from agriculture.

²⁶ Крип'якевич І. П. Історія України. Львів: Вид-во «Світ», 1990. С. 134.

Polish historiography of the 1920s and early 1930s of the 20th century showed the interest in the problem of urban planning in the GDL. Some aspects of the urban management on the Magdeburg law in Vilno, Brest, Polotsk, Desna, as well as in Lutsk have been revealed in the works of S. Kutsheba, G. Lovmyansky, I. Yavorsky. In a thorough article on the history of Volyn from 1340 to 1569, S. Zayonchkovsky linked the process of genesis of the bourgeoisie in the GDL, in particular in Volyn cities, with the spread of German law and the organization of public life “Western-style”.

The period after the end of World War II was marked by increasing ideological pressure on the humanities, the development of campaigns against the Soviet intellectuals, which took various forms: the struggle against “cosmopolitanism” in the late 40’s – early 50’s, later – against Ukrainian “nationalism” 60 – early 70’s). All this has objectively led to a reduction in the research in the field of the Ukrainian history in general and the urban issues in particular.

Among the isolated publications of the postwar period one should mention a long article by O. Baranovych “New city of Western Ukraine in the sixteenth century. (Foundation of Starokonstantyniv)” (1951). On the example of the city of Starokostiantyniv, the author showed the process of founding this type of city in the 16th century by legally securing of the city, building a castle, as well as attracting colonists to it with the provision of appropriate benefits.

Since the 1960s, Soviet historiography the interest of the scientific community in the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania has been revived. Some aspects of the development of Volyn cities, questions of origin, nature and role of Magdeburg law in them were raised in historiographical studies. Russian historians. Khoroshkevich (1966) and Y. Klokman (1966), as well as Ukrainian scholars, in particular G. Shvydko considered the historiography of the cities of Ukraine in the 16th and 18th centuries (1975, 1979). The researchers acknowledged that their main focus was on the socio-economic history of the cities, since such research was crucial to elucidating the genesis of capitalist relations in Russia.

The first significant investigation of Soviet historiography in this area was the work of V. Pashuto “Education of the Lithuanian State” (1959), although it only partially touched on the organization of power in the cities of Volyn. V. Otamanovskyi continued to study self-government in the cities of Ukraine of the 14th-16th centuries. Against the background of socio-economic development of Ukrainian cities, the researcher showed the evolution of their legal status and structure in Magdeburg law.

O. Kompan's work “Cities of Ukraine in the Second Half of the 17th Century” is of some interest for research (1963). Her materials make it possible to trace the trends of socio-economic and socio-political development of Volyn cities, in particular in terms of the organization of municipal self-government and the activities of workshops. Noting the peculiarities of the bourgeoisie of Ukrainian cities, O. Kompan noted that the bourgeoisie was a stratum in many respects different from the peasantry, although it originated from its environment. However, in Ukraine this difference did not appear as clearly as in more developed countries.

O. Kompan's research is characterized by a balanced approach to the role of Magdeburg law in the life of Ukrainian cities. The author rightly noted that the Magdeburg law was a natural stage of the development for Ukrainian and Polish cities. The cities at a certain stage of their development in the struggle against the feudal lords began to demand a separate organization and jurisdiction, i.e. the right to self-government. In Western Europe, this was Magdeburg law. At the time when the cities of the GDL due to socio-economic and political development felt the need for such a law, it has already existed in neighboring countries and the cities took it as a model, but in the process of life Magdeburg law here has changed according to local circumstances and traditions. Thus, “Magdeburg law in Ukraine cannot be considered as something artificial, planted from above without internal need. But its consequences had both positive and negative sides”²⁷.

²⁷ Компан О. С. Міста України в другій половині XVII ст. Київ: Вид-во АН УРСР, 1963. С. 116–117.

Since the 60's of the 20th century medievalists have begun to realize the history of small towns as an independent problem, because in the Middle Ages small towns predominated in the general mass of urban settlements. The problem of the different types of medieval Ukrainian cities studying was posed by Ya. Isayevych. The scientist noted that the history of the Ukrainian city cannot be created without writing the history of medium and small cities, where the majority of the urban population lived. On the example of one of the important centers of handicrafts and trade in the Ukrainian Carpathians the royal city of Drohobych, whose trade links stretched to Kholm, Dnieper, Volyn, the researcher raised the issue of the Ukrainian cities management in general. The reasoned conclusions on the organization of administration under Magdeburg law on the example of one city serve as a guide in finding the necessary information to study other cities with Magdeburg law; they provide a scientific basis for the abandoning and comparing of the activities of municipal authorities in different cities of Ukraine, in particular Volyn ones.

The clarification of the trend of industrial development, and at the same time changes in the social structure, organization of urban self-government in Ukrainian cities are contained in the monograph of Lviv scientist J. Kis "Lviv industry in the period of feudalism (13-14 centuries)" (1968). It analyzes in detail the activities of craft shops, their integration into the system of municipal self-government, which operated on the basis of Magdeburg law. The activity of Lviv workshops was directly related to the organization of guild crafts in Volyn cities, since Lviv was the "senior city" for the cities and towns of Rus, Volyn and Podil voivodships, and its guild charters were a model for them.

Unlike the representatives of the Kyiv historical school, J. Kis generally positively assesses the role of Magdeburg law in the development of the urban community. According to the researcher, this law in the 15th-17th centuries in conditions of economic weakness of Ukrainian cities, immaturity of the bourgeoisie, the powerlessness of the central government in the period of aristocratic autocracy and anarchy gave them (though often limited) the right to immunity, independence

from government officials, saved cities from complete subjugation by the nobility, from economic ruin. At the same time, German law accelerated the formation of the municipal government forms, helped the organization of small producers, contributed to the development of trade and economic relations²⁸.

The source works of M. Kowalski under the general title “Source Studies and Archaeography of the History of Ukraine in the 16th – First Half of the 17th Century”; parts 1–4 (1977–1979) are quite valuable for covering the topic of urban self-government. They directly touched upon the problems of self-government organization in Volyn cities. The scholar started a thorough study of the act books of city, zemstvo, tribunal, magistrate and other courts as important historical sources. The merit of the scientist before science lies in the fact that he initiated the study of grodski (castle) books as sources on the history of Ukraine in the 16th-first half of the 17th century, when such work was not carried out and this initiative was not supported. He carried out a source analysis of location and Magdeburg privileges in Ukrainian cities. He carried out a source analysis of location and Magdeburg privileges in Ukrainian cities. The introduction into scientific circulation of previously unknown texts of these privileges, primarily from the books of Lithuanian metrics, their analysis and comparison with previously published sources allowed the author to explore further such important issues as the history of settlements, obtaining urban status and self-government, dating of the cities and towns, including Volyn ones and others. The identification of such aspects made it possible to determine more substantially the essence of the policy of the Grand Ducal government in relation to the cities and the limited functioning of Magdeburg law and its institutions in the lands of Ukraine and Volyn. Thus, the conducted by the scientist analysis of the sources on the history of Lutsk 16th – the first half of the 17th century in the documents LM not only enriched the source base on the history of the city, but also identified the priority areas of research of management in cities.

²⁸ Кісь Я. П. Промисловість Львова у період феодалізму (XIII–XIX ст.). Львів: Вид-во Львів. ун-ту, 1968. С. 5.

It is worth noting the work of scientists in the study of such an important medieval source as the Lithuanian metrics, because it contains a large number of documentary evidence on the history of Volyn cities in the 15th and 16th centuries. A significant contribution to the study of LM was made by the Soviet and Russian researcher A. Khoroshkevych, who in many of her works identified the current tasks of the source study of LM, as well as many specific issues on the history of GDL, including self-government in GDL [491-493, 495]. Of the importance for the research are the works of Dnipropetrovsk researcher S. Abrosimova on the analysis of LM materials to reflect in them the development of Ukrainian cities in the first half of the sixteenth century.

Valuable for the study of the problem of organization of power in Volyn in a certain period is the monograph by P. Sas “Feudal cities of Ukraine in the late 15th – 60's of the 16th century” (1989) from the history of Ukrainian cities that were part of the GDL²⁹. The scientist studied the socio-economic development of the cities of this region, their administrative system. He not only counted the number of cities, presented their typology by socio-economic characteristics, but also showed their fortification and defense significance. The author managed to analyze the economic development, social and ethno-confessional structure of the urban population, the development of crafts and trading, trade, organization of workshops. Considerable attention was paid to the legal status of cities, their administrative structure, and the traditions of urban self-government in Magdeburg law. He managed to show the practice of the functioning of Magdeburg law in Lutsk and Volodymyr, to a lesser extent in Kovel. There were revealed not only the general tendencies of development of city self-government on the Magdeburg law in the Ukrainian cities, but also the problems which arose in relations between separate branches of the power, in particular between Vogt and the council. At the same time, some problems of self-government in cities, due to the tasks and volume of the publication, did not find

²⁹ Сас П. М. Феодальные города Украины в конце XV – 60-х годах XVI в. Київ: Наук. думка, 1989.

thorough coverage, such as the relationship between the castle and the city governments, their structure and personnel, procedural issues, etc.

In general, Soviet historians have taken a step forward in the study of the medieval city. They raised the issues of economic, social, political, partly cultural development of cities in the regions of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, their administrative and legal status, introduction and functioning in the cities of Magdeburg (German) law, etc. However, the researchers' attention was focused on the problems of economic development of cities and the class struggle of the population. The investigations of Soviet historians, which contained a significant amount of material and conclusions on the self-government of cities under Magdeburg law, were conducted, according to the Polish historian J. Bardakh, around "the actual borderline – separately for Lithuania, separately for Belarus"³⁰ [526, p. 79]. This opinion was shared by the Belarusian historian M. Ulashchyk and the Polish researcher S. Alexandrovich³¹.

Some aspects of the socio-economic situation of Volyn cities, their management under Magdeburg law were covered in the works of famous Polish researchers J. Bardakh, M. Bogutska, S. Kuras, J. Okhmyansky, G. Samsonovich and others. Their works are valuable for clarifying of the general historical context, the political situation in Volyn of the time, the internal history of Volyn cities, in particular in Lutsk in the 15th century at the time of receiving Magdeburg Privilege, identifying the interest groups associated with its granting. The works of Polish, as well as Belarusian, Russian historians, in which the problems of introduction and dissemination of Magdeburg law in other regions of the GDL were studied, make it possible to identify similarities and differences in the regional development.

³⁰ Bardach J. Ustrój miast na prawie magdeburgskim w Wielkiem Księstwie Litewskiem do połowy XVII wieku. *Bardach J. O dawnej i niedawnej Litwie*. Poznań, 1988. S. 79.

³¹ Улащик Н. Н. Очерки по археографии и источниковедению истории Белоруссии феодального периода. Москва: Наука, 1973. С. 6–14; Alexandrovicz Stanislaw. *Studia z dziejów miasteczek Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego*. Torun: Wydawnictwo naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 2011. S. 218.

Yu. Bardakh, in his work “*O dawnej i niedawnej Litwie*” (“*About old and recent Lithuania*”) (1988) set the task of studying the dynamics of changes in the structure and development of the cities of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania under Magdeburg law. In investigations of the problem of urban self-government, the historian believed, it is necessary to ensure the historical and political integrity of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which included Lithuanian and Belarusian lands, and before the Union of Lublin in 1569 included also Podlachia and Ukraine. Considering the origins and adaptation of Magdeburg law, its spread, characterizing the division of cities into privileged and unprivileged, freedoms and rights of burghers, the competence of Vogts and city officials, the activities of magistrates, he actively involved sources from the history of Volyn cities, especially Lutsk³².

Of the importance in comparative terms are the studies of the history of cities and bourgeoisie in Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, carried out in the 80s of the 20th century by M. Bogutska and G. Samsonovych, in particular on the organization of self-government in cities on the basis of Magdeburg law and their socio-economic situation.

Revival of interest in the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in general and, in Volyn in particular, among Ukrainian historians in the late 20th and early 21st centuries is due to the lack of thorough modern research on the history of cities in the region, inherited from Soviet policy of the history studying as the priorities of historical research were determined by the then idea of the messianic role of the Moscow state in the unification of Rus lands. With the independence of Ukraine there was a fundamental change in the paradigm of research on the history of the GDL, where the history of the cities of the Right Bank of Ukraine has become the subject of increased attention.

The first thorough historiographical study of the political history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania problem, which also raises the issues of governance in the cities of Volyn, is the monograph of the Dnipropetrovsk historian V. Vasylenko “Political history of the Grand

³² Bardach J. *Ustrój miast...*, 1988. S. 79, 84, 89, 97, 99.

Duchy of Lithuania (before 1569) in East Slavic historiographies of the 19th – first half of the 20th century”. (2006). Written on a new methodological basis with the use of modern methods of historical analysis and a wide range of sources, it contains information about the nature of urban governance in Volyn. The historian did not set the task of considering urban problems in the Ukrainian lands, but raises partly the issue of the Ukrainian cities’ situation, the organization of their management on the basis of Magdeburg law: Lutsk, Volodymyr, Kremenets and other cities are the defense and administrative centers of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. V. Vasylenko's analysis of the discussion that took place among historians at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries became valuable for the history of Lutsk around the reasons for providing in the early 30's of the 15th century privileges on the Magdeburg law to the Ukrainian cities, in particular to Lutsk on October 30, 1432³³.

Contemporary Ukrainian historiography in the late 20th – early 21st century was enriched with the research on the activities of local officials in Volyn in the 15th and 18th centuries. Thus, the works of a famous modern Ukrainian medievalist N. Yakovenko “Ukrainian nobility since the end of the 14th- to the middle of the 17th century. Volyn and Central Ukraine” (1993, 2008), “An Essay on the History of Medieval and Early Modern Ukraine” (1997, 2006), provide an opportunity to imagine the realities of life at that time, to “comply” the activities of Volyn government officials into the context of late medieval social relations. According to the scientist herself, she set a task “to overturn the depopulation of the “national-state” paradigm of Ukrainian history, which is inhabited by the “doers” themselves – as if neither children are born nor the seasons change without them. To overturn the belief that everything is predetermined in history “for us and without us” by some mysterious “laws” that push if you step forward / back – then by group, if you love / hate – then unanimously. To overturn, after all, the fixation on

³³ Василенко В. О. Політична історія Великого князівства Литовського (до 1569 р.) в східнослов'янських історіографіях XIX – першої половини XX ст. Дніпропетровськ: Нац. гірн. ун-т, 2006. С. 226–230.

one's own victories and troubles – as if there was no wide world around, from where good or bad winds brought new relatives, new aspirations, new values”³⁴ [512, p. 9]. The object of the historian's attention was the origins and social structure of the Ukrainian nobility, its personal composition, legal and property status of elite groups, including Volyn officials [515]. The researcher paid attention to the problems of spreading of the city law in Ukrainian lands, including Volyn, calling this process a real “urbanization revolution”, as Magdeburg law removed the urban community from the jurisdiction of the royal administration and introduced the elected self-government³⁵ [512, p. 127]. Methodologically important are her conclusions about the peculiarities of the development of Volyn cities. N. Yakovenko believes that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania city has not undergone such a bright rebirth into a new open community as in Galician or Podolsk Rus. However, this does not mean that it did not develop. Since the 15th century the wave of urbanization in Volyn, which the historian, following M. Hrushevskyi, associated with the presence of large aristocratic land tenure is gaining strength: “the emergence of new cities was due primarily to the establishment of large land ownership of the dukes”. However, their inhabitants are closely connected with the rural district and this, in turn, hampered the development of urban life as such³⁶ [512, p. 167–169]. According to N. Yakovenko, with the exception of Lviv, in fact, there was no what we usually call “Magdeburg city” in Ukraine. Each city was self-governing in its own way, considering its status as “Magdeburg”, and therefore, each city appears as a unique phenomenon with its own “Magdeburg”³⁷. Therefore, the accumulation of regional research, including the example of the cities of Volyn, remains relevant.

³⁴ Яковенко Н. М. Нарис історії середньовічної та ранньомодерної України. 3-тє вид., переробл. та розш. Київ: Критика, 2006. С. 9.

³⁵ Там само. С. 127.

³⁶ Там само. С. 167–169.

³⁷ Датування міст як проблема історичної урбаністики: європейський та український досвід: матеріали «круглого столу» 24 вересня 2008 р. За заг. ред. В. Г. Панченка. Київ: Інститут суспільних досліджень, 2008. С. 53–54.

As you know, the system of public administration is concentrated in the cities, so the study of urbanization is not accidentally the subject of close attention of scientists. The monographs of the Lviv scientist A. Zayats “Urbanization process in Volyn in the 16th – first half of the 17th century” (2003), The city society of Volyn in the 16th – first half of the 17th century” (2019), concerning the problem of the city network of the region, conducting locations and its components, the basics of self-government in the cities of Volyn are of great scientific interest. The author considers the place and role of the studied cities in the general context of urbanization in Volyn, pays attention to the order and priority of granting Magdeburg law to cities, etc. The issues of spatial location of cities, the role of castles as fortifications and centers of local government are of great scientific interest.

Among the works on the history of the Magdeburg law spread and functioning in the cities of Volyn in the late 15th – first half of the 17th century, in particular in Kremenets, Olyka, Lutsk, the work of Kyiv researcher N. Bilous should be mentioned. Her Monograph “Kyiv in the late fifteenth – in the first half of the seventeenth century. City Power and Self-Government” (2008) contains a lot of information on the history of city self-government not only in Kyiv, but also in Vilno, Krakow, and others, which served as a model for the introduction of city government in some cities of Volyn region³⁸. Comparative analysis of government systems in Kyiv and Volyn makes it possible to recreate the specifics of the functioning of government in Volyn cities.

Ukrainian historians started to pay more attention to the study of the Volyn cities role and place in the processes of state building and socio-economic development of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Among them of importance are the investigations of the famous historian V. Atamanenko, which relate to the analysis of descriptive and statistical sources, especially inventories and audits of Volyn cities and castles. The materials of his articles make it possible to clarify the structure of

³⁸ Білоус Н. О. Київ наприкінці XV – у першій половині XVII століття. Міська влада і самоврядування. Київ: Вид. дім «Києво-Могилян. акад.», 2008. 358 с.

handicraft production, directions of trade of local residents, quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the population of Lutsk, Volodymyr, Kovel and other cities in the second half of the 15th – first half of the 16th century³⁹.

The investigations of the American historian and archivist P. Kennedy Grimsted, modern Polish scientists (G. Blazzczyk, L. Korczak, Z. Noga, K. Pietkiewicz, R. Shchigel), Lithuanian scientists (A. Dubonis, Z. Käupa, J. Käupane, R. Petrauskas), Belarusian scientists (V. Voronin, S. Kalinin, M. Makarov, V. Menzhynskiy, A. Yanushkevich) promote to clarify the peculiarities of the self-government in Volyn in the comparative retrospective. Despite the fact that there are no special studies on the history of self-government in Volyn cities of the period under the study, there are only mentions of Volyn cities in the research on the history of cities in Poland, Lithuania, and Belarus. Modern researchers from Poland, Lithuania, and Belarus pay considerable attention to the publishing sources on the history of the GDL. In recent years, Vilnius has become the center of publication and active research of Lithuanian metrics. Lithuanian historians (Z. Käupa, J. Käupane), not limited to the territory of modern Lithuania, also elaborate the problem of socio-economic development of cities and urban population of the GDL.

CONCLUSIONS

Thus, the study of the self-government organization problem in the cities of Volyn within the GDL had its own specifics due to the needs of the time. The real thorough scientific elaboration of the self-government

³⁹ Атаманенко В. Б. Описи міст Волині середини XVI ст. *Україна і Велике князівство Литовське в XIV–XVIII ст.: політичні, економічні, міжнаціональні та соціокультурні відносини в загальноєвропейському вимірі*. V Міжнар. наук. конф. Київ, Кам'янець-Подільський, 2017. С. 40–43; Атаманенко В. Б. Описово-статистичні джерела до історії населення Володимира другої половини XVI – першої половини XVII ст. *Минуле і сучасне Волині і Поліся: Місто Володимир-Волинський та Побужжя у світовій та українській історії*. Наук. зб. Вип. 55. Всеукр. наук. істор.-краєзнав. конф. 23 жовтня 2015, м. Володимир-Волинський / упорядн. А. Силюк, В. Пикалюк. Луцьк, 2015. С. 95–106 та ін.

problem in Volyn cities became possible thanks to the activity of the Temporary Commission for analysis of ancient acts. The most important in terms of studying of the theory and practice of self-government of Ukrainian cities were the works of scientists of the second half – early 20th century M. Vladymyrskyi-Budanov, F. Taranovskyi, V. Antonovych, M. Hrushevskyi and others, who clarified the legal basis of self-government in cities, their structure and functions. The significant contribution to the coverage of the influence of institutions of state power (governments of elders, marshals, locksmiths, city-provosts, etc.) on the system of municipal government was made by M. Lyubavsky. The attention of the mentioned scholars is mainly focused on the developed forms of self-government in the cities of the second half of the 16th and 17th centuries, at the same time the activity of city governments, future magistrates until 1569 in Volyn cities was insufficiently covered.

The research of Soviet historians tended to analyze the socio-economic development of Ukrainian cities in the context of the escalation of class contradictions there, the tendentious assessment of Magdeburg law, the role of the bourgeoisie as a social status, etc. The works of such scientists as M. Kovalskyi, O. Kompan, P. Sas, A. Khoroshkevych, G. Shvydko and others contributed to the expansion of the source base of scientific research, clarification of the specifics of the functioning of government and self-government in Volyn cities of the period under the study.

Modern Kyiv historians, such as N. Bilous, V. Polishchuk, N. Starchenko, N. Yakovenko, are active in considering the problem of the state authorities and local self-government in Volyn activity, which is largely due to the high professionalism of researchers and greater convenience for them in the use of funds of the CSHA of Ukraine. Scientists from Lviv (A. Zayats, M. Krykun, M. Kapral), Ostroh (V. Atamanenko), Dnipropetrovsk (S. Abrosimova, G. Shvydko) and others also made a significant contribution to the study of this problem. Their conceptual positions on many general issues of the GDL political history, analysis of Lithuanian metrics, Lutsk castle books, revisions of Volyn castles, and other descriptive and statistical materials make it

possible to trace the genesis of the formation and evolution of state authorities in the GDL and self-government in Ukrainian cities.

Despite the relevant achievements of science in this field of knowledge, the current level of history of self-government in the cities of Volyn requires further research, in particular in terms of coverage of the city governments of Lutsk, Vladimir, Kovel, Ostrozhets and many others, procedures for their formation, activities, and diversification of functions between the board and the Lava, etc. Some issues of the specifics of self-government in Volyn cities of different subordination – Grand Ducal and privately owned.

The involvement of a rich set of materials in scientific circulation, “new reading” of previously used sources significantly expands the understanding of the nature of socio-political and legal relations in society, the level of consciousness, moral and ethical values that prevailed in the late Middle Ages and early modern times in Volyn.

Thus, despite some investigations of domestic and foreign scholars, the study of the history of self-government in the cities of Volyn of this period requires further in-depth research, since municipal government in Volyn as a complex problem has not yet become the appanage of domestic historical science.

SUMMARY

The review of the scientific literature on the problem of self-government in the cities of Volyn on the basis of Magdeburg law in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania has been carried out. It has been proved that the history of Volyn was first considered by Polish historians in the context of the general history of Poland. Within the framework of approving the concept of “one and indivisible Russia” and the activities of the Temporary Commission for the Analysis of Ancient Acts, the basis of many studies on the history of the cities of Volyn was laid. Two directions of research – historical-legal and historical-economic were formed in 60’s and 70’s of the 19th century. The Soviet period was not active in studying this problem. The achievements in source studies (M. Kowalski) were the exceptions. With the acquisition of independence

there was a fundamental change in the paradigm of the Ukrainian cities and Volyn in particular research. The development of cities began to be considered in the context of Ukrainian national and state building with an emphasis on identifying common and special in the organization of self-government in cities on a democratic basis and compliance with European practice of local self-government.

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POST-ELECTION SITUATION IN UKRAINE: CHANGING FACES OR IDEOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATIONS?

Kroytor A. V., Yakovlev D. V.

...ideology never says, “I am ideological”
It is necessary to be outside ideology, i.e. in scientific knowledge,
to be able to say: I am in ideology (a quite exceptional case)
or (general case): I was in ideology.

As is well known, the accusation of being
in ideology only applies to others, never to oneself
(unless one is really a Spinozist or a Marxist ...)

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INTRODUCTION

There is a gradual construction of a new ideological design in Ukraine. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the devastating consequences of a one-party political system became apparent to all. For the newly formed political actors, the “golden times” came. It seemed that it was possible to move on from the discussions of the perestroika to the clash of ideologies in national states: “Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the inhabitants of its former republics have witnessed the return of history in their homelands. The Soviet illusion of a preordained and predestined future has been replaced by a sense of unpredictability about the future coupled with a sense of vulnerability vis-à-vis history in these new states... Formerly engaged in the dogmas of Soviet Marxism, ideological creativity has returned to the new societies that are currently dwelling on the ruins of the USSR. History

has repatriated the post-Soviet lands as a conflict of ideas and a clash of ideologies” (Minakov, 2012)¹.

Were political parties able to take advantage of this and, in cooperation with civil society, come up with ideological identification and formulate their ideological doctrines? During the existence of the Ukrainian party system, it has become competitive and pluralistic, but it is mostly the competition not of ideologies but leaders and technologies (Barkouski, 2018)². There are ideologies, but a mass voter does not vote by ideological criteria. The 2019 parliamentary elections are another confirmation of this.

The “marks” of ideological forms and transformations are defined and studied in various social spaces and social interactions of the post-Soviet countries. In particular, these are the studies of ideological innovations in party politics (Minakov, 2012³; Mochulska, 2017⁴; Whitmore, 2014⁵), public policy and youth policy (Barrett R., 2018⁶; Yenin, 2018⁷), education and science (Guttke, K uchler, & Shvaika 2012⁸;

¹ Minakov, M. (2012). Ideological Innovations in the Post-Soviet Countries. Editorial introduction. *The Ideology and Politics Journal*, № 1, pp. 2-4. Retrieved from https://ideopol.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/1__ENG__Minakov.pdf

² Barkouski, P. (2018). Contemporary post-ideologies: “hybrid ideologies”, or “new mythologies” as a factor of constituting of post-modern social field, *The Ideology and Politics Journal*, № 3(11), pp. 13-55. Retrieved from https://ideopol.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/_____Eng_2018%203.%204.%20Barkouski%20.pdf

³ Minakov, M. (2012). Ideological Innovations in the Post-Soviet Countries. Editorial introduction. *The Ideology and Politics Journal*, № 1, pp. 2-4. Retrieved from https://ideopol.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/1__ENG__Minakov.pdf

⁴ Mochulska, M. (2017). The legal status of political parties in Ukraine: peculiarities and improvement. *Zeszyty naukowe*, № 4. Retrieved from http://iusetadministratio.eu/wp-content/Zeszyty_naukowe/2017/4_2017/4_2017_1_Mochulska.pdf

⁵ Whitmore, S. (2014). Political party development in Ukraine. *GSDRC Helpdesk Research*, Birmingham, UK, 2014, Report 1146, pp. 1-13. Retrieved from <http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/hdq1146.pdf>

⁶ Barrett, R. (2018). *Ukraine at the Crossroad in Post-Communist Europe : Policymaking and the Role of Foreign Actors*. Dissertations, 259 p. Retrieved from <https://irl.umsl.edu/dissertation/725>

⁷ Yenin, M. (2018). Ideological forms and value modifications of patriotism of Ukrainian youth (based on analysis of moderated group discussions), *The Ideology and Politics Journal*, № 2(10). Retrieved from https://ideopol.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/_____2.%203.%202018.%20ENG.%20Yenin.pdf

Yakovlev & Kreutor, 2018⁹; Kroytor, Yakovlev & Aleksentseva-Timchenko, 2019¹⁰), public engagement and political participation (Cianciara & Zacharuk, 2018¹¹), history and politics of memory (Umland, Yurchuk & Fedor, 2018¹²).

Nowadays the Ukrainian party system is at a crossroads. On the one hand, there are the old parties (“Seasoned Wolves”) that have gone the complicated way and gradually formed their ideological doctrines and identifications in the fight against right-wing radicals, communists, and had a close relationship with various “parties of power” (Yakovlev, 2015)¹³. On the other hand, there are young, ambitious parties who are also leaders’ projects. However, marketing and targeting are more trusted than good old ideologies. According to the results of the 2019 parliamentary elections, the first to be mentioned is Fatherland, Opposition Platform – For Life, and European Solidarity. The others who have just started to search for their ideological niche are Servant of the People and Voice.

⁸ Guttker, M., Kuchler, F., Shvaika, O. (2012). Ideological Foundations of Educational Reforms in Ukraine, *The Ideology and Politics Journal*, № 2, pp.4-13. Retrieved from https://ideopol.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/2_ENG-ED-Kuechler.pdf

⁹ Yakovlev, D., Kreutor, A.. (2018). History of choice and choice of history. Religious choice of Kyiv in textbooks of Ukraine. *Regional policy: history, political and legal foundations, architecture, urban studies: collection of scientific works*. Kyiv-Ternopil: Beskidi, 1, pp. 38-44.

¹⁰ Kroytor A., Yakovlev D., Aleksentseva-Timchenko K. (2019) 'Apostles' of indoctrination: ideological peculiarities, *The Ideology and Politics Journal*, №. 2(13), pp. 127–146. Retrieved from: <https://ideopol.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/12/>

¹¹ Cianciara, A. Zacharuk K. (2018). The Hidden Party Game in Ukraine. *In Party Members and Their Importance in Non-EU Countries: A Comparative Analysis*, Chapter 9. Retrieved from: <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781315201177/chapters/10.4324/9781315201177-9>

¹² Umland A., Yurchuk Y., Fedor J. (2018) Transmutations and Permutations of the Post-Soviet Ukrainian Radical Right. *In book: Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society Special Section : Issues in the History and Memory of the OUN II*. Retrieved from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330010576_Special_Section_Issues_in_the_History_and_Memory_of_the_OUN_II December 2018

¹³ Yakovlev, D. (2015). Democracy “On the March”: Rethinking the Role of Propaganda and the “Party of Power” under Armed Threat. Proceedings of the *Scope: science of politics – International Interdisciplinary Conference of Political Research* (Romania, Bucharest 8-9 May, 2015), University of Bucharest, 2015.

This is the natural way for party policy in the post-Soviet countries. The organizations that have a political purpose appear first. They are initiated by interest groups to be pushed in parliament, and artificially constructed by the power to disperse the opposition electorate. Headquarters are formed, financial conditions for participation in elections are found. And it is only in the course of election campaigns that when deciding a strategy, the elements of ideology are declared, which are not the part of a holistic ideological doctrine, but a component of the technological support of the campaign.

A new trend has appeared: "...the traditional approach to building ideological parties "first ideology, and then – a political organisation" should be changed to the opposite: the first one has to create "living" political organisations and the main function of these organisations will consist in producing a full-fledged "living ideology" in a real-time mode by efforts of the collective intelligence generated as a result of synchronisation of the mental activity of their members. The backbone component in the structure of the "living ideology" has to be the organisational ideal as an integral part of the social ideal" (Plakhtiy, 2015)¹⁴.

This trend was fully reflected in the 2019 parliamentary elections, which resulted in the newly formed political party "Servant of the People" that gathered 43.16% of votes (*The Central Election Commission, 2019*)¹⁵ and received 251 seats in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (three deputies were subsequently expelled from the faction)¹⁶.

The aim of our article is to study the election programmes of parliamentary parties. We want to find out, based on the content of the party programmes, an ideological map of the modern Ukrainian parliament and define "white spots" and "hybrids" on it.

¹⁴ Plakhtiy, T., (2015) Prerequisites for Creating Ideological Parties in Ukraine. *SSRN*. Retrieved from: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2912462> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2912462>

¹⁵ Elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine Official *Website of the Central Election Commission*. Retrieved from: <https://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2019/wp300pt001f01=919.html>

¹⁶ Deputies factions and groups of IX convocation, Official *web portal Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy*. Retrieved from: http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/site2/p_fractions

1. “Seasoned Wolves”: In Search of Paradise Lost

In today's conditions, the development of the party system of Ukraine is inextricably linked to tectonic transformations of the state and society. It is the process of European integration (or its imitation?), and the informatization of society, which require the adaptation of political institutions and methods of policy implementation to the mediatization of politics and increasing the role and influence of communicative factors (Yakovlev, 2007)¹⁷. In addition, the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea, and the war in Donbas have become significant factors in the activities of Ukrainian political parties, which influence their ideological platform. From now on, the issues of defence and the search for ways of resolving the conflict in the East of Ukraine are no longer marginal, but the main ones in the programmes of political parties. The current political situation in the country has led to a new stage in the formation of the ideological spectrum of the Ukrainian party system.

It is worth noting that “uncertainty about political ideologies both in the activities of modern parties and in the minds of society, and the blurring of programmatic foundations of parties in the ideological spectrum along the “right- left” axis, leads to the creation of “quasi-party” structures. The consequence of the blurring of the ideological component of political parties is the structuring of their activities not around a certain political ideology, but a party leader – a person with a high personal rating. That is why election campaigns with the participation of political parties and blocs are becoming personalized” (Krojtor, 2012)¹⁸.

Modern parties have long ceased to meet the criteria of the classical mass parties because they have become an effective tool in the

¹⁷ Yakovlev, D.V. (2007). Komunikatyvni chynnyky formuvannia demokratychnoi polityky [Communicative factors of democratic policy-making] *Contemporary Ukrainian politics. Politicians and political scientists about her*, Kyiv, Vol. 9, pp. 167-175.

¹⁸ Krojtor A. V. (2012). Politychna ideologhija jak chynnyk formuvannja partijnoji systemy [Political ideology as a factor in forming the party system] *Aktualjni problemy polityky*, vol. special issue, pp. 36–44.

fight for votes. In the course of this struggle, there is a blurring of party ideologies and the actual disappearance of barriers between parties that associate voters solely with a party leader and his image. Successful party brands have been formed in Ukraine. At the same time, there is a simulation of party ideologies, the construction of which takes place around the political position of the party leader, whose rating depends on the competitiveness of a party in the political market.

Party ideology is based on empirical ideological and methodological forms of the subjective perception of political reality. The practical expression of party ideology is contained in the programmatic and statutory documents of political parties. A party ideology aims to express popular political ideas and values in society. In this case, parliamentary elections are a mechanism not only for the rotation of the elite, but also for the selection of basic requirements in the political system, and therefore – determining the dominant political ideology: “... the election result demonstrates the ideological palette in society, the level of influence of individual party ideologies on the process of forming political ideology and public opinion” (Krojtor, 2012)¹⁹.

The analysis of the legislation of Ukraine in the sphere of regulation of party activities gives grounds to point out that the state avoids the term “ideology” and considers a party as “... a voluntary association of citizens, supporters of a certain national programme of social development, registered under the law, which aims to promote the formation and expression of the political will of citizens, participates in elections and other political events”²⁰.

According to the Law of Ukraine “On Citizens' Associations”, a party is defined as an association of citizens, supporters of a certain

¹⁹ Krojtor A. V. (2012). Politychna ideologhija jak chynnyk formuvannja partijnogo systemu [Political ideology as a factor in forming the party system] Aktualni problemy polityky, vol. special issue, pp. 36–44.

²⁰ Zakon Ukrainy “Pro politychni partiji v Ukraini” [The Law of Ukraine “On Political Parties in Ukraine”] *Official web portal Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy*. Retrieved from: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2365-14>.

national programme of social development, whose main aim is to participate in the development of state policy, formation of government bodies, local and regional self-governance and representation in their membership²¹.

However, the practical expression of party ideology is found in the programme documents in the form of the declaration of the purpose and goals of the party, means of achieving this goal, slogans, symbolism, etc. (Krojtor, 2012)²².

Therefore, the main document that expresses the ideology of a political party is its programme. According to Article 7 of the Law of Ukraine “On Political Parties”, the programme of a political party is a statement of the goals and objectives of this party, as well as the ways to achieve them²³.

M. Obushny states: “The positive or negative evaluation of the role of parties in the life of modern society is determined mainly by the attitude of a person, social class, class, nation to one or another ideology based on which a political party bases its political and practical activity. Ideology is a fundamental feature in determining the majority of party names, its essence and the principles on which the political platform is developed. That is why ideology is one of the basic characteristics of the activity of a political party” (Obushnyj, Prymush & Shveda, 2017)²⁴.

Y. Schweda defines ideology as a system of views and ideas that expresses a relation to existing reality. Thus, a political ideology should be understood as a system of values, ideas that express political reality

²¹ Zakon Ukrainy “Pro ob’jednannya ghromadjan” [The Law of Ukraine “On Public Association] *Official web portal Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy*: Retrieved from: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2460-12>.

²² Krojtor A. V. (2012). Politychna ideologhija jak chynnyk formuvannya partijnogo systemy [Political ideology as a factor in forming the party system] *Aktualjni problemy polityky*, vol. special issue, pp. 36–44.

²³ Zakon Ukrainy “Pro politychni partiji v Ukraini” [The Law of Ukraine “On Political Parties in Ukraine”] *Official web portal Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy*: Retrieved from: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2365-14>.

²⁴ Obushnyj M. I., Prymush M.V., Shveda Ju.R. (2017) *Partologhija [Partology]*, Kiev, 432 p.

and attitude to the political process. The central category of political ideology is a political idea (Shveda, 2003)²⁵.

It is worth agreeing with M. Obushny, who notes that a political idea should be interpreted as a form of reflection of political reality, as a result of comprehension of the object of cognition – the political process. “In this context, a political idea is a bridge from thought to action, from consciousness to activity. Here, an objective need is reflected in theory through interests, goals, motives of social communities and personalities, it becomes a guide to action. Therefore, the development of new political ideas should be considered as not only an important sphere of spiritual production but also a necessary need to improve the activity of political mechanisms of society. In such circumstances, it is important that the self-fulfilling possibility of a political idea is complemented by appropriate forces and means that would most fully bring it to life” (Obushnyj, Prymush & Shveda, 2017)²⁶.

The party “Petro Poroshenko Bloc-Solidarity” (later “European Solidarity”) defines ideology in the programme as follows: “The idea of solidarity is the core principle of our ideology”²⁷. The ideology of the party has a clear nationalist orientation. In particular, it states: “Solidarity is the protection of Ukrainian traditions, the reproduction of values and cultural identity inherited from previous generations. The idea of solidarity is based on our values and beliefs, on which a free solidary society should be built”²⁸.

Such provisions of the party programme testify to a commitment to the ideas of national conservatism. For example, the party's programme

²⁵ Shveda, Ju. R.(2003) *Teorija politychnykh partij ta partijnykh system* [The theory of political parties and party systems], Lviv: Ivan LNU Publishing Center Franco, 325 p. Retrieved from: http://filelibsnu.at.ua/navchalno-metod/uchebniki/Shveda_Yu-Teoriya_politychnyx_partij-ta_partijnyx_.pdf.

²⁶ Obushnyj M. I., Prymush M.V., Shveda Ju.R. (2017) *Partologhija* [Partology], Kiev, 432 p.

²⁷ Prohrama politychnoji partiji “Blok Petra Poroshenka ‘Solidarnistj’ [The program of the political party “Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity”] Retrieved from: http://solydarnist.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/programa_solidarnist.pdf.

²⁸ Prohrama politychnoji partiji “Blok Petra Poroshenka ‘Solidarnistj’ [The program of the political party “Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity”] Retrieved from: http://solydarnist.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/programa_solidarnist.pdf.

states that “We have a shared responsibility for preserving and nurturing cultural traditions and passing them on to future generations. Our mission is to preserve historical memory, our identity, our national identity. The state shall create conditions for the development of Ukrainian culture, ensure the status of the Ukrainian language as a single state language, and ensure the development of the culture of national minorities”,²⁹.

Among the basic social values that the party has identified as fundamental ones, there is dignity, patriotism, responsibility, democracy, and justice. Defining state policy in the sphere of regulation of the economy, the party advocates minimizing state interference in the economic sphere.

The programme of the party states that “we seek minimal government intervention in the economy while developing opportunities for private enterprise. Giving as much space as possible to the initiative and self-development of citizens in the economy, politics, public life is an important task for the political class of the country”,³⁰.

The foreign policy of Ukraine according to the provisions of the party should be aimed at ensuring Euro-Atlantic integration and integration with the EU. The programme of the party identifies the Russian Federation as an aggressor against which foreign policy of the state should be targeted, and effective diplomacy is the method of such fight³¹.

Much attention in the programme of the party is paid to providing by the state its social functions to protect the population and its most vulnerable social groups. The reform of the system of accrual of benefits, pension and medical reform is envisaged. Considering the

²⁹ Prohrama politychnoji partiji “Blok Petra Poroshenka ‘Solidarnistj’ [The program of the political party “Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity”] Retrieved from: http://solydamist.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/programa_solidarnist.pdf.

³⁰ Prohrama politychnoji partiji “Jevropejsjka Solidarnistj” [European Solidarity Political Party Program] Retrieved from: https://eurosolidarity.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/es_program.pdf.

³¹ Prohrama politychnoji partiji “Jevropejsjka Solidarnistj” [European Solidarity Political Party Program] Retrieved from: https://eurosolidarity.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/es_program.pdf.

results of the analysis of the programme of “Petro Poroshenko Bloc-Solidarity” and “European Solidarity” Party, it can be concluded that the programme documents contain the basic ideological principles of the activities of the party, which are expressed in the activities of the parliamentary fraction.

The programme of the party “Fatherland” has a significant social component. It has a pronounced socialist ideological component. In particular, the programme states that the priority of the party is free medicine and education, raising the minimum pensions and salaries. Attention is drawn to the fact that “The minimum pension will be raised to the level of 3094 UAH. No pensioner will receive the pension less than the minimum subsistence level for the retired approved by law”³².

Particular attention is paid to the tariffs and their obligatory reduction by reducing twice the price of gas. The programme promises to raise salaries for educators and healthcare professionals, ensure payments and increase them to young families with children. In particular, the programme states: “Mortgage loans with insurance from the state fund will make it possible to purchase housing without a down payment and collateral, under special risk insurance. The interest rate on such loans will be no more than 3% per annum. The mortgage loan will be issued for a period of 10 to 30 years”³³.

The priorities of the foreign policy of the All-Ukrainian Union “Fatherland” are the implementation of the Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement and the submission of the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Ukraine. The programme of the party also emphasizes the need to start a negotiation process on the reintegration of annexed Crimea and Russia-occupied Donbas using the “Budapest +

³² Proghrama politychnoji partiji “Vseukrajinsjke ob’jednannja “Batjkivshhyna” [The program of the political party “All-Ukrainian Union” Homeland”] Retrieved from: <https://ba.org.ua/programm/>

³³ Proghrama politychnoji partiji “Vseukrajinsjke ob’jednannja “Batjkivshhyna” [The program of the political party “All-Ukrainian Union” Homeland”] Retrieved from: <https://ba.org.ua/programm/>

formula”, involving such states as the United States and the United Kingdom”³⁴.

The elements of the socialist ideology of the party are also traced in the vision of the basic principles of the implementation of agricultural policy in the state by Fatherland. The party has made it clear that its priority in agricultural policy is to continue the moratorium on the sale of land and support small and medium-sized farms and agricultural enterprises. At the same time, it is stated: “Farmers, small and medium-sized farmers who live and work on land will be able to buy their land without auctions at the expense of preferential loans. People who want to sell their land shares will be able to sell them to the state at market value”³⁵.

On the other hand, the party is a supporter of the development of small and medium-sized businesses, advocating “macro- and micro-crediting of business on European terms”. The programme also states that “VAT will be abolished and replaced with a minimum sales tax like in the USA. Instead of a burdensome income tax, a tax on distributed profit will be introduced. And instead of a single social tax, which holds in the shadow of 50% of salaries, a personalized pension system will be introduced”³⁶.

The party programme does not follow a clear position on important issues of the humanitarian policy of the party, in particular, language, memory policy, religious issues. However, the programmatic position of the party states: “Positive trends in increasing expenditures on cultural financing will be retained and the practice of allocating sufficient funds to finance Ukrainian cinema, books, radio and television content

³⁴ Prohrama politychnoji partiji “Vseukrajinsjke ob’jednannja “Batjkivshhyna” [The program of the political party “All-Ukrainian Union” Homeland”] Retrieved from: <https://ba.org.ua/programm/>

³⁵ Prohrama politychnoji partiji “Vseukrajinsjke ob’jednannja “Batjkivshhyna” [The program of the political party “All-Ukrainian Union” Homeland”] Retrieved from: <https://ba.org.ua/programm/>

³⁶ Prohrama politychnoji partiji “Vseukrajinsjke ob’jednannja “Batjkivshhyna” [The program of the political party “All-Ukrainian Union” Homeland”] Retrieved from: <https://ba.org.ua/programm/>

will continue. By adopting the law on patronage, we will reduce the burden on the state budget and make the system of financing the culture more flexible”³⁷.

Political party “Opposition Platform – For Life” stands out from the general context of the political parties that won the elections as a result of their views on the domestic and foreign policy of Ukraine. The programme of the party reveals the focus of the party on protecting citizens who profess Soviet values and ideals. The programme makes quite contradictory judgments about the political situation: “For five years, the authorities have systematically violated the rights and restricted the freedoms of millions of Ukrainian citizens. The policy of language bans and harassment, the interference of authorities in the affairs of religious communities have split Ukrainian society, degrading the honour and dignity of people. Opposition platform will end the life of discrimination, xenophobia and radicalism”³⁸. Based on this formulation, the party regards the political regime in Ukraine, which emerged from 2014 to 2019, as a “radical regime of xenophobic nature”. Such a statement has all the signs of manipulations and is used by the party as a technological technique to mobilise its electorate and reproduce information messages that dominate the information space of the Russian Federation.

In view of the steps that the party is proposing to overcome political tensions in society, it can be considered reactionary. They include “introducing a moratorium on decision-making that splits the country; a policy of reconciliation and consent that will unite the Ukrainians from the West to the East and from the North to the South and “stitch” the country; repealing anti-constitutional, discriminatory laws on language, education, and renaming the church; decommunization,

³⁷ Proghrama politychnoji partiji “Vseukrajinsjke ob’jednannja “Batjkivshhyna” [The program of the political party “All-Ukrainian Union” Homeland”] Retrieved from: <https://ba.org.ua/programm/>

³⁸ Proghrama politychnoji partiji “Opozycijna platforma – Za zhyttja” [Political party program “Opposition Platform – For Life”] Retrieved from: <http://zagittya.com.ua/ua/page/programma.html>.

lustration and other acts that violate the rights and freedoms of citizens”³⁹.

The basis of economic stability is industrialization. This provision makes a dissonance with the views of other parties that the basis of economic development should be the introduction of the latest information technologies⁴⁰.

The programme of the party contains the signs of ideologies of socialism and social democracy. These are the following theses of the programme: “building a social state”, “reducing gas tariffs for the population of Ukraine”; “raising the subsistence minimum, the minimum salary, the minimum pension”; “raising payments for a childbirth”; “The main priority is the fight against poverty and social protection of the population”; “We will renew privileges and provide decent state aid to all socially vulnerable categories of the population”⁴¹.

In its foreign policy, “Opposition Platform – For Life” focuses entirely on the Russian Federation and advocates: “ensuring active neutrality of Ukraine in the military-political sphere and non-participation in any military-political alliances, as provided for in section IX of the Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine; ending the policy of mutual sanctions and renewing mutually beneficial trade and economic ties with Russia and the CIS countries; reviewing of conditions for the participation of Ukraine in the World Trade Organization and the Free Trade Area with the European Union”⁴².

³⁹ Prohrama politychnoji partiji “Opozycijna platforma – Za zhyttja” [Political party program “Opposition Platform – For Life”] Retrieved from: <http://zagittya.com.ua/ua/page/programma.html>.

⁴⁰ Prohrama politychnoji partiji “Opozycijna platforma – Za zhyttja” [Political party program “Opposition Platform – For Life”] Retrieved from: <http://zagittya.com.ua/ua/page/programma.html>.

⁴¹ Prohrama politychnoji partiji “Opozycijna platforma – Za zhyttja” [Political party program “Opposition Platform – For Life”] Retrieved from: <http://zagittya.com.ua/ua/page/programma.html>.

⁴² Prohrama politychnoji partiji “Opozycijna platforma – Za zhyttja” [Political party program “Opposition Platform – For Life”] Retrieved from: <http://zagittya.com.ua/ua/page/programma.html>.

Thus, the party does not regard the Russian Federation as an aggressor, and considers resolving the conflict in the Donbas as follows: “ensuring direct negotiations in a Kyiv – Donetsk – Lugansk – Moscow quadrangle; ending the economic blockade of Donbas; granting Donbas autonomous status as an integral part of Ukraine by amending the Constitution and laws of Ukraine; adoption of laws: about amnesty, about elections and free economic zone in Donbas. The implementation of the Plan-Concept of crisis management in the South-East of Ukraine is the way of making peace and returning Donbas to Ukraine and Ukraine to Donbas”⁴³.

The analysis of the “Opposition Platform – For Life” programme gives grounds to claim that the party can be conditionally attributed to centre-left parties, and in the party's views on humanitarian politics – to reactionary ones that focus on the electorate, which is nostalgic for the Soviet past.

2. Parliamentary neophytes: Is it better to light a candle than curse the darkness?

One of the important institutions for the implementation of political ideas, their transformation into a strategy of political development of the state, are political parties that, by presenting their ideologies in elections, gain the right to implement them with the support of society.

In such circumstances, the party programme establishes the main ideological tenets of the party and becomes the basis of its ideological activity. However, the analysis of party programmes of political parties of Ukraine, which are represented in the parliament after 2019 elections, shows not only the blurring of party ideologies, the vagueness of ideological provisions and definitions but sometimes also contradictory theses.

For instance, the site of the party “Servant of the People” states that the main values are “transparent activity, openness to the people, the responsibility to the country, and teamwork. Party members should

⁴³ Prohrama politychnoji partiji “Opozycijna platforma – Za zhyttja” [Political party program “Opposition Platform – For Life”] Retrieved from: <http://zagittya.com.ua/ua/page/programma.html>.

always be honest and remain people!” and the aim of the party is to “make the Ukrainians equal before the law, the people's deputies responsible and punish bribe-takers. To give the economy a chance to develop, put the system in order, build a humanitarian policy that unites Ukraine”⁴⁴.

The preamble to the programme of the party does not define the ideological foundations of the “Servant of the People” activities and states that the party “is going to early parliamentary elections to bring decent people to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine who will serve Ukraine and their constituents. We will embody President Zelensky's course in specific bills and political decisions, form a professional government that will be trusted by the people of Ukraine, and together introduce drastic changes that will help us make Ukraine a free, independent, successful Country of Dreams”⁴⁵.

Overall, the programme document contains provisions that characterize both liberal and social-democratic ideologies. So the party stands for deregulation, demonopolization of the economy and at the same time expansion of the social welfare of citizens.

Regarding the reform of state authorities, the party insists on:

- Abolition of parliamentary immunity;
- Introduction of an imperative mandate;
- Creation of a mechanism of popular veto on the just adopted

laws.

As for the last point, the programme does not specify how they can be implemented in Ukraine. It should be noted that the legislative process that took place in the parliament in the so-called “turbo mode” after the beginning of the Verkhovna Rada's work showed that this proposal was a populist promise, which lost its relevance immediately after the formation of the majority;

- Introduction of the mechanism of influence of citizens on the decisions of the government through referendums. This situation also

⁴⁴ Proghrama politychnoji partiji “Slugha narodu” [Servant of the People's Political Party Program] Retrieved from: <https://sluga-narodu.com/>

⁴⁵ Proghrama politychnoji partiji “Slugha narodu” [Servant of the People's Political Party Program] Retrieved from: <https://sluga-narodu.com/>

raises a number of questions. The referendum, as a form of direct democracy, is envisaged by the Constitution of Ukraine. However, the party does not determine what mechanisms will ensure the implementation of this form of democracy;

– Restitution of officials' liability for illegal enrichment. It sounds more like the slogan of all political parties that participated in the 2019 election campaign.

In addition, the political party “Servant of the people” is in favour of introducing a proportional electoral system with open lists and electronic voting. The party considers the introduction of mechanisms that would ensure the independence of journalists from media owners an important task in the field of media activity. At the same time, there are no such mechanisms in the programme of the party.

The main measures to combat corruption, which is a priority task for all parties, “Servant of the People” in the programme of the party indicates the following: “We will implement the maximum possible number of public services online; clean up and restart the prosecutor's office; ensure real independence of anti-corruption bodies; restart ineffective or compromised bodies; introduce mandatory confiscation of corrupt property; introduce a system of financial compensation for citizens for detecting corruption; deprive the Security Service of Ukraine, the Procurator-General and the National Police of non-peculiar business harassment functions”⁴⁶. These provisions are not new in the Ukrainian political space. However, the party does not reflect the specific mechanisms of their implementation in its programme. It is interesting to note the provision on “business harassment” by the Security Service of Ukraine, the Procurator-General and the National Police, as it does not specify in a sufficiently broad formulation which functions of these law enforcement agencies put pressure on entrepreneurship.

In the field of security and defence, the “Servant of the People” Party, using, as in the previous sections of the programme, the verbs of

⁴⁶ Proghrama politychnoji partiji “Slugha narodu” [Servant of the People's Political Party Program] Retrieved from: <https://sluga-narodu.com/>

present and future tenses, promises: “We will provide legislative support to the President's initiatives aimed at restoring the territorial integrity and state sovereignty of Ukraine; establish expenses on defence at the rate of at least 5% of GDP; renew the reformation the Armed Forces by NATO standards; stop the outflow of valuable personnel from the army; introduce a system of training and retraining of soldiers and officers; introduce the harshest penalties for corruption and theft in the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine; decentralize and demonopolise defence public procurement”⁴⁷.

These provisions have manipulative features, in particular regarding the resumption of reforming of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, since their reform process began in 2014 and the budget of the Armed Forces has been steadily increasing since 2015.

In the field of foreign policy, “Servant of the People” acts as a pro-European party supporting the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine. It should be noted that the programme does not define the role of the Russian Federation in the annexation of Crimea, the conflict in the Donbas. The party does not express its attitude to these processes.

In the sphere of culture and national politics, the party intends to implement a humanitarian policy that will promote the cultural, civic and spiritual unification of Ukrainian citizens. At the same time, some statements made by party leaders and some of its members contradict the provisions of the programme of the party, including provisions on linguistic, security and foreign policy.

Furthermore, party leaders cannot determine the party's ideological affiliation. In particular, the leader of the “Servant of the People” at the party congress stated: “Our ideology is libertarian. Will it change? It will be refined since libertarian ideas are not supported by all party members. That is, some compromise should be found between liberal and socialist views”⁴⁸.

⁴⁷ Prohrama politychnoji partiji “Slugha narodu” [Servant of the People's Political Party Program] Retrieved from: <https://sluga-narodu.com/>

⁴⁸ Biljshe ne libertarianci: Kornijenko zajavyv pro zminu ideologhiji “Slughy narodu” [No longer libertarians: Kornienko declared change of ideology of “Servant of the people”]

The party leader recognizes that his organization is not the unity of people who share common values and ideals. In particular, O. Kornienko pointed out that “We have human-centrism. Now, looking at our decisions, we are moving towards democracy, in the direction of increasing opportunities for people. However, there are also conservative points connected with the fact that it is difficult to create liberalism in Ukraine at once”⁴⁹.

Therefore, one can expect the ideological drift of the party in the future, most likely towards socialism. These tendencies, associated with changing party ideology, are normal, given that most parties are universal and try to reach as much of the electorate as possible. Populism is becoming a feature not only of national party projects but of political parties in a global context.

It is worth noting the conscious appeal to utopias: “... together we will introduce drastic changes that will help us make Ukraine a free, independent, successful Country of Dreams”. The purpose of the party is to transform Ukraine into a “utopian” “Country of Dreams”. Thus, the party gains the support not of sympathizers of a particular ideology, but of the politically indeterminate masses who believe in political utopias.

In this sense, the programme of the “Voice” party is quite similar to the programme of “Servants of the People”. It is also characterized by emotionality. However, the programme provisions broadly outline the basic principles, goals and means of achieving the core objectives of the party. The programme also lacks a clear definition of the party's ideological affiliation. Some provisions point to both socialist and liberal ideas. In particular, the party aims to fight the monopolization of the economy, promote the development of an entrepreneurial activity, reduce

Dzerkalo tyzhnja. Retrieved from: https://dt.ua/POLITICS/bilshе-ne-libertarianci-korniyenko-zayaviv-pro-zminu-ideologiyi-slugi-narodu-329152_.html.

⁴⁹ Bilshе ne libertarianci: Kornijenko zajaviv pro zminu ideologhiji “Slughy narodu” [No longer libertarians: Kornienko declared change of ideology of “Servant of the people”] *Dzerkalo tyzhnja*. Retrieved from: https://dt.ua/POLITICS/bilshе-ne-libertarianci-korniyenko-zayaviv-pro-zminu-ideologiyi-slugi-narodu-329152_.html.

the regulatory impact of the state on the economy and build an effective social security system.

The clear ideological affiliation of the party is difficult to determine. This is a hybrid ideology. The programme of the party states that “Voice” goes to politics to return a person to the centre of the state, stop the division into left and right, nationalists and liberals, and unite around people and their indestructible dignity. The citizen Ukraine is above all. The state is in the palm of a person, but not a person in the fist of the state”.

Unlike “Servant of the People”, the party “Voice” does not aim at the fictional “Country of Dreams”. However, the task of its activity is that “We will get rid of what now does not allow Ukraine to spread its wings and move forward. We are realizing the potential of Ukraine that has been talked about for so many years. We are creating strong and innovative Ukraine, a true Eastern European tiger”⁵⁰.

The programme of the party focuses on justice as a social value and a person whose interests are intended to serve the state. Regarding the cultural aspect of social life, the programme of “Voice” states: “In Ukraine, new, modern cultural traditions should be established and finally unite the Ukrainian nation, cementing its identity. We will contribute to the enrichment of national culture with various achievements of global culture. Preservation of authenticity should not interfere with the modernization of culture”⁵¹. This programme statement proves that regarding national matters the party is quite moderate and centrist. Language policy has not been given much attention in the programme of the party. However, this is compensated by a large number of statements made by the party leader S. Vakarchuk in support of the Ukrainian language and its status in society.

The mechanisms for clearing and reforming the judicial system are presented in more details by “Voice” than by “Servant of the People”. In

⁵⁰ Prohrama politychnoji partiji “Gholos” [The Political Party's “Voice” Program] Retrieved from: <https://goloszmin.org/storage/app/media/files/Program.pdf>.

⁵¹ Prohrama politychnoji partiji “Gholos” [The Political Party's “Voice” Program] Retrieved from: <https://goloszmin.org/storage/app/media/files/Program.pdf>.

particular, it is stated in the programme of “Voice” that “to run the changes, you need to restart the system of selecting and supervising judges. The system cannot clean itself. That is why we need to recruit honest and competent judges into the key bodies (the High Qualifications Commission of Judges and the High Council of Justice) and public experts with an impeccable reputation. We will be assisted by international experts, who have already managed to prevent an unprecedented number of unworthy judges in the Anti-Corruption Court...”⁵².

The party in the programmatic provisions is quite positive about the system of anti-corruption bodies established in the state. However, it notes that “at present, these structures are not working smoothly, and the management of SAPO and NABU are not doing their job and playing along with corruptors. We know how to rectify an effective anti-corruption system that will put an end to the impunity of large-scale corruption” (10). To overcome this problem, the party promises to implement a number of measures that are quite broadly outlined in the programme.

In economic policy, the party pays close attention to the IT sector. Thus, the programme contains provisions on the need to adopt the “Digital Freedom Act”⁵³.

The party “Voice” was not an exception among the parties that announced their intentions to fight the oligarchy. In particular, the party's programme states: “A dozen masters of life” have no right to control national policy and information field (four oligarchic groups control about 75% of the country's television market), place their people in key positions in the state and use captured state structures for promotion of interests of their business. We will strike simultaneously at all sources of influence of the oligarchs: economic monopolies, media control and politics. To do this we will apply antitrust legislation, appoint

⁵² Proghrama politychnoji partiji “Gholos” [The Political Party's “Voice” Program] Retrieved from: <https://golozmin.org/storage/app/media/files/Program.pdf>.

⁵³ Proghrama politychnoji partiji “Gholos” [The Political Party's “Voice” Program] Retrieved from: <https://golozmin.org/storage/app/media/files/Program.pdf>.

professionals who are ready to fight the oligarchs into key state regulators and introduce stringent requirements for the editorial independence of the media. We will also harness the potential of modern information technology to effectively collect and analyze information about the members of oligarchic groups”⁵⁴.

Concerning the electoral reform of the electoral system, the positions of the party “Voice” are identical to the positions in the programme of “Servant of the People”.

They promise the following: “We will introduce a long-overdue system of open list elections; the majority system must be abolished. This will open the way to politics for decent and professional people, not a limited number of rich people who can buy a position in the list. We support the abolition of immunity for members of parliament, except in cases where they directly fulfil their functions as legislators and representatives of the people. We are in favour of reducing the number of members of parliament”⁵⁵.

The programme of the party also contains a statement similar to the programme of “Servant of the People” about the need to involve citizens of the state in the process of political decision-making. In particular, the promise of transparency of power is given.

It is determined: “We will open the Parliament; we will increase the participation of citizens in decision-making through the tools of e-democracy. Every citizen will be able to vote on their smartphones, join the distribution of state or local budgets, and evaluate the work of politicians and officials”. It should be noted that these statements are populist.

In foreign policy, similar to “Servant of the People”, “Voice” is focused on the integration with the EU and NATO. But unlike “Servant of the People”, the party “Voice” clearly defines its position regarding the aggressor country.

⁵⁴ Proghrama politychnoji partiji “Gholos” [The Political Party's “Voice” Program] Retrieved from: <https://goloszmin.org/storage/app/media/files/Program.pdf>.

⁵⁵ Proghrama politychnoji partiji “Gholos” [The Political Party's “Voice” Program] Retrieved from: <https://goloszmin.org/storage/app/media/files/Program.pdf>.

The programme states: “We will not surrender positions on the diplomatic front: pressure and isolation of Russia on the world stage must intensify, and Ukraine will return to the European civilizational and security space ... We will use the whole diplomatic arsenal to stop the fire as soon as possible and stabilize the situation in Donbas, and subsequently to restore the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Crimea is Ukraine and it will not become a bargaining chip on any agreements”⁵⁶.

The programme of the party clearly states its position on the role of the Russian Federation as an aggressor and occupier in the conflict in eastern Ukraine.

It is stated: “Our ultimate goal is to return our territories and win the war for the right of Ukraine to self-determination. We strongly oppose any plans that involve the representatives of the terrorist groups in government or local authorities led by the Russian Federation. Peace, bought at the cost of the partial loss of sovereignty in favour of the Russian aggressor, will never be permanent; it can lead to an even greater war in Ukraine. We will do everything necessary for the bloodless de-occupation of the occupied territories and the safe reintegration of the people whom Russia has taken hostage, their return to a normal, dignified life. We need to stop the murder of Ukrainian citizens. It is a crime that Russia is responsible for”.

In his speech at the party congress, S. Vakarchuk described the ideological foundations of the party: “The interests of Ukrainian citizens are above all, the existential choice of Ukraine is Europe, one law for all, a free economy without oligarchs, a power that is accountable to the citizens of Ukraine. These are the ideas. We will reveal the details of these ideas later; you will see them in our programme”⁵⁷.

⁵⁶ Prohrama politychnoji partiji “Gholos” [The Political Party's “Voice” Program] Retrieved from: <https://goloszmin.org/storage/app/media/files/Program.pdf>.

⁵⁷ Vakarchuk ozvuchyv ideologhiju partiji “Gholos” [Vakarchuk voiced the ideology of the Voice Party] *Rubryka*. Retrieved from: <https://rubryka.com/2019/05/16/vakarchuk-ozvuchyv-ideologiyu-partiyi-golos/>

CONCLUSIONS

The study of the programmatic provisions of the political parties of Ukraine, which overcame the barrier as a result of the parliamentary elections, allows us to draw the following conclusions.

First, in Ukraine, the ideological factor is not decisive for winning the parliamentary electoral campaign. The political parties that had positioned themselves as new projects, such as “Servant of the People” and “Voice”, won. They used the non-political popularity and mass recognition of the leader (V. Zelensky, S. Vakarchuk) rather than ideology for electoral support.

Second, such political parties as “European Solidarity”, “Fatherland”, and “Opposition Platform – For Life” have an ideological niche, positioning themselves on the Ukrainian and European ideological map (through participation in the activities of the fractions of the European Parliament). Will this help them gain popularity in the next elections and expand their electoral field? It depends on the actions of the contemporary “party of power”. An important indicator here will be the process of resolving the armed conflict in Donbas;

Third, the newly formed political parties remain the leader parties whose rating engines are their leaders. So far, they have not paid enough attention to positioning in the ideological space, which can have negative effects on their rating. This is a threat especially for the party “Servant of the People” whose rating depends on the personal popularity of V. Zelensky.

Fourth, most “left-centrist-right-wing” parties in their programmes position themselves as centrist parties of liberal or social-democratic orientation. However, insufficient attention is paid to social policy and social protection issues. These issues are presented as a separate section only in the programme of “Opposition Platform – For Life”.

Fifth, in relation to humanitarian policy, according to the programmes of “European Solidarity”, “Fatherland”, and “Voice” parties, they position themselves as national democratic parties. “Opposition Platform – For Life” can be attributed to the parties that profess a Soviet system of ideological values and a Russian-oriented information space.

Sixth, all political parties that won the support of the electorate, except “Opposition Platform – For Life”, have a pro-European orientation, declaring the need to continue the course for European and Euro-Atlantic integration.

Seventh, a characteristic feature of such parties as “Voice” and “Servant of the People” is the virtualisation of their activities and the lack of an extensive organizational regional structure.

The tendency of modern political parties is “the high level of ideological mobility and receptiveness, the ability to integrate individual postulates of competing political ideologies into the programme of a party” (Krojtor, 2012)⁵⁸.

Parliamentary parties balance between (1) the “Ukrainian electoral standard”, which was formed in times of independence and provides formal mentioning of raising salaries and pensions and reducing tariffs, (2) open populism and manipulation to gain the support of the most socially disadvantaged groups and (3) a comprehensive ideological identification following existing ideological matrices and world trends. The results of our study show that the third ones are in absolute minority, and the danger of populism will increase in proportion to the decline in the level of well-being of citizens.

SUMMARY

The article is devoted to the study of political ideology as a factor of formation of the party system of Ukraine based on the analysis of programmes of political parties of Ukraine. The article analyses the programmes of such political parties: “Servant of the People”, “Voice”, “European Solidarity”, “All-Ukrainian Union Fatherland”, “Opposition Platform – For Life”. In the process of parliamentary elections in 2019, ideology was not a determining factor. The “Servant of the People” party, which won by a wide margin and received the majority of votes in parliament, pays little attention to ideology. Internal party discussions

⁵⁸ Krojtor A. V. (2012) Politychna ideologhija jak chynnyk formuvannja partijnoji systemy [Political ideology as a factor in forming the party system] *Aktualjni problemy polityky*, vol. special issue, pp. 36–44.

regarding ideological doctrine have continued so far. On the contrary, parliamentary old-timers, who have a relatively comprehensive ideological doctrine, received minimal electoral support. This is an alarming signal that will lead to a decrease in attention to ideologies in the next elections.

The features of party programmes and their ideological components are determined. It is proved that political parties of Ukraine are parties of universal type with blurred ideological orientations.

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COGNITIVE-COMMUNICATIVE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PERSON IN THE CONTINUUM OF THE INTERNET NETWORK

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INTRODUCTION

It is impossible to imagine the reality without the Internet, social networks and different machines that changes the natural environment of human beings, influences the formation of worldviews and creates a new space-time continuum – a virtual reality, organized on the principle of rhizoma, and they also generate the emergence of new technological means of communication. “In the information society, there is not only a change in production, but also in the whole way of life: cultural leisure is becoming more important, and interest in material values is declining. The main specific feature is the production and consumption of intellect, knowledge, and as a result – the increase of share of mental work. The human being is required to be able to create, and the demand for knowledge increases. Therefore, the human being in the information society is placed in a framework that requires its rules of communication (Naumova, 2012).¹

If the beginning of the XX century is characterized by a “linguistic” turn when speaking is at the center of philosophical reflection, the beginning of the twenty-first century is already characterized by a new turn – “digital” or “network”, when signs receive a completely different semantic load, and the process of communication

¹ Naumova D.N.(2012) O procesah komunikacii sovremennogo obshchestva [On the processes of communication of modern society] *Uchenye zapiski Orlovskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, Series: Gumanitarnye i social'nyenauki*, pp. 139-141.

turns into an interaction with the computer screen. “Virtualization of space is an inevitable solution to the problem of information explosion. A person has gained access to a huge amount of information, has found the ability to instantly exchange products of intellectual work” (Naumova, 2012)².

There is an erosion of printed sources of information, the way of translation and perception of information is transformed, the book culture is replaced by the screen culture because the book in the library by the number of marks on the order significantly loses to the number of likes, which the message on the Internet receives. The linear text gives way to the rhizomatic text, the attributive features of which are decentralization and fragmentation.

1. Virtual Reality is an alternative space of being of the 21st century

The picture of the world disintegrates into fancy fragments, the worldview from the whole and the organized turns into a “clip”, “file”, the main cognitive load slips out of the educational-scientific sources of classical sense and finds itself in the field of virtual network where conformity to truth is no longer a fundamental factor, so there is a high probability of obtaining so-called zero knowledge.

“The phenomenon of virtual reality has become a quite natural stage in the process of evolution of visual communication through media. Today, almost every subject of communication is an active participant of virtualization of communication, management, art, economics, space, money, politics, aesthetics, etc. We can state that the phenomenon of the virtualization gravitates towards worldview and identification status. A special virtual worldview is formed, pushing the boundaries of human abilities and experience, by means of its penetration into the space of

² Naumova D.N.(2012) O procesah komunikacii sovremennogo obshchestva [On the processes of communication of modern society] *Uchenye zapiski Orlovskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, Series: Gumanitarnye i social'nyenauki*, pp. 139-141.

specific non-material influence and the second, non-linear flow of time” (Pryahina, 2018)³.

Virtual reality is rapidly developing and has a significant impact on the development of all spheres of public life, defines the vector of individual self-improvement and self-development of a human being, provides the means and schemes of the transformation of nature, significantly expands the horizons of cognitive and scientific activity. However, along with the obvious advantages, which in cognitive terms the virtual space of the network provides, threats that await people, their mental state in the seductive rhizomatic space of the Internet are undeniable. “Symbolic images and signs, in which the modern man is immersed, have a minimal relation to real life and blur the boundaries of authenticity and fiction” (Badmaev, 2018)⁴.

Virtual reality is a space of existence of simulacra, copies, ersatzers of various qualities. “The processes of simulacra” (J. Baudriard) lead to leveling, the disappearance of reality, replacement of real life and real emotions only with their pale copies. “Carnivals, irony, non-serious attitude even to the traditionally serious things (life, death, birth, beauty and goodness, love, family) form the culture where the simulacrum as a model, changing depending on the purpose of application, and polyontology create multiple reality” (Belyaeva, 2018)⁵.

The tops of our existence is a world in which there is an overabundance of information with a simultaneous lack of meaning (J. Bodriard), which results in the structuring of the sphere of cognitive activity. “Reality becomes visibility, filled with all kinds of images

³ Pryahina A.V. (2018) *Novye tekhnicheskie sredstva kommunikacii v transformacii medijnoj kul'tury informacionnogo obshchestva* [New technical means of communication in the transformation of the media culture of the information society] *Znak: problemnoe pole media obrazovaniya*, pp. 80-85.

⁴ Badmaev V.N., Dzhevakova A.M. (2018) *Postmodernistskoe mirochuvstvovanie sovremenno informacionnogo obshchestva* [Postmodern worldview of the modern information society] *Vestnik AGU № 2* (219), pp. 141–148.

⁵ Belyaeva L.A., Novikova O.N. (2018) “Chelovekigrayushchij” v epohupostmoderna. [“The man playing” in the postmodern] *Idei i Idealy*, № 3(37), pp. 82-91.

through which an individual perceives information. There is a substitution of the signs of the real for the real” (Badmaev, 2018)⁶.

Essential transformations also capture the sphere of scientific and cognitive activity, since in the network you can find a huge array of (scientific) information, which has nothing to do with science, far from the concept of “truth”. It is a kind of “empty” form, devoid of any sense, capable of producing only zero knowledge, but extremely attractive at first sight.

It should be noted that the propagandist discourse of “post-truth” is organically integrated into the post-modernist worldview. Contrary to the postmodern irony of any truths, attention should be paid to a specific paradox of the truth that resembles the well-known paradox of a liar. Let us consider the statement: “The truth does not exist”. Is it false or true? Let us suppose that it is false. Then the truth exists because it is wrong that the truth does not exist. Let us assume that it is true. Then again, the expression “the truth does not exist” is false because there is at least one truth, which is that the truth does not exist. So, anyway, the expression “the truth does not exist” is false.

Information flows permeates all spheres of social functioning, and when it is necessary they are turning into information “tornadoes” (especially demanded in the periods of preparing the consciousness of the population for the change of political elites). These “tornadoes” have a manipulative influence on the consciousness and moods of the electorate, form a picture of reality on predetermined parameters in an axiological matrix that is beneficial for a customer.

The Internet environment offers endless possibilities for obtaining information, the volume of which depends only on the basic training of the person who collects this information. For example, if a person has a sufficient degree of knowledge of foreign languages, they have considerably more resources, the processing of which will ensure the

⁶ Badmaev V.N., Dzhevakova A.M. (2018) Postmodernistskoe mirochuvstvovanie sovremennogo informacionnogo obshchestva [Postmodern worldview of the modern information society] *Vestnik AGU* № 2 (219), pp. 141–148.

removal of appropriate cognitive entropy. However, it should be remembered that the availability of information on the web carries a risk of misunderstanding, as it is difficult to identify true information from false information.

The ways of searching and receiving information are also exposed to essential transformations. Accordingly, the forms of cognition and thinking are changing; the personality loses the usual sense of reality, plunges into the alluring world of virtual existence, which waits for him or her behind the shimmering screens of various gadgets. “A contemporary can't imagine his life without a gadget, a cell phone or the Internet. He is transformed from a human playing – homoludens – into a human homomobilis (to quote A.V. Golovnev), living thanks to information technologies (communications, transport, information) that have changed his ways and forms of activity... “Searching” the sites, he satisfies the eternal craving for innovation, impressions, the change of circumstances and situations. He gets used to the duality of space (so typical of game situations) when everything that happens is simultaneously perceived as real and unreal. Personal communication is more and more replaced by virtual content, a publication with a natural ability to replicate (tweet, tell friends, share in a group, etc.)” (Belyaeva, 2018)⁷.

Chats and forums, blogs and Youtube channels confidently push to the sidelines of everyday life not only live communication with friends and family, but also familiar educational models and techniques, which undoubtedly have a negative impact on the formation of personality. However, it has a positive impact, because there are many opportunities for self-education and self-improvement.

There is a kind of anthropo-axiological turn in education, a sign of which is the increasing role of the subjective factor. In other words, there is an axiological, anthropological and humanitarian reorientation of the educational process because now it is necessary to form not an

⁷ Belyaeva L.A., Novikova O.N. (2018) “Chelovekigrayushchij” v epohupostmoderna. [“The man playing” in the postmodern] *Idei i Idealy*, № 3 (37), pp. 82-91.

“abstract individual”, a “screw” in a certain social system, the attributive features of which were discipline and responsibility to the requirements of society, but a creative, mobile personality in the plural of his abilities and skills. The problems of self-development and self-education of the personality are updated. “Conscious self-development is one of the ways of self-assertion. Under the conditions of the spread of individual freedom and responsibility, self-development becomes not only a necessary but also an irreplaceable subjective factor of its formation and development, socialization and individualization. Without conscious, volitional self-development of an individual, integrity and social maturity of the individual cannot be achieved” (Myronchuk, 2013)⁸. This determines the necessity of qualitative changes in the educational process, the wide use of innovational technologies and the newest methodological approaches, the attraction of information technologies that are able to provide training of high-qualified specialists ensuring welfare and prosperity of the country. But only changes in the educational process are not enough. The problem of forming a new image of a pedagogue is being updated. This pedagogue is aware of cognitive, axiological, praxiological needs of the generation, which was born in the era of globalization, post-modernism and total consumption and is able to accept significant amounts of information, but requires skills to analyze it. That is why the problem-solving style of thinking and the ability to analyze information and highlight the main one become so much in demand.

2. Transformation of communication processes under the influence of the Internet

In the conditions of information infinity, the new picture of the world is forming, and therefore self-realization becomes the vector of

⁸ Myronchuk N.M. (2013) Profesiino-osobystisnyi samorozvytok maibutnoho pedahoha: sutnisni kharakterystyky ta shliakhy formuvannia [Professional-personal self-development of the future teacher: essential characteristics and ways of] *Novi tekhnologii navchannia: nauk.-metod. zb.*, Kyiv, № 76, pp. 209-214.

the orientation of the personal growth in the transient social environment. Self-realization is “the process of the most complete revealing and introduction by people their possibilities, the achievement of the planned goals in the solution of personally significant problems that allows as much as possible to realize creative potential” (Vatkovska)⁹. Through self-actualization, the person is able to transform the environment according to his or her needs, interests, and opportunities. “The need for self-actualization is the highest in the hierarchy of needs. As a result of its satisfaction, the person becomes the one he or she can and should become in this world. The main purpose of a human being is determined together with the creation of his or her personality, his or her self-concept” (Vatkovska)¹⁰. At the same time, there is a growing demand for such personality qualities as independence, flexible thinking, creative approach to solving problems, tolerance, responsibility for his or her behavior, ability to work in a team and make joint decisions.

All of the above-mentioned actualizes the emergence of a new form of learning, which, according to J. Bech, “should be focused on developing the ability to transform information into knowledge, and knowledge into actions. This implies the ability to make decisions about what to look for, how to look for, how to process and how to use the things that have been found, to be able to accomplish the tasks that prompt to searching of information” (Bekh, 2017)¹¹.

Another threat is that the person that is immersed in the Internet-web risks to become a knowledge collector. Instead of using

⁹ Vatkovska M.H. Samorealizatsiia osobystosti: sprobа filosofskoho uzahalnennia [Self-realization of personality: an attempt of philosophical generalization] *Hileia*, № 134, pp. 261-264.

¹⁰ Vatkovska M.H. Samorealizatsiia osobystosti: sprobа filosofskoho uzahalnennia [Self-realization of personality: an attempt of philosophical generalization] *Hileia*, № 134, pp. 261-264.

¹¹ Bekh Yu. (2017) Smyslohenez yak systemoutvoriuiuchy chynnyk morfolohii merezhevoho suspilstva [Sense ogenesis as a system-forming factor in the morphology of a network society] *Nova paradyhma* № 132, pp. 3-14.

what this person has learned, he or she wants to receive as much information as possible, and the quality of what he or she has learned is substantially inferior to the quantity. A paradoxical situation is created when becoming more educated a person does not become an intellectual, information does not transform into knowledge, the cognitive abilities of a person are leveled, in particular the ability to critically analyze information. In the language, the computer slang starts prevailing.

The role of the Internet in the process of socialization and personality formation is significantly increasing, wherein the personality formation is determined by the following factors:

1) The Internet becomes an almost endless source of information, promotes the expansion of the cognitive personal horizon, and transforms the value system and worldview orientations;

2) it provides unlimited opportunities for communication;

3) it forms both individual position and public opinion.

At the same time, it is important to remember that the Internet is a continuum of Text, where the constant virtuoso play of what it is and what it is meant is perceived as the norm, semantics is enigmatical, codes and ciphers are dominant over the meaning and common sense. “In the written and book era, the text contained the most important spiritual values of culture and society. However, in the XXI century, the book text loses its exceptional importance because it ceases to be morally canonical. Today, the new media text is different: it can be understood as a changeable object that is transforming and containing references to other texts, as an object that can be mistaken and therefore can be corrected (Pryahina, 2018)¹². Here we should remember the paradoxical thought of L. Tolstoy, who in his novel “War and Peace”

¹² Pryahina A.V. (2018) *Novye tekhnicheskie sredstva kommunikacii v transformacii medijnoj kul'tury informacionnogo obshchestva* [New technical means of communication in the transformation of the media culture of the information society] *Znak: problemnoe pole media obrazovaniya*, pp. 80-85.

called printing “a powerful weapon of ignorance”! It is hard to imagine what the great writer would say about the Internet. Therefore, it is not surprising that communication on the Internet is carried out without taking into account the requirements of laws and principles of logic because in this “proteus space” of the network (J. Baudriard) we can juggle not only masks, nicknames, avatars, but also senses, strengthening or even leveling the senses depending on the purpose of the communicative act.

In a virtual world ruled by anonymity, interactivity, fragmentariness, simulacra lost their illusiveness a long time ago, and turn into ordinary and convenient ontological-existential matrices, disseminated and understandable clichés thanks to which a new worldview paradigm is creating and a new dimension of being – virtual being is forming. “A person's virtual existence makes him or her dependent on the sociocultural and anthropological sense. It forms an attitude to life as a game in which it is possible to easily change situations and receive diverse sensations and emotional states” (Belyaeva, 2018)¹³. All these factors lead to the fact that real communication based on rational principles can quickly succumb to virtual communication, which is extremely mobile. For virtual communication, there are no space-time limits, so it quickly spreads to all spheres of life of a person as well as the society.

“Modern society is too large for direct contact between its members, therefore communication is mediated by social institutions, organizations and the devices that transmit and receive information. Means of communication, besides their direct purpose, serve secondary purposes: create images and stereotypes, form an ideology, promote the sale of goods through advertising. Control mechanisms are changing. A human gets used to being constantly controlled because we do not

¹³ Belyaeva L.A., Novikova O.N. (2018) “Chelovekigrayushchij” v epohupostmoderna. [“The man playing” in the postmodern] *Idei i Idealy*, № 3 (37), pp. 82-91.

always understand what the controlling device is. Accordingly, new behavioral skills are being developed” (Luhynyna, 2016)¹⁴.

CONCLUSIONS

Internet communications become the dominant communicative model. Internet communications “are technologies of information design and realization of communicative goals of traditional forms models and types of communication that have emerged as a result of attracting new extra-linguistic (social, political, historical, ethnic, cultural communicative and medial) factors and realities to the communicative space (computer and computer networks)” (Bilan, 2015)¹⁵.

“The Internet is a universal channel of communication; it is accumulating the possibilities of all mass media and creating opportunities for communication in a new environment. The Internet initiates changes in the social structure of society, creating new communities united by new characteristics” (Bilan, 2011)¹⁶ In terms of resources and heuristic-communicative potential, production and retransmission of information, the great importance of the Internet is certainly a perfect tool for cognition, communication and production, but there is a narrow line between positive and negative consequences of the network. The temptation to provide the virtual image with hypertrophied meaning is dangerous for the society as well as for a person. Considerable collisions, intellectual and emotional-existential alienation, the domination of computer reality objects over objects of the natural world can become the consequences of the above-mentioned temptation. One more danger is that unreliability of those masses of information that

¹⁴ Luhynyna A.H. (2016) Modeli setevykh obshestv v postindustrialnykh iinformatsionnykh koncepciyah [Models of network societies in postindustrial and informational concepts] *Scientific journal KubGAU, № 120 (06)*.

¹⁵ Bilan N. (2015) Osoblyvosti Internet-komunikatsii [Features of Internet communication] *Naukovi zapysky instytutu zhurnalistyky, Vol. 59, pp. 51-54*.

¹⁶ Bilan N. (2011) Internet yak prostir riznykh vydiv sotsialnykh komunikatsii [The Internet as a space for various types of social communications] *Aktualni problemy mizhnarodnykh vidnosyn, № 103(1), pp. 46-50*.

are received thanks to the Internet, generates hyper-criticism and promotes the gradual formation of value orientation of almost total distrust to any source of information.

It is interesting that hyper-criticality is becoming a kind of protest against manipulative media technologies. Once, one of the authors conducted in-depth interviewing with the participants of the events in Lugansk 2014. To the question “Did you differentiate the truth from lies in the flows information? a respondent replied: “The most important principle is not to believe what you have not seen by yourself. And even sometimes do not believe what you see”. It should be emphasized that this opinion was expressed not just by a participant of the events, but by a fighter of a volunteer battalion.

To conclude, thanks to Internet resources and communication in the network space, there is not only the formation of scientific systems and the creation of scientific strategies, but also the danger of losing cognitive capital and the transformation of the person who is cognizing to the information collector.

SUMMARY

The article deals with the influence of the Internet and social networks on the basic spheres of human life. First of all – communicative, cognitive, social. Virtual reality is analyzed. Signs receive a different semantic load. The communication process becomes an interaction with the computer screen. The argument about the formation of a “clip”, “fragmentary” outlook, which replaces a holistic, organized outlook. It also proves that the ways of finding and obtaining information are also subject to significant transformations, and the forms of cognition and thinking change accordingly.

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MODERN ASPECTS OF EU REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY

Palinchak M. M.

INTRODUCTION

EU regional policy has been characterized by a history describing a period of over 50 years. Its essential filling has been transformed within this period. Initially, it was shaped around the implementation of infrastructure projects, and later became deeply meaningful in the form of the “Europe of the Regions” concept, which is the result of regional interactions deepening and complicating relations in the global competitive environment. Nowadays the importance of the “Europe of the Regions” is growing in the context of EU regional policy relative to subnational entities and in the geopolitical dimension as a whole.

In scientific literature much attention has been focused on the region as a structural unit of the integration union. It is often seen as a link between national member states with the EU as a coherent supranational entity. There are many representatives of foreign scientific environment and scientists-economists from Ukraine among well-known researchers, studying the EU regions and the policies of the countries of regional character, e.g. EU regional policy has been considered by Y. Wannop, Z. Gerasymchuk, M. Dolishniy, M. McGinnis, D. Palma, M. Porter, G. Richardson, M. Storper, R. Walker, S. Hardy, M. Hart, V. Chuzhikov and others. However, as globalization and integration processes are becoming stronger in the global economic environment, new aspects of regional development and interaction are constantly emerging. The European Union is forced to monitor the necessary changes in regional policy constantly in order to be able to respond effectively to the challenges of the global economic environment and to be a fully-fledged strong player.

1. Transformation of Regional Policy in the EU

There are various interpretations of the concept “region” in scientific literature, particularly in regional studies, and namely:

1. The part of the country (region, district) that differs from the others in certain ways: natural-climatic, economic-geographical and others, which are considered in combination with the peculiarities of the national composition of the population.

2. Spatially organized form of population life activity, including the spheres of residence, professional and labor activity, managed from a single center and united by numerous links (industrial, political, socio-economic, cultural, ethnic, etc.) on the basis of self-management and full realization of their rights as a subject of socio-political life.

3. A large taxonomic unit of the production-territorial structure of the country and a form of organization of production and social life of the population, which is characterized by geoeconomic, geopolitical, production-economic, cultural-ethnic, dynamic characteristics.

4. Territory within the administrative boundaries of a particular country, characterized by the complexity, integrity, specialization and controllability, that is, the presence of political and administrative governing bodies¹.

On the basis of such approaches, the characteristic features of the region have been distinguished. The most important of them are:

- the unity and integrity of the region;
- community and unity of the economy;
- comprehensive economy;
- availability of population possessing appropriate education, qualification and traditional production skills;
- entering the market and using the actual amount of labor, land, capital;
- specialization;

¹ Бутов В.И., Игнатов В.Г., Кетова Н.П. Основы региональной экономики. Москва, Ростов-на-Дону : Мар, 2000. 448 с.

– controllability that implies the functioning of political and administrative governing bodies².

Most often the “region” is considered within the national boundaries, although the variety of ways of its interpreting goes beyond the state level. That is, the region may be a state as a whole, and several states being close in character, criteria of analysis or practice.

The concept of regional policy is a complex and multidimensional concept. The regional policy of the European Union (further – EU), also referred as Cohesion Policy, is a policy with the stated aim of improving the economic well-being of regions in the EU and also to avoid regional disparities³.

It is a policy aimed at managing economic, political and social development within the region in order to achieve the set goals complemented simultaneously with the crystallization process along with the dynamic changes of the EU development as a separate integration group within the world economy. The achievement of the goals is partly due to the interaction of the regions with each other.

O. Polikarpova analyzed the transformation of the EU Regional Policy objectives within the period from 2000 to 2020 (see Table 1).

Table 1 demonstrates that for three periods the main long-term goal is a policy of disparities balancing in the development of EU regions, along with the quality of domestic economic development improving in the first period, consolidation processes – in the second, and enhancing the EU's potential as a subject of international economic relations – in the third period.

The focus of the European Union on regional development has been also changed. Transformation of regional development policy is shown on Figure 1.

² Регіональна політика Європейського Союзу : підручник / за ред. В. Чужикова. Київ : КНЕУ, 2016. 495 с.

³ Regional policy of the European Union. URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regional_policy_of_the_European_Union

Table 1

Transformation of EU regional policy objectives in 2000-2020⁴

Regional policy objectives		
2000-2006	2007-2013	2014-2020
Promoting of development and structural regulation of lagging regions	Convergence and competitiveness	Increasing economic growth and investment, poverty reduction
Supporting the economic and social transformation of areas facing structural difficulties	Regional competitiveness and employment at regional and national level	Research and innovation, development of information and communication technologies
Support of adaptation and modernization policies, training and employment	European territorial cooperation	Resources and environment protection, as well as strengthening institutional capacity

Regional policy is an EU tool for local investment. It is directed to boost the economic growth and jobs and improve the life quality. Thanks to this active form of EU solidarity, people in less developed regions can seize the opportunities raised by the largest market in the world.

EU regional policy works to make a difference in five key areas:

- investing in people by supporting access to employment, education and social inclusion opportunities;
- supporting the development of small and medium size businesses;
- strengthening research and innovation through investment and research-related jobs;
- improving the environment through major investment projects;

⁴ Полікарпова О. Регіональна політика ЄС: практичний досвід для України. *Вісник THEV*. 2015. № 3. С. 101-110.




Figure 1. Transformation of regional policy in the EU since 1960⁵

- modernising transport and energy production to fight against climate change, with a focus on renewable energy and innovative transport infrastructure⁶.

Regional policy is not just an economic policy, it covers, as mentioned above, social issues, namely employment, education and skills, which is particularly important. The development of small and medium-sized enterprises, innovative issues and supporting of various types of research are of great importance. These issues are complemented by environmental protection issues that at first glance appear to be separated from regional development. It is gratifying that the European

⁵ Innovative strategies of territorial development of V4: Experience for Ukraine / Y. Savelyev, I. Lishchynskyy, M. Lyzun, K. Borsekova, M. Sokolowicz, K. Vitališova, Y. Kurylyak. Ternopil: Terno-graf, 2016. 216 p.

⁶ Regional policy. Regional investment and solidarity. URL: Regional Policy https://europa.eu/european-union/topics/regional-policy_en

Union is building its policy in an integrated way, taking into account the fundamental aspects of sustainable development policy.

More than one third of the EU's budget is devoted to this policy, which aims to remove economic, social and territorial disparities across the EU, restructure declining industrial areas and diversify rural areas which have declining agriculture. In doing so, EU regional policy is geared towards making regions more competitive, fostering economic growth and creating new jobs⁷.

It is important to realize that the latest EU enlargement has resulted in a 10% increase in production, a 22% increase in population, 5% – in agriculture and 30% – in the number of unemployed. The population of regions with GDP per capita less than a third of the EU average has risen to 62 million (20% of the EU population)⁸. Such indicators further actualize the alignment of intra-regional EU asymmetries. In general, disproportionality is reflected in the indicators of living standards and economic development, which have only deepened with each phase of expansion⁸. On the one hand, the EU has expanded its potential and scope in the world economy, while on the other it was complemented by some economically backward regions and countries where domestic conflicts took place. Regions with varying duration of economic policy making and formation, specialization specificities, ethnic differences, which often result in civilizational clashes or interpenetrations, have begun to be clearly observed.

Currently, according to GDP per capita indicator (calculated on the PPP), EU countries are quantitatively divided into the following groups:

1. 10 relatively affluent countries in Western and Northern Europe (which include Ireland) with GDP per capita of more than 110% of the EU average;

⁷ Regional policy of the European Union. URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regional_policy_of_the_European_Union

⁸ Поліщук Л.С. Регіональні симетрії в ЄС та нові інструменти політики вирівнювання. *Актуальні проблеми міжнародних відносин*. 2015. Вип. 126 (част. II). С. 116-124.

2. Italy and Germany, where the GDP per capita is higher than the European average, in highly developed regions and “problem areas” (respectively in the south and east);

3. 7 small and medium-sized Mediterranean countries (including Spain and Slovenia) where GDP per capita is below the European average, but the gap does not exceed 30%;

4. 9 Eastern European countries where GDP per capita has fluctuated from 30 to 70% of the EU average in recent years.

2. Structural Funds as Mechanisms of Regional Policy Implementation

Asymmetry overcoming in the EU requires the costs of the Structural Funds and the development of equalization mechanisms⁸.

Within the period from 2014 to 2020 the European regional policy has been closely connected with the activity of three funds: the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), The European Social Fund (ESF) and the Cohesion Fund (CF). Their activities are often compared or viewed within the context of other funds, such as the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) and the Youth Employment Initiative (YEI). The percentage of allocation of these funds’ financing processes within the period from 2014 to 2020 is shown at Figure 2.

The largest amounts of funding are provided by the European Regional Development Fund. The European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development ranks second in terms of funds. They are immediately followed by the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund. Together, these 4 funds account for 97.2% of the funds. In fact, they are the main financial instruments for implementing EU regional development policy.

It is important to examine in greater detail the competence of each fund in the field of regional policy implementation.

The aim of the European Regional Development Fund’s activity is to reduce the economic and social imbalances between the EU regions. The central part is occupied by the attention to research and innovation, small and medium entrepreneurship, digital and the low-carbon economy.

Combined approach of the European Regional Development Fund to financing these spheres in different types of regions is worth our attention. So, the amount of resources allocated by the ERDF depends on the level of the region development. The ERDF resources allocated to these priorities will depend on the category of region. At least 80 % of funds must focus on at least two of these priorities in more developed regions. In transition regions, this index is 60 % of the funds and 50 % – in less developed regions.




Figure 2. Allocation of funds of EU Structural Funds for the period 2014-2020,%⁹

A differentiated approach is also maintained for financing low-carbon economy projects. 20% of the allocated funds are sent to the developed regions, 15% – to the transition regions and 12% – to the less

⁹ European Structural and Investment Funds. EU Overview. URL: <https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/overview#>

developed ones¹⁰. It is gratifying to note that a feature of EU regional policy is that the least developed regions, although less involved in the priority areas of the EU economy, are not deprived of them.

One of the important goals of the European Regional Development Fund is to reduce the importance of borders within Europe. Reducing the importance of borders is important both between and within EU countries. The ERDF can achieve this goal by activating regional cooperation, and namely: cross-border, transnational and interregional cooperation. This trend can be developed in the form of cross-border and transnational as well as interregional cooperation.

The European Social Fund is busy with the poverty problem and its solution. Much attention has been devoted to the education issue. This fund is oriented to help people who are in the risk group according to the poverty as a result of education, training and employment issues increasing¹¹.

During the specified period from 2014 to 2020 the activities of the European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund are oriented differently to different regions of the European Union. At figure 3 the eligibility of the funds is marked by the color.

Figure 3 shows that most of these funds are directed to the least developed regions where GDP per capita is less than the EU-27 and transitional economies, where GDP per capita is more than 75% and less than 90% of the EU – 27 average. It is important to note that, to a lesser extent, attention is also paid to developed regions where GDP per capita is more than 90% of the EU – 27 average. That is, Structural Funds contribute to both narrowing the gap between levels of regional development and maintaining high levels of development. In general, it influences the unity and mutual understanding of the regions and the

¹⁰ European Regional Development Fund. The ERDF aims to strengthen economic and social cohesion in the European Union by correcting imbalances between its regions. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/funding/erdf/

¹¹ A Europe of the regions – What is EU Regional Policy? URL: <http://hum.port.ac.uk/europeanstudieshub/learning/module-3-governance-in-a-multi-level-europe/a-europe-of-the-regions-what-is-eu-regional-policy/>

strength of such an integration structure and its position in the market. This completely dispels the myth that only the least developed countries benefit from the structural funds' financing of the regional development, while the largest financial contributions are made by the developed countries. In 2017, 11 EU countries – the richest – paid more into the EU budget than what they received back in EU funding¹².




Figure 3. The eligibility of the Structural Funds (ERDF and ESF) within the period from 2014 to 2020¹³

¹² 10 myths and facts about EU Cohesion policy URL: https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/what/myth-busting/

¹³ My Region, my Europe, our Future. Seventh report on economic, social and territorial cohesion / L. Dijkstra, European Commission, Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy. Luxembourg : Publications Office of the European Union, 2017. 220 p.

Even if these countries do not receive so much direct financial benefits, they can enjoy the opportunities created in this way throughout the European Union, namely they live in a stable economic and political environment within the EU with the appropriate level of security. The implementation of infrastructure projects also creates the appropriate conditions from which developed regions benefit and can focus on integration freedoms ensuring. This myth is also debunked by international trade, whose growth confirms the involvement of both the underdeveloped and developed EU regions.

The aim of the Cohesion Fund activity is to help the regions whose GNI/inhabitant is less than 90% of the EU average to approach towards the richer regions. Regions of this kind are: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

Financial resources of the Cohesion Fund (€ 63.4 billion for the 2014-2020 period) are allocated to specific areas. One of the priorities is the direction of trans-European transport networks. The European Union pays much attention to infrastructure projects in the framework of the cooperation with the Connecting Europe Facility, whose main objective is a high level of connectivity between European Union member states. Much attention is paid by the European Union to the environment and ecological issues, which are also part of the Cohesion Fund's competence. The Cohesion Fund supports projects related to energy or transport, developing rail transport, supporting intermodality, strengthening public transport etc.¹⁴

Generally, it can be noted that the investment priorities of the Cohesion Fund are all measures that contribute to the development of:

- a low-carbon economy;
- climate change adaptation, risk prevention and management;
- environmental protection/conservation;

¹⁴ Cohesion Fund. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/funding/cohesion-fund/

– sustainable transport and removing bottlenecks¹⁵.

The European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund mainly implement the largest projects in the field of EU regional policy. ‘Major Projects’ are usually large-scale infrastructure projects in transport, environment and other sectors such as culture, education, energy or ICT¹⁶. More than € 50 million is being allocated for their implementation. It is important to consider the degree of the largest projects implementation by EU regions (see Figure 4).




Figure 4. Participation of countries in the implementation of EU regional development projects¹⁶

Figure 4 shows that countries are involved differently in various regional policy development projects. Poland, Romania and Italy are most involved in this process. In Poland and Italy, the implemented projects prevail, in Romania – those that have not been completed. Participation of other countries is less active and there is no clear trend

¹⁵ Cohesion Fund (2014-20) URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=legisum:2602_2

¹⁶ Major projects. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/projects/major/

for project implementation or non-implementation. It depends on various factors inherent in countries.

The total budget of the EU Structural Funds (European Regional Development Fund, Cohesion Fund, European Social Fund) for the period from 2014 to 2020 is \$ 314.88 billion¹⁷. The budget is aimed at strengthening the link between cohesion policy and other common policies of the European Union, as well as developing smart strategies, job creation, tackling climate change and energy dependency, poverty reduction and social exclusion.

It is important to note that the process of regionalization is closely connected with the governance processes in the European Union. It should be clearly understood that regionalism is a reflection of the decentralization process, which entails the transfer of powers to regional authorities and is based on the principle of subsidiarity¹⁸. The cohesion policy 2014-2020 is aimed at creating strategic and institutional capacity, democratic legitimacy, strengthening administrative capacity. 67.2% of the total budget is allocated to this¹⁷.

The EU regional policy is not isolated but organically integrated into the overall economic policy of the integration group. Therefore, the threats affecting the EU economy as a whole undoubtedly transform the EU's regional policy. It should be noted that a comprehensive study of EU threats to be monitored has received little attention in scientific literature. The importance of permanent monitoring of the level of regional development is increasing in the context of transformational processes concerning regional development policy and the manifestation of economic crisis processes, which are much easier spread around the world as a result of globalization. A permanent monitoring approach would allow to systematize and develop preventative measures for the

¹⁷ Полікарпова О. Регіональна політика ЄС: практичний досвід для України. *Вісник THEV*. 2015. № 3. С. 101-110.

¹⁸ European Commission. Regional policy Inforegio website: EU cohesion funding – key statistics, Available budget 2014-2020. URL: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/thefunds/funding/index_en.cfm

future. The current threats that already exist and the need of immediate resolution are identified most often.

Systematizing key threats and challenges of the EU functioning, L. Dorosh and O. Ivasechko distinguish their internal and external nature, while not forgetting their interdependence. Predominantly internal problems include the institutional crisis (the Brexit problem and making of a future vision for the EU's development) and the economic challenges that are partly influenced by the external factors. Key external threats include increased security challenges in the light of the latest hybrid conflicts in the region, the rise to power of D. Trump in the United States, terrorism as a way of destabilizing the internal situation in EU member states. Among the factors that undermine internal stability in the EU is, of course, the issue of the migration crisis. These factors indirectly affect the migration situation and politics, but are more concerned with social policy and the financial aspects of its implementation. Challenges of 2017 – 2018 include the possibility of launching a domino effect and increasing the tendency to withdraw from the Union of other states, the inability of its Member States to pursue a coordinated common domestic and foreign policy¹⁹.

Overcoming current threats, the institutional structures of the European Union are carrying out planned regional development projects, but are not able to pay more attention to regional aspects of the Union's economic policies. In other words, the challenges of modern EU development are hampering the effective development of EU regional policy. Without the current challenges and threats, it could be argued that European regional development policy would have developed at a much faster pace.

It is advantageous and worth considering to re-establish positive experience by developing priority directions for regional policy prospects for the next seven-year period 2021-2027. Such priority areas of

¹⁹ Дорощ Л., Івасечко О. Особливості функціонування та виклики розвитку ЄС у близькій перспективі (2017-2018 рр.). *Політичні науки*. 2017. № 3. С. 19-24.

development are being developed taking into account the strategic goals and the challenges of today.

One of the areas of investment of the European Regional Development Fund and the European Cohesion Fund will remain the sphere of innovation. The process of digitization of the EU economy, the development of industrial technologies, entrepreneurship, especially small business will continue too. Emphasis will be placed on education and the employment of youth, migration issues, climate change control and the development of a low carbon economy. Cohesion support policies will continue to be maintained for all EU regions, and further efforts will be made to reduce disparities and promote low-income and low-growth catching-up regions. A feature of the 7-year future policy is to simplify procedures for re-orienting funds to more urgent issues in the case of need and to simplify the administration of EU spending as a whole²⁰. The anticipated result of this approach is to make the European Union smarter, greener, carbon free, social more connected and closer to citizens²¹.

In the context of integration aspirations realization, Ukraine has been building its relations with the European Union for a long time. These relationships are multidimensional and are often characterized by activation or on the contrary by retardment. These are not just economic or in particular integration issues, and they have often geopolitical character.

The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement has become an instrument for bringing Ukraine and the EU closer. This Agreement is an opportunity for cooperation in the regional aspect, an opportunity for united confrontation to global challenges that are equally confronting both Ukraine and the EU.

As a result of signing the Association Agreement, it can be stated with confidence that regional cooperation between Ukraine and the EU is

²⁰ Куйбіда В. С., Федулова Л. І. Нова регіональна політика ЄС: уроки для України : аналіт.зап. Київ : НАДУ, 2019. 24 с.

²¹ New Cohesion policy URL: https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/2021_2027/

not limited to the state level, but develops at the level of individual administrative-territorial units. It has been stated in the Article 446 of the Association Agreement that “the Parties shall promote mutual understanding and bilateral cooperation in the field of regional policy concerning the methods of formulation and implementation of regional policies, in particular multilevel governance and partnership, with particular emphasis on the development of backward territories and territorial co-operation, while creating communication channels and enhancing the exchange of information between national, regional and local authorities, socio-economic entities and civil society representatives”²².

The deepening of cooperation between Ukraine and the EU in the regional aspect implies active cooperation of regional and local authorities. This requires the development of a clear legislative framework that will assist Ukraine's European integration steps in the future, as well as deepening cross-border and border links between regional units, often in the form of joint programs and projects, meetings and exchanges of experience. The regional level has multidimensional directions for the development of integration processes. Such areas as transport, energy, communications networks, culture, education, tourism, health care and the coordination of emergency services are particularly effective in this regard²³.

In general, the European Union's experience in the field of regional policy points to the importance of certain aspects²⁴, in particular:

1. **High importance of economic framework conditions.** The success of economic development depends on ensuring of equal conditions for economic actors of different levels. Within the framework

²² Угода про Асоціацію між Україною, з однієї сторони, та Європейським Союзом, Європейським співтовариством з атомної енергії і їхніми державами-членами, з іншої сторони. URL: http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/984_011

²³ Куриляк М.Ю. Еволюція концепції «Європи регіонів» у рамках регіональної політики ЄС. *Економічний вісник Донбасу*. 2018. № 2 (52). С. 60-67.

²⁴ Європейська регіональна політика: натхнення для країн, що не входять до ЄС? Застосування принципів та обмін досвідом. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/international/external_uk

of regional policy, it is advantageous to combine the cooperation of entities at the micro and macro levels within the framework of joint implementation of the general economic strategy.

2. Strategies and programs should be adapted to the current state of affairs. Prospective programs and strategies should be tailored to the needs and current challenges of the regional level. Otherwise they are doomed not to be successful.

3. The importance of the stable budgets and consistent programming. The advantage of the European Union is the development of a seven-year budgetary strategy that allows the planning and implementation of long-term investment into regional development and policy. This approach allows a more careful planning and adjustment of expenditures in program implementation and budget expenditures.

4. The need for international cooperation. EU experience shows that the implementation and promotion of cross-border, transnational and interregional cooperation, which are important elements of regional policy, contribute to the development of constructive interaction between regions within and outside the neighboring countries. This in turn gives benefits not only in the economic and political spheres, but also in the social, cultural, spiritual and others.

5. Economics of agglomerations and urbanization. It is also an important component of European regional development policy. Although the region of Europe is a central focus of economic policy, particular attention is paid to the development of large cities as centers of innovative development and key drivers of economic growth.

6. The role of small and medium-sized cities and local centers. In the context of regional policy, the EU pays much attention to the polycentric development, where identical attention is given to small and medium-sized cities alongside to large cities. They provide connectivity with major cities and the dissemination of economic developments that have passed their lifecycle in major cities and continue them in downtowns with lower levels of urbanization. The EU is spending a lot

of effort to develop rural areas and prevent significant depopulation processes, understanding all the threats that may be posed.

7. Local employment and capacity building initiatives. First and foremost such initiatives are connected with the development of the backward regions where the poverty issue is particularly actual. Overcoming the imbalances of regional territorial development implies an increase in the level of employment and, accordingly, the well-being of citizens living in these regions, and in general the level of their economic development, which lays the foundation for their future development, taking into account the challenges of today.

8. Strong institutional support. In order to achieve the successful implementation of regional initiatives, the institutional mechanism should function coherently and be well coordinated. The institutional mechanism includes both the institutions directly or indirectly involved in the implementation of EU regional policy, and the links between them, the activities of which are aimed at achieving the set of goals of regional development and securing the interests of actors of different levels and fields of activity.

9. Multilevel management. This type of management includes vertical and horizontal elements that activate integration processes.

Within the vertical management system, various levels of European, national, regional and local governments are being promoted through a plan and program development system that has developed over the years to provide information sharing and one-way traffic for local benefits. Within the horizontal management system of the company, social groups and civic organizations are actively involved in the process and activities of governing bodies²⁴.

CONCLUSIONS

The EU's regional policy has undergone significant transformations during its existence, evolving from a policy of a united Europe to create a favorable economic environment to a policy of united potential of a strong player in the international arena. The strategic goals of EU regional policy were to ensure the economic

growth of the community as a single integration group and a correspondingly high level of citizens' well-being. The overarching goals remained unchanged, while the interim goals that ensured the implementation of the chosen strategy were adjusted according to the current situation and the global economic environment. The European Union is making continuous efforts to minimize the disproportionate and asymmetric development of EU regions, facilitating the management and regulation of individual processes. The main tools are the EU Structural Funds financial mechanisms that implement regional development programs differing in several levels of development. It is important to take into account the inconsistency of individual myths about the inefficiency of regional policy and the overriding focus on underdeveloped regions. Indirect benefits also come from developed regions, which are more involved in the financing and implementation of EU regional policy. Certain regional policy approaches may be exemplary for countries, including Ukraine, for the interaction of regions in order to strengthen the integrity and economic potential of the subject of international relations.

SUMMARY

The main aspects of the EU regional policy transformation have been considered by the author. The essence and main characteristics of the region have been analyzed. Today the region is of great importance in the global economic environment, so much attention has been paid to regional policy. The transformation of the goals of EU regional policy during 2000-2020 has been analyzed by the author. The Structural Funds are the financial mechanism for the implementation of EU regional policy. They help to reduce imbalances in the levels of development of the regions, to support the high level of development of the rich ones, which affects the unity and cooperation of the regions. The EU regional policy is an integral part of the overall economic policy of the integration grouping and is influenced by the threats of the EU economy as a whole. The importance of permanent monitoring the level of regional development in the context of transformation processes and the

manifestation of economic crisis phenomena in the era of globalization has been emphasized by the author. That will allow timely response to threats and preventive measures working-out. Some elements of the EU regional policy experience can be applied to regional development policy in Ukraine.

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SIMILAR MENTALITY AND PERCEPTION IN THE CONTEXT OF CONTEMPORARY UKRAINE-POLAND RELATIONS

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INTRODUCTION

To date, Ukraine-Poland relations are recognized as being a topic of paramount importance in both print and electronic media; it has become a matter of special interest to ordinary citizenry in both Poland and Ukraine. In addition, it is quite justifiable, because since the late 90s of the twentieth century the Republic of Poland, bordering on Ukraine, has become its reliable strategic partner. Remarkable features of the established Ukraine-Poland relations are developing mutually beneficial economic cooperation, building effective political momentum, having geographical proximity, cultural and language similarities, as well as the presence of a large Ukrainian national minority in Poland and the Polish one in Ukraine respectively. Thus, a growing body of evidence speaks for Ukraine-Poland relations, providing a great boost to their ongoing political confidence-building narrative as an indispensable part of cross-border cooperation strategies for their sustainable development. However, it is now well established that sharing common pools of memories and historical past can impair interstate coherence and empathy.

Consequently, a challenging problem, which arises in this domain, is an established negative and adverse stereotype and psychological make-up of a Ukrainian in the Republic of Poland and a Pole in Ukraine, which in its turn becomes a powerful tool of influencing interethnic relations. In a broader perspective, two-country's different perceptions of their historical trauma serves as a litmus test determining the tone and tenor of bilateral rapprochement. On the transboundary level, the pragmatic search for joint solutions to common local problems "how to

integrate actors representing different sectors (public, private, societal) and cultures into existing patterns and structures of cooperation, how to create and manage inter-sectoral synergies in a cross-border perspective¹ is required.

Noteworthy, the peculiarities of mentality mapping and the moral landscape of two nations immediately influence different interpretations of the shared historical memory and the experience of interaction between the two nations in the neighboring countries. Accordingly, the present study extends on mentality-focused approach to evolution of socio-historical stereotypes as well as the interrelationship and conflict-solving strategy in terms of historical memory of neighboring peoples. Furthermore, to embrace and evaluate state-of-the-art of the Ukraine-Poland interethnic and interstate relations, the given study is the key contribution to solving disputes over the interpretation of their shared historical memory.

1. Genetic and cultural traits of Poles and Ukrainians' mentality

Research suggests that two neighboring nations, Poles and Ukrainians, have been sharing their 700-year of the neighborhood history, which resonates loudly through the centuries; throughout the period the two countries experienced both times of good neighborliness and misunderstandings, open hostility and cleavages. It is obvious that both Ukrainians and Polish mutually influenced each other across the development of their relations, undergoing twists and turns. The processes of living in border areas, and, consequently, developing economic, cultural and political contacts have formed a definite rapport and attitude to the neighboring people.

For a long time, both peoples were incorporated into the same territory powers: the First and Second Commonwealth (Rzeczpospolita),

¹ Beck, J. Pradier, E. 2011: Governance in der transnationalen Regionalpolitik: Bestandsaufnahme und Perspektiven der Kooperationsbeziehungen in grenzüberschreitenden Verflechtungsräumen, in: Joachim Beck / Birte Wassenberg (Hrsg), Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit erforschen und leben (Band 2): Governance in Deutschen Grenzregionen Stuttgart (Steiner), S. 107-135.

the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires. Ukrainians and Poles suffered a brutal interethnic confrontation during the Second World War, experienced the construction of socialism and terror of totalitarianism, the collapse of the communist system, as well as elaborating a new model of post-socialist development². All these shared experiences and historical memories united and at the same time divided Ukrainians and Poles. The common historical legacy, but own national historical memory has given rise to many socio-historical stereotypes and myths, which have strongly influenced and continue to influence the national mentality of Poles and Ukrainians and their bilateral relations. The current stage of the Ukrainian and Polish communities' development has much in common, since at the turn of the twentieth and the twenty-first centuries both nations experienced a kind of civilizational explosion, which gave nations a chance to restore their sovereignty and direct their historical development towards independence and democracy³.

It should be stated that for humanity scientists the problem of a holistic analysis of interstate Polish-Ukrainian' relations is difficult to handle without a clear understanding of the Polish and Ukrainian nations' conscious awareness and perception, because they significantly affect the interaction style, the applied decision rules, and ultimately the efficiency of cross-border problem-solving strategy.

Therefore, our focus revolves around the essential characteristics of similar mentality and perception of contemporary Ukraine-Poland relations. Furthermore, the problems of mentality and mind setting have attracted much attention in the field of modern humanities studies, which pivotal focus is a holistic system of knowledge about human society, culture, environment and history.

² Стрільчук Л. Історична пам'ять українців та поляків: пошук шляхів примирення чи привід до конфлікту? *Історичні та політологічні дослідження. Науковий журнал. Спеціальний випуск: доповіді на міжнародній науково-практичній конференції «Трансформації історичної пам'яті»*. Вінниця, 2018. С. 177.

³ Михальченко Н. Великий цивилизационный взрыв на рубеже XX – XXI веков. К.: Парламентское издательство, 2016. С. 3-5.

Mentality as a way of thinking and mind setting is increasingly becoming a vital factor in investigating its historically rooted consciousness and behavior, lifestyle and values, traditions and customs, cultivated and fostered in the course of generations' history. Taking into consideration a common humanities and social sciences research focus on scientific approach to understanding essential characteristics of mentality and mindset of the Ukrainian and Polish civilizations, only a few humanities studies have shown mentality continuous cultural intermingling, moral values, history and state-of-the-art reality through the prism of civilizational interpretation the historical process⁴.

Mentality is the psychological make-up of each individual and each nation, each society (in our case study – Polish and Ukrainian). Mentality is integral-cultural-spiritual and ethno-psychological features of the nation, a manifestation of the soul, a characteristic of the nation biography and civilization. A collated model of mentality harmoniously blends such components as emotional-behavioral, authoritative, cognitive, perceptual, and communicative etc. They are formed historically in the process of ethno-genesis, under the influence of socio-cultural environment and enable to enrich and be passed on through a form of genetic memory from generation to generation, are manifested in all forms of human activity, in its morals, behavior, consciousness, culture, customs⁵, etc. The long life of Ukrainians in foreign territories, frequent historical disputes between Ukrainians and Poles over neighboring territories, interethnic conflicts on the same border, and the fact that Poles and Ukrainians have preserved their selfhood and uniqueness, their ethnic identity, their mentality and mindset, language and culture, feeling the part of 'other' nation⁶, are the essential characteristics of the mentality. The authors of the present study use an approach to researching a problem through; and develop on the key concept of the Ukrainian and Polish mentality, determined by

⁴ Калакура Я. Ментальний вимір української цивілізації. Київ: Генеза. 2017. С. 5.

⁵ Рафальський О. Україна як цивілізаційний феномен. К.: Бланк-Прес, 2010. С. 56.

⁶ Горелов М., Моця О., Рафальський О. Українська етнічна нація. К.: Еко-продакшин, 2012. С. 92.

M. Popovych, as a deep and relatively stable set of essential characteristics of collective and individual consciousness of Ukrainians/Poles. This concept determines a national character, traditions, social psychology, cultivated cultural and spiritual values and their own vision of the world⁷.

Mentality, like civilization, is inseparable from the immersion of people in the socio-cultural environment (milieu of its origin, shaping and establishing). The historical legacy, mostly negative, affecting the Polish and Ukrainian mentality was mainly reasoned by frequent interethnic conflicts, long periods of statelessness, being under foreign rule (for example, the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires, the German occupation regime during World War II), from numerous wars and revolutionary upheavals, migration and assimilation processes⁸.

We present a few, in our opinion, the most significant mental stereotypes, domineering reciprocal labelling in both modern Polish and Ukrainian societies, which are the archetypal of the retransmission of history to the mentality of Ukrainians and Poles. Firstly and in particular, in Poland the negative stereotype of Ukrainians was fostered by sharing historical memories about Khmelnytsky Uprising and Haydamachchyna, as well as instilled by the relatively recent events of World War II, and the events in Volhynia in the mid-1940s of the twentieth century⁹. Additionally, in the western Ukraine, the Polish neighbor figure dredges up the oppression of Ukrainians during the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, when ‘Kresy Wschodnie’ closed Ukrainian schools, cultural and educational institutions and destroyed Orthodox churches. In addition, the policy of pacification pursued by the Polish government in the 1930s, not only undermined credibility to the Polish government, but set on edge interethnic enmity between the indigenous ethnic group – the

⁷ Попович М. Українська національна ментальність. *Проблеми теорії ментальності*. Відп.ред. М.В. Попович. К.: Наукова думка, 2006. С. 232-240.

⁸ Калакура Я. Ментальний вимір української цивілізації. Київ: Генеза. 2017. С. 8.

⁹ Стрільчук Л., Стрільчук В. Інституційні складові українсько-польських гуманітарних взаємин і співробітництва. Монографія. Луцьк: Волинські старожитності, 2013. С. 10.

Ukrainians, and the nation-state – the Poles. The policy of pacification brought sweeping arrests for the Ukrainian population of Volhynia and Galicia, massacres of civilians, and prohibition on the activities of Ukrainian public and cultural institutions and organizations. Another case of vandalism of the Polish government was the destruction of the oldest and most authoritative public and cultural organization ‘Prosvita’, which defended the national interests of Ukrainians for more than half a century, and functioned in both the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires. One of the consequences of the pacification policy was the radicalization of the Ukrainian resistance in this area¹⁰. During the World War II, the Polish underground exterminated the Ukrainian intelligentsia, and at the same time, the operation ‘Vistula’ became another example of Poland’s postwar government attitude towards Ukrainians.

During the period of totalitarianism, the negative stereotypes of both nations intensified due to anti-Polish propaganda in Ukraine and anti-Ukrainian propaganda in Poland respectively, in particular by falsifying and distorting the history. Consequently, in the Polish consciousness, Ukrainians were depicted as ‘nationalists’ in the most negative sense of the word, and therefore, Ukrainians were seen as the worst enemies of the Poles and the cause of all their misfortunes¹¹.

Regrettably, modern Polish-Ukrainian interethnic relations still need time to rethink and cleanse all negative stereotypes in the mental consciousness of both nations. As previously noted, we consider the main reasons for such antagonism are as followed:

– it is quite difficult to break the biased syndrome ingrained in the mentality of the older generation, this process can take quite a long time, sometimes even some generations might change;

– the established negative stereotype of Ukrainians in Poland is supported by various extremist and nationalist groups and some (certain)

¹⁰ Strilchuk L. The Ukrainian-Polish Confrontation in Volhynia in the Second World War: Historical Memory Transformations. *Codrul Cosminului*, 2018, Vol. XXIV, No. 1, P. 145-165.

¹¹ Заброварний С. До повного примирення і широго порозуміння. *Політика і час*. 1997. № 9. С. 5-11.

publications in the press. For example, activities of Kresy-oriented organizations in Przemyśl can serve as an excellent example;

–there is a question risen about the good will of the other party's intentions in strengthening collaboration and friendly relations;

– there is a lack of economic and cultural attractiveness of Ukraine for Poles. The Republic of Poland has never seen Ukraine as a financial or technological partner. It is better to say that all of Poland's hopes have been always about Western Ukraine¹²;

– for the Polish society, the vast majority of which is professing Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Greek Catholicism, the religious situation in Ukraine is unclear and incomprehensible, and therefore the religious factor has a strong influence on public consciousness¹³;

– political statements of the Polish political elite throughout 2013-2016 were mostly focused on the problems of the shared Polish-Ukrainian historical memories, especially touching the historical emphasis of Polish society on the conflicting moments of the past, in particular, the events of World War II in Volhynia¹⁴.

Thus, concluding, we potentially provide insights into the mindset of both individuals and cultures, where mentality is a historical pillar of both Polish and Ukrainian civilizations, the contours of which were formed historically within the ethnic territories of Poles and Ukrainians and have a local-border character. Despite heated debates on the essence of the Ukrainian and Polish mentalities, searching for the ways to interact, interpenetrate and establish the historical socio-cultural heritage of Ukrainians and Poles, inseparably linked to European values, is quite

¹² Стрільчук Л., Стрільчук В. Інституційні складові українсько-польських гуманітарних взаємин і співробітництва. Монографія. Луцьк: Волинські старожитності, 2013. С. 11.

¹³ Добржанський О. Еволюція суспільно-історичних стереотипів у свідомості українців та поляків на прикладі опіки над місцями національної пам'яті. *Україна-Польща: історичне сусідство. Матеріали міжнародної наукової конференції 19-20 травня 2017 р.* Вінниця: ТОВ «Нілан-ЛТД», 2017. С. 365-370.

¹⁴ Стрільчук Л. Проблеми історичної пам'яті в сучасних українсько-польських взаєминах. *Україна-Польща: історичне сусідство. Матеріали міжнародної наукової конференції 19-20 травня 2017 р.* Вінниця, 2017. С. 375.

justified, especially in terms of modern European integration processes¹⁵. Another concluding point is that psychological make-up of the Polish and Ukrainian nations with their strengths and weaknesses has been formed historically. The process of origin and development of mentality, having a long progressive-evolutionary nature, acts as a priority feature of the establishment of cultural, historical and genetic code of civilization, which is influenced by numerous push and pull factors.

2. Ukraine-Poland relations in the mental dimension of political elites

Another significant aspect of mental dimension is the fact that Poland-Ukraine inter-ethnic conflicts and the influence of historical memories on the mentality's formation are obvious. In addition, it is important to stress that historical events and facts, crusted in the memory of generations, serve as a kind of framework, perceiving not only their own past and the past of the neighboring people, but also their modern realities. As far as mentality is concerned, mutual support and cooperation during historical collisions and difficulties, or conflicts with neighbors can be an important part to reach the psychological make-up of peoples.

Turning now to another perspective of the study, we should state that Ukrainians have clear knowledge and understanding of the fact that at various times for quite a long period of time ethnic Ukrainian lands used to be the part of the First and Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which proves that the Poles deprived Ukrainians of their statehood at least twice. Consequently, the western neighbor is associated in the Ukrainian's mentality with an oppressor, an aggressor, trying to impose their own language, culture, religion, their way of life. On the other hand, mental borders are the ones, which result more difficult to overcome, in the context of modern Polish society' vocalizing their historical borders of Kresy Wschodnie, implying the Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Belarusian lands incorporated. It is now understood, that modern Ukrainian and Polish political elites have not only conveyed the

¹⁵ Калакура Я. Ментальний вимір української цивілізації. Київ: Генеза. 2017. С. 9.

sense of their neighbors, but also established traditions of political relations that are with a hint of a certain “psychological” shadow.

Addressing this common challenge and erasing mental borders among both nations and individuals through joint aspirations, inference should be drawn that foreign policy concepts regarding the neighbors of both the Ukrainian and Polish political elites become more relevant over time. Providing an insight into the problem, they acquire new shapes and psychological shadows, while remaining fairly stable. The permanence of foreign policy concepts confirms their mental basis. For this very reason, it was important to use the analysis of the evolution of Poland’s foreign policy concepts towards Ukraine while studying the mentalities’ similarity of Ukrainians and Poles with an aim to trace the formation of the Polish political elite mentality over the last century. In the light of recent events, it should be stated that today’s perception of Ukraine as a state and Ukrainians as neighbors is based on historical traditions and historical experience.

One of the well-accepted statement of the Polish publicist J. Giedroyc demonstrates that two ghosts of Piłsudski and Dmowski embody the modern Republic of Poland¹⁶. We cannot but agree that modern foreign policy of the Republic of Poland has mostly absorbed the political concepts of J. Piłsudski and R. Dmowski. In particular, two main visions of a new Poland were formed on the wave of Polish state nationalism establishment and are topical until now – Jagiellonian and Piast concepts. In fact, these are the oldest Polish political doctrines, deeply rooted in the prime of the Polish state establishment, the times of greatness and power, and become a model to follow, a cause for regret for the past and projected by contemporaries on their own realities. They are also a cause to regret for the past and a reason to be projected by contemporaries on their own reality.

Piast concept is based on the concept of ‘Sarmatism’, which followed a pathway in accordance with political events and left

¹⁶ Unger L. Europa, nie Azja. *Gazeta Wyborcza*. 2002. 4 lipca. S. 12.

significant oriental traces on Polish civilization, bringing Christianity in 966. According to this approach, we can highlight incorporative and anti-German idea of R. Dmowski¹⁷, who emphasizes that there is no place for a weak Poland between Russia and Germany. In addition, Poland also should own those lands where Polish people dominate¹⁸.

The second concept mentioned above, the Jagiellonian concept is based on memories of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which emerged and became stronger under the Jagiellonians. Retracing the history, Polish state was established in the result of concluding successful unions and alliances, which eventually turned the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth into a multinational state that could have resisted encroachment by Russia¹⁹. The main emphasis in this foreign policy concept is placed by the Polish political elite on the special mission of Poland in the history of European civilization, as it has a divisive and at the same time unifying role between West and East. The most radical supporters of the Jagiellonian concept argued that the rights of Poland to the Russian lands and Lithuania arise from the merits of civilization²⁰.

Created in the nineteenth century, the ‘Jagiellonian myth’ and the concept of ‘civilizational mission of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the East’ received the second chance of representing Poland as a ‘lawyer’ of the former peoples of the Commonwealth, especially Ukraine, by integrating them into the European commonwealth.

One of the doctrines of the Jagiellonian concept is Prometheanism – a policy pursued by J. Piłsudski between the 20s and 30s of the twentieth century. It resolved into the Renaissance of Great Poland through the creation of a federation of Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus. The Ukrainian Question played a decisive role in

¹⁷ Wapinski R. Roman Dmowski. Lublin. : Wydawnictwo Lubelskie, 1989. S. 185.

¹⁸ Roszkowski W. Najnowsza historia Polski (1914 – 1945). Warszawa: Świat książki, 2009. S. 29.

¹⁹ Koniuszewski A. Meandry geopolityki. Wpływ gry mocarstw na położenie Polski. Warszawa, 2012. S. 94.

²⁰ Сінкевич Є. Проблема цивілізаційної місії Речі Посполитої в історіографічному доробку представників краківської історичної школи. *Наукові праці МДГУ ім. П. Могили*. Миколаїв, 2008. Т. 88. Вип. 75. С. 112-115.

Prometheanism, because this was defined as an opportunity to deescalate Russia²¹. J. Piłsudski was convinced that imperial Russia is the greatest threat on the way to the independence of Poland and other countries in the region, thus, it was in the interests of Poles, Lithuanians and Ukrainians to fight together for their independence.

Attempts to create a field of independent nation-states between Russia and the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, linked with federal ties²², led to the problem of delimitation of territories. On all these lands Poles made up a significant part of the population and densely inhabited such territories as Eastern Galicia, Grodno and Vilnius region, although Ukrainians, Belarusians and Lithuanians dominated among the population²³.

The mentality of the Polish political elite was clearly manifested through the Endek doctrine incorporation, which was actively discussed in Poland aligned with Prometheanism. The incorporation doctrine provided for the unconditional inclusion in Poland of most of Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine (almost to the Dnieper) based on the borders of the Commonwealth in 1772²⁴.

The Polish politician of the interwar period R. Dmowski defined the eastern Polish policy, and highlighted a thesis that being still powerful, but at the same time weakened, Russia had to give the part of its lands back to Poland. Similarly, Belarus and Ukraine had to be divided between Warsaw and Moscow on a national basis: lands, mostly populated by Poles, should have been annexed to Poland, and the rest – to Russia²⁵.

In the same vein, the essential characteristic of Polish political elite's mentality of the interwar period was reduced to historically justified (from

²¹ Суєля В. Юзеф Пілсудський. К.: Дух і Літера, 2018. С. 268-271.

²² Зашкільняк Л.О., Крикун М.Г. Історія Польщі: Від найдавніших часів до наших днів. Львів: Львівський національний університет імені Івана Франка, 2002. С. 451.

²³ Українсько-польські відносини. Новітня доба / [відп. ред. М. Литвин]: Національна академія наук України, Інститут українознавства ім. І. Крип'якевича. Львів, 2017. С. 230-244.

²⁴ Зашкільняк Л.О., Крикун М.Г. Історія Польщі: Від найдавніших часів до наших днів. Львів: Львівський національний університет імені Івана Франка, 2002. С. 451.

²⁵ Wapinski R. Roman Dmowski. Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie, 1989. S. 185.

the Polish side) claims to Ukrainian ethnic lands, which had been identified in terms of civilizational understanding of history and vision of the Polish state perspectives. Accordingly, Ukrainians, unlike Poles, failed to create a nation-state, no counterbalance was offered by the Ukrainian side.

In 1945, in the aftermath of the war in Europe, the reality of foreign policy for both Poland and Ukraine was dictated by Moscow. In a broader perspective, in the period of construction of socialism, with its inherent totalitarian control and unification of public opinion, there is no point in speaking about any political elites' mentality dimension in the context of bilateral relations. Discussions on the pages of the Parisian 'Culture' by Polish emigrants J. Giedroyc and J. Mieroszewski were the only exceptions.

Experts have seen this period as a noticeable mental shift with regard to the eastern policy of Poland and Ukraine among the representatives of the Polish political elite (only emigrants though). J. Giedroyc and J. Mieroszewski recognized the irreversibility of territorial changes because of the war²⁶. In the 1950s and 1960s, this tended to be an innovative position contradicting the established popular visions of the Polish emigration politicians in Great Britain. To be more precise, Poland was supposed to agree to its post-war borders and abandon the ideas of revisionism. Literally, for nowadays, such a mental dimension of Ukraine in the Polish society is quite logical and obvious, but in the days of the Polish People's Republic, the vast majority of Polish political emigrants did not accept the existing borders, and recognized only the borders of the Second Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth.

The beginning of a new period in Poland's history can be marked on June 4, 1989, when "Solidarity" won the election and proposed a new Eastern policy called the 'two-vector policy', being implemented in 1990. On the one hand, it consisted of supporting the former Soviet republics aspiring to independence and, on the other hand – in maintaining contacts with the Soviet authorities without violating the

²⁶ Мєрошевський Ю. Російський «польський комплекс» і простір УЛБ. *Простір свободи. Україна на шпальтах паризької «Культури»* / Упор. Богуміла Бердиховська. К. : Критика, 2005. С. 195-209.

Warsaw Pact. In short, it was a chance to implement the Prometheanism ideas while missing Moscow.

We believe that at this stage there were serious transformations of the mentality of the Polish political elite towards Ukraine and the vision of Polish-Ukrainian interstate relations. In the early 1990s, in the independent Ukrainian state, the state's mentality towards the bordering Republic of Poland began forming. The common desire for good neighbor relations was implemented by the end of the 1990s through a strategic partnership, and Poland's support for Ukraine during the Orange Revolution. It should be emphasized that it only strengthened mutual sympathy of both Ukrainian and Polish societies, as well as greatly cohering the mentalities of neighboring nations. However, shared historical legacy and associated historical memory continue to be dissonant in Ukrainian-Polish interstate and interethnic relations until present day.

3. Historical memory as the psychological make-up of the nation

A recent review of the literature on this found that nowadays there is hardly anyone on both sides of the Polish-Ukrainian border, who is unaware of the current discussions about shared historical memory by the Republic of Poland and Ukraine. The media of both countries are competing for disclosing the fact of mutual insults and claims regarding the interpretation of the historical past, the so-called "history wars", connected with the Volhynia tragedy, and strained Ukraine-Poland relations. In this context, it is worth paying attention to the warning of the American researcher T. Snyder, pointing out the impossibility of the rightness of one of the parties in such disputes²⁷. Disputes as to whether these killings could be considered genocide continue to this day.

A clear trend of the memory transformations that have engulfed the Republic of Poland and Ukraine (and the whole Europe in general) at the end of the twentieth century became the return of the victimized

²⁷ Snyder T, Gdy na Ukrainie wojna, lepiej ws. zbrodni wołyńskiej oddzielić historię od polityki. URL: <https://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/opinie/artykuly/532748,snyder-gdy-na-ukrainie-wojna-lepiej-ws-zbrodni-wołyńskiej-oddzielic-historie-od-polityki.html>

groups from the backyards of memory that till that moment remained in the shadow of the official historiography. Precisely at the end of the twentieth century, the first steps were made to open archives in post-totalitarian countries. Memories of those who stayed silent until that moment gained the wide dissemination. The opened archival documents and testimonies of participants and eyewitnesses of the events that were concealed before were interpreted in the concept of filling so-called “white spots” in history. Back then, researchers imagined history, as well as historical memory, as a holistic picture that lacked individual puzzles. Therefore, it is worth erasing these ‘white spots’, but rather ‘bloody spots’ (including the entire twentieth century as the biggest amount of these ‘spots’), filling them with information and thus eliminating them. Drawing on an extensive range of sources, the historical picture will be complete and clearer, and the national mentality will lose the taste of the bitterness of insults but quickly it became clear that the idea of ‘white spots’ as the concealed truth was too simplistic. It appears that the historical picture and maps compiled by neighbors are significantly different and it is not so easy for joint groups of historians to reduce the historical past to one denominator. At the same time, the academia clearly embraced that the so-called ‘common historical denominator’ not only explains the past but also more importantly, constructs the present and the future by adjusting the mentality of people²⁸.

While analyzing the situation in Ukraine, we should note that the special complexity of historical memory formation in the national policy and with the further adjustment of national mentality has been lying in an aggravation of political sentiments polarization that is not always embedded in the regional dichotomy of ‘East-West’²⁹.

²⁸ Набок С. Політика пам’яті у сучасній Україні: проблеми формування та контroversійність наслідків. *Етнополітичний контекст соціокультурних трансформацій у сучасні Україні*. Ред. кол. О. Рафальський, В. Войналович, Л. Нагорна. – Київ: ІПіЕНД ім. І.Ф. Кураса НАН України, 2017. С. 233.

²⁹ Срільчук Л. Сучасний польський націоналізм і українсько-польські суперечності – нові обличчя старих проблем. *Історичні і політологічні дослідження. Науковий журнал*. № 1 (64). Вінниця, 2019. С. 197.

First underpinnings of the Ukrainian society's political drama can be traced during 15 years of its independence, since its political class failed to create a coherent 'Ukrainian memory project'³⁰. In addition, the recent study on various types of collective identity prove the political identity to be particularly vulnerable in the context of destabilization, which has become a visible sign of the Ukrainian life. The Ukrainian society, in fact, is deprived of unifying incentives – neither ideology, nor history, nor do commonalities of values play a crucial role. Only a clear-cut and balanced policy of memory promoted by the state can change the state of affairs.

Laying a theoretical foundation for the 'politics of memory', in 1925, a French sociologist M. Halbwachs attempted to distinguish between the concepts of 'historical memory' and 'collective memory' in his book "The Social Frameworks of Memory"³¹. They seemed to be antagonistic, because the collective memory, formed artificially according to someone's group interests, inevitably accompanied by the destruction of historical memory, since it displaces the whole layers of history that are not aligned with the prevailing stereotypes in this society.

According to M. Halbwachs' arguments and conclusions, it should be noted that it is hardly possible to construct the concept of 'objective' historical memory on such a contradiction. After all, the range of people's own life experience limits an individual's natural, reminiscence-based memory. In addition, what is embedded in the concept of 'historical memory' at the household level is the same artificial construction as a collective memory.

According to the Ukrainian historian Y. Shapoval, in contrast to memory as such, historical memory is 'genetically' programmed to evaluate and is inextricably linked to the mentality. Historical memory is not only characterized by recollection and reproduction, but also by a

³⁰ Етнополітичний контекст соціокультурних трансформацій у сучасній Україні / Ред.-кол. О. Рафальський, В. Войналович, Л. Нагорна. Київ: ІПіЕНД ім. І.Ф. Кураса НА України, 2017. С. 21.

³¹ Гельбвас М. Социальные рамки памяти. Пер. с фр. и вступ. статья С. Н. Зенкина М.: Новое издательство, 2007. С. 48.

peculiar perception or non-perception, approval or condemnation. Every historical fact allegedly falls under the spotlight and becomes the object of meticulous analysis. In addition, a biased individual usually carries out such analysis. Guided by their own system of values, the people themselves choose a ‘starting point’ in the approach to the era they are investigating. Nevertheless, the almost inevitable ‘evaluation binary’ (white and black, good and evil) prevents from seeing the halftones and nuances, the pros and cons, and vice versa can be changed surprisingly easy. This opens up almost unlimited opportunities for manipulating the public consciousness³².

In our case study, an in-depth analysis of the up-to-date situation in Ukraine on issues concerning the formation of historical memory shows the permanent politicization of the problem. The reason for this, in our opinion, lies in both objective and subjective factors. In particular, decommunization processes and the development of an independent Ukrainian state caused a natural change in the people’s assessments of the historical legacy, in reality, is an objective regularity³³. Subjective factors include a different interpretation of the past by different political and social groups, the inclusion of historical themes in the context of the political promises of individuals and political parties, etc.

The present study was designed to determine the effect of important aspects of Ukraine’s historical past assessment that has outgrown not only the scope of scientific discussions, but also went beyond the borders of two states, which is manifested in the interpreting history to politically manipulate by the public opinion, particularly in Poland. Collective ideas about the past acquire a valued and, at the same time, semantic dimension exclusively in the social context and are determined by the ‘social framework’. Communities reconstruct the past for the needs of the present. Changes in the socio-political context

³² Шаповал Ю. Політика пам’яті в сучасній Україні. URL: <http://khpg.org/index.php?id=1230112797>

³³ Добржанський О. Проблеми опіки над місцями національної пам’яті в українсько-польських відносинах. *Sprawy Międzynarodowe*. Warszawa. 2018. T.I XXI. Numer 1. S. 245- 251.

inevitably lead to a full change of the collective memory and national mentality³⁴.

The Republic of Poland was the first to break with the communist past and step onto the path of revising its own historical policy. Thus, there was a process of official revision of its own historical policy towards its eastern neighbors in post-communist Poland, especially to Ukraine. As early as August 3, 1990, the Senate of the Republic of Poland issued a Resolution condemning the 1947 Vistula action³⁵. The document stated that the communist authorities were responsible for the mass displacement of Ukrainians. By this decision, the Senate actually recognized the partial responsibility of the Polish side for the action organized by the regime of Boleslaw Berut, and demonstrated its attitude to the Vistula tragedy³⁶.

The next steps taken by official Warsaw in terms of rapprochement with Ukraine were good-neighborly and impartial and they became the first to harmonize the bilateral relations. Thus, on July 28, 1990, the Sejm of the Republic of Poland approved the Resolution, facilitating the adoption of the Declaration of State Sovereignty by the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR as an expression of Ukraine's strivings for its independence³⁷. The Polish Sejm approved the next Resolution on Ukraine on August 31, 1991. The document welcomed the Act of Independence of Ukraine, "Poland, which puts the freedom and independence of its own state as a top priority, fully understands and realizes the significance of the historic decision of the Ukrainian

³⁴ «Концептуальні засади державної політики пам'яті». Аналітична записка.. Національний інститут стратегічних досліджень. URL: <http://www.niss.gov.ua/articles/269>

³⁵ Стрільчук Л. Нінічук А. Війна пам'яті та війни пам'ятників у сучасних українсько-польських відносинах. Луцьк: Вежа-Друк, 2019. С. 53.

³⁶ Хахула Л. Україна та українці в офіційному та медійному дискурсах сучасної Польщі (перша половина 1990-х років). *Україна-Польща: історична спадщина і суспільна свідомість*. 2010-2011. Вип. 3-4. С. 224.

³⁷ *Monitor Polski*. 1990. Nr 30. Poz. 234.

Parliament...’³⁸. The Republic of Poland became the first state to recognize Ukraine’s independence on December 2, 1991³⁹.

Further steps towards the official development of Poland-Ukraine cooperation were manifested in the ‘Treatise on Good Neighborhood, Friendly Relations and Cooperation’ signed during the visit of the President of Ukraine L. Kravchuk to Poland in May 1992. Additionally, this document stipulated the rights of national minorities on preservation and development of cultural, linguistic, religious identities and principles for the care of existing and found in the future military and civilian graves⁴⁰.

The unarticulated national policy of historical memory started its shaping from the moment of the USSR’s collapse and the rise of independent Ukraine. Traditionally, this sector of public administration in Ukraine was controlled directly by the then presidents and, therefore, depended on their experience. With minor differences, by 2005 the policy of historical memories was pursued on a consistent basis but still characterized by amorphousness, ambivalence, and was of a conjuncture nature, held in the general flow of compromises to reconcile public opinion between the followers of post-Soviet and state narratives. Namely, the country’s political leaders did not vigorously attempt to shape the citizens’ historical consciousness but to adapt historical policy to situational circumstances⁴¹.

Of particular importance of our study are the events happening at the turn of the 90s of the twentieth century and early twenty-first century in both Ukraine and the Republic of Poland. They marked a new round of bilateral relations, after both states’ gaining independence, almost simultaneously, and established in the international arena as full participants in interstate relations, there is a convergence of their foreign policy vectors, a mutually beneficial business partnership, and economic

³⁸ *Monitor Polski*. 1991. Nr 29. Poz. 205.

³⁹ Стрільчук Л. В. Україна – Польща: від добросусідських відносин до стратегічного партнерства (кінець XX – початок XXI століття). Луцьк: Волинські старожитності, 2013. С. 143–145.

⁴⁰ *Dziennik Ustaw RP*. 1993. Nr 125. Poz. 573.

⁴¹ Стрільчук Л. Нінічук А. Війна пам’яті та війни пам’ятників у сучасних українсько-польських відносинах. Луцьк: Вежа-Друк, 2019. С. 55.

reforms. The outcome of political interaction between the Presidents' neighboring states was the establishment of Ukraine-Poland relations as strategic partners, which was finally formed in the late 90s of the twentieth century (tandem A. Kwaśniewski – L. Kuchma)⁴², that testifies to coordinated and coherent policy of memory, represented by the Presidents of both states.

Several reports have shown that a qualitatively new stage in the implementation of historical memory policy in Ukraine and its representation abroad began in 2005. It is associated with the President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko. Since then, the state policy of historical memory, its essence and methods have undergone radical changes. The principled position and determination of actions in the formation of collective ideas about the past were one of the main reasons for the escalation of domestic and foreign policy controversy over issues of historical memory⁴³.

Several lines of evidence suggest that according to Y. Shapoval, throughout a couple of centuries nation-states have been engaged in constructing a 'collective memory' with greater or lesser success. Simultaneously, the general tendency was immanently established in historiography as a political bias: the reduction to the absolute of its exceptional merits was accompanied by outdated claims to 'others'. Accordingly, the politics of memory is a process of staying in tune with collective outlook epitomizing the mood of the era, and mentally understandable and justified images of the past. Importantly, the media-symbolic sphere, where 'battle for the past' occurs as a clash of interests of various social strata and political actors. Because the modeled past is in some way a valuable symbolic resource and has its own mobilizing potential, its interpretations in polarized societies are gaining the power of ideological weapons. At the same time, they are able to perform the

⁴² Нінічук А.В. Концепт історичної пам'яті як чинник ускладнення українсько-польських взаємин. *VI Всеукраїнські політологічні читання імені професора Богдана Яроша* : зб.наук.пр. Луцьк: Вежа-Друк, 2017. С. 77.

⁴³ Стрільчук Л., Нінічук А. Війна пам'яті та війни пам'ятників у сучасних українсько-польських відносинах. Луцьк: Вежа-Друк, 2019. С. 56.

functions of social protection, to minimize the traumatic impact of current realities⁴⁴.

The danger of rewriting history for political purposes is obvious. Polish researcher E. Jedlitsky identifies two options when historical memory enables achieving maximum tension and confrontation in a society: 1) consecration of some historical events that would turn them into influential symbols and myths; 2) a reminder of mass offenses through the fault of another group or force. The researcher argues that collective memory can be 'cold' versus 'hot', in case 'cold' stores facts, then 'hot' produces a politically relevant version of the past, and further developments will depend on the emotional tension in society⁴⁵. Addressing the heroic and 'victorious' history and the lack of responsibility for the insults inflicted on other societies shape the so-called memory of the war. For example, the theorization in Ukraine of the UPA, S. Bandera, and at the same time the adoption in July 2016 by the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of the resolution 'On July 11 as the Day of Remembrance of Poles, victims of genocide committed by the OUN-UPA'. This problem has received substantial interest, since the Sejm approved forgetting and erasing all scholars and political elites' achievements of the two countries from a quarter century history and demonstrated diametrically different, irreconcilable approaches to the formation of memory policy in Ukraine and Poland.

Thus, the politics of memory is the process of building images of the past in tune with the moods of the era (and certain political forces). It is in this information-symbolic sphere that the 'battle for the past' takes place with a sharp clash of interests of various social strata and political actors. Because in some way the modeled past is a valuable symbolic resource and has its own mobilizing potential, its interpretations in polarized societies

⁴⁴ Шаповал Ю. Політика пам'яті в сучасній Україні / Ю. Шаповал // Політика і права людини. URL: <http://khp.org/index.php?id=1230112797>

⁴⁵ Добржанський О. Вплив сучасних ЗМІ на формування історичної пам'яті українців та поляків. *Історичні і політологічні дослідження. Науковий журнал. Спеціальний випуск: доповіді на міжнародній науково-практичній конференції «Трансформації історичної пам'яті»*. Вінниця, 2018. С. 18-20.

are gaining the power of ideological weapons and are able to significantly adjust the mentality. At the same time, they are able to perform the functions of social protection, to minimize the traumatic impact of modern realities. In other words, the historical memory of a people is a reflection of its mental face. Given the historical experience of the neighborhood of Ukrainians and Poles, we can say about the direct dependence of historical memory and the mental dimension of interethnic relations.

CONCLUSIONS

Therefore, the purpose of the research is to theoretically prove and develop on the problem of mentality and different perceptions of a Ukraine-Poland cross-border reality. The initiation process and development of the mentality of both Poles and Ukrainians, while having a long evolutionary-progressive character, acts as a priority feature of the establishment of the cultural-historical and genetic code of civilization. The psychological make-up of Polish and Ukrainian civilization has been formed historically with all of their strengths and weaknesses. They distinguish and emphasize Poland and Ukraine from other regional civilizations and there is not only the past eternalized, but also a powerful projection on the future. The mental dimension of Polish-Ukrainian relations should be a focal point in further building of interstate and interethnic relations between Ukrainians and Poles.

To summarize, it is necessary to emphasize that the mentality is an integral part of human society, its history, culture, morality that distinguish a nation. The mentality also can be defined as a certain level of religious, economic, cultural and political development of the society (in this case, Polish and Ukrainian). Consequently, the mentality assimilates everything socially valuable related to the history, customs, morals and religion, and, at the same time, serves as a valuable asset to the world culture and civilization. In recent decades, we have witnessed the extent to which the national mentality and national historical memory, as its derivative, influence and define interethnic Polish-Ukrainian relations.

It is widely thought that in recent years, the national mentality is gaining considerable independence from Polish and Ukrainian societies and has the opportunity to considerably affect them. There is increasing awareness that memory is embedded in social context and subject to social influence, and little connected with theoretical integration of memory and social psychological thinking. Various approaches have been proposed to solve the issue of mentalities in the context of modern Poland-Ukraine relations. The problem under study has become a vital issue for future research on encouraging the Ukraine-Poland authorities, academia and public to follow a multiperspective approach to investigating neighboring countries' history that allows a shared vision of their past in order to promote social cohesion, peace and democracy, whilst cohering their mentality.

SUMMARY

Theoretical and conceptual frameworks for a collective mentality are recognized as being an indispensable part of the research of a human society, its history, culture, morality, the trait that distinguishes the nation and unites a man and a society, between the nation and power and as a necessary stabilizing factor in the social system. Thus, a growing body of evidence speaks for Ukraine-Poland relations, providing a great boost to their ongoing political confidence-building narrative as an indispensable part of cross-border cooperation strategies for their sustainable development. This research paper provides an insight of that field by sketching out the major themes that exist in the body of scholarship known as the peculiarities of mentality setting and the moral landscape of two nations that immediately influence different interpretations of the shared historical memory and the experience of interaction between the two nations in the neighboring countries.

Therefore, the authors' focus revolves around the essential characteristics of similar mentality and perception of contemporary Ukraine-Poland relations. Furthermore, the problems of mentality and mind setting have attracted much attention in the field of modern

humanities studies, which pivotal focus is a holistic system of knowledge about human society, culture, environment and history.

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COMPETITIVENESS AND ITS IMPORTANCE IN MODERN WORLD ECONOMIC PROCESSES

Tsalan M. I.

INTRODUCTION

The processes taking place nowadays in the world and national economies necessitate a review of the mechanisms and approaches to managing and regulating particular activities. It is important to take into account such challenges in the context of reforming the main lines of business. Nowadays the principles of work and cooperation between countries, regions, enterprises are changing. This must be taken into account while developing long-term development strategies. New trends in the national and international economic environments place new requirements for reorientation of activities and implementation of measures system for timely adaptation to these changes before subjects of different levels and nature, including enterprises of different ownership, particularly state-owned ones. While private enterprises carry out these activities faster, focusing on their own vision, market research and their own capabilities, state-owned enterprises are often forced to comply with government regulation and state support measures. Kyrylov Yu.Ye. emphasizes that in the context of globalization, a new paradigm of competitive development is being formed, when every economic entity of different level and sphere of activity should focus on its level of development and competitiveness¹. Over time, this issue will become more urgent, for this reason, mechanisms for reorientation of forms of economic activity to the principles of competitive development should be urgently formed.

¹ Кирилов Ю.Є. Конкуренстспроможний розвиток аграрного сектору економіки України в умовах глобалізації: теорія, методологія, практика : дис. ... д-ра екон. наук : 08.00.03. Херсон, 2015.

1. Competitiveness as a basis for competitive development ensuring

According to M.A. Khvesyk and A.M. Sunduk, the competitive development of the economy is the process of improving its quantitative and qualitative characteristics. Such a process takes into account the constancy of functioning, the characteristics of which are conditioned by the influence of a complex of socio-economic and other factors of endo- and exogenous orientation². The basis of competitive development is the economic category of competitiveness. In general, it is important to note that competitiveness is studied and determined not only at the level of the national economy, but also at the level of regions, industries, enterprises and goods. This concept is studied in a broad and narrow sense. In a broad sense, competitiveness is the presence of strong, stable positions in the market³. According to the definition of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, competitiveness should be understood as the ability of companies, industries, regions and nations to generate high levels of income and remuneration, while remaining open to international competition¹.

L. Kyrylenko points out that competitiveness is especially relevant in the conditions of a market economic system. This is an important socio-economic category of a market economy, which reflects the universal properties and relations of market interaction of economic entities and patterns of a market organization of economic activity development in general⁴.

S. Mochernyi, T. Siudek, A. Zavojska, and others formulated their views on competitiveness through the prism of market and market relations. Competitiveness as “the ability to act in the conditions of market relations and at the same time to obtain a profit sufficient for scientific and technological improvement of production, stimulation of employees and support of products at a high quality level” defines

² Хвесик М.А., Сундук, А.М. Управління розвитком національної економіки в контексті дії глобальних процесів. *Економіка України*. 2013. № 3. С. 4-16.

³ Румянцева Е.Е. *Новая экономическая энциклопедия*. Москва, 2005. С. 218.

⁴ Кириленко Л. Конкурентоспроможність як категорія ринкової економіки. *Вісник Київського національного університету*. 2011. № 124-125. С. 49-52.

S.V. Mochernyj⁵. In another scientific work competitiveness is also considered in market conditions⁶. On the other hand, competitiveness is the property of a product, a service, a subject of market relations to act on the market on an equal footing with similar goods, services or competing subjects of market relations⁷. In view of the above definitions, it is possible to make such generalizations that competitiveness is the ability to withstand competition in the market and to generate profit that enables an entity to develop.

In the study of competitiveness V.L. Korinev and R.I. Zhovnovach distinguish macro-level (country competitiveness), mezzanine (regional and industry competitiveness) and micro-level (enterprise and product competitiveness)⁸. The levels of competitiveness research are shown in Figure 1.

Today, another level of competitiveness, namely the nanolevel, is a relatively new approach. N.M. Kuprina adds the nanoscales to the overall structuring, where they consider the competitiveness of the products of a private entrepreneur (individual) and the level of the cluster structures competitiveness as an intermediate level between the level of the enterprise competitiveness and the level of industry and region competitiveness⁹. In recent years, the cluster organization of activities¹⁰ has become increasingly important in the economy, and therefore we fully support the need to expand the scope of scientific research on the competitiveness of clusters as subjects of economic activity, as well as

⁵ Мочерний С.В. *Економічний словник-довідник* / ред. С.В. Мочерний. Київ, 1995. С. 164.

⁶ Siudek T., Zavojska A. Competitiveness in the economic concepts, theories and empirical research. *ACTA Scientiarum polonorum*. 2014. № 13 (1). P. 91-108.

⁷ Абалкин Л.И. *Экономическая энциклопедия*. / ред. Л.И. Абалкин. Москва, 1999.

⁸ Корінев В.Л., Жовновач Р.І. Оцінювання конкурентоспроможності об'єктів і суб'єктів господарювання. *Вісник Запорізького національного університету: Збірн. наук. праць. Економічні науки*, 2011. № 2 (10). С. 45-52.

⁹ Куприна Н.М. Конкурентоспособность деятельности предприятия: виды и уровень. *Формування ринкової економіки: зб. наук. праць. – Спец. вип. Регіональний розвиток України: проблеми та перспективи: у 2-х ч. 2011.* (Ч. 1). Київ.

¹⁰ Tiits M. *Competitiveness of Estonian forest and wood cluster* / Ed. Tiits M. URL: <https://www.ibs.ee/en/publications/competitiveness-of-estonian-forest-wood-cluster/>

instruments of competitive development of industries, regions and countries.




Figure 1. Levels of research and study of the “competitiveness” concept

V. Andrianov notes that there is a correlation between all levels, because the competitiveness of the country and the industry depends on the ability of competitive manufacturers to produce competitive goods¹¹. B.M. Kurganskaya emphasizes the connection between the concepts of product competitiveness and the enterprise competitiveness¹². Scientists

¹¹ Андрианов В.Д. Конкурентоспроможність Росії у світовій економіці. *Світова економіка та міжнародні відносини*, 2000. № 3. С. 47-57.

¹² Курганська Б. М. Організаційно-економічні механізми забезпечення конкурентоздатності підприємства (на прикладі швейної промисловості) : дис. ... канд. екон. наук : 08.06.01. Львів, 2002.

in their theory of mezzanine levels proceed from the definition of the middle link, which, without losing the signs of the original object, at the same time acquires the signs of the next link, which gives it additional socio-organizational energy. Based on this hypothesis, they proved that the intermediate level, located at the boundary of the micro- and macroenvironment, accumulates the advantages of both the lower and upper levels¹³. P.R. Putsentejlo emphasizes on the synergistic effect, assuming that the competitive advantages of the industry as a subject of mezzanine level do not only combine the strengths of firms and the external macroeconomic environment, but also enhance them¹⁴. On this basis, we believe that the competitive development of economic activity in the region will depend on the competitive development of enterprises in a particular industry and will be one of the components of the region economy competitiveness as a whole.

Competitiveness is a complex phenomenon that has its own specific meaning depending on the level at which it is examined and investigated. In addition, it should be noted that the interconnectedness of levels is due to the fact that each lower level is a component of a higher level. Therefore, we have reason to argue that providing competitiveness at the lower level contributes in part to the competitiveness at the higher level. Competitive enterprises are contributing to the competitiveness of the region, and in turn, to the competitiveness of the country. Therefore, in order to reach the maximum level of competitiveness of the country, it is necessary to maximize the efforts of increasing the competitiveness at all previous levels.

2. Factors of competitive development in the regional dimension

Today, along with globalization processes, processes of regionalization are being actively pursued, which is often seen as a stage

¹³ Демченко А. А., Кузбожьев Э. Н. Управление конкурентоспособностью предприятий отраслевого комплекса: моногр. Курск, 2002.

¹⁴ Пуцентейло П. Р. Конкурентоспроможний розвиток галузі тваринництва як найвищий рівень прояву конкуренції. *Інноваційна економіка*, 2014. № 3. С. 55–61.

and response to globalization processes¹⁵. Kurakov V. defines regionalization as the development, strengthening of economic, political and other ties between regions or states within one region; the emergence of regional associations of states¹⁶.

This approach points to the multifaceted notion of “region”, which may encompass the administrative units of an individual country, country by itself, or the totality thereof. In view of this and the diversification of ties configuration between regions in modern international relations, increasing attention was paid to the competitive development ensuring of the regions themselves. When the processes of powers decentralization, and the levers of management and development are transferred to the regional level, the subjects of economic activity of a particular region should take care of their current economic problems and prospects.

In today's environment, only competitive entities can provide active management in the region, thereby maintaining their competitive position in the market and improving the position of the region and the country as a whole. Each region, on the basis of natural, economic and other advantages, has priority types of economic activity, at the expense of which it can increase the level of its development. Within one work, it is difficult to consider several sectors of the economy and the factors that determine competitiveness at the regional level. For example, we have selected the forestry sector, which is of strategic importance both in the European Union and in Ukraine, according to the economic, environmental and social components of its development. Forests are an important part of the national wealth of states and regions. It is a favorable ecological, healthy environment of human activity and a source of raw materials for economic development. By-products are valuable both for meeting human needs (nutrition, treatment), and for supporting production processes (food, medicine, etc.).

¹⁵ Дергачев В.А. *Геоэкономический словарь-справочник*. Одесса, 2004. – URL: <http://politike.ru/dictionary/973>

¹⁶ *Экономика и право: словарь-справочник* / Л.П. Кураков, В.Л. Кураков, А.Л. Кураков. Москва, 2004. 1288 с. – URL: <http://www.twirpx.com/file/1539752>

The competitive development of forestry is influenced by a number of general and special factors. Factor is the driving force or condition of any process or phenomenon. D.A. Panasenko defines a factor as the set of conditions by which one or another process is carried out, one result or another is ensured¹⁷. Factors often mean the parameters, the nature and effectiveness of economic processes depends on, and which determine the quantity and quality of the manufactured economic product¹⁸.

Scientists separately define the concept of competitive factors. In this regard, S.M. Bondarenko and V.I. Bokiyy argue that competitive factors are the driving force that shapes and determines the nature of competitiveness¹⁹. L.A. Zaytseva summarizes that the competitive factor is the driving force acquired in the effective economic processes, which allows to stand in competition²⁰.

The basis of forest management is the activity of forestry enterprises, therefore, among the factors of competitive development of the forest industry factors of enterprises competitiveness should be considered.

As A. Marenych and I. Astakhov point out, competitiveness as a complex characteristic of the activity of enterprises is based on the analysis of various aspects of production and economic activity (production potential, labor resources, availability of materials, financial results of activities, etc.), and allows to identify companies strengths in competition, find ways to achieve an advantage over competitors²¹.

¹⁷ Панасенко Д. А. Системний підхід до показників конкурентоспроможності. *Формування ринкових відносин в Україні*, 2008. № 3(82). С. 19–24.

¹⁸ Жовновач Р. І. Системний підхід до управління конкурентоспроможністю підприємства. – URL : www.nbu.gov.ua/portal/natural/npkntu_e/2010_18_1/stat.../50.pdf.

¹⁹ Бондаренко С. М., Бокій В. І. Про механізм формування конкурентоспроможності продукції промислового підприємства. *Економіст*, 2001. № 9. С. 58–59.

²⁰ Зайцева Л. О. Класифікація факторів конкурентоспроможності підприємства. – URL: <http://dspace.luguniv.edu.ua/jspui/bitstream/123456789/525/1/zaitseva%201%2012%20052012.pdf>

²¹ Маренич А., Астахова І. Управление конкурентоспособностью предприятия. *Бизнес-Информ*, 1996. № 5. С. 23-27.

Scientists often include the factors of the internal economy organization, as well as those formed in the external environment of their activity, as components of the analysis of enterprises competitive development. A.H. Bydyk, believes that the competitiveness of an enterprise is determined by the resource potential, the results of economic activity, the financial and economic state of enterprises²². On the other hand, competitiveness depends on the market in which the company operates. D.V. Malashchuk believes that in order to compete successfully in the domestic and foreign markets, businesses need to have such “competitive arguments” as: tax legislation aimed at stimulating business activity, production productivity, reducing capital cost, developing productive forces, infrastructure, technical and technological instruments, business information support and other means of exporter support²³.

From the above competitive advantages it is evident that D.V. Malashchuk includes to them both those which depend on the enterprise itself, and those which depend on the environment in which the enterprises operate. The degree of influence of the environment on the internal organization of the enterprise depends on the functioning of the market, which in turn depends on the well-being of consumers and their solvency, i.e. demand, market capacity, including the scientific and technological achievements, which contribute to diversification of commodity positions and growth offers in terms of quantity and quality, as well as the creation of an appropriate entrepreneurial environment in the region and the country as a whole (opportunities to enter the market, favorable conditions for starting own business, tax policy and others). The influence of the external environment is determined by the potential of the internal organization of work of the business structure to withstand this influence, which is governed by the leadership and management qualification, financial potential of the entity, opportunities for

²² Бидик А.Г. Підвищення конкурентоспроможності аграрного виробництва. *Економіка АПК*, 2003. № 6. С. 115-121.

²³ Малащук Д.В. Пріоритетні заходи щодо забезпечення конкурентоспроможності економіки України. *Актуальні проблеми економіки*, 2005. № 1 (43). С. 22-31.

innovation (Innovation is represented as the ability to update itself, as internal organizational processes of restructuring by the criteria: rhythm, adaptability, minimal cost)²⁴, the effectiveness of the strategic vision of economic development in perspective. According to Yu.F. Yaroshenko, the system of the enterprise competitiveness increasing should include a subsystem providing adaptation to environmental conditions, which is expressed in such concept as adaptability (Adaptability of the organization is the property of adaptation, a form of relations between the enterprise and the external environment, as a process of organizational restructuring)²⁵, the subsystem of providing flexibility of management structure and production system, subsystem of ensuring of the effective enterprise and the market potential utilization, which are interdependent and at the same time are relatively autonomous. Therefore, the better the internal environment of the enterprise is organized, the easier it adapts to the “challenges” of the external environment and functions more successfully.

The criteria for competitive development are also determined in the world practice, focusing more on the external environment, and they include the enhancement of technological advantages, the increase of innovative advantages, the development of benefits under the influence of globalization.

Summarizing the different approaches, it should be noted that the opinions of scientists are divided: some emphasize on the provision of resources, the level of the production process cost, the organization of the business structure activity and its management, others – on the environment in which the enterprise operates. We have summarized the views of scientists in the competitive development of enterprises researching and ensuring in Figure 2.

²⁴ Хамазіна Т.О. Розвиток підприємницької організації в конкурентному середовищі. *Держава та регіони. Серія: Економіка та підприємництво*, 2005. № 1. С. 305-311; с. 306-307.

²⁵ Ярошенко Ю.Ф. Формування організаційно-економічного механізму підвищення конкурентоспроможності підприємства : автореф. дис. ... канд.екон.наук : 08.06.01. Харків, 2001. 19 с.




Figure 2. Factors for the competitive development of enterprises ensuring

Competitiveness factors shown in Figure 2 are common to different sectors of the economy, while in the forest industry, competitive enterprise development should be adjusted to the rational use of forest resources, taking into account the conservation and restoration conditions of the forest fund of the region and the country as a whole.

T.I. Posvyatenko notes that at the enterprise level the following factors contribute to competitive development ensuring:

- resource factor (physical consumption of resources per unit of finished product – feedback from partial and overall performance indicators);
- price factor (level and dynamics of prices for all used production resources and finished products);

– “environmental factor” (economic policy of the state and the level of its influence on the market counterparty)²⁶.

The factors influencing the competitiveness of an enterprise research makes possible to determine which of them increase it. Arthur A. Thompson, Jr. and A. Strickland among “factors of the company success”, focusing on the internal component, determine the following: quality and characteristics of products, reputation (image), production capacity, use of technology, dealer network and distribution opportunities, innovative capabilities, financial resources, costs compared to competitors, customer service²⁷.

The classification of the factors influencing the competitiveness of enterprises is also made by B.M. Kurganska. By the scope she divides them into internal and external, by the form of influence – direct and indirect, by the nature of the action – on economic, political, organizational etc.¹²

Under the factor of enterprise competitiveness M.M. Halelyuk offers to understand the factors of the internal and external environment of an enterprise that affect its ability to increase competitiveness in a particular market²⁸. He classifies them according to different classification characteristics, namely: the level of influence (microeconomic, macroeconomic), the nature of manifestation (explicit, hidden), the possibility of prediction (random, regular), the nature of influence (negative, positive, neutral), the possibility of measuring impact (non-measuring, low-measuring, measuring), dynamic of action (static, dynamic), period of influence (discrete, continuous), degree of complexity (single, complex), scale of distribution (general, specific), controllability (managed, poorly managed, unmanaged). According to the medium of influence M.M. Halelyuk distinguishes internal and

²⁶ Посвятенко Т.І. Фактори конкурентоспроможності суб'єктів на товарних ринках. *Держава та регіони. Серія: Економіка та підприємництво*, 2005. № 4. С. 202–206.

²⁷ Томпсон-мл. Артур А., Стрикленд, А.Дж. Стратегический менеджмент: концепции и ситуации для анализа / 12-е изд., пер. с англ. Москва, 2003. 928 с.

²⁸ Галелюк М.М. Чинники та стратегії конкурентоспроможності машинобудівних підприємств : автореф. дис. ... канд.екон.наук : 08.00.04. Львів, 2010. 28 с.

external factors of enterprise competitiveness. External factors are important, but internal factors should not be overlooked. Even the most favorable external factors will not be able to provide highly efficient development, if ineffective internal organization of activity takes place. M.M. Haleluk divides external factors into two groups according to the direction of their action, namely, direct and indirect factors²⁸. The factors of direct action include the level of competition in the industry, the capacity of the main competitors, the level and peculiarities of demand, the availability and competitiveness of suppliers, availability of resources, legal regulations in the country. Indirect factors include climatic conditions, geographical location of the country, regions, tax and interest rates in the country, socio-cultural, demographic circumstances, national standardization and certification system, state support for business, peculiarities of economic management of the country, industry, region, political events in the country, openness of society and markets, quality of information support, level of integration in the country and within the world community.

V. Martsyn as external factors determines ones that company can not change and should perceive them as something invariable²⁹. In other words, these are the factors that an enterprise needs to adapt to its operations, optimizing costs and benefits, maximizing its competitive advantage in these circumstances. According to V. Martsyn, external factors include the following:

– *activity of state power structures* (fiscal and monetary policy, legislation);

– *economic conjuncture*. It includes the conjuncture of commodity and material markets, labor markets, means of production markets, financial resources markets;

– *development of the main supporting industries* (development of new technologies (resource-saving, deep processing technologies), new

²⁹ Марцин В. Умови виникнення та показники оцінки факторів, що формують конкурентоспроможність підприємства. – URL: http://www.anvou.org.ua/academy/herald_info/visnyk_61_5_08/visnyk_61_5_08_98-113.pdf.

materials and energy sources, their introduction into production increases the scientific and production potential of the enterprise);

– *demand parameters* (growth of demand for goods produced by the enterprise, its stability, consolidation of market position)²⁹.

In our opinion, the division of factors that influence the activity of the enterprise and its competitive development into external and internal is debatable. On the one hand, there are internal factors that determine the internal organization of the enterprise, and external factors that affect its operation from the outside. And from the point of view of foreign economic activity conducting by the enterprise, external ones may be those acting on the foreign market in relation to the national market, and internal ones may be those factors that take place directly in the national market in which the enterprise operates.

Thus, when analyzing export-oriented enterprises, external factors that affect the export activity of enterprises in the conquest of global industry markets are often identified. These are: the dependence on the global market conditions, aggressive competition policy, limited demand for products, insufficient solvency of key consumers from underdeveloped countries, and the global economic crisis. Internal factors, according to N.O. Filipova, are: insufficient budget financing, bureaucratic system of export control, depreciation of fixed assets, poor legal regulation, rigid tax policy, outflow and aging of personnel, lack of state support, a small share of closed-loop production³⁰.

It is important to note that the factors are general (which affect all components of the enterprise's operating environment) and specific (which affect the competitive environment of a particular industry or region). Given the limited coverage of factors affecting forestry activity in the literature, we consider it appropriate to divide them into state-level and regional-level influence factors. The first should include the following:

³⁰ Філіпова, Н.О. Розвиток експортної діяльності високотехнологічних підприємств в умовах загострення конкуренції : автореф. дис. ... канд.екон.наук : 08.00.04. Запоріжжя, 2008. 20 с.

- legislative – creation of a legislative framework that forms the conditions and regulates the implementation of forestry activities;
- economic – the economic situation in the state directly affects the implementation of commercial activities in general and forestry in particular;
- political – in the aspect of forest policy, taking liberalization or protectionist measures to develop forestry activities;
- institutional – creation of institutional support for the implementation of forestry activities;
- demographic – demographic situation in the countries and regions is a factor affecting the consumption of timber and by-products and to a lesser extent the employment in forestry;
- technical and technological factor – the level of development of this sphere in the state influences the technical and technological support of the branches of economy;
- socio-cultural factor – understanding of the role of forestry from the economic, ecological and social point of view in terms of cultural, mental and regional characteristics of the population and their willingness to participate in the conservation of the forest as a natural wealth.

This list of factors is suggested to be complemented by other factors affecting forestry and emerging at the regional level, namely:

- structure of the regional economy – the share of the industry in the regional economic system creates the preconditions for its development;
- historical – is a factor formed during the period of development of the industry and determines its peculiarities in the region;
- environmental – these are the components of the environment that determine the development of forestry in the region;
- geographical – location of the region influences the formation of economic relations in forest industry with foreign partners;
- logistic – promotes the formation of communication channels between forestry entities within the region and country;

– clustering factor – a factor of competitive development of forestry in the region through the creation of forestry clusters.

Specific factors determining the development of forestry include:

– natural factor, which presupposes the location of forest resources in the territory, dependence on which determines the length of the production of wood period, and the production itself requires a specific material and technical base;

– technical and technological factor, world and national level of development of wood processing technologies;

– human factor that determines the specific conditions of life and development of the rural population, which is the main provider of labor resources for forestry³¹.

The natural factor is of particular importance in forestry, which contains both the provision of forest resources in a whole and the type of dominant breed in the forest fund of the enterprise. That is, forestry, which is in an area with large reserves of forest resources that are of higher quality and value, will have better starting conditions for ensuring its competitive development. Although the availability of resources alone does not ensure the high efficiency of the enterprise activity.

If the company wants to support its development and reach the expansion of markets, it must, according to H.M. Skudar, constantly take care to add to the set of activities new ones and to stop in time those which no longer meet the strategic goals and new orientations³². Similarly, when it comes to the factors of competitiveness of an enterprise, it is necessary to focus on those that increase it and level out those that reduce. Indeed, factors can be both positive and a negative, that is, a risk effect that is specific for the forest industry and especially manifested in it, as negative processes of a natural character (winds, forest fires, illegal deforestation, which result as natural losses and

³¹ Овчарук В. В. Аналіз конкурентоспроможності лісогосподарських підприємств Хмельницької області. *Науковий вісник НЛТУ України*, 2008. № 18.9. С. 239–243.

³² Скудар Г.М. Організаційно-економічний механізм управління конкурентоспроможністю підприємства : автореф. дис. ... докт.екон.наук : 08.02.03. Донецьк, 2000. 40 с.

economic losses), imperfection of mechanisms of organization of forestry activities, conflicts of interest of socio-economic nature (enterprises seek to maximize their profits, but must act in the conditions of regional forest resources conservation for the benefit of the population). Therefore, forestry should maximize the impact of incentives (those that have a positive impact on the activity of the enterprise) and minimize the effect of disincentives (which impede the process of increasing the competitiveness of the forestry enterprise).

CONCLUSIONS

In the revitalization period of globalization, regionalization and integration processes, the concept of competitiveness with regard to macro, mezzanine and micro levels of economic entities activity is updated. Competitiveness is an economic category that reflects the subject's ability to compete. Higher levels of competitiveness provide stronger competitive positions in the market in which the business is conducted.

Competitiveness is a multifaceted and hierarchical phenomenon. Competitive entities of one level make a contribution to the competitiveness of another higher level. A feature of the regional dimension of competitiveness is that it depends on the competitiveness of industries, enterprises and goods, and contributes to the level of competitiveness of the country. It is important to investigate the factors that exert their influence at different levels. There are a large number of them. They are divided into several groups just at the regional level in the forestry sector. Among the factors that determine the development of forestry in the context of regional development, it is advisable to consider both factors that affect the competitive development of forestry enterprises, including a group of internal and external factors, and factors affecting forestry in the region formed at the national and regional levels. This approach allows for a comprehensive analysis of the forestry activities development, the identification of complexities and the development of appropriate tools to achieve the goals.

SUMMARY

The main theoretical approaches to defining the concept of competitiveness have been considered by the author. Attention has been paid to the importance of this economic category in the current conditions of the world economic environment transformation and the formation of a new paradigm of competitive development. Competitiveness implies the presence of strong, stable positions in the market and should be understood as the ability of a competitive entity to generate profits, maximize them and invest in their future development. The levels of competitiveness research have been analyzed by the author. The role of the region in the modern world economic environment has been considered. The factors of competitive development of enterprises on the example of the forest industry have been defined. The forestry industry has been selected in view of its importance in the context of current areas of ecological, economic and social development.

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HISTORY, HISTORICAL MEMORY, MEMORY POLICY: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ASPECT

Yarosh Y. B., Kalishchuk O. M.

INTRODUCTION

One of the trends of modern science is the interdisciplinarity of research, which is particularly pronounced in the Humanities. This is a way to adapt the experience of the past to the realities and challenges of today. Thus, these searches represent the existence of memory in societies and the formation of boundaries of concepts related to it.

Over the past decades, Memory Studies have taken one of the leading positions not only in western Humanities, but also in the research of scientists from post-communist countries (including Ukrainian). It is interesting that the “memorial boom”, which began in the 60s of the 20th century, began to claim the status of a new paradigm of humanitarianism at the turn of the 1980s – 1990s, remains relevant to this day, covering more and more variety of historical topics and more and more scientists. We are talking about both theoretical developments and so-called CaseStudies (works on specific problems). As indicated by E. Langerbacher “memory cannot fail to be put forward in advance in any country that has suffered from a dictatorial regime or social trauma, and that has subsequently managed to restore peace and a democratic system”¹.

It should be noted at once that some scientists perceive history and memory as synonymous, while others on the contrary – as antagonistic. Already the author of the first systematic substantiation of the concept and analysis of the phenomenon of collective memory, M. Halbwax contrasted history and memory: memory – unreliable, effective only

¹ Langerbacher E. Collective Memory as a Factor in Political Culture and International Relations. *Power and the Past Collective Memory and International Relations*. Ed. by E. Langerbacher, Y. Shain. Washington: Georg Town University Press, 2010. P. 13–49.

during repetitions, modernizes the mentioned, and history is documented, deals with unique events and critically distances itself from the present. Modern researchers also contrast these concepts. Therefore, Yaroslav Gritsak, answering the question “What is historical memory” without any reservations confirmed “This is something that is not history. It is a distorted and bad mirror of what was actually” and clearly the difference between these phenomena. The study of history is aimed at the most accurate reflection of the past, often based on theories and approaches borrowed from other disciplines. On the contrary, the oral tradition of transmitting information about the past is mythological and is characterized by the fact that memory preserves and “reproduces” the past based on imagination generated by feelings and sensations caused by the present. After all, memories of past events are reproduced through the prism of modernity.

1. Historical memory

If history (or more precisely, historical science) has a certain ontological and epistemological status as a science, then this cannot be said about “historical memory”. It is no accident that N. Yakovenko suggests the concept of “historical memory” in quotation marks, since it does not exist in history as a science. We should agree with those researchers who claim that all research in the field of historical memory is focused around several common tasks: the most common is to define the concept itself. Some researchers point to the ambiguity of the use of the concept and term “historical memory”, despite its active use in social and political vocabulary and professional literature. The discrepancies indicate that a clear definition has not yet been developed, and therefore the boundaries of the concept are not defined and the term is used in different senses. Generalization of various approaches to the nature of the relationship between history and memory allows us to distinguish the following positions: history and memory are opposed, even considered as incompatible phenomena; history and memory are identified; history and memory are interpreted as a form of understanding, interpretation and

representation of the past and are in the process of constant interaction, mutual complementarity².

In the context of the outlined problem, it should immediately be emphasized that researchers do not have a single definition of the essence of the concept of “historical memory”. German scholar Th. Ruzen believed that historical memory, on the one hand, is the mental ability of the subject to retain memories of past experiences, which is the basis for the formation of historical consciousness, and on the other – it is the result of certain sensorimotor operations to produce memories formed in the process of forming historical consciousness due to the understanding of historical experience³. In this sense, as N. Yakovenko notes, “historical memory” is likened to myth, because it chooses from the chaotic flow of existence only certain values that are necessary for the community, and also allows you to overcome the transience and fleetness of the life of an individual⁴.

We also recall the definition of P. Tronko, according to which historical memory is “a kind of focused consciousness that reflects the significance and relevance of information about the past in close relationship with the present and future”⁵. It is an expression of the process of organizing, preserving and restoring the experience of the people for possible use in the activities of people or for returning its influence to the sphere of public consciousness. Russian researcher Zh. Toshchenko pointed to the ability to hold in the minds of people the main historical events of the past up to the transformation of historical knowledge into various forms of worldview perception of the experience as a feature of historical memory⁶. In a more imaginative definition of historical memory, V. Masnenko claims about it as a kind of

² Касьянов Г. Исторична пам'ять та історична політика: до питання про термінологію й генеалогію понять. *Український історичний журнал*. 2016. № 2. С. 118-137.

³ Rüsen J. Historische Orientierung. Über die Arbeit des Geschichtstewusstseins sich in der Zeit yurechzrubinden. Cologne, Weimar, and Vienna: Böhlau, 1994.

⁴ Яковенко Н. Вступ до історії. Київ: Критика, 2007. С. 34.

⁵ Тронько П. Інститут національної пам'яті як засіб зцілення від пострадянської ментальності. *Дзеркало тижня*. 2005. 19-25 листопада (№ 45).

⁶ Тощенко Ж. Историческое сознание и историческая память. Анализ современного состояния. URL: <http://vivovoco.rsl.ru/VV/JOURNAL/newhist/himem.htm>

psychological equipment of a community or individual as a “matrix-sieve”, through the holes of which only what causes emotional stress or outrage of public passions is sifted⁷. One way or another, historical memory can be interpreted as the ability of public actors to preserve and transmit from generation to generation knowledge about historical events, historical figures, national heroes and apostates, about traditions and collective experiences of mastering the social and natural world, about the stages of development that a particular ethnic group, people, or nation has passed through⁸.

At the same time, a number of authors expand the discourse of memory. According to Ya. Assman: “Everyone says that a new paradigm of cultural Sciences is being built around the concept of memories; that various phenomena and spheres of culture – art and literature, politics and society, religion and law-can be considered in new relationships”⁹. In the interpretation of A. Vasylyev historical memory is “a transdisciplinary field of historical and cultural character that has its own subject, that is, one that allows us to consider the entire set of phenomena of human culture from a certain angle, seeing their relationship from the position of how “images-memories” were stored, transmitted, updated, displaced and used in a particular culture”¹⁰.

It is worth agreeing with A. Kyrydon that the peculiarity of the formation of domestic historiographical discourse is that the first (often unconscious) use of the term “historical memory” had mainly a metaphorical meaning. In the mass media and journalism, the concept of “historical memory” was accepted at the level of metaphor or phraseological turnover, but it was thanks to the media, cinema,

⁷ Тощенко Ж. Историческое сознание и историческая память. Анализ современного состояния. URL: <http://vivovoco.rsl.ru/VV/JOURNAL/newhist/himem.htm>

⁸ Ярулин И. Ф. Историческая память как социальный гипноз: к методологии исследования. *Вестник Тихоокеанского государственного университета*. 2016. № 3 (42). С. 148.

⁹ Ассман Я. Культурная память: Письмо, память о прошлом и политическая идентичность в высоких культурах древности. Пер. с нем. М. М. Сокольской. М., 2004.

¹⁰ Васильев А. Memory studies: единство парадигмы – многообразие объектов. *Новое литературное обозрение (НЛО)*. 2012. № 5. С. 461-480.

documentaries, literature, etc. that the concept was actualized in the mass consciousness¹¹.

During a kind of trend for memory and at the same time a superficial delving into social and historical processes, it becomes possible to use historical memory, that is, "... the generalized collective experience of a social group or society as a whole, which is formed in the process of developing a person's thinking about the world, is relevant for the current generation"¹² to achieve modern political goals. Not by chance, H. Kasianov generally interprets historical memory as "a relatively stable set of interconnected collective ideas about the past of a certain group, purposefully constructed by means of historical policy, codified and standardized in social, cultural, political discourses, myths, symbols, mnemonic and commemorative practices. Historical memory, on the one hand, is the result of cultural, social, and political construction, but also, in turn, becomes a means of constructing cultural, social, political, and religious identity, which in the era of nationalism are synthesized into a national identity"¹³. This statement is supplemented by the conclusion of Ch. Valtser "Memory is not so much connected with the past as with the present"¹⁴.

It should be recognized that the concept of "historical memory" appeared in historiography on the one hand, it stimulated the structuring of multi-level formation of ideas about the past, on the other hand, it complicated the conceptual disorder.

In Western Europe, they tried to create a new culture of memory "apology and repentance" for the crimes of totalitarian (authoritarian) regimes. The Holocaust became the strategic dividing line in the politics of memory. Now in modern historiography, there are several models and

¹¹ Киридон А. Студії пам'яті в Україні: основні тенденції становлення. *Україна – Європа – світ*. 2014. № 14. С. 265–274.

¹² Тавокин Е. П., Табатадзе И. А. К вопросу об исторической памяти о Великой Отечественной войне. *Социс*. 2010. № 5. С. 62.

¹³ Касьянов Г. Исторична пам'ять та історична політика: до питання про термінологію й генеалогію понять. *Український історичний журнал*. 2016. № 2. С. 135.

¹⁴ Вельцер Х. История, память и современность прошлого. Память как арена политической борьбы. *Неприкосновенный запас*. 2005. № 2-3. С. 10.

strategies for overcoming the “inconvenient” past (first of all, the events of the Second World War). Lviv scientist Yaroslav Hrytsak identified Spanish, German, Anglo-Saxon Western European and Russian models of memory¹⁵. At the same time, the famous intellectual in his research drew attention to the peculiarity of historical memory in Ukraine and its inability, in his opinion, to be unified and common for all Ukrainians, which caused a long period of stay of Ukrainian lands as part of their native state entities¹⁶. Another domestic researcher Vladyslav Hrynevych in the national memory policy of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe identified the Eastern European/Baltic, Western European (German liberal-democratic), and post-Soviet (Russian-Belarusian) models of memory of the Second World War¹⁷. The Polish historian and political scientist Tomasz Stryjek turned to the Polish and Baltic models (not bypassing the Spanish)¹⁸. Yurii Shapoval drew attention to the reconciliation policy in Spain and the application of its positive elements in the Ukrainian context¹⁹. Olha Hnatiuk²⁰, Andrii Portnov²¹,

¹⁵ Грицак Я. 26-й процент, або як подолати історію. Київ: Фонд Порошенка, 2014.

¹⁶ Грицак Я. Нариси історії України: формування української модерної нації XIX-XX століття. Київ: Видавництво «Генеза», 2000; Грицак Я. Парадокси національної ідентичності. URL: <https://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/podrobici/paradoksi-nacionalnoyi-identichnosti>

¹⁷ Гриневиц В. Український вимір війни та пам'яті про неї. *Сучасні дискусії про Другу світову війну*: збірник наукових статей та виступів українських і зарубіжних дослідників. Львів: ЗУКЦ, 2012. С. 50-64.

¹⁸ Стрик Т. «Війна за війну» 2005-2010 рр. Стратегії політики пам'яті про події 1930-х – 1950-х років у Центральній та Східній Європі. *Сучасні дискусії про Другу світову війну*: збірник наукових статей та виступів українських і зарубіжних дослідників. Львів: ЗУКЦ, 2012. С. 34-49; Стрик Т. Україна в дзеркалі Іспанії. Політика пам'яті на зламі XX-XXI ст. і націотворчі процеси на двох кінцях Європи. *Невловимі категорії. Нариси про гуманітаристику, історію і політику в сучасних Україні, Польщі та Росії*. Київ: Ніка-Центр, 2015. С. 207-240; Stryjek T. Ukraina w zwierciadle Hiszpanii: polityka wobec pamięci na przełomie XX i XXI w. a procesy narodotwórcze na dwóch końcach Europy. Alvydanas Nikžentaitis i Michał Kopczyński, red., *Dialog kultur pamięci w regionie ULB*. Warszawa: Muzeum Historii Polski, 2014. S. 215-246; Stryjek T. “Jak powtórzyć osiemnastego brumaire’a: o dramacie w historii i farcie w polityce wobec pamięci w Chorwacji, Serbii i na Ukrainie od 1991 r. *Jak patrzeć na Polskę, Niemcy i świat?: księga jubileuszowa profesora Eugeniusza Cezarego Króla* Joanna Szymoniczek, red. Warszawa: Bellona: Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 2017. S. 594-630.

¹⁹ Шаповал Ю. Політика національного примирення в Іспанії: що корисне для України. *Національна та історична пам'ять: зб. наук. пр.* Вип. 5. Київ: ДП НВЦ «Пріоритети», 2012. С. 190-195; Шаповал Ю. Примирення по-іспанськи. Космос після громадянської війни. *День*. 2013. 18 лютого.

Michal Urban²² and others wrote separately about the Polish experience of forming and preserving historical memory.

German model. The German example of overcoming a difficult past should be considered the most textbook in Europe. A well-known German culturologist Aleida Assman have identified the remaining four stages of transformation of historical memory that survived Germany. The first was a period that could be described as “general oblivion”. The second period is “remember so that you never forget” (this is a mandatory stage of memory transformation, since the future must be built on the meeting with the past). The third period is “remember to overcome”, which reveals the transformational potential of memory when forgetting goes through remembering and forgiving. Finally, the fourth is when the so-called “dialogic memory” is built, when there is an internal reconstruction of communities that have a common history, and the goal of the process is to discuss the past and settle accounts with it²³.

The period of the 40s – to the mid-60s 20th century in both cases, Germany was designated the “silent phase”, when the Germans sought to forget about the Nazi past, believing that the status of the defeated in the war gave them such an opportunity. Representatives of the former Nazi regime and the “grey majority”, which during the Third Reich passively supported Hitler (the so-called “fellow travellers”), agreed in a common desire to “forget” the recent past, as well as to get rid of the guilt that burdened the Fuhrer and his inner circle. The few voices trembling from Nazism, historians and writers who called to repent and draw conclusions

²⁰ Гнатюк О. Обличчя історичної пам'яті. Доробок польського Інституту національної пам'яті та суспільні дискусії. *Культура історичної пам'яті: європейський та український досвід*. Ю. Шаповал, ред. К: НАНУ, 2013. С. 280-300.

²¹ Гнатюк О. Обличчя історичної пам'яті. Доробок польського Інституту національної пам'яті та суспільні дискусії. *Культура історичної пам'яті: європейський та український досвід*. Ю. Шаповал, ред. К: НАНУ, 2013. С. 280-300.

²² Гнатюк О. Обличчя історичної пам'яті. Доробок польського Інституту національної пам'яті та суспільні дискусії. *Культура історичної пам'яті: європейський та український досвід*. Ю. Шаповал, ред. К: НАНУ, 2013. С. 280-300.

²³ Ассман А. Длинная тень прошлого: мемориальная культура и историческая политика. Пер. с нем. Б. Хлебникова. М.: Новое обозрение, 2014.

did not find understanding. This process was also influenced by the “cold war”, which made Germany an element and ally of the Western world and opposed it, respectively, to the USSR.

The next phase was the “phase of understanding conclusions from the past”, which can be chronologically designated from the mid-1960s to the early 1990s. The change of generations allowed us to break the “cursed questions” that were hushed up by parents. Gradually (thanks to the efforts of young people and historians who were not afraid to talk about the horrors of Reich's time) the Germans began to partially realize their collective guilt, mainly for the Holocaust. “This was a positive shift, which, however, laid the foundation for the future hierarchy of victims of Nazism, when against the background of the “victim of the first turn” – Jews who forget and do not notice others who suffered from Hitler's terror”²⁴. This phase was logically completed by the stormy discussions of 1986-1987 with the participation of not only historians, but also the political leadership of Germany.

Third, we will define the phase of “active memory culture”. During the 1990s and early 2000s, the country held open Museum and memorial events with the involvement of photographic documents and testimonies of participants in the events of the war. The most painful and shocking thing for the public was to realize that Hitler was supported by the vast majority of the German population, and that 99% of them were somehow (directly or indirectly) involved in the crimes of that time. Obviously, the disclosure of the truth about the times of the Third Reich caused resistance from a part of society (regardless of age).

Spanish model. The Spanish experience is based on the acceptance by the citizens of the country of an informal pact on amnesia that is, forgetting all the political excesses of the past in order to avoid them in the future. The policy of “reconciliation” or “oblivion” introduced during the transition from dictatorship to democracy was in effect until the mid-1990s. Due to the unwritten agreement between the

²⁴ Леньо П. Ю. Забуття чи подолання минулого? Німецький досвід вирішення проблем колективної вини та відповідальності. *Науковий вісник Ужгородського університету, серія «Історія»*. 2014. Вип. 33. С. 162.

main social and political groups of post-Franco Spain, he categorically rejected any attempts to use historical disputes outside the scientific and historiographical plane, thus giving history to historians. This position allowed us to reject historical revanchism on the part of the vanquished for the sake of the “common good” in the future and for the time being restrained discontent with historical memory, which broke through to the surface when the “fears of the past” were forgotten.

Initiated at that time “the war for history” acquired categorical forms, first of all because of the intervention of political parties that sought to “privatize” the past by manipulating their own historical images (“left” – loser democrats that were defeated in the war against “fascism” and forced to agree to “reconciliation” for the sake of democratic system restoration; “right” – Spanish patriots” who, against all odds, tried to keep “unity” of the Spanish nation, which, in particular, undermines the “disinterested” in history devoid of the feeling of unitarity and continuity of Spanish history)²⁵.

It should be considered that Spain has passed four stages in creating a national memory: 1) the denial of memory (1936-1977); 2) the policy of oblivion (1977-1981); 3) the suspension of memory (1982-1996); 4) the revival of memory (since 1996). The fact is that not often remember the initiative of Franco April 1937 “Decree of unity”, which to a certain extent united the monarchists and supporters of the Phalanx. Later, King Juan Carlos and the government led by Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez initiated the conclusion in October 1977 the Pact of national accord, which was called the “Moncloa Pact” (after the Palace-residence of the leadership of the Spanish government in Madrid) with all the parties responsible for the fate of the country.

In Ukraine, the famous intellectual and historian Yaroslav Hrytsak came up with ideas of “memory freezing” like the Spanish one. However, this position has not found support in society. According to Vladyslav Grynevych, the historical experience of these countries was too different.

²⁵ Чума Б. «Іспанська «війна за історію»: політика, історіографія та шкільна освіта». *Україна модерна*. 2012. Ч. 19: Як (не) писати підручники з історії. С. 63-88.

In Spain, there was a civil war and the conflict was polarized between the right and left citizens of the same state. Nevertheless, in post-Communist and post-colonial Ukraine, the conflict was between supporters of the “red Empire” and independence. Ukrainian society, after decades of silence, sought to reveal the truth about the crimes of totalitarian regimes (the Holodomor, mass repression, deportation of Crimean Tatars, the Holocaust, and so on), and the idea of a Pact of oblivion did not meet the public's needs²⁶.

Baltic model is based on parliamentarism as an expression of public opinion, including on historical topics. The President acts as a symbol of identity and “Keeper” of national memory. Defining for these countries is the formation of the memory of the titular nation while preserving the youthfulness of the development of an alternative memory model.

The leadership of the Baltic countries of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia tries to influence historical discussions and attaches great importance to historical education. This is reflected in the creation of institutions of national memory in the Baltic States, whose task is to develop a strategy for the “correct” popularization of national history. The main strategic task remained the process of balancing the image of a victim, hero or participant in the crimes of World War II, and recognizing responsibility for crimes against Jews. Anti-Jewish pogroms at the beginning of the Nazi occupation explain the participation of Jews in the Soviet repressive apparatus, state security agencies that committed crimes against the Baltic Nations during 1940-1941. In historiography, this was called the “concept of two genocides” and brought a certain division and rivalry for the title of the most affected nation. Honouring the heroes of the struggle for independence in 1940-1941 and 1944-1953, who, in turn, were involved in the anti-Jewish pogroms of 1941-1944, remains a controversial issue.

²⁶ Гриневич В. Подолання тоталітарного минулого. Ч. 1: світовий досвід. URL: <http://uamoderna.com/blogy/vladislav-grinevich/totalitarianism1>

As we can see, the number of studies of various aspects of historical memory, its formation and functioning is only growing. Among others, we should highlight the problems of social functions, mechanisms of functioning, the relationship between historical memory and national and regional identity.

2. “Memory Policy”

Memory structures are embedded in the political process and are constantly reproduced in various symbolic actions (public holidays, the installation and dismantling of monuments, places of memory). Therefore, the state builds a certain line of interpretation of historical events, which is based on the awareness of citizens of belonging to the nation, citizenship.

As in all other cases with multiple currents within Memory Studies, we are dealing with a variety of definitions: historical politics, memory politics, public history, and even applied history. This applies to both the domestic context and the situation in the English-speaking environment: memory politics, politics of remembrance, politics of history, past politics, public history, applied history, history marketing. The concept of “memory politics” arose in the second half of the 20th century in the philosophical concepts of postmodernists (R. Barth, Y. Kristieva, J. Derrida, M. Foucault), who put forward the thesis about the construction by the government and society of ideas about the past, the most successful for the formation of social and group identity. The practical use of the term “memory policy” dates back to the early 1980s. In Germany, when German Chancellor Helmut Kohl began a policy of forming German patriotism of a positive character, that is, based not only on the recognition of the German people's own guilt for the crimes of Nazism, but also an understanding of their own German nation and its culture²⁷. After 2004 the concept of “Geschichtspolitik” was revived in Poland as “polityka historyczna”, giving it a new, positive meaning after

²⁷ Петелин Б. В. Гульмут Коль: отвечая на вызовы истории. *Журнал региональной истории*. 2017. Т. 1, № 2. С. 12.

some intellectuals made a call in the mass media to develop and vigorously pursue a patriotic “historical policy”.

According to the classification of A. Kyrydon, all the variety of interpretations of this concept can be divided into two approaches. The first-value-is defined as a variety of social practices and norms related to the regulation of collective memory (Zh. Mink), as a conscious strategy for designing images of the past in plans for the future (P. Nora), as a public space for dialogue between social forces and historians (A. Miller). The second-constructivist-as imposed memory and permitted history (P. Ricker), as “creating criteria for selecting those historical events that are worth storing in the memory of those that need to be “erased” from it, the program and from it “erased”, the program and actions to implement these criteria in the mass consciousness in order to turn them into unconscious stereotypes, as the development and promotion of the context in which events selected for restoration in the mass consciousness are combined with actual reality and set politically appropriate attitudes and preferences (P. Kara-Murza), as a process of extraction of images of the past that are contrary to the moods of the epoch (and certain political forces), a symbolic resource that is quite acceptable to use, including in the process of political and cultural rivalry of elites (Yu. Shapoval)²⁸.

The offensive of memory on history was acutely perceived by historians in their professional environment. O. Miller's definition clearly emphasizes this threat of “intrusion” into academic discourse: “historical politics is a qualitatively different, much more intense than usual, intervention in the interpretation of history of the part of the political elite that controls power at the moment”²⁹. If we consider the policy of memory from the perspective of a historian, then this is a professional study, the result of which is the reproduction of ideas about the past, the institution of the state in this case is responsible only for the stage of

²⁸ Киридон А. М. Політика пам'яті в Україні (1991–2015 рр.). *Україна – Європа – Світ*. С. 244-245.

²⁹ Миллер А. Россия: власть и история. *ProetContra*. 2009. № 3-4. С. 8.

reproduction, in particular delegating to other social institutions, the interpretation remains for scientists. Thus, memory comes to the fore, its opposition to oblivion, and not “politics”³⁰. Researcher D. Anikin believes that the term “memory policy” is more acceptable and successful in scientific discourse and defines memory policy as a purposeful activity to represent a certain image of the past, which is in demand in a political context, through a variety of verbal (speeches of politicians, history textbooks) and visual (monuments, state symbols) practices³¹.

Since any policy is carried out to achieve a goal, it is logical, that memory policy is used to promote self-identification and social cohesion. In the understanding of some researchers, historical policy is “the conscious and purposeful use of history as an instrument of political struggle”, and memory policy, respectively, is actions aimed at the formation and reproduction of identities, primarily national identity³².

Ukrainian researcher A. Konyk considers memory policy as a study of the role of a political project, an order to form and consolidate values, knowledge about the past with a specific social and political goal. At the same time, the researcher points to the exercise of control by the power elite or the dominant elite over the construction of knowledge about the past as the essence and purpose of memory policy³³.

Attention is drawn to the relation of concepts programmed by O. Malynova³⁴.


³⁰ Рубцова В. Ю. Политика памяти в практике конструирования локальной идентичности. *Вестник Удмуртского университета. Социология, Политология, Международные отношения*. 2017. Т. 1, вып. 4. С. 451.

³¹ Аникин Д. А. Стратегии практики памяти на постимперском пространстве. *Известия Саратовского университета. Серия Философия. Психология. Педагогика*. 2012. Т. 12. Вып. 2. С. 34–41.

³² Ачкасов В. А. Роль «исторической политики» в формировании российской идентичности. *Журнал социологии и социальной антропологии*. 2015. № 2 (79). С. 181–192.

³³ Коник А. «Історична пам'ять» та «політика пам'яті» в епоху медіа культури. *Вісник Львівського університету. Серія Журналістика*. 2009. Вип. 32. С. 157-158.

³⁴ Малинова О. Ю. Политика памяти как область символической политики. *Методологические вопросы изучения политики памяти: сб. науч. тр.* Под ред. А. И. Миллера и Д. В. Ефременко. М. – СПб: Нестор-История, 2018. С. 34; Малинова О. Ю. Коммеморация исторических событий как инструмент символической политики: возможности сравнительного анализа. *Полития*. 2017. № 4 (87). С. 10.



In this approach, historical policy is a single version of memory policy. In this case, it is characterized by the active participation of power institutions and the pursuit of party-ideological interests, which determines the confrontational nature. The essence of memory politics is an irreconcilable confrontation between political opponents, in which there must be a winner and a loser. For this interpretation of the politics of memory is no room for compromise and common interpretations.

CONCLUSIONS

The politicization and mediatization of history, the functioning and use of memory to achieve political goals, determine the research interest in this issue. One of the mandatory conditions for the success of scientific (and not only) discussion is the agreement of its participants of the terms that they will use to define certain concepts, phenomena, events. How

interdisciplinary memory studios in modern Humanities actualize intersubject dialogue and perspectives of combining those concepts that were competing and mutually exclusive at previous stages. A review of methodological concepts developed by historians, political scientists, and sociologists, which are related to the memory of the past, is obviously not exhaustive. However, it emphasizes the possible approaches of scientists to understanding the past, the relationship of the past, present and future (especially through the prism of the influence of power on these processes).

Following other authors, we will confirm that the understanding and expansion of memory studios is intended to teach (both ordinary citizens and political figures) the value of their own and other people's memories, to search for areas of dialogue, coordination, and exchange of experience. We are also talking about the formation of a kind of value-moral atmosphere in society, where different positions regarding the past and its distinctive images will form a constructive basis for interaction between political actors. By opening up opportunities for competing experiences and legitimizing controversial interpretations, the modern memorial paradigm can become a serious foundation for the development of a tolerant, democratic society devoid of destructive and violent forms.

SUMMARY

The concepts of “history”, “historical memory”, “historical policy” and “memory policy” are revealed and compared. It is shown that historical memory can: first, precede direct influence as a means of influence that is, determine the features of implementation; second, constitute the final goal of influence on the transformation of the object of influence. The main forms of manifestation of the phenomenon of remembrance and its features in societies are updated. The harmful influence of historical traumas on the historical consciousness and historical memory of societies is demonstrated. The processes that affect the state of scientific development of the problem are outlined. It is demonstrated that the combination of methods of historiographical research and modern theoretical and methodological approaches

(in particular, the methodology of memory studios, the history of interactions, postcolonial and Imperial studios, etc.) will allow us to go beyond the classical historiography and solve research problems about the possibility/impossibility of mutual influence of historical science and memory policy.

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**TRADITIONS AND INNOVATIONS
IN THE ACADEMIC DISCOURSE OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
IN THE XIX–XXI CENTURIES
(ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE KREMENETS REGION)**

Skakalska I. B.

INTRODUCTION

The acquisition by science of the features of academic discourse is accompanied by the appearance in its structure of innovative components. It is important to trace how the methodological and socio-cultural principles of transformation of science into academic discourse with the synthesis of scientific-theoretical, scientific-production and scientific-educational activity took place over the centuries. Scientific research in the Kremenets region during the XIX–XXI centuries were held on the basis of educational institutions, therefore we emphasize the academic discourse, not just the scientific component. Because scientists did not only carry out research, but taught and popularized their own knowledge.

Kremenets region in the XIX century experienced educational, cultural and scientific rise, associated with the opening in 1805 of the Volyn gymnasium (since 1819 – the lyceum). Scientific research of that time replenished classrooms and the best students were involved in them under the guidance of teachers-scientists. A striking example is the scientific collaboration of V. Besser and A. Andrzejowski. In Kremenets in the XIX century formed a center of natural research. Volyn Lyceum not only gave young people a good foundation of natural knowledge, but also became a center of exact sciences (botany, mathematics, agronomy, mineralogy). It should be noted that some Kremenets teachers were members of the Warsaw Society of Science Admirers.

Early twentieth century characterized by the spread of local lore research in the Kremenets region, first of all, that is, the works of

M. Teodorovich. It also had an explanation: there was no educational center around which scientists could gather and conduct their research on its basis.

Scientific discourse of the interwar period of the twentieth century concentrated around the restored Kremenets Lyceum and the scientific structures that were part of it (Volyn Scientific Institute, Museum of Kremenets Land named after Dr. Willibald Besser). Also some scientists from Volyn.

Modern academic discourses of scientific research are developing in scientific centers and laboratories, scientific problem student groups of the Kremenets Regional Humanitarian and Pedagogical Academy named after Taras Shevchenko. We observe the longevity of traditions in scientific research on local lore and natural sciences.

Considering this topic from a conceptual standpoint, it is necessary to outline the range of problematic issues. The first conceptual problem that determines the general structure of research is the need to study the scientific tradition in the context of modern change. After all, innovation must cover the whole spectrum of scientific research, and it should not be destructive, but complementary.

The second conceptual problem is that educational traditions continue in Kremenets, so there is an academic environment that creates a basis for scientific research. The main thing is that the achievements of scientific research are not hampered by various factors, in particular, financial.

The third conceptual problem is that research is pro-European. In the XIX century Volyn Lyceum focused on Vilnius University in its programs. Scientific research was conducted in line with the methodological traditions that prevailed in Europe, but not in the Russian Empire. The influence of European innovative technologies was felt in the interwar period of the twentieth century. In addition, some Volyn scientists worked in scientific and educational institutions in Warsaw, Krakow, Prague and others. The modern higher education institution cooperates with several European universities and supports European research projects. Topics of scientific discourses cover the problems of

the humanities and natural sciences. The essence of the innovative component of modern academic discourse is studied, on the basis of which the ratio of its theoretical, pragmatic and socio-cultural aspects is analyzed.

Scientific-academic discourse, which unites communication in scientific and educational spheres, the purpose of which is to transfer the best achievements of scientific research and professional knowledge in the field of higher education of Kremenets region, which have a long historical tradition, is relevant despite innovations. Because there must be a basis for new research projects.

1. Direction of scientific research in the XIX – early XX centuries

The center of development and formation of scientific schools in the XIX century in Kremenets became the Volyn lyceum. The emphasis in the scientific work was on conducting basic research in the exact sciences. Thus, the researcher Wanda Grambetska aptly noted that “The research conducted by local botanists fit well into this area of science”¹. Among the leading scientists stands out the figure of W. Besser, the scientific direction of his research was floristics. His able student was A. Anzheiovsky. It is worth noting the fruitful cooperation of scientists, their joint expeditions to study the floristics of Volyn and Podillya. A. Andrzejowski officially became first an assistant and then an assistant (assistant professor) to his teacher W. Besser, they spend almost all their free time from high school students on trips supported by the Polish nobility. In addition, A. Anzheiovsky established cooperation with European scientists, Professor of Zoology at Vilnius University K. Eichwald and others².

S. Zenovich's theory of metaphysical character was a well-known scientific concept of the philosophy of nature among scientists of that time. The scientist was thoroughly acquainted with the physics,

¹ Грембецька В. Ботаніка в Кременці: люди, навчання, дослідження. *Волинські Афіни 1805-1833*. Зб.наук.праць під ред. С. Маковського, В. Собчука. Тернопіль, 2006. С. 173-187.

² Там само. С. 182.

chemistry and natural history of that time. He combined the learning process with scientific research. His scientific discourses provoked a lively discussion in the academic environment outside of Kremenets³.

The researcher also taught his theory during lectures at the Volyn Lyceum in Kremenets. This was a useful practice, both for the scientist and for his students, because the scientific findings of the research were combined with theory and discipline. Professors of Volyn Lyceum encouraged their students to scientific activity. It is clear that these were only skills of scientific work. Scientific centers of youth were created in the educational institution. Their purpose was to cultivate interest in scientific research and the realization of creative abilities of young people in various fields of science and culture. Suffice it to say that the famous philosophers and historians Jan Senkiewicz, Karl Senkiewicz, and Tit Shchelevsky emerged from these societies; Polish fiction writers Jan Sovinski, Gustav Olizar; famous writers Yu. Krashevsky, N. Dobrovolsky. Characteristic of these societies was the presence of democratic principles (election of the chairman of the society, discussion of scientific abstracts and public speeches with them, publishing the best works in scientific journals), combined with a certain conservatism (organizers and leaders were exclusively teachers, membership in the society was elitist, political and religious problems were avoided in the research topics, polemics were not allowed at the meetings and, in general, there were teachers-censors on the research topic)⁴. After the closure of the Volyn Lyceum, scientific research in Kremenets in the natural sciences ceased, and was conducted mainly to study the history and culture of the region.

Local lore research occupied an important place in the scientific research of scientists. Local historian M. Teodorovych belongs to the Volyn local historians of the end of the XIX – XX centuries, who

³ Гарбовська Я. Стефан Зенович – кременецький теоретик природничих наук. *Волинські Афіни 1805-1833*. Зб.наук.праць під ред. С.Маковського, В.Собчука. Тернопіль, 2006. С. 187-194.

⁴ Коляденко О. С. Кременецький ліцей у системі освіти Волині (XIX – 30-ті рр. XX ст.). Житомир, 2003. С. 143. URL: http://eprints.zu.edu.ua/4339/1/MONOGRAFIJA_%D0%904.pdf

gathered in Kremenets around the Volyn Theological Seminary, the Volyn Historical and Statistical Committee and the periodical “Volyn Diocesan Information”. In general, his research did not go beyond the official historiography of the time and was based mainly on the philosophy of positivism. However, the factual and source material collected by him did not lose its value, and the first, although Russian-language, five-volume fundamental encyclopedic work “Volyn. Historical and Statistical Description of Churches and Parishes of the Volyn Diocese” “has no analogues in the region and today itself is a powerful historical and local lore source. M. Teodorovich used local static material in his research, as well as information obtained from local priests. His works of the early twentieth century. became the basis for further local lore research. In the field of his scientific interests was the history of Kremenets. Among M. Teodorovich's researches, it is necessary to specify “History of the city of Kremenets”, “Volyn in descriptions of cities, towns and villages in church-historical, geographical, ethnographic, archeological, etc. relations”. Interesting and important as a historical source for researchers is the book “Historical and statistical description of churches and parishes of the Volyn diocese”, which was published in five volumes. The first three volumes of the work were recommended by the Academic Committee of the Ministry of Public Education for the purchase by libraries of educational institutions of Kyiv and Vilnius educational districts. In 1904, M. Teodorovich's work “History of the City of Kremenets” was published in Sidlets, in which the researcher offered his views on the history of the city of Kremenets, Volyn Province⁵.

During the Kremenets period of M. Teodorovich's life, a historical and statistical description of the Volyn eparchy was created. The leadership of the seminary invited M. Teodorovich to compile a “Commemorative Book” of the parishes of the diocese. The young researcher, getting acquainted with the statistics of benefactors, the archives of the Volyn consistory, analyzing the Volyn pages in the works

⁵ Теодорович М.І. Історія міста Кременця. Сідлець, 1904. 141 с.

of V. Tatishchev, M. Karamzin, M. Maksimovich, a collection of documents “Archives of Southwest Russia”, etc., admired the Volyn region and came up with a complete “Historical and statistical description of the Volyn diocese.” He began his work by adding historical texts, documents, priestly testimonies, and other records to short clerical descriptions. Thus, first in the “Volyn Diocesan Gazette”, and then in separate books, descriptions of 1477 parishes and churches of 10 Volyn counties appeared ⁶.

It is necessary to analyze the research of the local historian to generalize and understand the scientific achievements of the period. M. Teodorovych begins the work “History of the city of Kremenets” with a description of the physical and geographical location of Kremenets. The author notes that the city center is located in a ditch surrounded by mountains. The researcher notes that from the flint, which is in large quantities in the vicinity and the city itself was named – Kremenets. Mykola Teodorovych teaches the history of the city in a popular science form. Of course, the report on the city begins with the history of the castle, noting that it was built in the ninth century. As proof, the author cites data from his description, compiled on July 21, 1545, which states that the castle has existed since time immemorial. The book also tells about the rulers of Kremenets Castle and the city – the Mokosi family ⁷.

The author proudly notes that in 1240 Kremenets withstood the siege of the Mongols, led by Khan Batu. It was Kremenets that stood in the way of their conquests further west. M. Teodorovych traces the history of the city under the rule of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In the history of medieval Kremenets a prominent place belongs to Prince Svidrigail. At Kremenets in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Crimean Tatars repeatedly attacked. The raids in 1497 and 1500 were especially devastating. We also find information about this in

⁶ Скакальська І. Питання краєзнавства за науковим доробком Миколи Теодоровича «Історія міста Кременця». *Збірник наукових праць. Серія «Історія та географія»* / Харк.нац.пед.ун-т ім. Г.С. Сковороди. Харків: Планета-Прінт, 2009. Вип. 35. С. 158.

⁷ Теодорович М.І. Історія міста Кременця. Сідлець, 1904. С. 11-14.

the work of M. Teodorovich. The author reports that on April 4, 1536, King Sigismund I the Elder of Poland gave the city of Kremenets and the surrounding area to his wife Bonnie, with the obligation to strengthen the castle and maintain a military garrison. Kremenets belonged to Queen Bonnie for 20 years until she left for her homeland of Italy in 1556. Bona ruled the city through the elders: Stanislaw Falczewski and Felix Hercyk, who were engaged in the improvement of the castle. A significant array of material from M. Teodorovich's book is devoted to the descriptions of Queen Bonnie's castle. Describes the author and the destruction of the castle by the Cossacks under the leadership of Colonel Maxim Krivonos in 1648 during the national liberation war led by B. Khmelnytsky ⁸.

The author writes about the construction of the Jesuit college in the city in 1731–1743 and characterizes its functioning. The history of the Volyn gymnasium (lyceum) founded by Tadeusz Chatski, traced by Mykola Teodorovych from the time of its foundation to its transfer to Kyiv. In particular, the gymnasium was opened on October 10, 1805. Education in the gymnasium lasted 10 years and was divided into seven classes, the first of which were two years. They included: geography, history, mathematics, architecture, botany, God's law, moral sciences, agriculture, horticulture, political economy, physics, chemistry, law, language and literature – Polish, Russian, French, German, Greek and Latin, as well as music, horseback riding and swimming ⁹.

Thus, to study the history of education in Kremenets, the study of M. Teodorovich can provide maximum information. For example, in 1836 the Volyn Theological Seminary was transferred to the premises of the former lyceum. With the transfer of the seminary to Zhytomyr, the Volyn Diocesan Women's School was located in these buildings.

It should be noted that M. Teodorovych does not ignore the cult buildings of the city, even those that have not survived to this day. In particular, a description of the castle church of St. Mykhailo, which was located on the Castle Hill, near the left wall of the castle. It was built at

⁸ Там само. С. 28-44.

⁹ Там само. С. 55- 62; 95.

the beginning of XII century by the head of the castle Gavril Denis – Mokosiy in memory of his brother Mikhail. The church is mentioned in the lustration of Kremenets Castle from 1552. This position of the author in the work “History of the city of Kremenets” corresponds to the circumstances of the time when the study was written, it became the basis of many local lore. Collected M. Teodorovych factual and source material has not lost its value and is a powerful historical and local lore source. His works since Ukraine's independence are the most popular in writing research on the history of the Volyn region. Undoubtedly, M. Teodorovych's research “History of the city of Kremenets” and his other works had a significant impact on the formation of public opinion and contributed to the education of patriotism in many fields. A number of other works of the Volyn researcher have not yet been studied in detail by scientists.

Thus, the academic discourse was formed around the Volyn Lyceum, and later the Volyn Theological Seminary.

2. Scientific discourse of the interwar period of the twentieth century

An important center of academic scientific discourse in the interwar period of the twentieth century Kremenets Lyceum was restored. The Volyn Scientific Institute operated at the Kremenets Lyceum. His task was to coordinate scientific research in Volyn, to process the already collected material. Among the main areas of work was the organization of local lore research, publication of scientific papers and conferences¹⁰. It is clear that Polish scientists united around the Volyn Scientific Institute, but Ukrainian figures are also involved in its work.

An important center of scientific research in the interwar period of the twentieth century becomes the Museum of the Kremenets Land named after Dr. Willibald Besser. The museum was founded in 1937 as part of the Kremenets Lyceum. It was in one of the buildings of the school. It should be noted that from the first months of its work, the

¹⁰ Держархів Рівенської обл., ф. 160. Гофман Якуб (історик, краєзнавець, депутат польського Сейму. Автор «Путівника по Волині»). оп. 1, спр. 76. Проект устава Волинського наукового інституту при Кременецькому ліцеї (1938 р.), арк.1.

museum has established cooperation with other scientific institutions in Poland. There was also a constant correspondence of its employees with colleagues from other museums, such as Lviv, Warsaw, Krakow, with the Ukrainian National Museum “Hutsulshchyna”. Josaphat Kobrynsky in Kolomyia, the Natural History Museum in Grodno, the Archaeological Museum in Warsaw, with the latter an exchange of archaeological exhibits. Among the staff of the museum is O. Tsynkalowski, as a delegate of the Archaeological Museum in Warsaw, he participated in the excavations initiated by the museum. I. Gipsky was also involved in the ethnographic work of the museum.

During this period, local lore research developed. It is important to mention the local lore work of M. Tuchemsky, a church and public figure, a graduate of the Volyn Theological Seminary. Accompanying Archbishop Alexei M. Tuchemsky, visiting Volyn parishes, he describes them in detail. The most famous work of M. Tuchemsky is “On the nooks and crannies of Volyn Polissya”, it describes the journey of the Archbishop of Volyn and Kremenets in Volyn. For example, the author gives a geographical description of the area, notes what the population does, in particular, the parishioners of Nova Vyzhva have long been engaged in furriery¹¹. The author illustrates his posts. The most valuable in these explorations is historical information about the region. Accordingly, the work of the researcher M. Tuchemsky aroused considerable interest among the people of Volyn about the historical and architectural monuments of Volyn, ancient temples, monasteries and fortresses.

In the field of archeology, Yu. Shumovsky, a priest, public figure, archaeologist, and ethnographer, made his discoveries. In 1938 he graduated from the Faculty of Archeology of the University of Warsaw. In 1934–1938 he was a delegate from Volyn to the Warsaw Archaeological Museum. Yu. Shumovsky is also known as an archaeologist, so we will dwell on his scientific achievements in this field of research. As the author himself writes, he was “terribly in love with

¹¹ Тучемський М. По глухих закутках Волинського Полісся. *Церква і нарід*. ч. 1-2. 1938. С. 42-49.

archeology.” After receiving the certificate of a delegate from Volyn of the Warsaw Archeological Museum, he began to officially conduct excavations, and at the same time graduated from the Faculty of Archeology of the University of Warsaw. Near his native village of Myrogoshchi, Yu. Shumovsky found many Neolithic tools and ceramics that belonged to the Trypillia culture. These were his first achievements, which interested all the museums of Poland and the Ukrainian National Museum in Lviv, where Mr. Svetsytsky and Mr. Pasternak worked ¹². In 1934–35 – a new discovery of a young scientist. He discovered well-preserved Neolithic burials, which caused a sensation in Polish archeology. There was one burial of two skeletons of a man and a woman. There were many utensils in the grave with an ornament of cord pottery culture. All Polish newspapers wrote about this discovery ¹³. Professors, archaeologists from Vilna, Krakow, Lviv, Poznan and

Warsaw came to Myrogoshcha to see the discovery. I. Feshchenko-Chopivsky, a Ukrainian metallurgist, statesman and public figure, was a representative of the technical sciences. He was born in Zhytomyr region. From 1920 – in Poland, for a long time he lived on the farm Yurkove near the village Vyshnivets in Kremenets district in Volyn, where in 1935 he bought an estate. The scientist was looking for gifted Ukrainian children in the Kremenets region and paid for their education at the Jagiellonian University. Since 1922, I. Feshchenko-Chopivsky has been a senior assistant at the Department of Metallurgy and Metallurgy of the Warsaw Polytechnic ¹⁴. In the same year, at the invitation of the rector of the Mining and Metallurgical Academy in Krakow, he founded the Department of Metallography and General Metallurgy and held the position of head and professor of the department. In 1927 he defended his dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Sciences; in 1931 – a dissertation for the degree of habilitated doctor of sciences. From 1928 he was a

¹² Шумовський Ю. Зруйноване гніздо, чи Історія однієї священицької родини на Волині. Рукопис. Том 2. США, Саванна, 1994. С. 41.

¹³ Tereny archeologiczne w pow. Dubieńskim. *Dzien dobry*. 1935.

¹⁴ Фещенко-Чопівський І. Хроніка мого життя. Життєписно-бібліографічний нарис. Визначні діячі НТШ. Львів, 2000. С. 73-211.

scientific adviser, head of the research laboratory of the metallurgical plant “Bayldon” in Katowice. From 1933 he was a corresponding member of the Polish Academy of Technical Sciences. He was a full member of the Scientific Society named after Shevchenko, Societies of metallurgists and mechanics of Poland, Metallurgists of Germany. He has published more than 135 scientific papers in Ukrainian and foreign languages. In 1945, he was captured by Soviet special services in Katowice (Poland), brought to Kyiv, and illegally sentenced to 15 years in prison. He died in the Abez concentration camp (Komi Republic)¹⁵.

On the initiative of I. Feshchenko-Chopivsky, a scholarship fund named after Simon Petliura, who acted on the principles of public loan. The scientist understood that young scientists should be financially supported so that they could discover themselves and achieve results in scientific research. Dr. I. Feshchenko-Chopivsky repeatedly came to Western Volhynia with lectures. For example, on April 14, 1938, in Kremenets, in the class of the Kremenets Lyceum, a public lecture was given by Professor of the Krakow Mining Academy, Doctor of Engineering I. Feshchenko-Chopivsky on the topic: “What are the ways of modern craft?” The report, which brought together the Ukrainian intelligentsia of the city, was heard with deep interest¹⁶.

The scientific works of Ivan Vlasovsky, secretary of the Volyn Consistory, editor of the magazine “Church and People” in Kremenets are of interest¹⁷. He was an active public figure, theologian, scientist, professor. He is the author of a multi-volume work on the history of religion “An Essay on the History of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.” The author's opinion is correct that the Ukrainian people under the auspices and influence of the Orthodox Church created their national culture as a branch of general Christian culture¹⁸.

¹⁵ Краєзнавчий довідник. Українська еліта Кременеччини міжвоєнного періоду XX ст. Автор-упорядник І. Скакальська. Кременець: ВЦ КОГПІ, 2012. 46 с.

¹⁶ Відчит проф. І. Фешченка-Чопівського. *Церква і нарід*. ч. 8-9. 1938. С. 373.

¹⁷ Черняхівський Г. І. Кременеччина від давнини до сучасності. Кременець : Папірус, 1999. 320 с.

¹⁸ Власовський І. Нарис історії української православної церкви. Ремпринтне видання. т.4.ч.2. Київ, 1998. С. 5.

From the educational point of view, I. Vlasovsky's article "New teaching methods and the science of religion in school" is practical. The author reveals the pedagogical systems of education of A. Kamensky, K. Ushinsky. Separately, I. Vlasovsky dwelled on the characteristics of the "Dalton Plan", called the advantages of this system of education. However, it also cites shortcomings, in particular, in the conditions of rural school life, to apply the Dalton system, and thus to adapt science to religion, is not an urgent issue¹⁹. Thus, the methods of teaching and educating the younger generation were also the subject of consideration of the Ukrainian intelligentsia.

The issues of theology, as well as the history of religion were the subject of research by Professor V. Bidnov. He worked for some time at the Theological Seminary in Kremenets. The number of scientific works of V. Bidnov is significant. In particular, archival materials (10 titles), works on the history of the church (23), articles on the history of Ukraine (15), monographs and biographical essays (26)²⁰ were published. As we can see, one of the activities of the spiritual elite was scientific work. In his article "Volyn in defense of the Orthodox Church in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries." V. Bidnov talks about the spread of Protestantism in Poland and in Ukrainian lands. He emphasizes that the positive side of the victory of the Reformation was the creation of schools, the development of education. In this connection, the Jesuit Order intensified its activities. In order to prevent these influences on Ukrainians, the scientist suggests that one should create one's own educational institutions²¹. The author gives a description of education in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The scholar's research interests include the history of religion, problems of education and biographical works.

Thus, the interwar period marked the development of science in the Kremenets Lyceum and its structural parts, as well as independent

¹⁹ Власовський І. Нові методи навчання і наука релігії в школі. *Церква і нарід.* ч. 6. 1938. С. 20-25.

²⁰ Сакович Є. Ю. Спомини про професора В. О. Біднова. *Церква і нарід.* ч. 7-8. 1936. С. 280.

²¹ Біднов В. Волинь в обороні Православної церкви в XVI-XVII ст. *За соборність.* Луцьк, 1932. № 1. С. 12-18.

research by humanities and partly technical sciences and theology, as in Kremenets at that time there was a seminary. It was a center of religious scientific intelligence.

3. Trends in scientific research in modern Kremenets University

Kremenets Regional Humanitarian and Pedagogical Academy named after Taras Shevchenko has a long educational and scientific traditions, whose scientists seek to develop and modernize them. The latest research centers, research projects, research laboratories focus their activities on solving current problems of education and science, respectively, create an academic discourse of scientific research.

The academy has international research centers (“Higher Education of Ukraine in the context of European integration”, scientific moderator – Professor O. Beznosyuk, “Ukrainian-Polish historical border”, scientific coordinator – Professor G. Stronsky), which are a continuation of the historical traditions of European scientific vectors cooperation of scientists of Volyn Lyceum with representatives of European universities.

In line with the research of the interwar period, local lore explorations of both the history of Kremenets in general and individual periods continue²². Since 2019, the Academy has established the Center for Local Lore and Tourism, scientific moderator – Head of the Department of History and Teaching Methods Skakalska I. The realization of the idea of creating the Center became a reality during the international project “Innovative University and Leadership” (Poland). The purpose of the center is to involve young people in the study of the history of the region and the promotion of tourism in the Kremenets district. Among the main tasks are the following: 1). Popularization of knowledge on the history of Kremenets region and educational traditions of the Academy. 2). Providing methodological assistance to secondary schools to study the problems of local lore.

²² Скакальська І. Б. Кременеччина у міжвоєнний період. *Нескорена Кременеччина у першій половині ХХ ст. (сторінки пам'яті)*: Науково-документальне видання. За ред. В. Мазурка. Тернопіль, 2009. С. 15-73.

3). Training of a group of creative guides and local historians. 4). Acquaintance of students and pupils with methods of collecting local lore material, performance of scientific researches. 5). Nurturing a sense of patriotism. The center outlined such practical ways to implement tasks as the preparation of scientific papers on local lore by teachers of the Department of History and Teaching Methods and students majoring in “History”. Also reviewing and consulting scientific research of students of secondary schools of Kremenets district. Organization of thematic excursions, workshops, quests, round tables, book presentations, trainings on the history of Kremenets and Ternopil. Conducting scientific and methodological seminars and scientific readings for teachers of Kremenets district. Realization of practical knowledge by students during archeological and pedagogical practice. Visiting historical and cultural sites, museums of the region. Making presentations on the history of Kremenets and Volyn. An important scientific event was a scientific and methodological seminar on local lore and archeology²³.

The academy under the leadership of leading scientists implements research projects: “Monitoring the state of the flora of Podillya and the physiology of higher plants”, “Educational technologies for the formation of personal values in the system of continuing education” and others.

Research centers are a platform that unites well-known and young scientists. Among them are the following: “Theoretical and methodological principles of training future teachers for professional activities”, “Problems of artistic and aesthetic education and upbringing of student youth in a national revival.”

Fundamental research is carried out in scientific laboratories: “Laboratory of Ecological Monitoring and Experimental Biology”, as part of its work carried out a project to study the composition of water reservoirs of Kremenets, also conducted floral expeditions, as once did V. Besser. The scientific activity of the laboratory “Physical and

²³ Центр краєзнавства і туризму. Офіційний сайт Кременецької обласної гуманітарно-педагогічної академії ім. Тараса Шевченка. URL: http://www.kogpi.edu.te.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1278:2016-03-24-14-31-47&catid=26:2011-11-14-09-37-14&Itemid=273

pedagogical factors of formation of a healthy way of life of youth” is important.

The research laboratory “Creativity of Ulas Samchuk and Borys Kharchuk: Art Chronicle of the 20th Century” has a literary-biographical and linguistic orientation. Kharchuk's readings are periodically held on the basis of the laboratory.

Research laboratories “Problems of man and philosophy of health”, “Educational technologies in the system of continuing education” contribute to the establishment in academic discourse of the practice of using theory and applied achievements.

As part of the research laboratory “Modern trends in linguodidactics and discourse research” (scientific coordinator Associate Professor Semegin TS) published the second issue of the collection of student research papers “Verba magistri”.

The academy trains young researchers. According to the results of the 2019 academic year, 13 graduate students (8 full-time and 5 part-time) study at the postgraduate course of the Academy in the specialty 011 Educational and Pedagogical Sciences. Four people are studying for a postgraduate degree at other higher education institutions. The international partnership cooperation of the academy with foreign institutions of Poland has been established, namely: Higher Socio-Economic School in Przeworsk (February 2019), Higher State Vocational School in Kholm (June 2019), Lublin Higher School in Rykach (November 2019), SAYHELLO SCHOOL Language School in Warsaw 40 (December 2019). The agreement on international cooperation with the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn (Poland) has been extended.

The teaching staff and students of the Academy were co-organizers and organizers of a number of scientific conferences. Among them: scientific conference “On the history of Poland and Ukraine” in the framework of the XV International Literary and Artistic Forum “Dialogue of Two Cultures – 2019” (September 8–9, 2019); XIX International Scientific Conference “Personality and Society: Confrontation or Consensus” in the framework of the International

Methodological Symposium “Subject of Humanitarian Cognition” (September 9-13, 2019); All-Ukrainian scientific-practical conference “Cultural heritage of the Olympic movement in the system of humanitarian education of schoolchildren” (Rivne – Kremenets, November 12-13, 2019); V All-Ukrainian scientific-practical conference “Medical and biological problems of physical education of different groups, occupational therapy, inclusive and special education” (Lutsk, December 3, 2019); “Education in Kremenets: traditions and prospects” in the IV All-Ukrainian seminar-hiking trip “Kremenets science: open air, or Science in sneakers” (May 23, 2019); II All-Ukrainian scientific-practical Internet conference “Current state and prospects of education: theory, practice, innovation” (November 19, 2019); IV All-Ukrainian scientific-practical conference “Litteris et artibus: new horizons” (November 14, 2019); XV reporting scientific-practical conference of the teaching staff for 2018” (May 16, 2019)²⁴.

An annual scientific seminar is organized at the academy, which is organized jointly with the specialists of the methodical office of the education department of the Kremenets District State Administration. During the seminar important problems of historical and local lore research, museum pedagogy, etc. are discussed²⁵.

The following periodicals are published in the Kremenets Regional Humanitarian and Pedagogical Academy: Scientific Bulletin of the Kremenets Regional Humanitarian and Pedagogical Academy named after Taras Shevchenko. Series: Pedagogy. Issue 11; Kremenets comparative studios; Actual problems of humanitarian education. The Council of Young Scientists has published collections of scientific works: Literis et Artibus: new horizons; Kremenets science: open air, or Science in sneakers.

²⁴ Звіт ректора за 2019 рік. URL : http://www.kogpi.edu.te.ua/images/stories/vchena_rada/zvit_rektora_2019.pdf

²⁵ В центрі уваги – музейна педагогіка. Офіційний сайт Кременецької обласної гуманітарно-педагогічної академії ім. Тараса Шевченка.

URL: http://www.kogpi.edu.te.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2539:2019-11-29-17-48-45&catid=71:2016-03-04-07-11-15&Itemid=369

Thus, traditions and innovations in the academic discourse of scientific research in the XIX–XXI centuries successfully continued, there is an academic environment that creates a basis for scientific research. It is important that historical and innovative models of science development in Kremenets region serve as a cultural basis, without which it is impossible to understand the ontological origins of the intellectual scientific community of the region as a whole and assess ways of science development in the future.

CONCLUSIONS

Based on a systematic approach that combines philosophical and methodological, historical, scientific, retrospective and sociocultural aspects, a study of the genesis of academic discourse, as well as its place and role in the information society, allows us to draw the following conclusions.

Around the educational centers of Kremenets and the XIX–XXI centuries formed an academic discourse on research. A long historical tradition must be studied and best practices revived. Because, we understand from the words of K. Sagan that scientists are influenced by the cultural environment. Accordingly, scientists should continue their research and promote their knowledge²⁶.

Research should be conducted on the methodological basis of best European and world practices. In the XIX century Volyn Lyceum focused on Vilnius University in its programs. Scientific research was conducted in line with the methodological traditions that prevailed in Europe, not in the Russian Empire. The influence of European innovative technologies was felt in the interwar period of the twentieth century. In addition, some Volyn scientists worked in scientific and educational institutions in Warsaw, Krakow, Prague and others. As an example, the modern academy cooperates with several European universities and supports European research projects.

²⁶ Саган К. Світ, повний демонів. Наука як свічка у п'їтьмі. Переклад з англ. М. Климчука. Харків, 2018. С. 235.

In general, the scientific traditions of the nineteenth century have such positive aspects as innovation, European trends, study and promotion of local materials. In the twentieth century the activity of scientific institutions at the Kremenets Lyceum was effective.

It should be noted that science in Kremenets at the present stage is carried out on the basis of scientific tradition and rationality, formed in the process of a solid foundation of established traditions of research, through the prism of leading research centers of the past, research heritage of scientists from various fields. scientific knowledge who have successfully conducted their scientific research. In our opinion, the most acute problems for modern scientists, which are potentially threatening and need to be resolved as soon as possible, are the following: the outflow of personnel from science; unconvincing without mutual support innovative cooperation of science and business; insufficient funding.

SUMMARY

The author notes that the accelerated development of technology requires the creation and implementation of innovative forms of education. However, without the traditions formed in the process of a solid foundation laid in the XIX–XX centuries it is difficult to continue progress. The research analyzes and generalizes the methodology of research and scientific research of scientists in the historical context on the example of educational institutions in Kremenets. A comprehensive study of the history of science from the XIX to the XXI century. Based on a systematic approach that combines philosophical and methodological, historical, scientific, retrospective and sociocultural aspects, the genesis of academic discourse is studied and the following main trends are outlined: traditionality and inheritability of research methodology from teachers to students (Volyn gymnasium); regional implementation of scientific research, combining the study and research of the history of the region.

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