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**STALIN'S REPRESSIONS AGAINST THE
POPULATION OF THE WESTERN
REGIONS OF UKRAINE (1939 – 1953):
SOCIAL AND PERSONAL DIMENSIONS,
POLITICS OF MEMORY**

Collective Monograph



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The proposed monograph presents some aspects of memory policy-making problems in Ukraine of Soviet repression in the western regions (1939 – 1953).

The materials of the monograph can be used by political and public organizations, educational and scientific institutions for a more thorough understanding and balanced construction of memory policy in Ukraine on Soviet repressions in western regions.

The studies presented in the monograph can also be useful for scientists, teachers, students, pupils, and anyone interested in the issues of History of Ukraine in the twentieth century.

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імені Івана Франка

**СТАЛІНСЬКІ РЕПРЕСІЇ
ЩОДО НАСЕЛЕННЯ ЗАХІДНИХ
ОБЛАСТЕЙ УКРАЇНИ (1939 – 1953):
СОЦІАЛЬНИЙ І ОСОБИСТІСНИЙ
ВИМІРИ, ПОЛІТИКА ПАМ'ЯТІ**

Колективна монографія



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Сталінські репресії щодо населення західних областей України (1939 – 1953): соціальний і особистісний виміри, політика пам'яті : колективна монографія / відп. ред. В. Ільницький. Латвія : Baltija Publishing, 2022. 224 с.

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У запропонованій монографії представлено окремі аспекти проблеми формування політики пам'яті в Україні щодо радянських репресій у західних областях (1939 – 1953).

Матеріали монографії можуть використовуватися політичними й громадськими організаціями, освітніми та науковими закладами задля ґрунтовнішого розуміння і виваженого конструювання політики пам'яті в Україні щодо радянських репресій у західних областях.

Уміщені в монографії дослідження також можуть бути корисними науковцям, учителям, студентам, учням та усім, хто цікавиться питаннями історії України ХХ ст.

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ЗМІСТ

Депортаційні процеси в західній частині України в 1944 – 1953 рр.: сучасний науковий дискурс (<i>Оксана Каліщук</i>).....	9
Кадрове забезпечення управлінь НКДБ-МДБ Дрогобицької, Закарпатської, Станіславської, Чернівецької областей УРСР (1944 – 1950 рр.): просопографічний аналіз (<i>Василь Ільницький</i>).....	27
Ідейно-політичний терор радянської влади в західних областях України (<i>Олег Малярчук</i>).....	47
Соціальна частина ідеолого-пропагандистського впливу сталінського режиму на Дрогобиччині в перші післявоєнні роки (<i>Руслана Попп</i>).....	81
Репресії радянської влади щодо військових та цивільних осіб, які побували на окупованій території (1944 – 1953 рр.): пошуки у пам'ятєвому просторі (<i>Людмила Стрільчук, Олександр Добржанський</i>).....	105
Репресовані освітяни Дрогобиччини (друга половина 1940-х рр.): просопографічні аспекти (<i>Микола Галів, Анна Огар, Мазурик Вікторія</i>).....	114
Обмеження релігійних прав та початки репресивної конфесійної політики сталінського тоталітаризму в західних областях України на завершальному етапі Другої світової війни та в перші повоєнні роки: історична пам'ять крізь призму архівних документів (<i>Василь Гулай, Віра Максимець</i>).....	130
Вплив політичних репресій 1944 – 1946 років на духовне служіння отця Маркіяна (Матвія) Когута (ЧСВВ) (<i>Юрій Стецик, Антоніна Бойчук</i>).....	144
Добрі сусіди: стосунки волинських чехів та підпілля ОУН та УПА (<i>Ярослав Антонюк</i>).....	153

Репресивна політика комуністичного і нацистського режимів стосовно українських правників Станиславівщини під час Другої світової війни (*Степан Кобута, Світлана Кобута*).....193

Репресії проти польського населення західних областей України на завершальному етапі Другої світової війни: архівні матеріали та сучасні інтерпретації суспільної пам'яті (*Василь Гулай, Наталія Дмитришин*).....213

CONTENTS

Deportation processes in the Western part of Ukraine in 1944 – 1953: modern scientific discourse (<i>Oksana Kalishchuk</i>).....	9
Personnel Staff of NCSS-MSS Drohobych, Transcarpathia, Stanislav, Chernivtsi regions of the USSR (1944 – 1950): prosopographical analysis (<i>Vasyl Ihnytskyi</i>).....	27
Ideological and political terror of the soviet government in the Western regions of Ukraine (<i>Oleh Maliarchuk</i>).....	47
Social section of ideological and propaganda influence stalinist regime on Drohobych region in the first post-year years (<i>Ruslana Popp</i>).....	81
Repressions of soviet authorities regarding military and civil persons who stayed in the occupied territory (1944 – 1953): search in the memory space (<i>Liudmyla Strilchuk, Oleksandr Dobrzhanskyi</i>).....	105
Repressed educators of Drohobych region (the second half of the 1940s): prosopographical aspects (<i>Mykola Haliv, Anna Ohar, Viktoriia Mazuryk</i>).....	114
Religious restrictions rights and the beginnings of the repressive confessional policy of stalinist totalitarianism in the Western regions of Uraine in the final stages of World war II and in the first postwar years: historical memory through the prism of archival documents (<i>Vasyl Gulay, Vira Maksymets</i>).....	130
The influence of the political repression of 1944 – 1946 on the spiritual service of father Markian (Matvij) Kohut (OSBG) (<i>Yurii Stetsyk, Antonina Boichuk</i>).....	144
Good neighbours: relations between Volyn Czechs and underground of OUN and UPA (<i>Yaroslav Antoniuk</i>).....	153
Soviet and Nazi Repressive Policies Towards Ukrainian Lawyers of the Stanislav Region During World War II (<i>Stepan Kobuta, Svitlana Kobuta</i>).....	193

Repressions of the polish population of Ukraine's Western at the
final stage of the Second World war:
archival materials and modern interpretations
of public memory (*Vasyl Gulay, Nataliia Dmytryshyn*).....213

DEPORTATION PROCESSES IN THE WESTERN PART OF UKRAINE IN 1944 – 1953: MODERN SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE

Systemic well-planned deportations and their importance for the state institutions in solving urgent political problems give grounds to assert the deportation policy in the USSR as a kind of state repressive measures. In this case “deportation policy” should be understood as a systemic activity of the state political institutions aimed at preparing and conducting deportation operations, the goal of which was to gain and retain power, to work out an integrated mechanism for transforming the socio-political relations and institutionalization of power in the region and thus to eliminate competition for owning power. Nazi Germany widely utilized the Soviet deportation actions in its propaganda and counter-propaganda practice. A German leaflet, familiarizing the population with the orders and instructions of the NKVD on mass evictions, can serve an illustration of it. It contains the text of the Order issued by Georgii Zhukov and Lawrentii Beria concerning the eviction of all Ukrainians who lived on the occupied territory. The leaflet as a historical document was introduced into the contemporary scientific and social discourse by Vasil Marochkin¹.

However, subsequent studies have revealed none of the orders under the No. 0078/42 of June 22, 1944 among the NKO or the NKVD / NKDB departmental decrees. The Order No. 0078, dated January, 26 1944 and signed by the Deputy Commissar Sergei Kruglov, concerned the organization of the camps for German prisoners of war. Nonetheless, deportations were so commonplace in the Soviet life mode that the meaning of forgery was perceived without calling into question its truthfulness (sometimes it is still now perceived in this way).

The mechanism of repression and the system of state violence has been comprehensively elucidated in the fundamental archaeological study by Ivan Bilas². It can be argued that probably for the first time in the Ukrainian historiography the laws and regulations issued by the top party leadership regarding the deportations and expulsion of peoples from the territory of Ukraine have been analyzed by Ihor Vynnychen-

¹ Марочкін В. “Выслать в отдельные края Союза ССР всех украинцев...”. *Літературна Україна*. 1992. 27 лютого. С. 1.

² Білас І. Репресивно-каральна система в Україні. 1917 – 1953. У 2 т. Київ: Либідь, 1994.

ko³. The research works of the scholars of that period are collected in the academic publication “Deportation. Western lands of Ukraine, the late 30s – early 50s”⁴. The thesis research of Lviv scientist Mykola Syvyryn can be considered as one of the first comprehensive works on the study of the issues of deportation and the police units’ participation in them, though it has certain shortcomings⁵.

The problem of the Ukrainian population deportations were considered in the monographs by Tamara Vronska⁶ and Iosyp Nadolskyi⁷.

The articles by Lviv researchers Kostiatyn Kondratiuk, Stepan Makarchuk, Ivan Pater⁸ have also contributed greatly to the elucidation of the problem under discussion. Although considerable amount of research has been devoted to this historical event it can be argued that the problem of mass deportations from the territory of Ukraine requires further in-depth studies⁹.

The deportation policy in the Western Ukrainian regions in the post-war years had a clearly explicit “anti-nationalist” coloring. The main goal of the Soviet leadership in the 1944 – 1950s was to suppress the national liberation movement. The Soviet government considered the struggle with the “Ukrainian nationalism” as a priority task and an important component of the sovietization of the region. Soviet security authorities understood that Ukrainians were nationally-conscious peo-

³ Винниченко І. Україна 1920 – 1980-х: депортації, заслання та вислання. Київ: Рада, 1994.

⁴ Депортації. Західні землі України кінця 30-х – початку 50-х рр: Документи, матеріали, спогади. У 3 т. Львів: “Місіонер”, 1996 – 2002.

⁵ Національні відносини в Україні у ХХ ст.: Збірник документів і матеріалів. Київ: Наукова думка, 1994. С. 328; Йосиф Сталин – Лаврентію Беріи: “Их надо депортировать...”: Документи, факты, комментарии / сост. Николай Бугай. Москва: Дружба народов, 1992.

⁶ Вронська Т. Позасудові репресії членів сімей учасників національно-визвольного руху в західних областях України (1944 – 1952). Харків: Право, 2008.

⁷ Надольський Й. Депортаційна політика сталінського тоталітарного режиму в західних областях України (1939 – 1953 рр.). Луцьк: “Вежа”, 2008.

⁸ Жупник В. Депортаційні процеси 1944 – 1953 рр. на території західних областей УРСР як засіб тоталітарного “упокорення”: історіографічний аспект. *Вісник Прикарпатського університету. Історія*. 2013. Вип. 23–24. С. 303.

⁹ Адамовський В. Депортації як форма державного терору в Україні (1930 – 1950-ті рр.) спроба термінологічного та історіографічного аналізу. *Історія України: маловідомі імена, події, факти*. 2007. Вип. 34. С. 255–268; Довбня О. Депортації населення Західної України 1939 – 1953 рр.): новітня вітчизняна історіографія. *Схід*. 2018. № 2. С. 70–77.

ple, and therefore potentially dangerous force. That is why Ivan Bilas, analyzing the means and mechanisms used by the communist regime to preserve and strengthen their power in Ukraine, interprets mass deportations of the population as “a measure of political persecution, criminal or administrative punishment”¹⁰. It is worth pointing out that in the works by the Soviet scholars, published in the second half of the 1940s and early 1980s, the violent repressive acts of the Soviet power were analyzed only with a reference to those inhabitants of the western regions of Ukraine, who collaborated with or were members of the UPA. Regarding other regions they claimed that the establishment of Soviet power was in accordance with the “will of the working people”¹¹.

However, we cannot exclude economic component in the deportation actions. In fact, family members of the Ukrainian national underground and the UPA members who were exiled to the far-away lands of the Soviet Union, were supposed to provide the coal industry with labour hands. According to the historian Tamara Vronska repressions of the underground members’ families are directly related to the needs of the Soviet industry, since the deported “Ostarbeitar” could be used as “slave” labour force.

According to Iosyp Nadolskyi, there was another reason for repression – the need to accelerate the collectivization of the Western Ukrainian villages, since, under the conditions of 1946 – 1947 famine there appeared a need for economy sovietization in the western regions.

A prominent Ukrainian public figure, Ievgen Onatsky, identified four principal objectives for the Soviet deportations: “to populate vast territories of Siberia, the Far East and Central Asia, which due to unfavourable climatic conditions are still sparsely populated; to increase the potential of the Russian people population rate through the nationalization and assimilation (Russification) of the settlers and their children; to use the forces of settlers to strengthen Moscow’s dominance in Asia and create a military and material base for the conquest of the free world; to exterminate physically or at least to debilitate those nations which they failed to communize or assimilate, and whom the Musco-

¹⁰ Білас І. Репресивно-каральна система в Україні (1917 – 1953). Кн. 1. Київ: Либідь, 1994. С. 133.

¹¹ Ніколаєць Ю. Проблема ОУН-УПА та масових депортацій у повоєнний період в українській історіографії. *Історія України. Маловідомі імена, події, факти*. 2008. Вип. 35. С. 329–347.

vites did not trust, fearing that at the earliest opportunity they will rise against Moscow tyranny”¹².

The Deportation of the Western Ukraine Population in 1944 – 1946. By its nature the deportation of 1944 – 1953 did not differ much from the deportations of 1939 – 1941, except for the fact that in 1939 – 1941 those evicted were the people, whose participation in the anti-Soviet movement was proved in one or another way, while in 1944 – 1953 all those, who were just only suspected of participation in the liberation movement, were deported. So, in order to weaken the national liberation movement in Western Ukraine the Soviet authorities resorted to punitive actions against the local population, having accused them of cooperation with and sympathy to the insurgents. The mass deportation of the civilian population substantially undermined the support of the Ukrainian liberation movement. The people who had avoided deportations were intimidated and cooperated much more actively with the Soviet power and joined the collective farms. On December, 14, 1943, the head of the special department of the NKVD of the USSR Mikhail Kuznetsov¹³ and the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the UkrSSR Vasyl Riasnoi sent an inquiry to the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR: “How shall we act toward the German invaders’ accomplices (folksdeutsch) and their families?” The Order/Decree of the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR Laurentii Beria No. 7129 of March 31, 1944¹⁴ gave an impetus for

¹² Оनाцький С. Українська мала енциклопедія, кн. 3, “Літери Д – Є”. Буенос-Айрес: накладом Адміністрації УАПЦ в Аргентині, 1958. С. 324.

¹³ Наказом НКВС СРСР від 17 березня 1944 р. на базі ОСП ГУЛАГу НКВС СРСР було утворено Відділ спецпоселень (ОСП) НКВС СРСР. Його начальником призначили саме у минулому офіцера для особливих доручень при наркомі внутрішніх справ СРСР полковника держбезпеки (гб) М. В. Кузнецова (Михаил Васильевич Кузнецов)

¹⁴ 31 березня 1944 р. з’явилися два документи, підписані наркомом внутрішніх справ СРСР Л. Берією: розпорядження № 7129 та наказ № 122 про репресування членів родин оунівців. Останній мав дещо незвичну форму, оскільки адресувався двом заступникам наркома внутрішніх справ СРСР С. Круглову та І. Серову, а також наркому внутрішніх справ УРСР В. Рясному. Цей документ був досить коротким, але “змістовним”. Без будь-якого обґрунтування чи мотивації він починався зі слів: “На ваш № 1-83 від 29 березня 1944 р. про репресування членів сімей оунівців – наказую: 1. “Всіх повнолітніх членів сімей засуджених оунівців, а також активних повстанців як арештованих, так і убитих у зіткненнях, – засилати у віддалені райони Красноярського краю, Омської, Новосибірської та Іркутської областей, а їх майно конфіскувати відповідно до наказу НКВС СРСР

repressive measures against people related to or suspected of cooperation with insurgents. In this document two deputies of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Sergei Kruglov and Ivan Sierov and the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR Vasył Riasnoi were ordered: "All adult family members of the convicted OUN soldiers and the relatives of the active rebels, either arrested or killed in the fights, must be exiled to the remote areas of Krasnoyarsk region, Omsk, Novosibirsk and Irkutsk regions, and their property must be confiscated in accordance with the order of the NKVD, No.001552, dated December 10, 1940¹⁵. The deportation had acquired a clearly regulated character since March 31, 1944 (the date of signing the directive of the NKVD of the USSR No. 122 by Lawrentii Beria concerning the eviction of the members of the OUN families and active rebels to remote regions of the Krasnoyarsk territory, regions of the Irkutsk, Omsk and Novosibirsk)¹⁶. Issued on April 5, 1944 "Instructions on the procedure of evicting OUN members' families and active insurgents to the remote areas of the USSR" determined the categories of people who were the subjects to deportation, namely, all the adult members of the OUNists' families and active rebels, including the arrested or killed in the fights, ... the families of the leaders of OUN-UPA governing bodies, who were hiding. The minors were to be deported with their families. The mention of the latter meant that virtually all those who were in the units of the OUN and, in fact, the UPA, automatically condemned their families to deportation. The Instructions provided regulations concerning the procedure for registration and the grounds for eviction of the population (source: documents of the City and District Departments of the NKDB-NKVS with motivations), etc¹⁷.

The archival documents of the departmental archive of the Ministry of Internal Affairs testify that during the long-term operation (1944 –

№ 001552 від 10 грудня 1940 р.». Посилання на останній документ означало, що, не маючи законних підстав репресувати родини цивільних осіб, визнаних "зрадниками" (кримінальні кодекси РРФСР і УРСР не містили такої статті), НКВС учергове обмежився власними відомчими приписами]

¹⁵ Галузевий державний архів Служби безпеки України. Ф. 2. Оп. 103. Спр. 3614. Арк. 7–8.

¹⁶ Депортації. Західні землі України кінця 1930-х – початку 50-х рр.: Документи, матеріали, спогади, т. 2, "1946 – 1947 рр. Львів: Місіонер, 1998. С. 303.

¹⁷ Винниченко І. Україна 1920 – 1980-х: депортації, заслання та вислання. Київ: Рада, 1994. С. 114–118.

1946) aimed at “clearing” Western Ukrainian lands of the “sympathizers” of the OUN and the UPA, people who avoided the recruitment to the Red Army were also the subjects to deportation. According to the report of Major of the State Security Moses Reznitsky, Deputy of the First Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR in April of 1945 the NKVDists sent to the plant “Karaganda Ugillia” 4,793 “avoiders” from the service in the Red Army¹⁸.

Yet at the beginning of April 1944, the first echelon of the families of the repressed OUNists was “staffed” in the amount of 2,000 people, whom they planned to settle in the Mansk and Radianske districts of the Krasnoiarisk territory. Forthwith in April - May they began to compile new lists of the participants in the liberation events and their close relatives who were subjects to eviction. So the contingent of those to be evicted had been increasing. Only in the Lviv region in October 1944 the prepared eviction lists comprised 10,517 people.

The Order of the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Lawrentii Beria and People’s Commissar of State Security of the USSR Vsevolod Merkulov under the No.001240-00380 of October 9, 1944 and entitled “On Measures as to Reinforcing the Fight against the OUN Underground and the Elimination of the Armed Gangs in the Western Regions of the Ukrainian SSR” pointed to the necessity of intensifying repressions against the families of the rebels and their sympathizers by deporting them to Siberia. Having recognized such tactics of eliminating the OUN underground as mandatory measure, the leaders of the penal bodies considered those actions as extremely important for the final solution of their goals. The local leadership not only promptly executed orders from higher authorities, but also repeatedly asked to apply more severe measures against the members of the nationalist underground. Namely, informing the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Ukraine Mykyta Khrushchov about struggle against the Ukrainian nationalists, the First Secretary of the Rivne Regional Committee of the CP (b) Vasyl Begma, on June 6, 1944 proposed: “In order to strengthen the fight against Ukrainian-German nationalist gangs and expand it, allow the deportation of the bandits’ families to the remote areas of the USSR and evict completely

¹⁸ Украинские националистические организации в годы второй мировой войны. Т. 2: 1944 – 1945 / Андрей Артизов (ред.). Москва: РОССПЭН, 2012. С. 631–634.

some of the villages, mostly influenced by banditizm *and* especially those located near the forest”¹⁹.

The First Secretary of the Lviv Regional Committee of the Communist Party Ivan Hrushetskyi (August 1944) introduced similar measures for the expulsion of the active supporters of the underground and their families to Siberia²⁰.

In October 1944, the People’s Commissar of the Internal Affairs of the USSR Lawrentii Beria sent out a directive on the quota of the deportees, which can be accepted in Siberia (Krasnoyarsk region – 5,000, Omsk region – 4,000, etc.). Historian Oleg Bazhan states that 4,724 families were sent to exile (totaling 12,762 people) from Volyn, Drohobych, Lviv, Rivne, Stanislav, Ternopil regions, and it was done only during 1944²¹.

However, the whole range of measures implemented by the Soviet punitive system, including mass evictions, did not bring about the expected results. The decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) of September 27, 1944, adopted at the November Plenum of the Central Committee of the CP (b) U, pointed to “the shortcomings in the political work among the population of the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR” Recognizing the achievement of positive developments in this important area, the party leadership at the same time obliged local party organizations, NKVD and NKGB bodies, the internal and border troops to fight more actively and intensify the repressive measures.

According to the Decree “On Strengthening the Struggle with Ukrainian Nationalists in the Western Regions of the UkrSSR” adopted at the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPU(b)U, held on January 10, 1945, People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR Vasil Riasnoi and the heads of the regional departments of the NKVD were obliged to compile by February, 15 the lists of all the inhabitants aged 15 and above, living in the countryside of Western Ukraine and register their exact place of residence. On November 27,

¹⁹ Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України. Ф. 1. Оп. 23. Спр. 889. Арк. 35.

²⁰ Коваль М. Україна в Другій світовій і Великій вітчизняній війнах (1939 – 1945 рр.). Київ: Альтернатива, 1999. С. 309.

²¹ Бажан О. Операція “Захід”: до 75-річчя депортації населення Західної України у віддалені райони СРСР. *Україна ХХ ст.: культура, ідеологія, політика*. 2013. Вип. 18. С. 339.

1945, there was adopted a special Decree aimed at “clearing” the territory around enterprises and roads within a radius of 10-15km from all the residents to protect the sites from the actions or attacks of the OUN and the UPA²².

The Secretaries of the Party Regional Committees compiled the lists of the families of “bandits and their accomplices”, who were to be evicted, and sent those lists for approval to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b) Mykyta Khrushchov. In pursuance of this order, the Secretary of the Lviv Regional Committee of the CP(b) Ivan Hrushetskyi proposed “to deport 4, 394 families (totaling 15 388 people) from their villages to the remote territories of the Soviet Union”. Inhabitants of 405 settlements were subject to eviction. The notes to this report contained additional information about the settlements located nearby the state border, railways and highways, government communication lines, machine-tractor stations, telegraph and telephone lines, factories, including information about actions of the Ukrainian underground in those districts. When carrying out deportation, the NKVS groups committed terror and iniquity (torture, beatings, assassinations, stealing and burning property, etc.).

According to the order of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR No. 0029 of February 25, 1946, the punishment for the support of the UPA became more severe – the whole villages or a part of them were evicted for their support of the UPA activities. Here are some reliable data regarding the deportation acts: in Ternopil region – 49 families (186 people), Buriakivka – 10 families (32 persons); in the Drohobych region from the villages of Lisovychy – 463 families (2 098 people), Rudnyky – 472 families (2,205 people), Strylbich – 381 families (1 893 persons), Dovge – 428 families (1,784 people), Deviatnyky – 218 families (880 people); in the Stanislav oblast the village of Selyshche in the Halytskyi district was devastated in 24 hours²³.

In his report (April 10, 1946) to the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Anastas Mikoian the Deputy Minister of the Internal Affairs of the USSR Vasyl Riasnoi emphasized that “in the second quarter of 1946 it was supposed to evict 30 thousand special

²² Сергійчук В. Десять буремних літ. Західноукраїнські землі у 1944 – 1953 рр.: Нові документи і матеріали. Київ: Дніпро, 1998. С. 364.

²³ Патер І. Репресії та депортації населення Західної України у 1940-х роках. *Вісник Львівської комерційної академії. Серія: Гуманітарні науки.* 2013. Вип. 11. С. 281.

settlers by echelons from the territory of the Ukrainian SSR to the northern and eastern regions of the Soviet Union”. That was the plan but the data known today allow us to state that this figure was even exceeded by the repressive bodies. The summary note of the 1st Special Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR reports on the eviction of 36,608 people (14,728 families) from the western regions and confirms the consideration and deportation of another 1,608 persons.²⁴ Over three years, for example, 1,777 families (respectively 5,272 people) were deported only from the Drohobych region²⁵.

Number of deportees from Drohobych region²⁶



The dynamics of deportation processes is reflected in the following diagram.

²⁴ Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України. Ф. 1. Оп. 23. Спр. 4968. Арк. 4, 34.

²⁵ Цікаво, що у довідці начальника 1-го спецвідділу МВС УРСР про виселення з Дрогобицької області за період 1944 – 1946 рр. вказана така ж цифра щодо сімей учасників українського підпілля (1 977), але кількість осіб вказана більша – 5 590


²⁶ Попп Р. Переміщення населення Дрогобицької області (1944 – 1953). *Східноєвропейський історичний вісник*. 2016. Вип. 1.

Number of deportees from the Western Regions of Ukraine²⁷



So, as we see, the flow of the deportees to the East in the period of 1944 – 1945 had been constantly and significantly growing. The party leadership considered deportation policy to be an instrument for the quick eradication of banditism in the region. They were convinced that if to use that “tool” appropriately, it will ensure expected results²⁸.

Settling of OUN Deportees in March 1945



²⁷ Винниченко І. Україна 1920 – 1980-х: депортації, заслання, вислання. Київ: Видавництво “Рада”, 1994. С. 53.

²⁸ Сергійчук В. Десять буремних літ. Західноукраїнські землі у 1944 – 1953 рр.: Нові документи і матеріали. Київ: Дніпро, 1998. С. 392.

October 21-26, 1947: Deportation Operation “West” (“Zapad”). Operation “West” was one of the most massive and the shortest in terms of all Stalinist deportations. The reasons for its implementation were clearly formulated by Mykyta Khrushchov²⁹ at the meeting of the secretaries of the regional committees and the heads of the regional departments of the MSS (Ministry of State Security) on April 23, 1947 in Lviv: “Shame for us, Shukhevych is actively fighting against us for two years, and we can not cope with him”. It implies that the main objective of the operation was to weaken the Ukrainian liberation movement in Western Ukraine³⁰.

Deportation in 1947 was carried out in accordance with the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 3214-1050 of September 10, 1947 entitled “On the deportation of the members of the OUN families from the Western regions of the UkrSSR”. To implement the Government’s decision “Plan of operational measures to implement the orders of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR No. 38 / 3-7983 regarding the dispatch of 50 trains with a special contingent from the western regions of Ukraine” was drawn up/worked out.

The operation had been preceded by thorough preparation. A number of railway stations had been chosen for reception of the so-called special contingent (Lviv, Chortkiv, Drohobych, Kolomyia, Rivne, Kovel). The operational headquarters of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR was located in Lviv and headed by Mykola Diatlov, the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR. 13,592 officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and about 23 thousand of soldiers of the border troops were involved into the operation. In addition, the Komsomol activists (about 34 thousand), “jumps” (participants of the assault battalions – about 8 thousand) were also involved into the operation. The latter conducted courtyard audits and property description on the eve of deportation, explaining it by exacerbation of the international situation. The preparation was carried out secretly and even the performers of the operation learned about it only at the very beginning of the operation itself. Therefore, although the

²⁹ It should be recalled that in early April 1947, Joseph Stalin removed Nikita Khrushchev from the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (B) U and sent to Ukraine Lazar Kaganovich, a subject in the struggle against Ukrainian nationalism.


³⁰ Дерев’яний І. Чорні справи в ім’я “світлого” майбутнього. *Свобода*. 2012. 12 жовтня. С. 6.

underground warned of a planned campaign, they failed to reveal its exact date.

The eviction was carried out in full conformity with the decisions of the operational headquarters and special secret meetings of the MSS. At 2 o'clock on the night of October, 21 many residents of Lviv were forced to wake up. Men in military uniforms broke into their homes, and after brief searches they allowed people to take their personal things in a hurry, and then they transported people by trucks to the railway station.

At six o'clock in the morning, they also began to deport families of the rebel villagers according to the compiled lists. They carried out searches to find possible kryivka (underground dugouts), anti-Soviet literature, weapon, etc. Kateryna Pelehata, who then lived in Drohobych and her parents in the nearby village, recalls how all this looked like. "At night, October 21, 1947, my father was arrested in the village. Mum and grandmother were not. The armed men came in the morning. They did it deliberately so that Daddy could not help them to get ready. While my mother was dressing grandmother and herself, the armed soldiers walked around the house and picked out the things, hid the stolen woolen shawls into the pockets of their trousers. Grandmother and mother were put on a cart. The guys, who went to school to Drohobych, ran to us to warn. We did not go to school. The soldiers came to our place at dinner-time. Grandfather was not in the house at that moment. Dad was accompanied by a convoy. We started to pack haphazardly our things. I took some books and pasta. Dad, fortunately, found the money and managed to take it. Grandfather was arrested at night of October, 22. We did not even know about it. As we were driven along the Drohobych streets, people fled and bid farewell to us. At the station we were driven into the freight train cars, without windows and a toilet, locked up with metal bars. There were so many people – the elder, the young, the students, the children – that it was hardly possible to find a place to sit ...". Every six hours they reported to the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR General Timofii Strokach on the progress of the operation. At ten o'clock, they started loading a "special contingent" at 53 stations (out of the mentioned 87 ones). In the reports about the number of the deported contingents from the territory of Ukraine in the period of 1944 – 1948 we have revealed, that in October 1947 the Soviet security agencies deported 26,332 families of the members of the nationalist underground, totally 77,791 people.


According to Yuri Soroka's estimations, done on the basis of the documents of the Central State Archives of Public Associations of Ukraine (F. 1. Op. 23, 4967. Ar. 12, 21–34, 39–46, 51–68), 26,518 families from Western Ukraine were deported in six days – a total of 78,531 people, among which 36,090 were women, 22,928 – children and 19,513 – men³¹.



The lists of those to be deported, which were hurriedly compiled by the secretaries of the village councils, included persons who were not the rebels' close relatives. Moreover, the materials of the criminal cases of the rebels did not contain any facts of "subversive" activities of their relatives. The social composition of the deportees was heterogeneous. It is confirmed by the data revealed in the reports of the secretaries of the Drohobych Regional Committee of the Party Ivan Gorobets and the Rivne Regional Party Committee Dmytro Hapii to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U Lazar Kahanych concerning the results of the deportation action.

³¹ Літопис Української Повстанської Армії. Нова серія. Т. 5. Кн. 2: 1946 – 1947 / Кентій А., Лозицький В., Павленко І., упоряд. Київ – Торонто, 2002. С. 430. Цит. за: Сергійчук В. Український здвиг. Волинь. 1939 – 1955. Київ: Українська Видавнича Спілка, 2005. С. 613.

The social composition of the deportees from Drohobych Region in 1947



Since mostly the average peasant families were affected by deportations, and they were the basis of a Western Ukrainian village, the consequence of the deportation process was the destruction of the foundations of the then population social structure, and it quickly became evident. Tamara Vronska impartially states that the deportation in the autumn of 1947, in terms of its tragic consequences was a humanitarian, ethno-demographic catastrophe and a crime against humanity³².

After the October deportation, the OUN distributed around the leaflet with a call to “All forcibly deported to Siberia and sentenced to slavery labor by Bolsheviks!”: “They think that in the snows of Siberia and in the dark underground mines your freedom-loving spirit will be broken and your patriotism will be extinguished, blown away by the frosty wind. Bolshevikytskyi invader plans in the end to build his bloody empire with your hands, the hands of those whom he brutally offended, deprived of homes and tortured their children. You, like the dumbest new slaves, are forced to build a kingdom for a hangman Stalin by your overwhelming work in the deep underground, in the dirty woods and tundra of Siberia ... You, intimidated with deportation! Do not let them catch and arrest you! If you expect to be deported – run away and

³² Вронська Т. Етнодемографічна катастрофа в Західній Україні: жовтень 1947 р. *Історико-географічні дослідження в Україні: зб. наук. пр.* 2009. Вип. 11. С. 254.

hide in every possible way! If you are parents of small children, old people or unable to escape, then, first and foremost, do not fall into despair. If possible, get ready for deportation. Do not leave the enemy your property! Take with you everything which you can take, and destroy the rest, or hand over to those, who stay ... In all even the most difficult situations, save your Ukrainian soul and believe in our victory. Teach your children Ukrainian and Ukrainian prayer *Pater noster!* (Our Father!). Nurture immortal love for Ukraine in them...”

By October 1, 1948, the contingent of special settlers – “Ounivtsi”, as they were called at that time in the documents of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, numbered to 95,584 people (or ≈4.3% of all the evicted special settlers)³³.

In general, according to Konstantin Kondratyuk, by the date of November 23, 1948, the so-called special contingent from Ukraine equaled 151 955 people³⁴.


Deportations in 1948 – 1953. It should be mentioned that although the deportation campaign “Zapad” (“West”) was the most large-scale of all similar Soviet actions in the region, it was not the end. Deportation of the population to the “remote areas” of the USSR lasted more than two decades (1949 – 1962). In 1948 – 1953 wealthy peasants suffered the most. The Soviet government believed them to be the major obstacle to the collectivization of the Western Ukrainian village. They exiled “kulaks” who supported the OUN and the UPA and resisted Stalin’s forced collectivization, refusing to join collective farms. On January 23, 1951, the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 189-88 SS “On the eviction of kulaks with families from Volyn, Drohobych, Lviv, Rivne, Stanislav, Ternopil, Chernivtsi and Zakarpattia regions of the Ukrainian SSR” was issued. By August 7, 1951 they planned to exile 1,240 “kulak” farms (4, 641 persons). In accordance with the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b)U on April 4, 1951, the property of the deportees was subject to confiscation. This property partially was used to pay state obligations to other entities, and another part was expropriated by the collective

³³ *Депортації. Західні землі України кінця 1930-х – початку 50-х рр.: Документи, матеріали, спогади.* Т. 2: 1946 – 1947 рр. Львів: Місіонер, 1998. С. 303.

³⁴ Кондратюк К. Депортаційно-переселенські акції із Західної України (40-х – початку 50-х рр. XX ст.). *Наукові зошити історичного факультету Львівського національного університету імені Івана Франка.* 2004. Вип. 5-6. С. 345.

farms. In the early 1950s, the scale of deportations decreased significantly. Yet in the end of the period of 1944 – 1952, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine data 65,906 families or 203,662 people were deported from the western regions of Ukraine³⁵.

Number of the people deported from the western regions (according to years)³⁶



In order to assess the situation objectively, it should be taken into account that the total number of population was (as for January 1, 1945): in Drohobych region – 750 thousand people, Stanislavsk region (as for 1946) – 1,054 million people, Chernivtsi region – 701 thousand people. That is, about 5% of the population was repressed by eviction from the regions, where the liberation movement was the most powerful³⁷.

In the late 1940s, the internment regime for “special settlers” became even more severe, because of the active resistance to the “Sovietization” in the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR. In 1944 – 1946

³⁵ Національні відносини в Україні у ХХ ст.: Збірник документів і матеріалів. Київ: Наукова думка, 1994. С. 328; Иосиф Сталин – Лаврентию Берии: “Их надо депортировать...”: Документы, факты, комментарии / Николай Бугай, сост. Москва: Дружба народов, 1992.

³⁶ Дані за: Патер І. Репресії та депортації населення Західної України у 1940-х роках. *Вісник Львівської комерційної академії. Серія: Гуманітарні науки*. 2013. Вип. 11. С. 284.

³⁷ Ільницький В. Депортаційна політика як засіб утвердження радянської адміністрації у Західній Україні (1944 – 1954). *Наукові записки Тернопільського національного педагогічного університету імені Володимира Гнатюка. Серія історія*. 2014. Вип. 2. Ч. 1. С. 106–111.

the “Ounivtsi’s families were evicted to special settlements for the term of five years, but in 1947 – 1949 the term was increased to 8 – 10 years and in some cases even to lifelong exile. The term of exile of some families, deported in 1944, ended in 1949, however, it was decided to leave them in the places of exile for life. It concerned 41,682 families or 115,471 persons. The argument for this step was as follows: “In view of the operation which is being held there, in accordance with the decision of the Council of Ministers of the CPD No. 3728-1524 of 04.10.1948 aimed at the eviction of the families of bandits and nationalist elements, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR considers it inappropriate to return the formerly deported “Ounivtsi” to the places of their previous residence. On April 15, 1950, an order was issued prohibiting the settlers-ounivtsi to leave their new special settlements to the end of life. Mass deportations on the Ukrainian territories decreased a year before the death of Iosyp Stalin. After his death the deportation actions subsided, but the abolition of the legal restrictions for the deportees was declared only in 1956. Notwithstanding the liberation of the deportees in 1957 there were still 3,224 “ounivtsi” and 111 “kulaks” from the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR living in special settlements in the Krasnoyarsk area.

Interesting is the fact, that by their number this category of deportees was second after the deportees from Lithuania (16 978 people)³⁸.

The situation was similar in the Irkutsk region, where in 1953, 17,386 of the exiled “Ounivtsi” (on the whole there were 25,047 people from Western Ukraine) represented the second largest group after the contingent from the Baltic (40,480 people), a third of all special settlers in that region (total 90 365)³⁹.

A lot of the former special settlers, who were deprived of basic rights and property by the Soviet legal system, were forced to search employment in the virgin areas of Kazakhstan and other undeveloped lands.

The mechanism of mass violence against humans, created by the Soviet authorities, consistently and severely restricted any manifesta-

³⁸ Зберовская Е. Спецпоселенцы из Западной Украины в Красноярском крае (1945 – начало 1960-х гг.): процесс социокультурной адаптации. *Вестник Красноярского государственного аграрного университета*. 2014. № 5. С. 250–254.

³⁹ Гуршоева Т. Спецпоселенцы из Западной Украины в Иркутской области: 1940-е – 1960-е годы: Дис . канд. ист. наук, Иркутский государственный университет, 2006.

tion of national identity, imposing coercion and terror. One way or another, it should be recognized that forced deportations accelerated collectivization, undermined the social foundations of the Ukrainian resistance movement and changed the ethnic and social structure of the region.

Oksana KALISHCHUK

PERSONNEL STAFF OF NCSS-MSS DROHOBYCH, TRANSCARPATHIA, STANISLAV, CHERNIVTSI REGIONS OF THE USSR (1944 – 1950): PROSOPOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS

With the opening of the access to the materials of archival institutions of Ukraine, which were marked “Top Secret”, historians were able to work with various documents, the introduction of which into scientific circulation allowed to enrich modern historical science with objective studies of the national liberation struggle of 1940 – 1950. However, not all aspects have found the same thorough coverage in the scientific literature. That is why there is a need to analyze not only the activities of the liberation movement, and its personnel potential, but to show (using a set of documents) Soviet special forces used in the fight against the nationalist underground.

The issue of personnel characteristics was reflected in generalizing works on the history of the confrontation between the Ukrainian liberation movement and the repressive and punitive system in the western Ukrainian lands (1944 – 1953). Among them, we note the research of I. Bilas⁴⁰, D. Vedenev and G. Bystrukhin⁴¹, A. Kentiy⁴², Y. Kirichuk⁴³, S. Makarchuk⁴⁴, A. Rusnachenko⁴⁵, V. Sergiychuk⁴⁶

⁴⁰ Білас І. Карально-репресивна система в Україні 1917 – 1953 рр.: Суспільно-політичний та історико-правовий аналіз. Кн. 2: Документи і матеріали. Київ, 1994. 688 с.; Білас І. Репресивно-каральна система в Україні. 1917 – 1953 рр.: Суспільно-політичний та історико-правовий аналіз. У двох книгах. Книга 1. Київ, 1994. 432 с.

⁴¹ Веденєв Д. В., Биструхін Г. С. Двобій без компромісів. Протиборство спецпідрозділів ОУН та радянських сил спецоперацій. 1945 – 1980-ті роки. Київ: К.І.С., 2007. 568 с.

⁴² Кентій А. В. Нарис боротьби ОУН-УПА в Україні (1946 – 1956 рр.). Київ: Інститут історії України НАН України, 1999. 111 с.; Кентій А. В. Українська повстанська армія в 1944 – 1945 рр. Київ: Інститут історії України НАН України, 1999. 220 с.

⁴³ Киричук Ю. Український національний рух 40–50-х років ХХ століття: ідеологія та практика. Львів: Добра справа, 2003. 464 с.

⁴⁴ Макачук С. Радянські методи боротьби з ОУН і УПА. 1944 – 1945 рр. // Українська Повстанська Армія у боротьбі проти тоталітарних режимів [гол. ред. кол. Ярослав Ісаєвич, упоряд. і відп. ред. Юрій Сливка] (Україна: культурна спадщина, національна свідомість, державність, 11 / Інститут українознавства ім. І. Крип'якевича НАН України). Львів, 2004. С. 210–223.

and others⁴⁷. However, they characterize the personnel of law enforcement agencies in fragments. Reference publications also help to form the collective image of the KGB officer. However, they provide biographical information on the leadership of the higher structural units of law enforcement agencies.

The purpose of the work – using staffing (1944, 1947, 1950) to characterize (age, nationality, education, party affiliation, time of employment in the security forces, rank) personnel potential of NCSS-MSS (National Commissariat of State Security – Ministry of State Security) in the Drohobych, Transcarpathia, Stanislav, Chernivtsi region. There are no statistical calculations for 1944 from the staffing of the Drohobych region.

The Soviet authorities in the western regions of Ukraine have never felt confident, openly disliking the local population. This was facilitated by the policies of the communist authorities, and the repressive and punitive activities of the NKDB-MSS, which behaved like outspoken occupiers, ignoring local customs and traditions. The desire to Sovietize the western Ukrainian lands met with popular resistance quickly. After the restoration of Soviet power in the western regions of Ukraine, its primary task was to fight the liberation movement. To this end, the structures of the political apparatus, huge military forces and repressive and punitive bodies were formed in advance in Western Ukraine.

One of the most significant problems in the course of Sovietization was the staffing (in particular, professional, educational, moral and psychological conditions) of the restored party, state and economic bodies. There was a constant shortage of staff. Therefore, to solve the problem, the Central Committee of the KP periodically sent them to the western regions of Ukraine. Thus, from 1944 to 1945, 80,000 party, Soviet, and economic workers were sent to various positions in the

⁴⁵ Русначенко А. М. Народ збурений: Національно-визвольний рух в Україні й національні рухи опору в Білорусії, Литві, Латвії, Естонії у 1940–50-х роках. Київ: Університетське видавництво “Пульсари”, 2002. 519 с.

⁴⁶ Сергійчук В. Десять буремних літ. Західноукраїнські землі у 1944 – 1953 рр. Нові документи і матеріали. Київ: Дніпро, 1998. 944 с.

⁴⁷ Лубянка: Органи ВЧК-ОГПУ-НКВД-НКГБ-МГБ-МВД-КГБ. 1917 – 1991. Справочник / [под. ред. акад. А. Н. Яковлева; авторы-сост.: А. И. Кокурин, Н. В. Петров]. Москва: МФД, 2003. 768 с.; Петров Н. Кто руководил органами госбезопасности. 1941 – 1954 гг. Справочник. Москва: Мемориал Звенья, 2010. 1000 с.; ЧК-ГПУ-НКВД в Україні: особи, факти, документи / Ю. Шаповал, В. Пристайко, В. Золотарьов. Київ: Абрис, 1997. 608 с.

western regions of Ukraine, and they became the basis of the party, repressive, punitive, and economic apparatus⁴⁸. By June 1946, about 87,000 members of the nomenklatura, party and komsomol workers, etc., had arrived in the western regions of Ukraine⁴⁹. Almost all regional bodies and institutions, without exception, consisted of such employees. Let us note another feature: although some employees noted in the questionnaire their nationality to Ukrainians, practically such personnel did not speak their native language. The local population was de facto removed from the government.

It should be noted that the second “Sovietization” of the western regions of Ukraine took place mainly by personnel from the eastern regions. This was especially true of the repressive and punitive apparatus, which was entrusted with the main function – to eliminate the Ukrainian liberation movement as soon as possible. Thus, in the middle of 1947 in the western regions of Ukraine among 2,447 employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Security Service, there were only 98 (4%)⁵⁰. These officials behaved, in fact, as outspoken invaders, atheists and barbarians. Of course, they were sent not only for party and administrative work but also in the structure of repressive and punitive bodies.

The structure of regional and district departments was the same, but they differed in number. The number of individual departments of the MSS of the regions changed frequently. The quantitative composition of the 2-H departments depended on the size of the district and the number of the underground in it.

With the help of staff positions of the KGB Office/MSS Personnel Department, we were able to make calculations, and display statistical data that allow us to form a portrait of a typical security officer. Staffing for 1947 and 1950 from the Drohobych, Transcarpathia, Stanislav, Chernivtsi regions were subject to the analysis. In addition, for comparison, there are no statistical calculations for 1944 from the staffing

⁴⁸ Сеньків М. Західноукраїнське село: насильницька колективізація 40 – поч. 50-х рр. XX ст. Львів: Інститут українознавства ім. І. Крип'якевича, 2002. С. 96.

⁴⁹ Веденєєв Д. В., Биструхін Г. С. Двобій без компромісів. Протиборство спецпідрозділів ОУН та радянських сил спецоперацій. 1945 – 1980-ті роки. Київ: К.І.С., 2007. С. 243.

⁵⁰ Веденєєв Д. В., Биструхін Г. С. Двобій без компромісів. Протиборство спецпідрозділів ОУН та радянських сил спецоперацій. 1945 – 1980-ті роки. Київ: К.І.С., 2007. С. 308.

of the Drohobych region. In particular, such data as age, nationality, education, party affiliation, time of coming to work in law enforcement agencies, and ranks were analyzed.

Age. In determining this indicator, there are cases when several different dates of birth appear in the documents, which was obviously due to the addition of years or, conversely, reduction (rejection), the desire to hide the “dark pages” of their biographies, and common mistakes. According to our data, up to October of 1944 in the KGB Office of the Drohobych region were employed: born in 1896 – 1, 1897 – 1, 1898 – 2, 1900 – 1, 1903 – 6, 1904 – 1, 1905 – 8, 1906 – 2, 1907 – 5, 1908 – 11, 1909 – 6, 1910 – 7, 1911 – 11, 1912 – 16, 1913 – 12, 1914 – 12, 1915 – 10, 1916 – 7, 1917 – 9, 1918 – 2, 1919 – 9, 1920 – 5, 1921 – 4, 1922 – 5, 1923 – 3, 1924 – 5, 1925 – 1, 1926 – 1, 1927 – 2⁵¹. According to *age out of 165 people: under 35 – 121 (73.3%), after 35 – 44 (26.7%)*. The situation with age peculiarities up to October, 1945 has practically not changed in KGB Office of the Drohobych region: born in 1896 – 1, 1897 – 1, 1898 – 3, 1899 – 1, 1900 – 1, 1901 – 1, 1902 – 5, 1903 – 7, 1904 – 3, 1905 – 14, 1906 – 5, 1907 – 17, 1908 – 18, 1909 – 17, 1910 – 19, 1911 – 20, 1912 – 31, 1913 – 34, 1914 – 30, 1915 – 32, 1916 – 19, 1917 – 14, 1918 – 18, 1919 – 25, 1920 – 16, 1921 – 15, 1922 – 26, 1923 – 17, 1924 – 24, 1925 – 16, 1926 – 2, 1927 – 8⁵². According to *age from 460 people: before the age of 35 – 347 (75.4%), after the age of 35 – 113 (24.6%)*. That is, they were young people (over 70% of people under the age of 35), who, however, already had life and combat experience.

Nationality. The attitude to the local population is shown by the calculations based on the nationality of employees of the Drohobych Department of the Drohobych Region in October 1944: out of 165 people: Belarusians – 1 (0.61%), Jews – 1 (0.61%), Kazakhs – 1 (0.61%), Ossetians – 1 (0.61%), Russians – 118 (71.5%), Ukrainians – 43 (26.06%)⁵³. Instead, the following year, in October 1945, the number of Ukrainians decreased. In the KGB Office of the Drohobych region was: Belarusians – 6 (1.3%), Jews – 2 (0.43%), Kazakhs – 1 (0.22%), Mordovians – 2 (0.43%), Udmurts – 1 (0.22%), Ossetians – 1 (0.22%), Russians – 330 (71.74%), Tatars – 1 (0.22%), Ukrainians –

⁵¹ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 71. Оп. 6. Спр. 858. 41 арк.

⁵² ГДА СБУ. Ф. 71. Оп. 6. Спр. 859. Т. 2. 90 арк.

⁵³ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 71. Оп. 6. Спр. 858. 41 арк.

113 (24.56%), Chuvash – 2 (0.43%), unknown – 1 (0.22%)⁵⁴. In this way we see who fought against the Ukrainian liberation movement. There is also the question of the true nationality of the security forces, who wrote that they were Ukrainians (because some have neither surnames nor names).

Education. Among the employees of the KGB Office of the Drohobych region up to October of 1944 had education: primary – 3, 1 / n – 2, 3 class. – 1, 4 cl. – 5, 5 cl. – 18, 6 cl. – 5, 7 cl. – 29, 8 cl. – 7, 9 cl. – 5, incomplete secondary – 19, secondary – 57, technical secondary – 1, incomplete higher – 5, higher – 7, unspecified – 1⁵⁵. According to education out of 165 people: graduated from 1 – 5 classes. – 29 (17.6%), up to 9 classes. – 65 (39.4%), 10 – 11 classes. – 57 (34.54%), unfinished higher – 5 (3%), higher – 7 (4.24%), secondary technical – 1 (0.61%), unspecified – 1 (0.61%); Department of the KGB of the Drohobych region (October 1945): out of 460: initial 1 – 5 classes. – 73 (15.87%), up to 9 – 220 (47.83%), from 10 – 11 – 1 (0.22%), secondary – 135 (29.34%), unfinished higher – 17 (3.7%), higher – 14 (3.04%)⁵⁶. Thus, the majority (over 50%) had primary and incomplete secondary education.

Party affiliation. Among the employees of the KGB Office of the Drohobych region up to October 1944 they had party experience: 1918 – 1, 1925 – 1, 1926 – 3, 1928 – 5, 1929 – 3, 1930 – 3, 1931 – 4, 1932 – 8, 1933 – 1, 1935 – 1, 1937 – 2, 1938 – 16, 1939 – 18, 1940 – 13, 1941 – 16, 1942 – 23, 1943 – 17, 1944 – 5, without affiliation – 25. According to party affiliation: until 1939 – 48 (29.1%), from 1939 to 1940 – 31 (18.8%), from 1941 to 1943 – 56 (33.9%), 1944 – 5 (3%), without affiliation – 25 (15.2%)⁵⁷. Accordingly, in October 1945, among the employees of the Department of the KGB of the Drohobych region had party affiliation: without experience – 60, 1918 – 1, 1919 – 1, 1921 – 2, 1925 – 2, 1926 – 4, 1927 – 2, 1928 – 10, 1929 – 5, 1930 – 3, 1931 – 14, 1932 – 20, 1933 – 2, 1935 – 1, 1936 – 3, 1937 – 8, 1938 – 27, 1939 – 65, 1940 – 56, 1941 – 41, 1942 – 60, 1943 – 46, 1944 – 26, Komсомол – 1⁵⁸. According to party affiliation out of 460: without experience – 60 (13.04%), by 1939 – 105 (22.83%), 1939 – 1940 – 121 (26.3%),

⁵⁴ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 71. Оп. 6. Спр. 859. Т. 2. 90 арк.

⁵⁵ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 71. Оп. 6. Спр. 858. 41 арк.

⁵⁶ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 71. Оп. 6. Спр. 859. Т. 2. 90 арк.

⁵⁷ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 71. Оп. 6. Спр. 858. 41 арк.

⁵⁸ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 71. Оп. 6. Спр. 859. Т. 2. 90 арк.

1941 – 1943 – 147 31.96%), 1944 – 26 (5.65%), Komsomol – 1 (0.22%). Thus, the majority of employees had about five years of party membership.

Work in state security bodies. Up to October, 1944, employees of KGB of the Drohobych region had considerable experience working in special bodies: 1922 – 2, 1923 – 1, 1926 – 1, 1928 – 2, 1930 – 2, 1931 – 3, 1932 – 4, 1933 – 7, 1934 – 7, 1935 – 3, 1936 – 3, 1937 – 8, 1938 – 16, 1939 – 12, 1940 – 17, 1941 – 16, 1942 – 19, 1943 – 30, 1944 – 12⁵⁹. Chekist experience out of 165 people: before 1939 – 59 (35.7%), 1939 – 1940 – 29 (17.6%), 1941 – 1943 – 65 (39.4%), 1944. – 12 (7.3%). The length of service in the Chekist bodies of employees of the KGB Department has not changed significantly in Drohobych region in October of 1945: 1919 – 1, 1921 – 1, 1922 – 1, 1923 – 1, 1924 – 1, 1926 – 1, 1927 – 1, 1929 – 2, 1930 – 4, 1931 – 4, 1932 – 9, 1933 – 13, 1934 – 13, 1935 – 4, 1936 – 8, 1937 – 16, 1938 – 39, 1939 – 34, 1940 – 51, 1941 – 28, 1942 – 51, 1943 – 93, 1944 – 80, 1945 – 4⁶⁰. Chekist experience out of 460: before 1939 – 119 (25.8%), 1939 – 1940 – 85 (18.5%), 1941 – 1943 – 172 (37.4%), after 1944 – 84 (18.3%). At the same time, information about the Chekist experience of 70 people could not be found. At the same time, it was found that more than 60% had less than five years of experience.

Rank. It is stated that out of 165 employees of the Drohobych Region had military ranks: 4 junior sergeants (2.42%), 17 sergeants (10.3%), 3 senior sergeants (1.81%), and 5 sergeants (3.03%), junior lieutenant – 43 (26.06%), lieutenant – 19 (11.52%), senior lieutenant – 20 (12.12%), captain – 13 (7.87%), major – 11 (6.66%), lieutenant colonel – 2 (1.21%), colonel – 1 (0.61%), without any rank – 20 (12.12%), it was not possible to establish information about 7 people (4.24%)⁶¹. That is, more than 70% of employees with the ranks of sergeant, senior and junior officer.

For comparison, it is necessary to compare the quality of personnel in 1947 and 1950 in the Drohobych, Transcarpathia, Stanislav, and Chernivtsi regions.

Age. According to our calculations, in January of 1947 the following persons worked in the Department of the NCSS of the Drohobych

⁵⁹ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 71. Оп. 6. Спр. 858. 41 арк.

⁶⁰ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 71. Оп. 6. Спр. 859. Т. 2. 90 арк.

⁶¹ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 71. Оп. 6. Спр. 858. 41 арк.

Region: 1878 – 1, 1898 – 1, 1901 – 2, 1902 – 2, 1903 – 5, 1904 – 5, 1905 – 10, 1906 – 5, 1907 – 21, 1908 – 12, 1909 – 13, 1910 – 19, 1911 – 14, 1912 – 34, 1913 – 27, 1914 – 28, 1915 – 23, 1916 – 20, 1917 – 26, 1918 – 27, 1919 – 23, 1920 – 23, 1921 – 23, 1922 – 36, 1923 – 36, 1924 – 34, 1925 – 29, 1926 – 9, 1927 – 8, 1928 – 4, unknown – 15⁶². According to the age out of 535 people: up to 35 – 376 (70.3%), after 35 – 144 (26.9%), unknown – 15 (2.8%); respectively in the Office of the MSS of the Transcarpathia region born July 1947: born in 1897 – 1, 1898 – 1, 1902 – 6, 1903 – 5, 1904 – 5, 1905 – 4, 1906 – 15, 1907 – 8, 1908 – 6, 1909 – 16, 1910 – 9, 1911 – 14, 1912 – 11, 1913 – 18, 1914 – 22, 1915 – 22, 1916 – 20, 1917 – 17, 1918 – 33, 1919 – 26, 1920 – 16, 1921 – 21, 1922 – 28, 1923 – 20, 1924 – 30, 1925 – 20, 1926 – 20, 1927 – 7, 1928 – 4, 1929 – 1⁶³. According to the age out of 426 people: up to 35 – 325 (76.3%), after 35 – 101 (23.7%); Office of the MSS of the Stanislav region on January 1947: born in 1894 – 1, 1895 – 1, 1896 – 1, 1898 – 1, 1899 – 1, 1900 – 3, 1901 – 5, 1902 – 10, 1903 – 6, 1904 – 12, 1905 – 23, 1906 – 15, 1907 – 13, 1908 – 21, 1909 – 22, 1910 – 18, 1911 – 28, 1912 – 28, 1913 – 40, 1914 – 45, 1915 – 40, 1916 – 37, 1917 – 41, 1918 – 60, 1919 – 59, 1920 – 31, 1921 – 37, 1922 – 40, 1923 – 36, 1924 – 48, 1925 – 35, 1926 – 27, 1927 – 13, 1928 – 5, 1929 – 1⁶⁴. According to the age out of 804 people: up to 35 – 595 (74%), after 35 – 209 (26%); Office of the MSS of Chernivtsi region from January to March 1947: 1896 – 1, 1899 – 2, 1900 – 4, 1902 – 6, 1903 – 7, 1904 – 6, 1905 – 8, 1906 – 14, 1907 – 11, 1908 – 9, 1909 – 3, 1910 – 10, 1911 – 15, 1912 – 19, 1913 – 31, 1914 – 27, 1915 – 18, 1916 – 21, 1917 – 24, 1918 – 29, 1919 – 18, 1920 – 23, 1921 – 30, 1922 – 22, 1923 – 20, 1924 – 25, 1925 – 14, 1926 – 3, 1927 – 5, 1928 – 4, 1929 – 2⁶⁵. According to the age out of 431 people: up to 35 – 316 (73.3%), after 35 – 115 (26.7%). Thus, in all MSS the majority of employees (over 70%) were young people under the age of 35. The largest number of them was in the MSS of the Transcarpathia region – 76.3%, the least in the MSS of the Drohobych region – 70.3%.

⁶² ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 106. 88 арк.; Ф. 71. Оп. 6. Спр. 860. Т. 1. 88 арк.

⁶³ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 102. 62 арк.

⁶⁴ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 111. 125 арк.

⁶⁵ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 95. 55 арк.

Nationality. By nationality in the Office of the MSS of Drohobych region in January 1947: out of 535 people were: Belarusians – 4 (0.75%), Jews – 4 (0.75%), Mordovians – 4 (0.75%), Ossetians – 1 (0.19%), Russians – 372 (69.53%), Tatars – 3 (0.56%), Udmurts – 1 (0.19%), Ukrainians – 129 (24.1%), Chuvash – 1 (0.19%), unknown – 16 (2.99%)⁶⁶; Department of the State Security Service of the Transcarpathia region up to July 1947: out of 426 people: Azerbaijanis – 1 (0.23%), Armenians – 1 (0.23%), Belarusians – 5 (1.2%), Georgians – 1 (0.23%), Jews – 7 (1.64%), Chuvash – 2 (0.5%), Mordovians – 3 (0.7%), Ossetians – 1 (0.23%), Russians – 228 (53.5%), Udmurts – 1 (0.23%), Ukrainians – 176 (41.31%)⁶⁷; Department of the State Security Service of the Stanislav Region up to January of 1947: out of 804 people: Armenians – 2 (0.25%), Bashkirs – 1 (0.15%), Belarusians – 6 (0.75%), Jews – 14 (1.74%), Komi – 2 (0.25%), Latvians – 1 (0.15%), Chuvash – 3 (0.37%), Moldavians – 1 (0.15%), Mordovians – 3 (0.37%), Udmurts – 2 (0.25%), 536 Russians (66.6%), 3 Tatars (0.37%), and 230 Ukrainians (28.6%)⁶⁸; Office of the MSS of Chernivtsi region from January to March 1947: out of 431 people: Armenians – 2 (0.46%), Belarusians – 3 (0.7%), Georgians – 1 (0.23%), Jews – 17 (4%), Mordovians – 1 (0.23%), Russians – 269 (62.4%), Ukrainians – 128 (29.7%), Kazakhs – 1 (0.23%), Kyrgyz – 1 (0.23%), Komi – 2 (0.46%), Moldovans – 1 (0.23%), Poles – 2 (0.46%), Tatars – 1 (0.23%), Chuvash – 2 (0.46%)⁶⁹. That is, the number of Russians ranged from 53.5% in MSS of the Transcarpathia region, to 69.53% in MSS of the Drohobych region, while the number of Ukrainians – from 24.1% in MSS of the Drohobych region, to 41.31% in the State Security Service of the Transcarpathia region.

Education. According to education in the Office of the MSS of the Drohobych region in January 1947 of 535 people: illiterate – 1 (0.2%), primary – 126 (23.6%), incomplete secondary – 225 (42%), secondary – 147 (27.5 %), secondary technical – 1 (0.2%), unfinished higher education – 14 (2.6%), secondary medical education – 1 (0.2%), higher

⁶⁶ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 106. 88 арк.; Ф. 71. Оп. 6. Спр. 860. Т. 1. 88 арк.

⁶⁷ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 102. 62 арк.

⁶⁸ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 111. 125 арк.

⁶⁹ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 95. 55 арк.

education – 7 (1.3%), unknown – 13 (2.4%)⁷⁰; Up to July of 1947, the Office of the State Security Service of the Transcarpathia Region out of 426 people: illiterate – 1 (0.23%), primary – 119 (27.93%), incomplete secondary – 157 (36.95%), secondary – 118 (27.7%), secondary technical – 1 (0.23%), unfinished higher – 16 (3.76%), higher – 14 (3.3%)⁷¹; Department of the State Security Service of the Stanislav Region up to January of 1947, out of 804 people: illiterate – 2 (0.25%), primary – 199 (24.75%), incomplete secondary – 366 (45.52%), secondary – 198 (24.6%), secondary technical – 1 (0.15%), unfinished higher – 25 (3.11%), higher – 13 (1.62%)⁷²; Office of the State Security Service of the Chernivtsi region from January to March of 1947 out of 431 persons: illiterate – 2 (0.46%), primary – 105 (24.4%), incomplete secondary – 176 (40.8%), secondary – 124 (28.7%), unfinished higher education – 12 (2.8%), higher education – 12 (2.8%)⁷³. Thus, we see that the majority of employees had primary and lower secondary education (65.8% in the MSS of the Drohobych, 65.11% – in the State Security Service of the Transcarpathia region, 70.52% – in the State Security Service of Stanislav region, 65.66% – in the State Security Service of the Chernivtsi region).

Party affiliation. At the time of joining the party in the Office of the MSS of the Drohobych region up to January 1947: without – 82, 1925 – 1, 1926 – 2, 1927 – 2, 1928 – 5, 1929 – 4, 1930 – 5, 1931 – 11, 1932 – 10, 1935 – 1, 1936 – 3, 1937 – 4, 1938 – 17, 1939 – 49, 1940 – 48, 1941 – 38, 1942 – 58, 1943 – 70, 1944 – 47, 1945 – 39, 1946 – 25, unknown – 14⁷⁴. *According to the party experience out of 535 people: without – 82 (15.32%), before 1939 – 65 (12.15%), 1939 – 1940 – 97 (18.13%), 1941 – 1943 – 166 (31.03%), after 1944 – 111 (20.75%), unknown – 14 (2.62%);* Office of the State Security Service of the Transcarpathia region up to July 1947: 1925 – 2, 1926 – 2, 1927 – 4, 1928 – 6, 1929 – 4, 1930 – 2, 1931 – 8, 1932 – 6, 1935 – 1, 1936 – 2, 1937 – 6, 1938 – 18, 1939 – 38, 1940 – 40, 1941 – 15, 1942 – 31, 1943 – 57, 1944 – 35, 1945 – 48, 1946 – 38, 1947 – 14, without – 48, un-

⁷⁰ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 106. 88 арк.; Ф. 71. Оп. 6. Спр. 860. Т. 1. 88 арк.

⁷¹ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 102. 62 арк.

⁷² ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 111. 125 арк.

⁷³ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 95. 55 арк.

⁷⁴ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 106. 88 арк.; Ф. 71. Оп. 6. Спр. 860. Т. 1. 88 арк.

known – 1⁷⁵. According to the party experience out of 426 people: before 1939 – 61 (14.3%), 1939 – 1940 – 78 (18.3%), 1941 – 1943 – 103 (24.2%), after 1944 year – 135 (31.7%), without – 48 (11.27%), unknown – 1 (0.23%); Department of the State Security Service of the Stanislav Region up to January 1947: 1925 – 2, 1926 – 1, 1927 – 4, 1928 – 8, 1929 – 6, 1930 – 16, 1931 – 10, 1932 – 17, 1935 – 3, 1936 – 4, 1937 – 4, 1938 – 31, 1939 – 54, 1940 – 73, 1941 – 51, 1942 – 103, 1943 – 120, 1944 – 71, 1945 – 59, 1946 – 47, 1947 – 1, Komsomol – 2, without – 117⁷⁶. According to party membership out of 804 people: before 1939 – 106 (13.2%), 1939 – 1940 – 127 (15.8%), 1941 – 1943 – 274 (34.01%), after 1944 – 178 (22.14%), Komsomol – 2 (0.25%), without – 117 (14.6%); Office of the State Security Service of the Chernivtsi region up to January – March 1947: 1919 – 1, 1920 – 1, 1923 – 1, 1924 – 2, 1925 – 1, 1926 – 8, 1927 – 2, 1928 – 3, 1929 – 3, 1930 – 3, 1931 – 6, 1932 – 9, 1936 – 1, 1937 – 9, 1938 – 20, 1939 – 28, 1940 – 38, 1941 – 29, 1942 – 49, 1943 – 46, 1944 – 38, 1945 – 36, 1946 – 31, Komsomol – 4, without – 62⁷⁷. According to party experience (431): 1939 – 70 (16.2%), 1939 – 1940 – 66 (15.3%), 1941 – 1943 – 124 (28.8%), after 1944 – 105 (24.4%), Komsomol – 4 (0.9%), without – 62 (14.4%)⁷⁸. As we can see, the majority had party experience of three years or more (61.31% – MSS of the Drohobych region, 56.8% in the State Security Service of the Transcarpathia region, 63.01% in the State Security Service of the Stanislav region, 60.3% in the State Security Service of the Chernivtsi region).

Work in state security bodies. At the time while entering the service of the MSS of the Drohobych region up to January 1947: 1921 – 1, 1927 – 2, 1929 – 2, 1930 – 2, 1931 – 5, 1932 – 11, 1933 – 11, 1934 – 9, 1935 – 10, 1936 – 10, 1937 – 10, 1938 – 38, 1939 – 31, 1940 – 36, 1941 – 26, 1942 – 49, 1943 – 76, 1944 – 47, 1945 – 89, 1946 – 68, 1947 – 2⁷⁹. According to the KGB experience out of 535 people: before 1939 – 111 (20.75%), 1939 – 1940 – 67 (12.52%), 1941 – 1943 – 151 (28.22%), after 1944 – 206 (38.51%); Department of the State Security Service of the Transcarpathia region up to July 1947: 1920 – 1, 1921 –

⁷⁵ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 102. 62 арк.

⁷⁶ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 111. 125 арк.

⁷⁷ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 95. 55 арк.

⁷⁸ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 95. 55 арк.

⁷⁹ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 106. 88 арк.; Ф. 71. Оп. 6. Спр. 860. Т. 1. 88 арк.

2, 1924 – 1, 1926 – 1, 1927 – 2, 1928 – 1, 1929 – 3, 1930 – 5, 1931 – 7, 1932 – 7, 1933 – 4, 1934 – 7, 1935 – 9, 1936 – 7, 1937 – 9, 1938 – 27, 1939 – 26, 1940 – 24, 1941 – 18, 1942 – 44, 1943 – 67, 1944 – 33, 1945 – 50, 1946 – 58, 1947 – 12, unknown – 1⁸⁰. *According to the KGB experience out of 426 people: before 1939 – 93 (21.83%), 1939 – 1940 – 50 (11.73%), 1941 – 1943 – 129 (30.3%), after 1944 – 153 (35.91%), unknown – 1 (0.23%);* Office of the MSS of the Stanislav region up to January 1947: 1920 – 2, 1921 – 1, 1922 – 1, 1924 – 1, 1925 – 1, 1926 – 1, 1927 – 3, 1928 – 1, 1929 – 5, 1930 – 13, 1931 – 6, 1932 – 7, 1933 – 5, 1934 – 10, 1935 – 12, 1936 – 14, 1937 – 37, 1938 – 39, 1939 – 49, 1940 – 39, 1941 – 37, 1942 – 70, 1943 – 135, 1944 – 121, 1945 – 87, 1946 – 104, 1947 – 3⁸¹. *According to the KGB experience out of 804 people: before 1939 – 159 (19.8%), 1939 – 1940 – 88 (10.9%), 1941 – 1943 – 242 (30.1%), after 1944 – 315 (39.2%).* Department of the State Security Service of the Chernivtsi region up to January – March 1947: 1919 – 1, 1920 – 1, 1923 – 1, 1926 – 4, 1928 – 1, 1929 – 3, 1930 – 6, 1931 – 5, 1932 – 3, 1933 – 8, 1934 – 1, 1935 – 3, 1936 – 8, 1937 – 13, 1938 – 28, 1939 – 38, 1940 – 24, 1941 – 22, 1942 – 48, 1943 – 53, 1944 – 69, 1945 – 41, 1946 – 50⁸². *According to the KGB experience out of 431 people: in 1939 – 86 (19.9%), 1939 – 1940 – 62 (14.4%), 1941 – 1943 – 123 (28.5%), after 1944 – 160 (37.2%).* Thus, in 1947, the MSSB employed persons who had more than three years of experience (61.49% – MSS of the Drohobych region, 63.86% in the State Security Committee of the Transcarpathia region, 60.8% of the State Security Committee of the Stanislav region, 62.8% of Chernivtsi region).

Rank. Among 535 employees of the MSS Office of the Drohobych region up to January 1947: Corporal – 2 (0.4%), Sergeant – 14 (2.61%), Junior Sergeant – 39 (7.3%), Sergeant – 34 (6.4%), senior sergeant – 30 (5.61%), junior lieutenant – 79 (14.7%), lieutenant – 137 (25.6%), senior lieutenant – 38 (7.1%), captain – 58 (10.8%), major – 15 (2.81%), lieutenant colonel – 9 (1.7%), colonel – 1 (0.18%), without – 79 (14.7%)⁸³; Up to January 1947, the Office of the State Security Service of the Transcarpathia Region had 426 members: corporal –

⁸⁰ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 102. 62 арк.

⁸¹ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 111. 125 арк.

⁸² ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 95. 55 арк.

⁸³ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 106. 88 арк.; Ф. 71. Оп. 6. Спр. 860. Т. 1. 88 арк.

1 (0.23%), sergeant – 6 (1.4%), junior police sergeant – 1 (0.23%), junior sergeant – 19 (4.46%), sergeant – 15 (3.52%), senior sergeant – 5 (1.2%), general lieutenant – 1 (0.23%), junior lieutenant of administrative service – 1 (0.23%), junior police lieutenant – 1 (0.23%), junior lieutenant – 83 (19.48%), junior technical lieutenant – 1 (0.23%), technical lieutenant – 1 (0), 23%), police lieutenant – 1 (0.23%), general lieutenant – 1 (0.23%), lieutenant – 94 (22.1%), general senior lieutenant – 2 (0.47%), senior lieutenant – 45 (10.6%), senior captain – 4 (0.93%), lieutenant captain – 1 (0.23%), captain – 55 (12.9%), general major – 1 (0.23%), police major – 1 (0.23%), major – 35 (8.21%), lieutenant colonel – 13 (3.05%), colonel – 2 (0.47 %), without – 36 (8.45%)⁸⁴; Department of the State Security Service of the Stanislaw Region up to January, 1947, out of 804 persons: corporal – 5 (0.6%), sergeant – 20 (2.5%), junior sergeant – 41 (5.1%), sergeant – 44 (5.5%), senior sergeant – 35 (4.4%), senior junior lieutenant – 1 (0.12%), junior lieutenant of the quartermaster's service – 3 (0.4%), junior lieutenant – 165 (20.5%), technical lieutenant – 2 (0.25%), lieutenant of the quartermaster's service – 2 (0.25%), general lieutenant – 3 (0.4%), lieutenant – 208 (25.8%), general senior lieutenant – 6 (0.7%), senior lieutenant – 57 (7.1%), captain – 64 (7.9%), senior major – 4 (0.5%), major – 25 (3.11%), general lieutenant colonel – 2 (0.25%), lieutenant colonel – 7 (0.8%), colonel – 1 (0.12%), without – 108 (13.43%), unknown – 1 (0.12%)⁸⁵; Department of the State Security Service of the Chernivtsi region in January-March 1947 out of 431 persons: corporal – 3 (0.7%), sergeant – 13 (3.02%), junior sergeant – 13 (3.02%), sergeant – 27 (6.3%), senior sergeant – 13 3.02%), technical lieutenant – 2 (0.5%), junior lieutenant ad. service – 1 (0.23%), junior technical lieutenant – 1 (0.23%), junior lieutenant – 69 (16%), general lieutenant – 1 (0.23%), lieutenant – 100 (23.2%), lieutenant ad. service – 1 (0.23%), senior lieutenant – 36 (8.3%), senior technical lieutenant – 1 (0.23%), captain – 60 (13.9%), major – 23 (5.3 %), lieutenant colonel – 5 (1.2%), colonel – 2 (0.5%), unknown – 60 (13.9%)⁸⁶. Thus, by military ranks, the vast majority of employees had the ranks of sergeant, sergeant and junior officer – 77.91% in the MSS of the Drohobych, respectively – 79.36%, MSS of

⁸⁴ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 102. 62 арк.

⁸⁵ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 111. 125 арк.

⁸⁶ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 95. 55 арк.

the Transcarpathia region, 81.52% MSS of the Stanislav region, 79.11% MSS of the Chernivtsi region.

The situation changed somewhat in these parameters in 1950.

Age. According to the age in the Office of the MSS of the Drohobych on December 1950: born in 1877 – 1, 1892 – 1, 1898 – 2, 1899 – 4, 1900 – 1, 1901 – 3, 1902 – 5, 1903 – 6, 1904 – 5, 1905 – 14, 1906 – 9, 1907 – 26, 1908 – 13, 1909 – 16, 1910 – 22, 1911 – 29, 1912 – 43, 1913 – 33, 1914 – 56, 1915 – 29, 1916 – 33, 1917 – 31, 1918 – 61, 1919 – 44, 1920 – 48, 1921 – 50, 1922 – 67, 1923 – 62, 1924 – 84, 1925 – 50, 1926 – 48, 1927 – 30, 1928 – 10, 1929 – 4, 1930 – 6, 1931 – 5, 1932 – 3⁸⁷. According to the *age out of 954 people: up to 35 – 636 (66.66%), after 35 – 318 (33.33%)*; the Office of the MSS of the Transcarpathia for December 1950: 1891 – 1, 1895 – 1, 1897 – 2, 1898 – 1, 1899 – 2, 1900 – 4, 1901 – 1, 1902 – 7, 1903 – 7, 1904 – 9, 1905 – 6, 1906 – 16, 1907 – 15, 1908 – 4, 1909 – 14, 1910 – 13, 1911 – 22, 1912 – 19, 1913 – 24, 1914 – 31, 1915 – 29, 1916 – 33, 1917 – 20, 1918 – 34, 1919 – 32, 1920 – 27, 1921 – 27, 1922 – 47, 1923 – 45, 1924 – 58, 1925 – 33, 1926 – 33, 1927 – 11, 1928 – 11, 1929 – 6, 1930 – 9, 1931 – 5⁸⁸. According to the *age out of 659 people: before the age of 35 – 431 (65.4%), after 35 – 228 (34.6%)*. Department of the State Security Service of the Stanislav Region for December 1950: born 1881 – 1, 1896 – 3, 1899 – 1, 1900 – 5, 1901 – 3, 1902 – 4, 1903 – 4, 1904 – 15, 1905 – 15, 1906 – 11, 1907 – 8, 1908 – 18, 1909 – 16, 1910 – 19, 1911 – 28, 1912 – 38, 1913 – 31, 1914 – 36, 1915 – 34, 1916 – 39, 1917 – 35, 1918 – 58, 1919 – 60, 1920 – 33, 1921 – 46, 1922 – 82, 1923 – 62, 1924 – 90, 1925 – 42, 1926 – 28, 1927 – 29, 1928 – 10, 1929 – 7, 1930 – 1, 1931 – 2, unknown – 4⁸⁹. According to *age out of 918 people: before the age of 35 – 624 (68%), after 35 – 290 (31.6%), unknown. – 4 (0.44%)*. The Office of the State Security Service of Chernivtsi region for December 1950: 1892 – 1, 1894 – 1, 1896 – 1, 1899 – 3, 1900 – 2, 1902 – 4, 1903 – 3, 1904 – 8, 1905 – 10, 1906 – 12, 1907 – 9, 1908 – 7, 1909 – 10, 1910 – 16, 1911 – 24, 1912 – 21, 1913 – 29, 1914 – 26, 1915 – 19, 1916 – 20, 1917 – 26, 1918 – 33, 1919 – 24, 1920 – 32, 1921 – 23, 1922 – 28, 1923 – 36, 1924 – 31, 1925 – 22, 1926 – 11, 1927 – 10,

⁸⁷ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 148. 119 арк.

⁸⁸ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 131. 105 арк.

⁸⁹ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 153. 128 арк.; Спр. 154. 17 арк.

1928 – 5, 1929 – 5, 1930 – 4, 1932 – 2⁹⁰. According to the *age out of 518 people: up to 35 – 312 (60.23%), after 35 – 206 (39.77%)*. Thus, in all MSS the majority of employees (over 60%) were young people under 35 years of age. The largest number of them was in the MSS of Stanislav region – 68%, the least in the MSS of the Chernivtsi region – 60.23%.

Nationality. Office of the State Security Service of the Drohobych region in December 1950 out of 954 people: 8 Belarusians (0.84%), 6 Jews (0.63%), 2 Kazakhs (0.22%), 1 Kyrgyz (0.10%), Moldovans – 1 (0.10%), Turks – 1 (0.10%), Ukrainians – 327 (34.3%), Mordovians – 9 (0.94%), Ossetians – 1 (0.10%), Russians – 591 (61.95%), Tajiks – 1 (0.10%), Tatars – 4 (0.42%), Uzbeks – 1 (0.10%), Chuvash – (0.10%)⁹¹; Office of the MSS of the Transcarpathia region up to December 1950, out of 659 people: Azerbaijanis – 1 (0.15%), Armenians – 2 (0.31%), Belarusians – 10 (1.51%), Georgians – 1 (0.15%), Jews – 9 (1.36%), Hungarians – 1 (0.15%), Uzbeks – 1 (0.15%), Chuvash – 3 (0.45%), Moldovans – 1 (0.15%), Mordovians – 2 (0.31%), Russians – 359 (54.5%), Slovaks – 1 (0.15%), Tatars – 2 (0.31%), Udmurts – 1 (0.15%), Ukrainians – 265 (40.2%)⁹²; Department of the State Security Service of the Stanislav Region up to December 1950, out of 918 people: Azerbaijanis – 1 (0.11%), Armenians – 1 (0.11%), Belarusians – 9 (0.98%), Greeks – 1 (0.11%), Jews – 14 (1.53%), Kazakhs – 2 (0.22%), Komi – 1 (0.11%), Latvians – 1 (0.11%), Mordovians – 2 (0.22%), Polish – 1 (0.11%), Udmurts – 4 (0.44%), Ukrainians – 308 (33.55%), Russians – 568 (61.87%), Tatars – 1 (0.11%), Uzbeks – 1 (0.11%), Chuvash – 3 (0.33%)⁹³; Office of the State Security Service of Chernivtsi region of December 1950, out of 518 people: Armenians – 2 (0.4%), Bashkirs – 1 (0.2%), Belarusians – 3 (0.6%), Georgians – 1 (0.2%), Jews – 12 (2.3%), Chuvash – 1 (0.2%), Moldovans – 1 (0.2%), Mordovians – 3 (0.6%), Russians – 334 (64.4%), Tatars – 6 (1.2%), Ukrainians – 154 (29.7%)⁹⁴. That is, the number of Russians ranged from 54.5% in MSS of the Transcarpathia region, to 64.4% in MSS of the Chernivtsi region, while the number of Ukrainians – from 29.7% in

⁹⁰ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 163. 75 арк.

⁹¹ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 148. 119 арк.

⁹² ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 131. 105 арк.

⁹³ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 153. 128 арк.; Спр. 154. 17 арк.

⁹⁴ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 163. 75 арк.

MSS of the Chernivtsi region, to 40.2% in State Security Service of the Transcarpathia region.

Education. According to the educational level in the Office of the MSS of the Drohobych region up to December 1950 of 954 people: illiterate – 1 (0.10%), little literate – 3 (0.31%), primary – 170 (17.82%), incomplete secondary – 480 (50.31%), secondary – 273 (28.62%), incomplete special – 1 (0.10%), incomplete higher – 18 (1.9%), higher – 8 (0.84%)⁹⁵; Office of the MSS of the Transcarpathia region up to December 1950, out of 659 persons: illiterate – 3 (0.45%), primary – 147 (22.3%), incomplete secondary – 291 (44.2%), secondary – 186 (28.2%), technical secondary – 1 (0.15%), unfinished higher – 13 (1.97%), higher – 18 (2.73%)⁹⁶; Department of the State Security Service of the Stanislav Region up to December 1950, out of 918 persons: primary – 206 (22.44%), incomplete secondary 382 (41.61%), secondary – 279 (30.39%), incomplete higher – 27 (2.94%), higher – 21 (2.29%), unknown – 3 (0.33%)⁹⁷; Office of the State Security Service of Chernivtsi region up to December, 1950, out of 518 persons: primary – 127 (24.52%), incomplete secondary – 190 (36.68%), secondary – 170 (32.82%), incomplete higher – 19 (3.66%), higher – 12 (2.32%)⁹⁸. Thus, we see that the majority of employees had primary and lower secondary education (68.54% in the MSS of the Drohobych region 66.95% – in the State Security Service of the Transcarpathia region, 64.05% – in the State Security Committee of Stanislav region, 61.2% – in the State Security Service of Chernivtsi region).

Party affiliation. At the time of joining the party, employees of the MSS Office of the Drohobych region in December 1950 were characterized by: 1918 – 1, 1919 – 1, 1925 – 1, 1926 – 1, 1927 – 7, 1928 – 3, 1929 – 6, 1930 – 3, 1931 – 16, 1932 – 12, 1935 – 1, 1936 – 1, 1937 – 3, 1938 – 15, 1939 – 39, 1940 – 56, 1941 – 34, 1942 – 60, 1943 – 100, 1944 – 74, 1945 – 73, 1946 – 60, 1947 – 57, 1948 – 54, 1949 – 72, 1950 – 60, 1951 – 1, without – 143⁹⁹. *According to the party experience of 954 people: in 1939 – 71 (7.4%), 1939 – 1940 – 95 (9.96%), 1941 – 1943 – 194 (20.34%), after 1944 – 451 (47.3%), without – 143*

⁹⁵ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 148. 119 арк.

⁹⁶ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 131. 105 арк.

⁹⁷ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 153. 128 арк.; Спр. 154. 17 арк.

⁹⁸ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 163. 75 арк.

⁹⁹ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 148. 119 арк.

(15%); Office of the MSS of the Transcarpathia region up to December, 1950: 1920 – 1, 1925 – 1, 1926 – 4, 1927 – 5, 1928 – 4, 1929 – 5, 1930 – 2, 1931 – 7, 1932 – 10, 1937 – 4, 1938 – 10, 1939 – 24, 1940 – 40, 1941 – 20, 1942 – 33, 1943 – 60, 1944 – 46, 1945 – 45, 1946 – 39, 1947 – 47, 1948 – 60, 1949 – 58, 1950 – 23, without – 111¹⁰⁰. According to *party affiliation out of 659 people: in 1939 – 53 (8.04%), 1939 – 1940 – 64 (9.71%), 1941 – 1943 – 113 (17.15%), after 1944 – 318 (48.3%), without – 111 (16.8%)*; Department of the State Security Service of the Stanislav up to December, 1950: 1912 – 1, 1916 – 1, 1924 – 2, 1925 – 1, 1926 – 1, 1927 – 1, 1928 – 5, 1929 – 6, 1930 – 8, 1931 – 10, 1932 – 15, 1933 – 1, 1936 – 2, 1937 – 1, 1938 – 20, 1939 – 39, 1940 – 47, 1941 – 36, 1942 – 74, 1943 – 130, 1944 – 73, 1945 – 57, 1946 – 69, 1947 – 68, 1948 – 47, 1949 – 53, 1950 – 18, without – 129, unknown – 3¹⁰¹. According to the *party experience out of 918 people: in 1939 – 75 (8.17%), 1939 – 1940 – 86 (9.37%), 1941 – 1943 – 240 (26.14%), after 1944 – 385 (41.94%), without – 129 (14.05%), unknown – 3 (0.33%)*; Office of the State Security Service of the Chernivtsi region up to December, 1950: 1918 – 1, 1919 – 1, 1920 – 2, 1923 – 1, 1924 – 1, 1925 – 1, 1926 – 2, 1927 – 3, 1928 – 2, 1929 – 2, 1930 – 3, 1931 – 9, 1932 – 8, 1937 – 2, 1938 – 9, 1939 – 22, 1940 – 27, 1941 – 25, 1942 – 40, 1943 – 34, 1944 – 32, 1945 – 44, 1946 – 41, 1947 – 32, 1948 – 34, 1949 – 22, 1950 – 13, 1951 – 1, without – 104¹⁰². According to the *party experience of 518 people: in 1939 – 47 (9.1%), 1939 – 1940 – 49 (9.5%), 1941 – 1943 – 99 (19.1%), after 1944 – 219 (42.2%), without – 104 (20.1%)*. As we can see, the majority had party experience of three years or more (59.43% – MSS of the Drohobych region, 54.63% in the State Security Service of the Transcarpathia region, 65.36% of Transcarpathia region, in the State Security Service of Stanislav region, 60.23% in the State Security Service of the Chernivtsi region).

Work in state security bodies. At the time of coming to work in special bodies Office of the State Security Service of the Drohobych Region up to December, 1950: 1924 – 1, 1927 – 3, 1928 – 1, 1929 – 2, 1930 – 6, 1931 – 7, 1932 – 7, 1933 – 8, 1934 – 8, 1935 – 8, 1936 – 13, 1937 – 16, 1938 – 47, 1939 – 46, 1940 – 38, 1941 – 32, 1942 – 53,

¹⁰⁰ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 131. 105 арк.

¹⁰¹ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 153. 128 арк.; Спр. 154. 17 арк.

¹⁰² ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 163. 75 арк.

1943 – 92, 1944 – 63, 1945 – 91, 1946 – 100, 1947 – 90, 1948 – 95, 1949 – 86, 1950 – 41¹⁰³. *According to the KGB experience out of 954 people: in 1939 – 127 (13.3%), 1939 – 1940 – 84 (8.8%), 1941 – 1943 – 177 (18.6%), after 1944 – 566 (59.3%);* Office of the MSS of the Transcarpathia region up to December, 1950: 1920 – 1, 1921 – 1, 1922 – 1, 1925 – 2, 1926 – 1, 1927 – 2, 1928 – 3, 1929 – 3, 1930 – 2, 1931 – 8, 1932 – 7, 1933 – 7, 1934 – 11, 1935 – 11, 1936 – 5, 1937 – 8, 1938 – 28, 1939 – 26, 1940 – 35, 1941 – 23, 1942 – 37, 1943 – 57, 1944 – 36, 1945 – 66, 1946 – 80, 1947 – 54, 1948 – 63, 1949 – 52, 1950 – 29¹⁰⁴. *According to the KGB experience out of 659 people: in 1939 – 101 (15.33%), 1939 – 1940 – 61 (9.26%), 1941 – 1943 – 117 (17.75%), after 1944 – 380 (57.66%);* Department of the State Security Service of the Stanislav Region up to December, 1950: 1917 – 1, 1920 – 2, 1928 – 1, 1929 – 3, 1930 – 7, 1931 – 3, 1932 – 10, 1933 – 6, 1934 – 6, 1935 – 9, 1936 – 14, 1937 – 24, 1938 – 36, 1939 – 44, 1940 – 32, 1941 – 29, 1942 – 55, 1943 – 95, 1944 – 56, 1945 – 66, 1946 – 93, 1947 – 76, 1948 – 132, 1949 – 78, 1950 – 37, unknown – 3¹⁰⁵. *According to the KGB experience out of 918 people: in 1939 – 122 (13.29%), 1939 – 1940 – 76 (8.28%), 1941 – 1943 – 179 (19.50%), after 1944 – 538 (58.60%), unknown – 3 (0.33%);* Office of the State Security Service of the Chernivtsi region up to December, 1950: 1919 – 1, 1921 – 1, 1923 – 1, 1928 – 1, 1929 – 4, 1930 – 3, 1931 – 2, 1932 – 3, 1933 – 8, 1934 – 3, 1935 – 4, 1936 – 8, 1937 – 12, 1938 – 32, 1939 – 34, 1940 – 23, 1941 – 20, 1942 – 43, 1943 – 56, 1944 – 34, 1945 – 31, 1946 – 52, 1947 – 39, 1948 – 40, 1949 – 40, 1950 – 23¹⁰⁶. *According to the KGB experience out of 518 people: in 1939 – 83 (16.02%), 1939 – 1940 – 57 (11.01%), 1941 – 1943 – 119 (22.97%), after 1944 – 259 (50).* Thus, in 1950, persons with more than three years of experience worked in the MSS bodies (67.3% – MSS of the Drohobych region, 70% in the State Security Committee of the Transcarpathia region, 64.5% of the State Security Committee of the Stanislav region, 72.59% of Chernivtsi region).

Rank. MSS Drohobych region up to December, 1950 out of 954 people: corporals – 11 (1.15%), senior – 43 (4.5%), junior sergeant – 88 (9.22%), sergeant – 37 (3.88%), senior sergeant – 38 (4%), senior

¹⁰³ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 148. 119 арк.

¹⁰⁴ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 131. 105 арк.

¹⁰⁵ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 153. 128 арк.; Спр. 154. 17 арк.

¹⁰⁶ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 163. 75 арк.

police sergeant – 3 (0.31%), junior lieutenant – 122 (12.8%), junior technical lieutenant – 3 (0.31%), junior police lieutenant – 2 (0.21%), technical lieutenant – 1 (0.1%), lieutenant – 167 (17.51%), senior technical lieutenant – 1 (0.1%), senior lieutenant – 153 (16.04%), captain – 106 (11.11%), major – 66 (6.91%), lieutenant colonel – 19 (2%), colonel – 3 (0.31%), without – 91 (9.54%)¹⁰⁷, MSS of the Transcarpathia region in December 1950 out of 659 people: foreman – 20 (3.03%), junior police sergeant – 1 (0.15%), junior sergeant – 51 (7.74%), sergeant – 42 (6.37%), senior sergeant – 19 (2.9%), junior lieutenant of police – 2 (0.3%), junior lieutenant – 83 (12.6%), junior technical lieutenant – 5 (0.75%), technical lieutenant – 6 (0.91%), lieutenant – 110 (16.7%), senior lieutenant – 91 (13.8%), captain-lieutenant – 1 (0.15%), captain – 66 (10.01%), major of Police – 1 (0.15%), major – 46 (6.98%), lieutenant colonel – 23 (3.5%), colonel – 4 (0.61%), without – 88 (13.35%)¹⁰⁸; Department of the State Security Service of the Stanislav Region up to December, 1950 out of 918 persons: corporals – 12 (1.31%), sergeant – 23 (2.51%), junior sergeant – 47 (5.12%), sergeant – 47 (5.12%), senior sergeant – 24 (2.61%), soldier. 1 rank – 1 (0.11%), junior lieutenant – 126 (13, 73%), junior technical lieutenant – 2 (0.22%), lieutenant of medical service – 3 (0.33%), technical lieutenant – 6 (0.65%), lieutenant – 184 (20.04%), senior lieutenant of medical service – 2 (0.22%), senior technical lieutenant – 1 (0.11%), senior lieutenant – 165 (17.97 %), captain of medical service – 1 (0.11%), captain – 100 (10.89%), major of medical service – 1 (0.11%), major – 48, (5.23%), lieutenant colonel – 16 (1.74%), colonel – 4 (0.44%), without – 105 (11.44%)¹⁰⁹; Office of the MSS of the Chernivtsi region up to December, 1950: corporal – 5 (0.96%), sergeant – 31 (5.98%), junior sergeant – 30 (5.8%), sergeant – 27 (5.21%), senior sergeant – 30 (5.8%), junior lieutenant – 43 (8.3%), technical lieutenant – 4 (0.77%), lieutenant – 81 (15.63%), senior technical lieutenant – 3 (0.6%), senior lieutenant – 97 (18.7%), captain – 61 (11.77%), major – 36 (6.95%), lieutenant colonel – 14 (2.71%), colonel – 2 (0.4 %), without – 54 (10.42%)¹¹⁰. Thus, by military ranks, the vast majority of employees had the rank of sergeant, sergeant and junior officer – 80.72 % in the MSS of the Drohobych region, respec-

¹⁰⁷ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 148. 119 арк.

¹⁰⁸ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 131. 105 арк.

¹⁰⁹ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 153. 128 арк.; Спр. 154. 17 арк.

¹¹⁰ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 8. Оп. 14 (1985). Спр. 163. 75 арк.

tively – 75.41% of the UMD of the Transcarpathia region 79.52% in the MSS of the Chernivtsi region, 81.05% MSS of the Stanislav region.

Thus, the occupation character of the regime is also evidenced by the fact that almost the entire administration, even at the lower levels, consisted of Russians, not the local population. Repressive and punitive bodies were no exception. Indigenous people were excluded even from the management of economic life. Up to May, 1946, there were no Galicians in the Drohobych region¹¹¹. According to D. Vedeneev, the incoming management staff was characterized by a low level of education (mostly incompetent people whose education did not exceed the level of primary, incomplete secondary school. – author), ignorance and disrespect for regional characteristics, brutal administration, which led to serious miscalculations at work”¹¹².

Thus, we see that in 1944 – 1945 in the Drohobych MSS the vast majority of employees were young people (over 70% of persons under 35 years of age), Russians (over 70%) who had primary or incomplete secondary education (over 50%), party – more than 80% (with experience up to 5 years – about 50%) and experience in law enforcement agencies up to 5 years (there were more than 60%), held the rank of sergeant, senior sergeant and junior officer (over 70%).

In general, the staffing in the areas considered in the above indicators in 1947 – 1950 did not change significantly. The majority were young people under 35 years (*in 1947, depending on the region ranged from 70.3% – to 76.3% (most in the MSS of the Transcarpathia region – 76.3%, the least MSS of the Drohobych region – 70.3 %), in 1950 from 60.23% – up to 68% (most in MSS of the Stanislav region – 68%, least MSS of the Chernivtsi region – 60.23%). Decreased inflow of new staff, slightly more different national composition, although the majority continued to be occupied by Russians (in 1947 – 53.5% – 69.53% (the least in MSS of the Transcarpathia region, the most – MSS of the Drohobych region), although a significant increase in the percentage of workers of Ukrainian origin – from 24.1% – up to 41.31% (the least in the MSS of the Drohobych region, the most – in the MSS of the Transcarpathia region), in 1950, respectively, Russians – 54.5% –*

¹¹¹ Веденеев Д. В., Биструхін Г. С. Двобій без компромісів. Протиборство спецпідрозділів ОУН та радянських сил спецоперацій. 1945 – 1980-ті роки. Київ: К.І.С., 2007. С. 41.

¹¹² Веденеев Д. В., Биструхін Г. С. Двобій без компромісів. ... С. 41.

64.4% (the least – in the MSS of the Transcarpathia region, most – in MSS of the Chernivtsi region), in 29.7% of Ukrainians – 33.55% (the lowest in the MSS of the Chernivtsi region, the most – in the MSS of the Transcarpathia region), the educational level has not changed – workers had primary or lower secondary education (in 1947 – (65.8 % in MSS of the Drohobych region, 65.11% – in the State Security Service of the Transcarpathia region, 70.52% – in the State Security Service of Stanislav region, 65.66% – in the State Security Service of the Chernivtsi region; in 1950 – 68.54% in the MSS of the Drohobych region, 66.95% – in the State Security Service of the Transcarpathia region, 64.05% – in the State Security Committee of Stanislav region, 61.2% – in the State Security Service of the Chernivtsi region). The law enforcement agencies included persons, most of whom had party experience of three years or more (in 1947 – 61.31% – in MSS of the Drohobych region, 56.8% in the State Security Service of the Transcarpathia region, 63.01 % in the State Security Service of the Stanislav region, 60.3% in the State Security Service of thr Chernivtsi region; 1950 – 59.43% – in MSS of the Drohobych region, 54.63% in the State Security Service of the Transcarpathia region, 65.36% of in the State Security Service of the Stanislav region, 60.23% in the State Security Service of the Chernivtsi region) and the corresponding more than three years of service in law enforcement agencies – 61.49% – in MSS of the Drohobych region, 63.86% in the State Security Committee of the Transcarpathia region, 60.8% of the State Security Committee of the Stanislav region, 62.8% in the Chernivtsi region; 1950 – 67.3% – in MSS of the Drohobych region, 70% in the State Security Committee of the Transcarpathia region, 64.5% of the State Security Committee of the Stanislav region, 72.59% in MSS of the Chernivtsi region). At the same time, the vast majority of military ranks were sergeants, senior sergeants and junior officers (in 1947 – 77.91% in the MSS of the Drohobych region, respectively – 79.36%, in MSS of the Transcarpathia region, 81.52% in MSS of the Stanislav region, 79.11% in MSS of the Chernivtsi region; 1950 – 80.72 % in the MSS of the Drohobych region, respectively – 75.41% in the MSS of the Transcarpathia region, 79.52% in the MSS of the Chernivtsi region, 81.05% in MSS the Stanislav region.

Vasyl Ilnytskyi

IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL TERROR OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IN THE WESTERN REGIONS OF UKRAINE

The socio-political and socio-economic development of the western lands of Ukraine was determined and directed by the Communist Party and the Soviet government for almost half a century. For two generations of residents, the October Revolution and the associated “socialist transformations” made fundamental changes in the traditions of life that had been developed over the centuries. Through the ages, certain features of historical and economic development have been formed in the western lands of Ukraine.

The history of Ukraine in the second half of the twentieth century was highlighted by Russian scholars V. Baran¹¹³, V. Danylenko¹¹⁴, V. Lytvyn¹¹⁵, Yu. Shapoval¹¹⁶ and others. An important qualitative expansion of the documentary base is distinguished by the works of I. Bilas¹¹⁷, I. Andrukhiv and A. Frantsuz¹¹⁸, V. Serhiichuk¹¹⁹. Some scholarly studies characterize the contradictory political processes that took place in the 1940s and 1950s in the western regions of the Ukrain-

¹¹³ Баран В. К. Україна після Сталіна: Нариси історії 1953 – 1985 рр. Львів: Свобода, 1992. 124 с.; Його ж. Україна 1950 – 1960-х рр.: еволюція тоталітарної системи. Львів: Інститут українознавства ім. І. Крип'якевича НАН України, 1996. 448 с. Його ж. Україна: новітня історія (1945 – 1991 рр.). Львів: Ін-т українознавства ім. І. Крип'якевича НАН України, 2003. 670 с.

¹¹⁴ Даниленко В. М. Україна в умовах системної кризи (1946 – 1980-і рр.). К.: Альтернативи, 1999. 304 с.

¹¹⁵ Литвин В. М. Історія України: [в 3 т.]. Т. 3. Кн. 2: Новітній час (1914 – 2004). К.: Альтернативи, 2005. 640 с.

¹¹⁶ Шаповал Ю. І. Україна 20 – 50-х років: сторінки ненаписаної історії. К.: Наукова думка, 1993. 351 с.

¹¹⁷ Білас І. Г. Репресивно-каральна система в Україні. 1917 – 1953: Суспільно-політичний та історико-правовий аналіз. Документи і матеріали. У 2 кн. К.: Либідь – Військо України, 1994. Кн. 2. 688 с.

¹¹⁸ Андрухів І., Француз А. Правда історії. Станіславщина в умовах терору і репресій: 1939 – 1959 роки, історико-правовий аспект. Документи і матеріали. Івано-Франківськ: Нова зоря, 2008. 448 с.

¹¹⁹ Сергійчук В. Десять буремних літ. Західноукраїнські землі у 1944 – 1953 рр.: Нові документи і матеріали. К.: Дніпро, 1998. 941 с.

ian SSR. These are the works of O. Rublov and Yu. Cherenko¹²⁰, B. Yarosh¹²¹, M. Senkiv¹²², O. Maliarchuk¹²³, V. Starka¹²⁴ and others.

The task of party organizations and Soviet authorities in the first post-war years was to continue and complete the process of “socialist perestroika” in the western Ukrainian region, which began in 1939 – 1941. Mass agitation work was supposed to be the most important means of mobilizing the western Ukrainian population of the region to fulfill Moscow’s economic and political plans. At the same time, local differences, features of the economic structure, the degree of “readiness” of the population, national diversity etc. were taken into account. The situation was complicated because of the small number of supporters of the communist ideology, an acute shortage of personnel, and fierce resistance to the extensive chain of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) units.

Party organizations and bodies of Soviet power launched the struggle “for socialist transformations” in the West Ukrainian villages in the following main directions: implementation of mass-political work; education of Soviet assets; armed struggle against “class enemies” by the forces of the local population (fighter detachments and self-defense groups) in close cooperation with state security agencies and the army; discrediting the Greek Catholic clergy and church.

In the campaign for the Greek Catholic church liquidation, the Communist Party authorities used proven methods: anti-unia slanderous propaganda, repression of clergy and their families, and forced conversion to Moscow orthodoxy. The decisive role was assigned to the staged Lviv pseudo-Cathedral of 1946, which marked the beginning of a catacomb period in church history.

¹²⁰ Рубльов О. С., Черченко Ю. А. Сталінщина й доля західноукраїнської інтелігенції (20 – 60-ті роки ХХ ст.). К.: Наукова думка, 1994. 350 с.

¹²¹ Ярош Б. О. Тоталітарний режим на західноукраїнських землях. 30 – 50-ті роки ХХ ст. (історико-політологічний аспект). Луцьк: Надстир’я, 1995. 176 с.

¹²² Сеньків М. В. Західноукраїнське село: насильницька колективізація 40 – поч. 50-х рр. ХХ ст. Львів: Інститут українознавства ім. І. Крип’якевича НАН України, 2002. 292 с.

¹²³ Малярчук О. М. Тоталітаризм проти західноукраїнського села. Івано-Франківськ: Місто НВ, 2008. 228 с. Його ж. Соціально-економічні процеси в західному регіоні Української РСР (1964 – 1991). Івано-Франківськ: Симфонія форте, 2015. 548 с.

¹²⁴ Старка В. В. Повсякденне життя західноукраїнського села в умовах суспільних трансформацій 1939 – 1953 рр. Тернопіль: Осадца Ю. В. 2019. 549 с.

In this case, the main attention was paid to the fight against the Ukrainian national idea and the monopoly planting of the policies of the Communist Party and the Soviet state. The program of political and educational work among the population of the region was outlined in the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU(В) “On Shortcomings in Political Work Among the Population of the Western Regions of the Ukrainian SSR” of September 27, 1944. It required strengthening the opposition to the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism, deploying political work among the masses, especially in rural areas. The resolution noted that in the conditions of the western regions of Ukraine, where the local population was brought up for decades in the “spirit of bourgeois ideology”, it is unacceptable to underestimate the importance of the ideological and political struggle against “agents of the German invaders – Ukrainian-German nationalists”¹²⁵.

On October 7, 1944, the Central Committee of the CP(В)U adopted a resolution defining measures aimed at implementing the above-mentioned document of Moscow. Subsequently, the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU(В) “On Measures to Help the Western Regions of the Ukrainian SSR Improve Mass Political, Cultural and Educational Work” was adopted and the third Republican meeting on propaganda and agitation was held under the Central Committee of the CP(В) of Ukraine (February 1945). The authorities also held regional meetings of peasants (November 10-11, 1944), intellectuals (November 30, 1944), women activists of Lviv region (December 28, 1944), meetings of peasant youth of Stanislavshchyna (December 19–20, 1944)¹²⁶ etc.

Relevant appeals calling on the population to actively participate in the restoration of the economy, as well as to fight against “bourgeois-nationalist ideology” were adopted there. On November 24, 1944, the appeal of the Central Committee of the CP(В)U, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR to the population of the western regions of the Republic was adopted. It was read out by the representatives of the party and Soviet organizations at meetings and rallies of rural residents in all

¹²⁵ Комуністична партія Радянського Союзу в резолюціях і рішеннях з’їздів, конференцій і пленумів ЦК. 1898 – 1971. Видання 8-е, доповн. і виправл. Т. 6: 1941 – 1954. К.: Політвидав України, 1980. С. 127.

¹²⁶ Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України (далі – ЦДАГО України). Ф. 1. Оп. 30. Спр. 213. Арк. 2–7.

localities of the region¹²⁷. On May 19, 1945, the authorities issued a new appeal to the population of the western regions, which called for a “decisive fight against nationalist banditry”, printed in newspapers in the form of posters and leaflets with a circulation of 500 thousand copies¹²⁸. The scale of the launched ideological campaign is also evidenced by the fact that these appeals had to be communicated to every resident of the village¹²⁹. “The Bolsheviks threw leaflets with a text appeal at all the villages. Planes thundered continuously over the forests. Leaflets were scattered from their entrails here, there and everywhere”¹³⁰.

Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR N. Khrushchev and Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(B)U D. Korotchenko on March 31, 1945, in their address “To the Peasant Men and Peasant Women of the Western Regions of Soviet Ukraine”, revealed the program of actions in rural areas and unfounded promised: “The collective farm path of life is the only correct path. Only in collective farms a peasant can make the best use of his work, apply all the achievements of Agricultural Science and create an exemplary highly mechanized farm with rich harvests and high productivity of animal husbandry. The collective farm system provides farmers with a rich and cultural life”¹³¹.

The preparation of the situation for the enforcement of totalitarianism policy in the western region of the Ukrainian SSR began with such ideological actions. A multi-sectoral ideological structure was created to ensure the implementation of the regime’s political course. Significant practical experience in the formation of a new socio-political system, obtained on the territory of Ukraine and in other regions of the USSR, gradually gave the desired result.

The creation of publishing houses contributed to the activation of ideological work in the Republic. In 1944, five publishing houses were already operating in Ukraine: “Ukrgosizdat”, “Sovetskaya Shkola”

¹²⁷ ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1. Оп. 75. Спр. 4. Арк. 19.

¹²⁸ Там же. Арк. 36.

¹²⁹ Державний архів Львівської області (далі – ДАЛО). Ф. П-5001. Оп. 2. Спр. 18. Арк. 1.

¹³⁰ Андрусак М. Брати грому. Художньо-документальна повість. Коломия: Вік, 2001. С. 278.

¹³¹ Радянська Буковина // До селян і селянок західних областей України. 1945. 4 квітня.

(“The Soviet School”), “Selkhozizdat”, the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, and the Union of Soviet Writers of Ukraine. In 1944, these publishing houses published 696 book titles and brochures with a total circulation of 16 million 677 thousand copies, a significant part of which was intended specifically for the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR¹³². Only the Ukrainian state publishing house within three months of 1944-1945 (November, December, January) published 29 titles of mass brochures for the western Ukrainian region with a total circulation of 655 thousand copies. Among them there are the works of M. Kalinin “Lenin and the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland”, E. Yaroslavskiy “The Party of Lenin-Stalin – organization of the struggle for victory over the Nazi invaders”, A. Vyshynskiy “The Soviet State in the Patriotic War”, D. Manuilskiy “The People-hero, the People-warrior”, M. Petrovskiy “The Reunification of the Ukrainian People in a united Ukrainian State”, F. Tolbukhin “The Battle for the Liberation of Soviet Ukraine” and others¹³³.

While agitation literature was published in millions of copies, the provision of educational textbooks to schools in the region remained in critical condition. Thus, the resolution of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR and the Central Committee of the CP(В)U No. 813 of May 24, 1945, referred to the unsatisfactory state of publication of textbooks, curricula, programs for schools of the Ukrainian SSR for the 1945/46 academic year. The resolution of the Central Committee of the CP(В)U “On Printing Textbooks for Schools of the Ukrainian SSR” of February 7, 1945, was not actually implemented. The Department of printing and publishing under the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR out of 28 textbook titles transferred to it by the “Sovetskaya Shkola” publishing house (with a total circulation of 3 million 985 thousand copies) printed only 6 titles (with a circulation of 310 thousand copies)¹³⁴.

Analysis of archival documents of the Central Committee of the CP(В)U of the Department of western regions shows that the Ukrainian state publishing house was obliged to publish specifically for the region 90 titles of literature with a total circulation of 2 million 366 thousand copies by April 1946. In fact, at that time, 51 titles were published

¹³² ЦДАГО України. Ф.1. Оп. 30. Спр. 213. Арк. 15.

¹³³ ЦДАГО України. Ф.1. Оп. 30. Спр. 213. Арк. 8.

¹³⁴ Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України (далі – ЦДАВО України). Ф. 166. Оп. 15. Спр. 54. Арк. 114.

with a circulation of 1 million 676 thousand copies. Due to the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, this publishing house switched to publishing pre-election campaign literature. Out of 48 brochures titles issued before the elections with a circulation of 4 million 475 thousand copies, about a half were sent to the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR. Thus, the party's decision on the number of literature releases was exceeded with some deviation from certain tasks¹³⁵. During 1946 "Ukrgosizdat" published 33 more titles of books for readers of western regions (works by V. Lenin, J. Stalin, V. Molotov, N. Khrushchev etc.) with a circulation of 1 million 770 thousand copies¹³⁶.

Even at the dawn of Soviet power, the censorship authorities played a key role. By the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR of August 11, 1922, the Central Department of Press, which worked under the People's Commissariat of Education was established. In July 1946, the Main Department for Literature and Publishing under the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR or Glavlit of the Ukrainian SSR was established, which carried out censorship control of the press and radio broadcasting. In the USSR, special library funds appeared designed to store "harmful" and "hostile" publications. It was there that the main part of the so-called "politically harmful" and "trophy" literature was put. Books of emigrants, repressed people, "bourgeois cosmopolitans", "enemies of the people", "degenerates" were seized.

Along with such total control, the totalitarian regime conducted systematic incriminating campaigns. These campaigns were most widespread in the first post-war years, embodied in the infamous "Zhdanovschina" against "vicious" and "fierce nationalists".

The press was widely used in the ideological work of party organizations. Especially for the western Ukrainian region, the Central Committee of the CP(В)У in April 1945 organized the publication of the newspaper "Soviet peasant". Twice a week, materials devoted to the socio-political life of the region were published on special pages of such newspapers as "The Soviet Ukraine", "The Truth of Ukraine", "Perets" Journal ("Pepper" Journal) and others. A huge number of copies of newspapers and magazines were sent from the center. At the

¹³⁵ ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1. Оп. 75. Спр. 111. Арк. 25.

¹³⁶ Там же. Арк. 16.

beginning of 1945, 707 titles of various newspapers were published in Ukraine, including 93 in the western Ukrainian region¹³⁷.

During the summer and autumn of 1947, a letter “From Collective Farmers, Individual Peasants and All Agricultural Workers of the Stanislavsky Region of the Ukrainian SSR to the Great Leader and Teacher Comrade Stalin Joseph Vissarionovich” was discussed in all villages of the Stanislav region¹³⁸. The regional committees of the party organized a constant flow of letters on behalf of the peasants, both personally to J. Stalin¹³⁹ and to famous marshals and generals¹⁴⁰. The personality cult of J. Stalin had an extremely adverse impact on the entire social and political life of the region. The hundreds of collective farms were “honored” in his name. The peasants were forced to serve on the collective farms and in reports written by party officials, systematically glorified the “Father of nations” and “thank him for a new happy life”¹⁴¹.

The regime paid special attention to ideological and propaganda work in the Zakarpattia Oblast. There were about 30 different parties and societies in this region prior to reunification with the Ukrainian SSR. One of the important circumstances in the policy of the party and the Soviet authorities in the region was the presence of 120,000 Hungarians, 35,000 Germans and 8,000 Romanians. At the same time, most of the Hungarian population were wealthy peasants, called the kulaks by the authorities¹⁴². Characteristic in this regard is the report of the Mukachevo Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, commonly referred to as the Mukachevo CPU obkom, to the Central Committee “On the village of Vyshnii Koropets”, which indicated the need “to isolate German families who remained in the villages of the district, as they conducted open propaganda among the peasants against the organization of collective farms”¹⁴³.

¹³⁷ Малярчук О. М. Тоталітаризм проти... С. 94.

¹³⁸ Державний архів Івано-Франківської області (далі – ДАІФО). Ф. П-1. Оп. 1. Спр. 645. Арк. 17.

¹³⁹ ДАЛО. Ф. П-5001. Оп. 8. Спр. 154. Арк. 39; Державний архів Чернівецької області (далі – ДАЧО). Ф. П-799. Оп. 1. Спр. 1. Арк. 2.

¹⁴⁰ Державний архів Тернопільської області (далі – ДАТО). Ф. П-1. Оп. 1. Спр. 394. Арк. 4.

¹⁴¹ ДАЛО. Ф. П-5001. Оп. 12. Спр. 195. Арк. 118.

¹⁴² ЦДАГО України. Ф.1. Оп. 30. Спр. 614. Арк. 124, 131.

¹⁴³ Там же. Спр. 930. Арк. 1.

The immediate tasks in the implementation of agrarian policy included the destruction of individual peasant farm, “the establishment of socialist property” and “resolute protection of the conquests from the entrenchment of the prostrate exploitative class”. The press was called upon to manipulate public opinion and become the center of political work among the masses. In 1947, 17 titles of newspapers were published in the Zakarpattia Oblast. Circulation of four regional newspapers reached 52 thousand copies: 21 thousand copies in Ukrainian, 15 thousand copies in Russian, 9 thousand copies in Hungarian of the newspaper “Zakarpatska Pravda” (“Truth of Zakarpattia”); 7 thousands copies of the newspaper “Zakarpattia Molod” (“Youth of Zakarpattia”). 12 different titles of newspapers with a total circulation of 21,800 copies were published in the districts of the region¹⁴⁴.

Based on the party’s directives, the Ternopil Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine in its resolution “On the distribution of central and republican newspapers and magazines among city and district committees of the Communist Party of Ukraine” from December 13, 1945, obliged to distribute circulation of newspapers so as not to less than 85% of them were sent to villages. This resolution stated that the local population in all districts of the region almost did not subscribe to Soviet periodicals¹⁴⁵.

According to the decisions of the XIII Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, regional newspapers were obliged to publish two publications per week of propaganda. During the year, the editors of regional newspapers published about one and a half hundred articles of propaganda, that is, official Communist slogans were “explained” to readers through each issue in a special section. All this was reduced to “stories about a new happy Soviet life”; “about the personal contribution of citizens to the early implementation of the new Stalin Five-Year Plan”; “comparisons of the present life under the sun of Stalin’s Constitution with the unbearable recent past”; “exposing the treacherous and anti-popular policies of Ukrainian-German nationalists, the church, the Central Intelligence Agency”, etc.¹⁴⁶.

¹⁴⁴ Там же. Спр. 614. Арк. 132.

¹⁴⁵ ДАТО. Ф. П-1. Оп. 1. Спр. 599. Арк. 90.

¹⁴⁶ ДАЧО. Ф. П-1. Оп. 2. Спр. 529. Арк. 115.

Newspapers systematically published advice and consultations on ideological issues to help propagandists and agitators. In the second half of the 1940s, the following agricultural newspapers were published in Ukraine: “Kolhospyk Ukrainy” (“The Collective Farmer of Ukraine”), “Tvarynnytstvo Ukrainy” (“Animal Husbandry of Ukraine”) (Ministry of Agriculture of the Ukrainian SSR), and “Radianskyi Selianyn” (“Soviet Peasant”) (a body of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine for the western regions). The newspaper “Kolhospyk Ukrainy” has been repeatedly criticized by the propaganda and agitation department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine for “its limited coverage of the production life of collective farms and the work of the primary party organizations of collective farms, the machine tractor station (MTS), which is the organizational basis for the rise of socialist agriculture, on the pages of the newspaper did not rise at all. The newspaper “Radianskyi Selianyn”, which was once specially created to serve individual peasant farms in the western regions of Ukraine, “played a positive role”. Due to the mass collectivization of the western Ukrainian region, the independent publishing house of the newspaper “Radianskyi Selianyn” was considered inexpedient by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. The newspaper “Tvarynnytstvo Ukrainy” “did not achieve its goal” due to its small circulation. Therefore, at the end of the summer of 1949, on the basis of the three mentioned newspapers, one newspaper “Kolhospane selo” (“Collective farm village”) (a body of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine) began to be published. The new newspaper covered issues of the production life of collective farms, MTS, the experience of primary party organizations, the leaders of agriculture. At the same time, its circulation was set at 300,000 copies, and the frequency was five times a week. In addition to agricultural newspapers, the republic published three relevant magazines: “Silske Hospodarstvo” (“Agriculture”), “Sad ta Horod” (“Garden and Patch”), “Sotsialistychne Tvarynnytstvo”, (“Socialist Animal Husbandry”). These magazines were reorganized into scientific and production journals, such as “Michurinets” (“Michurinian”) and “Mekhanizator Silskoho Hospodarstva” (“Agricultural mechanizer”)¹⁴⁷.

¹⁴⁷ ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1. Оп. 30. Спр. 1391. Арк. 1–3.

In turn, the soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and the members of The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) banned postmen from delivering newspapers to villages, thus trying to counter the massive dominance of Soviet literature in the western Ukrainian region¹⁴⁸. Nationalists and their supporters distributed insurgent leaflets, pamphlets, and newspapers among the population, repeatedly emphasizing that “in their writings, the bolsheviks are trying to distort, falsify the truth, and carry out false propaganda”¹⁴⁹. Leaders of the Ukrainian nationalist underground set the task of destroying the collective farm harvest, thwarting plans for consignment of grain and construction of collective farms¹⁵⁰. As we can see, the population of the western regions of Ukraine came under crossfire from the powerful party-Soviet propaganda and ideology of Ukrainian nationalism, which had a strong position.

The underground directives on ideological issues were based on the program tasks approved by the Third Extraordinary Great Assembly of the OUN, which took place on August 21-25, 1943. “The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists fights for the Ukrainian Independent United State and for the free life in their own independent state ... Against the intensified chauvinistic course of Bolshevik policy aimed at russification of the local population”¹⁵¹. In the field of agriculture, the OUN fights “for the destruction of Bolshevik collective farms, the provision of land to peasants without ransom, the right to free economic activity”¹⁵². The propaganda activities of the OUN and UPA hampered the political and educational work of party and Komsomol organizations among the Western Ukrainian population. Some party, Soviet, business, law enforcement, and local activists received threatening leaflets from nationalists and became more “moderate” or left the region¹⁵³. In response, state security forces brutally cracked down on all suspects.

¹⁴⁸ ЦДАГО України. Ф.1. Оп. 23. Спр. 929. Арк. 109.

¹⁴⁹ Літопис Української Повстанської Армії. Т. 8. Українська Головна Визвольна Рада. Документи, офіційні публікації, матеріали. 1944–1945 / За ред. П. Потічного, Є. Тендера. Львів: Літопис, 1992. Кн. 1. С. 164.

¹⁵⁰ Державний архів Рівненської області (далі – ДАРО). Ф. П-400. Оп. 3. Спр. 250. Арк. 23.

¹⁵¹ ОУН в світлі постанов Великих Зборів, Конференцій та інших документів з боротьби 1929–1955 рр. (Збірка документів). Видання Закордонних Частин Організації Українських Націоналістів, 1955. С. 107, 152.

¹⁵² Мірчук П. Українська Повстанська Армія. 1942–1952. Документи і матеріали. Львів: Атлас, 1991. С. 50.

¹⁵³ ДАТО. Ф. П-1. Оп. 1. Спр. 130. Арк. 164.

The head of the Chernivtsi regional department of the The People's Commissariat for State Security or NKGB, I. Reshetov, speaking on December 22, 1945 at a meeting of the regional committee of the party, with the knowledge of the assigned case thought: "Let me not be proofless. It is no secret that during this period the authorities killed bandits and eradicated the underground organisations, but instead new ones were created. Those that are now being exposed were formed one and a half to two months ago. This is a matter of purely ideological order. Our party organization of the region should not forget for a moment about the importance of the issue of ideological struggle against the nationalist underground"¹⁵⁴.

Due to the fierce conflict with the OUN and UPA, the directives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine aimed party-Soviet workers in the region "to strengthen ideological work in villages, create assets from the local population, organize party-Komsomol centers, self-defense groups, continuous improvement of the work of cultural and educational institutions"¹⁵⁵.

The documents of the Party repeatedly emphasized that the district committees of the Communist Party of Ukraine had unsatisfactorily organized political and ideological work with low-level Soviet activists, often limited to "pumping". The Soviet control showed that many agitators were fictitious in the lists¹⁵⁶, team leaders and their subordinates did not work as required by the instructions, agitators' seminars were rarely held, and there was a lack of systematic and planned work. In some villages, local intellectuals were not involved in ideological work¹⁵⁷.

The ideological work of the party-Soviet authorities in the countryside was concentrated around Ukrainian immigrants from Poland. It was "explained to them" that "they should be infinitely grateful to Soviet Ukraine for the warm welcome and thank them, in turn, for their immediate entry into the collective farms". Faced with the loss of property, changes in living conditions, and distrust of local residents, these people were often the first to apply to join collective farms¹⁵⁸.

¹⁵⁴ ДАЧО. Ф. П-1. Оп. 9. Спр. 19. Арк. 28.

¹⁵⁵ ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1. Оп. 23. Спр. 929. Арк. 109.

¹⁵⁶ ДАЛО. Ф. П-5032. Оп. 9. Спр. 82. Арк. 6.

¹⁵⁷ ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1. Оп. 75. Спр. 5. Арк. 14.

¹⁵⁸ Малярчук О. М. Тоталітаризм проти... С. 98.

Stalin's totalitarian system made considerable efforts to split the western Ukrainian village and made the local peasants fight against the national liberation movement. For this purpose, so-called fighter guards ("yastrubky" ("hawks"), "strybky" ("jumpers")) and groups to assist them from rural assets were created in the villages. The political report of the head of the Horodok branch of the OUN Sydor on fighter battalions states: "Extermination is a dangerous and cunning Bolshevik way to divide and demoralize Ukrainians"¹⁵⁹.

The intransigence of the positions resulted in a bloody confrontation in the western region of the republic for many years. During 1944 – 1945, 1273 organizational structures of the OUN and UPA were eradicated by fighter detachments and local assets (agents, secret informants, residents)¹⁶⁰. The age structure of the fighter units was dominated by young people, while the government relied on rural Komsomol members, whose number in the region in 1946 was only 2% of all young people¹⁶¹. At the end of 1946, the "jumpers" numbered about 50,000 locals¹⁶², including those exiled by nationalists.

"Fighter battalions" were usually formed of young people and people unfit for service in the regular army. In terms of ethnic composition, primarily in the Ternopil region, they were mostly Polish. The Poles regarded their somewhat new status as "Soviet policemen" as one that could be useful for the protection of the local Polish population, as well as for the revenge of the UPA. Although the Soviet government was well acquainted with the "anti-Soviet" sentiments of the Poles, it considered it convenient and necessary to use them as temporary allies in the war against a common enemy, the Ukrainian national liberation movement. Fighter detachments in the Ternopil region in early 1945 numbered more than four thousand people: Poles, Ukrainians and Russians, of whom Poles were 60%¹⁶³.

The bureaucracy and formalism inherent in Stalin's totalitarian system did not go unnoticed. Thus, there were 232 fighters in the lists of

¹⁵⁹ ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1. Оп. 75. Спр. 4. Арк. 23.

¹⁶⁰ Чередниченко В. Анатомія зради: Український буржуазний націоналізм – знаряддя антирадянської політики імперіалізму. К.: Політвидав України, 1978. С. 204.

¹⁶¹ Ярош Б. О. Тоталітарний режим... С. 69.

¹⁶² ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1. Оп. 75. Спр. 4. Арк. 23.

¹⁶³ Редліх Ш. Разом і нарізно в Бережанах / Перекл. з англ. К.: Дух і літера, 2002. С. 247.

Horodok district of Lviv region, and the inspection revealed “no more than 10”. In the village of Zavydovychi, the fighter group did not actually exist, and there were 22 fighters on the district list¹⁶⁴. By the decision of April 28, 1946, the Velyko-Hlubochiv district committee of Communist Party of Ukraine in the Ternopil region approved the position of deputy commander of the political unit in all fighter battalions, but none of them was in its unit and did not conduct any educational work among the fighters. A similar situation took place in Kozovsky, Probizhnyansky, Pidhayetsky and Mykulynetsky districts of this region¹⁶⁵.

Until the beginning of 1947, paramilitary detachments were located in the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) and then were transferred to the Ministry of State Security (MGB) under the leadership of district staff chiefs. In many cases, they showed low combat effectiveness, there were multiple cases of their “disarmament by bandits”¹⁶⁶. In May 1946, the Lviv Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, commonly referred to as the Lviv CPU obcom, carried out the personnel “purge” of paramilitary detachments from “suspicious and enemy elements”. Only in April 1946, 7 cases of disarmament were recorded in the region without any resistance from the paramilitary detachments fighters. Of the 306 detachments tested, 1,124 fighters were expelled. Due to the low combat effectiveness, the paramilitary detachments were reorganized into local defense groups of villages. These groups were tasked with maintaining public order in the villages, protecting socialist and collective farm property, and helping the MGB and MIA fight “bandits”¹⁶⁷. According to the Head of the District Department of the MIA of the Maherivsky district of the Lviv region V. Aksyonov, the work on creating local defense groups was unsatisfactory. Despite the fact that groups of 6 to 13 people were created in all collective farms, these groups were unstable. In total, they numbered around 125 people, but only 52 of them had weapons. They were received by the heads and secretaries of village councils, who “asked that no one knew about it”¹⁶⁸.

¹⁶⁴ ЦДАГО України. Ф.1. Оп. 75. Спр. 78. Арк. 4.

¹⁶⁵ Там само. Спр. 193. Арк. 66.

¹⁶⁶ Там само. Оп. 30. Спр. 927. Арк. 2–3.

¹⁶⁷ Там само. Арк. 9.

¹⁶⁸ ЦДАВО України. Ф. Р–27. Оп. 17. Спр. 6634. Арк. 73.

In propaganda work among young people, the Komsomol asset “combat reserve and party assistant” was widely used. In the party documents of that time, special emphasis was placed on the creation of Komsomol organizations in the villages of the western region of the Republic, which “had to grow based on local assets, strengthen their influence through rapprochement with the broad laboring masses in the western regions”¹⁶⁹. The main task of the Leninist Communist League of Youth of Ukraine was to “pull the youth out from under the influence of nationalist ideology”¹⁷⁰. At the beginning of 1947, in the western regions of Ukraine, 2,458 primary Komsomol organizations were created, which had 35,548 members, including 1,055 rural and collective farm organizations, which covered 8,930 peasants with their membership. Peasant youth accounted for 25% of the total number of Komsomol members in the region¹⁷¹.

In rural areas, despite the considerable efforts of Party and Soviet bodies, primary Komsomol cells grew slowly. At the beginning of the spring of 1949, 713 villages in the western region of the Republic did not yet have Komsomol organizations¹⁷². Central Party directives recommended systematically sending Komsomol members of cities and district centers to steady work in villages¹⁷³. The mobilization of city Komsomol members and the “expansion” of local reception contributed to a partial solution to this problem.

The Central Committee of the Komsomol systematically supplied the western Ukrainian region with Komsomol literature. To strengthen the ideological and political influence on the youth of the region, the circulation of Komsomol newspapers was increased. Thus, “Molod Ukrainy” (“The Youth of Ukraine”) was published with a circulation of 60 thousand, “Stalinskoye plemia” (“Stalin’s tribe”) – 60 thousand, “Yunyi Leninets” (“Young Leninist”) – 50 thousand copies. By the decision of the Central Committee of the Komsomol Secretariat of May 31, 1946, propaganda trains were sent to the Lviv and Kovel

¹⁶⁹ ЦДАГО України. Ф.1. Оп. 75. Спр. 4. Арк. 10.

¹⁷⁰ ДАТО. Ф. П-1. Оп. 1. Спр. 96. Арк. 23.

¹⁷¹ ЦДАГО України. Ф.1. Оп. 75. Спр. 62. Арк. 17.

¹⁷² Там само. Оп. 30. Спр. 1329. Арк. 24.

¹⁷³ Бількевич А. М. З історії відновлення комсомольських організацій в західних областях України у 1944 – 1946 рр. *Український історичний журнал*. 1974. № 5. С. 94–98.

Railways, which covered 20 railway junctions in the region¹⁷⁴. Various forms of work had to ensure the daily propaganda of the party among rural youth, i.e. Komsomol meetings, youth meetings, conversations, lectures, etc. This goal was also subordinated to physical mass cultural work and artistic amateur in rural areas¹⁷⁵.

In order to “rally revolutionary forces around themselves” and “launch a struggle against class enemies”, during the spring sowing of 1946, 252 propaganda and cultural education teams were specially created in the region. The Soviet government did everything possible to erase from the consciousness of the western Ukrainian peasant Christian morality, love for his or her people, and the traditional principles of farming on the land. Eliminating the versatility of national life and forced reorientation to atheistic, collectivist education were carried out by methods of psychological influence. Thus, in the Stanislavska region 47 propaganda and cultural education teams of 815 people worked in July of the same year. During the month, they visited 191 villages of the region, where they gave 273 concerts, which were attended by 32,465 people. In addition, the teams helped to produce 105 wall newspapers, 264 “voles” and wrote 317 notes and posters. At the same time, 121 mobile libraries were sent to the villages of the region, 226 lectures were delivered, which were attended by 13,570 people, and 357 political clubs worked at rural clubs. In the Lviv region, 18 propaganda and cultural education teams “agitated” 110 thousand villagers. They made 72 trips to villages and 56 to the field at their place of work. Special attention was paid to “politically backward villages”¹⁷⁶. During the period from April to June 1946, 672 reports were organized in cities and regional centers and 1998 lectures in villages of the Ternopil region which were attended by 110,630 people, etc.¹⁷⁷. The above Soviet statistics raise considerable doubts, but it should be stated that the authorities have taken up the “ideological education” of rural workers on a grand scale.

The cultural, historical, and economic experience of the peasant, formed on the basis of individuality, contradicted hyperbolized collective forms and methods of influencing the individual. As in the entire territory of the USSR, in the region we are studying, a collective and

¹⁷⁴ Ярош Б. О. Тоталітарний режим... С. 133.

¹⁷⁵ ДАТО. Ф. П-1. Оп. 1. Спр. 123. Арк. 18.

¹⁷⁶ ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1. Оп. 75. Спр. 111. Арк. 58–59.

¹⁷⁷ Там само. Спр. 7. Арк. 47–49.

state farm model of management was imposed on the peasants. Personnel sent by the authorities and individual local activists became propagandists of the party's policy in rural areas and employees of the propaganda machine. In all western regions of the Ukrainian SSR during the second half of October 1946, cluster and district seminars of agitators were held, which, according to official data, numbered 40 thousand people. The topics of the seminars were approved by the Central Committee of the Komsomol, i.e. "Lenin and Stalin are Organisers and Leaders of the National Bolshevik Party", "The Great October Socialist Revolution under the Soviet Union", "Lenin and Stalin and their Role in the History of the Ukrainian People", "A New Five-Year-Plan for the Restoration and Development of the National Economy", "On the Tasks of Socialist Building in the Western Regions of Ukraine in the New Five-Year-Plan", "Party Policy in the National Question", "International Review"¹⁷⁸.

In order to educate obedient, submissive-to-the-system citizens, teachers of the region were forcibly involved in conducting conversations among peasants on topics prepared in advance by District Party Offices¹⁷⁹. Under the leadership of District Party Committees, teachers' groups were specially organized in rural schools of the region to study Stalin's books "On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union" and "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union – Bolshevik (Short Course)". This method was specially prepared by "the forces of the Soviet intellectuals" to carry out ideological work among the local population. For Communists with a low general education level, who could not work self-dependent on the "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union – Bolshevik (Short Course)", party schools were organized by party offices. Night party schools once or twice a month held seminars of Secretaries of primary party organizations, where the primary issue was "socialist restructuring in rural areas"¹⁸⁰.

The list of topics of lectures of party offices necessarily included "Churchill Rattles Weapons and an Interview with Comrade Stalin", "The Electoral System in the USSR and in Capitalist Countries", "The reunification of the Ukrainian People is a Law of History", "Ukrainian

¹⁷⁸ Там само. Оп. 30. Спр. 375. Арк. 10.

¹⁷⁹ ЦДАВО України. Ф. 166. Оп. 15. Спр. 109. Арк. 8.

¹⁸⁰ ДАЧО. Ф. П-1. Оп. 2. Спр. 448. Арк. 16, 31, 35.

and German nationalists are the worst enemies of the Ukrainian People”, “The law on the Plan IV of Stalin’s Five-Year-Plan”, etc.¹⁸¹.

At the request of the authorities, “all” of the teachers participated in propaganda work with the population. In the annual report of the Stanislav Regional Department of Public Education for 1945/46 academic year, it was noted that “all of the teachers were in the groups where they studied the books of Comrade J. Stalin. During the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, teachers introduced the peasants to Stalin’s Constitution and the regulations on elections”¹⁸². Chernivtsi Regional Department of Public Education for the specified period reported that “teachers and all of the employees of public education of the region fittingly combine everyday educational work at school with political mass work, they conduct a large-scale propaganda and mass work among the population of the village”. Propagandistic teachers delivered 3,000 lectures, where they “explained to the peasants the most advanced, consistent, and democratic Stalinist Constitution” and the Communist party’s program on socialist construction in rural areas¹⁸³.

The teachers of the region were assigned the task of “constantly criticizing the hostile bourgeois-nationalist distortions of M. Hrushevskyy’s “school” of the history of the Ukrainian people” and systematically using various methods to “prove the advantages of the collective farm system over individual farms” to the younger generation”¹⁸⁴.

Formations of the Carpathian Military District were actively involved in the ideological support of the party’s policy in rural areas. The Head of the Political Department of the District Administration, Major General L. Brezhnev, stressed that “the work was especially active among the local population during the election campaigns”. The strategic aspect of the party, along which the ideological potential was constantly increasing, was strengthened by the “army” of 18 thousand military agitators. They held 31 thousand lectures, reports, and conversations on various issues, including “on socialist restructuring in rural areas”, that were attended by 391 thousand people¹⁸⁵.

¹⁸¹ ЦДАВО України. Ф. 166. Оп. 15. Спр. 194. Арк. 59.

¹⁸² ЦДАВО України. Ф.166. Оп. 15. Спр. 194. Арк. 56.

¹⁸³ Там само. Спр. 196. Арк. 1-а, 2.

¹⁸⁴ Там само. Спр. 459. Арк. 27, 62.

¹⁸⁵ ДАГО України. Ф. 1. Оп. 30. Спр. 347. Арк. 13, 15.

Ideological work in rural areas did not stop even in the hungry winter of 1946 – 1947, when about a million citizens of Ukraine died, left by the state to the mercy of fate. In the western regions of Ukraine, people arrived from different regions of the USSR, gripped by another famine. They were the best agitators against the collective farm system and socialist restructuring in the rural areas.

In 1946 and 1947, Ukraine held elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union and the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, which showed the “monolithic unity of the party and the people”. Noisy ideological campaigns related to pre-election propaganda contributed to the establishment of party politics in the rural area. The secret documents of the Statistical Office of the Ukrainian SSR did not cause anything but surprise about the scale of falsification. In Document No. 07/225 of April 7, 1947, this department gave instructions to find out “why did the data on the number of voters in rural areas not coincide with the data on the registration of the rural population aged 18 years and older?” Thus, in the Rivne region, the difference between the number of voters in rural areas exceeded the total rural population by 46,622 people. On April 17, 1947, the Authorized Representative of the USSR Council of Ministers Commission for Advanced Planning in the Rivne region stated “It was not possible to obtain complete data on the reasons for the discrepancy from all districts. A large number of the population from the eastern regions of the Ukrainian SSR, stationed in villages during the elections, as well as military garrisons, took part in the voting”. The Authorized Representative of the center counted 11,998 such voters, and in relation to 34,607 people, he suggested that, “apparently, they voted without certificates”. The situation was also typical in other regions of the Ukrainian SSR¹⁸⁶.

In many villages controlled by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, it was impossible to deliver ballot boxes and ballots, the Authorized Representatives themselves filled them out and reported on the successful completion of the election campaign. In party documents of that time, it is fixed that “in a number of villages of the Ivano-Frankivsk District of the Lviv region, only men took part in the voting, and in the village of Bila Hora only 3 people voted at all. In the villages of the Busk District, 33 out of 759 voters voted at the Umensk polling station, 48 out of 513 in the Chamensk polling station, 43 out of 526 in Sokolyansk

¹⁸⁶ ЦДАВО України. Ф. Р-582. Оп. 11. Спр. 130. Арк. 73, 132.

polling station, etc. The situation was similar in other districts of the region”¹⁸⁷. At the same time, official propaganda widely used data that 99.86% of voters took part in voting in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, in particular, in the western regions – 99.66%. The party elite appointed their proteges as candidates for deputies – one for one place. “For” voted in Chernivtsi region – 99.99%, Zakarpattia region – 99.99%, Rivne region – 99.80%, Ternopil region – 99.71%, Volyn region – 99.58%, Drohobych region – 99.56%, Lviv region – 99.30%, Stanislav region – 99.01%¹⁸⁸.

During the election campaigns, the actions of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) underground and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) rebels intensified. At the same time, the repressive measures of the OUN territory grid and UPA segments affected not residents of the region as a whole, but individuals who sided with the “Soviets”. Simultaneously the party-Soviet punitive bodies were fighting against the entire western Ukrainian population. Meanwhile, they preferred to deal not so much with the real Banderites as with “gang accomplices” (who could be declared anyone) and report to the capital about their fruitful work. It is also necessary to take into account the fact that a week before the elections, NKVD troops were additionally sent to the settlements of the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR. In memos, information, and reports, the meagre number of weapons seized among thousands of tortured nationalists immediately catches your eye, especially when you consider that the real rebels were armed with several units. So who was killed and for what? According to the norms of international law – physical influence on voters.

Through intimidation, repression, and falsifications, obedient lackeys of the totalitarian regime were brought to the new authorities. In addition to those sent from other regions of the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR, semi-literate or completely illiterate people who were overwhelmed by poverty were involved in the grassroots management level. The local intellectuals were under political distrust and were mostly repressed. For devotion to the authorities, they were given senior positions, placed in the homes of deportees, distributed looted property, presented state awards, etc. In return, it was necessary to

¹⁸⁷ ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1. Оп. 30. Спр. 353. Арк. 12.

¹⁸⁸ Там само. Оп. 75. Спр. 62. Арк. 97, 99.

work out trust: glorify the Communist Party and the Soviet government, search for the Banderites and snitch on neighbours, collect taxes and state loans, organize primary party and Komsomol organizations, join initiative groups and collective farms.

Party organizations and Soviet authorities attached great importance to work among women in the western Ukrainian region. The government structures took into account the traditionally high role of the “weaker half” in the public life of the region and the upbringing of the younger generation. New “Socialist transformations” in industry, agriculture, and culture required the formation of an active political consciousness among citizens on a “class basis”. In regional and district party committees, enterprises and various institutions, appropriate structures were created that purposefully influenced women. The political and educational work of the Soviet government was gaining more and more organized and purposeful every month. As of October 1, 1946, 810 women’s councils were organized in the Rivne region, 8,747 delegates were elected, and 2,162 sections were created at delegate meetings, including 711 land sections covering 2,210 people. From July 1st to July 2nd of the same year, a regional meeting of activists was held on the issue “Tasks of women of the Rivne region in the implementation of the fourth Stalin five-year plan”, where delegates from all districts were present. After it, a general meeting was held in the villages, where the “appeal of the meeting participants to all women of the Rivne region” was discussed¹⁸⁹. In 1946, 1,083 delegate meetings were held in the Lviv region, which attracted 14,043 participants. Events also developed according to the tested scenario in Drohobych, Volyn, Chernivtsi and other western regions of the Ukrainian SSR¹⁹⁰.

The main task of party organizations and Soviet authorities remained to overcome the resistance of “class-hostile elements”. In the face of a fierce struggle that has engulfed mostly rural areas, attracting “women activists” to their side has become an effective means. In the Stanislavsky region alone, 615 women (such persons were popularly called “sexots” (snitch/informer) were directly connected with the NKVD and participated in exposing the nationalist underground. On December 5, 1945, in the village of Novosilka, Tlumach district,

¹⁸⁹ ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1. Оп. 30. Спр. 375. Арк. 25.

¹⁹⁰ Там само. Оп. 75. Спр. 67. Арк. 21, 55.

M. M. (for obvious reasons, the author does not provide full surnames) indicated to the NKVD the place of storage (“cache”); P. H. from the village of Spas, Rozhniativskiy district, issued a “shelter” of 12 Sich Riflemen; T. F. from the village of Chukalivka, Lysetskiy district, helped to find a rebel hospital, etc.¹⁹¹. Cooperation with the regime was carried out through women’s councils, which were deliberately introduced in the collective farms of the region¹⁹².

The memos of the western Ukrainian regional party committees on the implementation of the resolution of the Central Committee of the CP(Б)У and the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR “On improving political and economic work in the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR” dated June 20, 1947, contain significant material about the ideological work carried out by state and party structures. Thus, in the western regions of Ukraine in the third quarter, lecturers of the system of cultural education institutions gave 26,653 lectures on agricultural, political and popular science topics, which covered 2382,407 students. In addition, 38 lecturers of the Central lecture bureau were sent to the region, who gave 578 lectures. In the clubs and cultural centers of the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR, 6267 amateur art circles worked, in which 87 thousand people took part¹⁹³. Numerous lectures and repertoire of censored amateur groups partially contributed to ensuring the appropriate mood among certain segments of the population and their entry into the first agricultural co-operative craft society.

In the third quarter of 1947, the committee for art affairs specially organized tours of theaters, groups of artists and ensembles to regional centers and villages of the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR. The repertoire of these groups included “the best works of social realism designed to mobilize rural workers to ensure agrarian transformation in the region”. Local regional drama theaters, which went to villages and collective farms of the region with the latest repertoire, were obliged to provide assistance in planting the party and government line in rural areas¹⁹⁴.

Houses-reading rooms, people’s houses, built on voluntary donations from people with the active work of “Prosvita”, “Native school”

¹⁹¹ Там само. Спр. 83. Арк. 110–111.

¹⁹² ДАТО. Ф. П-1692. Оп. 3. Спр. 8. Арк. 12.

¹⁹³ ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1. Оп. 75. Спр. 5. Арк. 117.

¹⁹⁴ Там само. Арк. 119.

(Ridna Shkola), numerous parties and societies, were taken away by the Soviet government. Where patriotic speeches were previously made and the Ukrainian national idea was popularized, evenings were held in honor of cultural and public figures, now blasphemous calls for Communist propaganda were heard. Various events were organized in libraries, museums, clubs, houses and palaces of culture aimed at educating and 're-educating' the local population in the spirit of Soviet socio-political values.

An important place in the political and ideological education of the population of the region was given to radio propaganda. As noted by the newspaper "Socialist agriculture" for December 2, 1948 (body of the Ministry of Agriculture of the USSR), "mass radio communication of collective farms and MTS (machine-and-tractor station) is a necessary condition for the further growth of the culture of the Soviet peasant, a powerful weapon in the struggle for high yields"¹⁹⁵.

Propaganda terror, deceptive promises of a rich and happy life did not convince the peasants of the region to give up their property and transfer it to collective farms. Only rough administration, threats, beatings, arrests forced them to join collective farms. The secret decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR 'On the eviction from the Ukrainian SSR of persons who maliciously evade work in agriculture and lead an antisocial, parasitic lifestyle' of February 21, 1948 provided for the convocation of a general meeting of collective farmers, at which 'public sentences' were adopted to a pre-determined circle of persons. The initiator of this decision was the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine N. Khrushchev. Victims of the arbitrariness of the authorities were often the sick, widows with children, and the elderly. Collective farmers who received a 'warning', in most cases gave written obligations to produce the 'minimum' established by the management. Direct violence of the repressive-punitive system, deportations to remote places of the USSR were the main methods of persuading 'the advantages of collective management' and increasing labor productivity. N. Khrushchev's initiative in Moscow seemed promising not only for Ukraine, but also for all the "free republics". Based on the report of N. Khrushchev, a draft decree of the Presidium of the

¹⁹⁵ Массовая радиофикация колхозов // Социалистическое земледелие. 1948. 2 декабря.

Supreme Soviet of the USSR was prepared, which was developed by H. Malenkov, A. Zhdanov, L. Beria, M. Suslov, as well as the ministers of Internal Affairs – S. Kruglov, State Security – V. Abakumov. After reviewing this draft, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) issued a resolution: “not for the press. J. Stalin”¹⁹⁶.

Party and Soviet organizations, daily promoting the necessity and profitability of the transition to collective economy for the peasantry, involved the workers of the region in this matter. The patronage of industrial workers over peasants should have veiled the deepening of contradictions between the city and the countryside. The rapid growth of the working class of the region was mainly due to the local rural population. If in 1945 the number of workers in industry was 96 thousand, then in 1948 – 214 thousand. During the fourth five-year plan, about 20 thousand workers arrived on a permanent basis in the western regions of Ukraine from major industrial centers of the USSR¹⁹⁷. Thus, “yesterday’s peasants” and cadres sent from other regions of the Union, sent to villages and newly created collective farms, were supposed to carry out ideological work among the masses, help fight the kulaks, “gangs of bourgeois nationalists” and help overcome the remnants of “small-ownership psychology”. The accelerated industrialization of the western regions of Ukraine was aimed not only at creating a new industrial center, but also at changing the traditional structure of the region’s population. The social base of power, along with various categories of Soviet employees, was to be the working class.

Trade union organizations of workers and employees contributed to the introduction of an anti-people collective farm system in the western Ukrainian Village. If on January 1, 1946, the percentage of coverage of trade union membership, except for collective farmers who did not have their own trade unions, was 65.4%, then a year later – 72.5%¹⁹⁸.

At the beginning of 1948, regional party conferences of the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR were held, which decided to start mass collectivization of agriculture in the region. At meetings, bureau

¹⁹⁶ Пихоя Р. Г. Советский Союз: история власти. 1945–1991. Издание второе, исправ. и дополн. Новосибирск: Сибирский хронограф, 2001. С. 17.

¹⁹⁷ Нагорна Л. П., Варгатюк П. Л., Василенко В. К. Сила інтернаціоналістського гарту. К.: Політвидав України, 1983. С. 214.

¹⁹⁸ ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1. Оп. 75. Спр. 62. Арк. 14.

meetings, and party assets, collective farm construction issues were a priority. Thus, the II regional party conference of the Volyn region, held in February–March 1948, decided: “in 1948, basically complete the collectivization of Agriculture in the region, ensure the rapid organizational, economic and political strengthening of all collective farms – rapid growth of public wealth of collective farms, as the basis of well-being and cultural life of all collective farmers”¹⁹⁹.

Party organizations directed all their ideological work to establish a socialist type of production in the agriculture of the western Ukrainian Village. At the same time, special attention was paid to attracting communists to study in District Party Schools and Political Schools, where they had to learn the necessary theoretical knowledge. Recruitment of students and training in such institutions took place superficially. There were no unified programs in the party education system, and many communists were formally covered by training and covered themselves up with independent work, especially for grassroots managers²⁰⁰.

The December (1948) plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party(B)U set the task for party organizations of the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR to improve the political education of all senior cadres in order to quickly “socialist perestroika” of agriculture, using the historical experience of the CPSU(B) in their work²⁰¹. The way out of critical agrarian problems was seen in the “ideological hardening” of cadres, particularly in the “conscientious study of the biography of leaders”.

Training and retraining of economic personnel covered a network of evening universities of Marxism-Leninism, district, regional and Republican Party schools and courses. Senior cadres had to raise their ideological and theoretical level independently by studying the works of Karl Marx, F. Engels, V. Lenin, and J. Stalin. In the party organizations of advanced collective farms, district party committees organized courses, meetings, and seminars. Under the primary party organizations, there were political schools of the first and second years of study, circles for studying the biography of the founders of the Marx-

¹⁹⁹ ДАВО. Ф. П-1. Оп. 1. Спр. 120. Арк. 11.

²⁰⁰ ДАЧО. Ф. П-1. Оп. 2. Спр. 727. Арк. 35.

²⁰¹ Комуністична партія України в резолюціях і рішеннях з'їздів, конференцій і пленумів ЦК. У 2 т. Т. 2: 1941 – 1976. К.: Політвидав України, 1977. С. 238.

ist-Leninist-Stalinist theory²⁰². Only in the districts and villages of the Stanislavsky region, 350 political schools had to complete their studies by May 1, 1949. In addition, there were 425 circles for studying the biography of V. Lenin and J. Stalin. Party schools and circles on the history of the party had to continue their work, since their program was designed for 15 months. The break was made for June–August due to harvesting²⁰³.

An important way of ideological work was lecture propaganda. It was considered that the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge (SDUK), staffed by researchers, university professors, and vocational school teachers, would accelerate scientific and technological progress in agriculture. Millions of rubles and thousands of hours were spent on lectures at this event. The organizers were convinced that a number of problems could be solved by appealing to science and the peasant movement activity²⁰⁴.

Complete collectivization undermined the productive forces of the village, accompanied by the expropriation of the most economically strong stratum of the peasantry – “strong hosts who owned morgues of land (parcels of land) and horses”²⁰⁵. Official propaganda described wealthy peasants as “fierce enemies of the Soviet government” and “cruel exploiters”. Most commonly, the basis of their relative well-being was the domesticity and work of all family members. Only a small proportion of the wealthy peasantry used the farm laborers’ work. On March 31, 1949, speaking in Lviv at an interregional meeting of party workers in the western regions of the USSR, N. Khrushchev emphasized that “some of the leading comrades in the western regions asked - how to deal with the kulak? And in some of them, one can even hear the echo that allows him to join the collective farm. Comrade J. Stalin once called such a question ridiculous, pointing out: “Nobody can let a kulak join a collective farm. It is impossible because he is a sworn enemy of the collective farm movement”. The meeting focused on various methods of involving the intellectual class, the leaders of agriculture, in ensuring the party’s agricultural policy in the countryside. The main focus was on “party organizations, Komsomol,

²⁰² ДАВО. Ф. П-1. Оп. 2. Спр. 215. Арк. 103–104.

²⁰³ ДАІФО. Ф. П-1. Оп. 1. Спр. 972. Арк. 82, 87.

²⁰⁴ ДАЧО. Ф. П-1. Оп. 2. Спр. 1456. Арк. 43.

²⁰⁵ Від учасників міжобласної наради партійних працівників західних областей Української РСР // Радянський селянин. 1949. 15 квітня.

work with propagandists”. At the same time, N. Khrushchev touched upon the issue of sending communists from cities to villages to help organize collective farms and stressed that “work in a collective farm is not a place of exile now”²⁰⁶.

The local workers’ councils were of special importance in the enforcement of the socialist mode of production and the struggle against “class enemies”. Issues of the socialist reorganization of country life were constantly discussed by village, district, and regional councils. Under the conditions of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists network’s fierce struggle, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army’s tactical divisions with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of State Security, fighter detachments, and local defense groups of the village, local activists were of considerable interest to both sides. There were many cases when people who were connected with the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army’s worked in village councils. For example, just in the Volyn region, the head of the village council of Kniazhe village of Gorokhiv district A. Kornei, subscribing to a loan of the fourth five-year-plan for reconstruction and development of the USSR economy, simultaneously subscribed to a loan from the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and personally contributed 5,000 rubles. In the village of Sukhodil, Volodymyr-Volynskii district, the head of the village council M. Maziichuk, being at the same time a deacon, turned out to be an active member of the OUN underground. In Markostav village, the head of the village council, V. Riabyi, was at the same time in the position of OUN commandant²⁰⁷. In Yamnytsia village, Tysmenytsia district, Stanislav region, chekists arrested the secretary of the village council, M. Dolchuk, on suspicion of links to the underground, because all loyalists of the village councils of nearby villages were killed. M. Dolchuk himself later recalled: “We were connected with the partisans (UPA. - Ed.), because there was a dual power: our power ruled at night and the Bolsheviks were during the day”²⁰⁸. Thus, the armed confrontation in the region gave rise to a kind of dualism of local government, which allowed in some way to mitigate the policy of the totalitarian regime.

²⁰⁶ ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1. Оп. 30. Спр. 1818. Арк. 1, 17–18.

²⁰⁷ Там само. Оп. 75. Спр. 5. Арк. 12–13.

²⁰⁸ Дейчаківський І. Ямниця. Історія села. Долі людей. Львів: Червона калина, 1994. С. 163.

An important role in the ideological support of agricultural policy in the countryside was given to excursions of collective farmers and individual peasants to the collective farms of the eastern regions of Ukraine, the republics of the USSR, and “fraternal peoples”. The Central Committee of the CP(B)U systematically organized such excursions to the advanced collective and state farms of Kyiv, Kharkiv, Stalin, Voroshylovgrad, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and other regions, research and development center, and stations, and agricultural machinery plants of the republic²⁰⁹.

Under conditions of fierce ideological struggle, which covered all aspects of social and political life in the region, political departments were introduced in the machine tractor station (MTS). They were entrusted with the functions of educating collective farmers in the spirit of loyalty to the collective farm system, high labor discipline, organizing socialist emulation for growing high yields of agricultural crops, managing collective farm assets, improving the work of party collective farm organizations. The heads of political departments tried to extend their powers not only to the collective farms served by MTS but also to the whole life of the village. This was exclusively within the competence of the district committees of the CP(B)U, so such encroachments of the heads of political departments were stopped²¹⁰.

An analysis of the orders of the political sector of the Ministry of Agriculture of the Ukrainian SSR²¹¹ and documents of the political sectors of the regional departments of agriculture²¹² shows that the party apparatus tried to control all aspects of public life in the countryside. This was done through strict regulation of the daily life of collective farmers and the mobilization of all human and material resources. However, in most cases the work of political bodies was formal. Thus, the political departments of Tysmenytsia, Kutsik, Stanislav MTS of the Stanislav region were systematically criticized for poor organization of political mass work. There were many cases when the heads of political departments themselves did not even read the resolution of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U “On measures to improve the work of MTS political departments in the western

²⁰⁹ ЦДАВО України. Ф. Р-27. Оп. 17. Спр. 6665. Арк. 112.

²¹⁰ ДАЧО. Ф. П-778. Оп. 1. Спр. 2. Арк. 2.

²¹¹ Там само. Оп. 2. Спр. 1. Арк. 4.

²¹² ДАЗО. Ф. П-179. Оп. 1. Спр. 1817. Арк. 120–122.

regions of Ukraine” on June 27, 1951, and other documents of the party and government²¹³.

“Sundays”, “subbotniks” and “monthly” were important sources of additional resources. The unpaid work of MTS employees and collective farmers was to build an economic system without commodity-market relations. The experience of Stalin’s collectivization and industrialisation convincingly proved that the worker’s detachment from the means of production made the Soviet economic system inefficient.

It is clear that the employees of the MTS political departments were repeatedly “neutralized saboteurs”, “class-alien elements”, “enemies who made their way into leadership positions”. Thus, the foreman of the tractor station P. Polishchuk, average drivers, S. Basarabovych and D. Mandryk in Kolodiivska MTS of Chernivtsi region, and many others were “exposed”²¹⁴. A number of high-profile show trials of “saboteurs” took place on collective farms in the western Ukrainian region²¹⁵.

It should be noted that to provide hands-on assistance in the party’s work, Soviet and economic bodies in the political and organizational, and economic strengthening of Western Ukrainian collective farms were sent under the control of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U groups of officials from other regions of Ukraine. Thus, in the spring of 1950, a group of 345 people arrived in the Stanislavsk region, including 145 people from the Kharkiv region, 124 people from the Sumy region, and 76 people from the Mykolaiv region. The incomer experts studied the situation on the ground and made a number of important conclusions: first, the district party organizations had no ties to the local population, did not create an asset of the poor and middle-class masses for active support during continuous collectivization. They did not sufficiently expose nationalist agitation, and in setting up farms they allowed administration and violated the principle of voluntariness. Secondly, the state security bodies did insufficient work to eliminate the kulaks and the “remnants of lawless elements”, failed to protect the emerging local assets from terror, and collective farms – from sabotage. Collective farm defense groups remained unsatisfactory

²¹³ ДАІФО. Ф. П-1. Оп. 1. Спр. 1323. Арк. 20.

²¹⁴ ДАЧО. Ф. П-778. Оп. 1. Спр. 1. Арк. 2.

²¹⁵ ДАРО. Ф. П-2193. Оп. 1. Спр. 28. Арк. 47, 70.

and distrusted. Third, the level of management of collective farms in the districts was very low, as part of the party assets “lost taste for mass education and political work, worked poorly to improve their ideological and theoretical level”²¹⁶.

Trials over the Banderas played a significant role in the process of forming political consciousness on a “class basis”. The republican and local press, radio and television, documentaries informed about these processes in detail in the right direction. Authorities forced residents to take part in show trials of “members of OUN and UIA formations”²¹⁷. The media, covering these events, repeated the established ideological clichés: “... now the peasant is not the one who was in the first days after the expulsion of the Nazis from Soviet area. Now he understands that the collective farm way is the only right way to a prosperous and cultural life”²¹⁸. In this regard, the official propaganda made a picture of the general well-being in the collectivized western Ukrainian village, the unprecedented growth of productive forces, the steady rise of the material and cultural level of the collective farm peasantry.

In the system of intensification of labor in collective farms, a special place was given to the deployment of the so-called socialist emulation among brigades, units, and individual collective farmers²¹⁹. To raise the agriculture of the region, the regional and district committees of the party held plenums and adopted various ideological resolutions. “Mobilization” of communists, invitations to these plenums of heads of collective farms, foremen, experts, activists of the district were called “based on socialist emulation to solve the main issues in the field of agriculture”²²⁰. Such tested through practice means of ideological influence was to form a “new man”, a “hero of labor”. The guidelines of the center aimed at party organizations to expand the competition not only between individual collective farms but also districts, regions, republics, to further promote “international education of workers”.

“Socialist emulation”, said Stalin, “is the main method of communist construction”²²¹. To intensify parToin the social emulation,

²¹⁶ ДАІФО. Ф. П-1. Оп. 1. Спр. 1155. Арк. 87.

²¹⁷ ЦДАГО України. Ф.1. Оп. 30. Спр. 1798. Арк. 6.

²¹⁸ Там само. Спр. 614. Арк. 5.

²¹⁹ ДАЛЮ. Ф. П-66. Оп. 2. Спр. 58. Арк. 65.

²²⁰ Там само. Ф. П-3. Оп. 4. Спр. 234. Арк. 19.

²²¹ ДАТО. Ф. П-1. Оп. 1. Спр. 1965. Арк. 2.

the authorities also used moral incentives-awarding leaders with orders and medals of the USSR, diplomas, and letters of thanks, transitional red flags and pennants, etc. “The top leaders of the collective farm were mostly conscientious, often very skilled workers, masters of their craft. The Soviet system, however, did not use only their highly productive labor, but also the example of the “top leaders” who sought to ensure a higher degree of exploitation of all peasants²²². At this time, for successes in the development of agriculture in the western regions of the USSR, several collective farmers were awarded the honorary title of Hero of Socialist Labor – F. Bezuglii, U. Bashtyk, A. Ladan, A. Zvarych, M. Mykytei, O. Horbut, I. Babych²²³.

With the completion of the continuous collectivization of the region, the influence of the primary party and Komsomol organizations on the lives of the peasants intensified. The creation of a network of party and Komsomol groups in the structural subdivisions of the collective farms — brigades, units, and farms — was actively promoted. New ideological relations completely controlled the working life of the collective farmer. In the early ‘50s, the twentieth century the socialist system of production in the region’s agriculture was largely planted. As noted in the resolution of the XVII Congress of the CP(B)U: “... the working peasantry of these areas hard and firmly embarked on the path of collective farm life. Based on continuous collectivization, the kulaks were eliminated, and a devastating blow was dealt with the shortcomings of the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists, the fiercest enemies of the Ukrainian Soviet people”²²⁴. However, the situation in the payment of hard labor of collective farmers has not improved much over the next five-years – as evidenced by “analytical notes” of the Central Statistical Office. At the same time, the expenses of the collective farmer mainly went to: food – 46.1%, industrial goods – 23.6%, payment for mandatory state supplies of meat, taxes and loan bonds – 14.3%, purchase of livestock and

²²² Когут П. В. Запровадження колгоспної системи в західних областях України (1944 – 1953 рр.). Автореф. дис... канд. іст. наук. Львів: Національний університет ім. І. Франка, 2000. С. 19.

²²³ За успіхи в розвитку сільського господарства // Колгоспне село. 1950. 9 липня

²²⁴ XVII съезд Коммунистической партии (большевиков) Украины, 23-27 сентября 1952 г. Материалы съезда. К.: Госполитиздат УССР, 1953. С. 187.

poultry – 5.9%, personal needs – 2.8%, including cultural – visiting theaters and cinema – as much as 0.4%²²⁵.

Therefore, it is quite natural that the indicator of the availability of books, newspapers, magazines in collective farm families, as well as the use of public libraries, was the lowest. The difficult financial situation did not allow the collective farmers to take full advantage of the opportunities that education and culture could give them, in particular, to educate children in seven-year or secondary schools, which remained paid. In some areas, the lack of clothing and footwear meant that the children of peasants did not attend school for a long time during the winter. In some districts, pupils did not go to school well in the spring, because their parents involved them in fieldwork. Thus, in the Pluhiv school of the Zolochiv district of the Lviv region, the share of attendance was 37.8%, in the Voroniakiv school – 65%²²⁶. To get from remote or mountainous villages to the regional centers, where education was concentrated, due to the lack of transport, the students did not have the opportunity. The youth sought to leave the village, becoming a cheap labor force in numerous new buildings, logging, attending vocational schools and factory schools.

On December 23-26, 1952, a plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party took place, during which the issue “On the progress of studying the decisions of the XIX Congress of the CPSU, the brilliant work of Comrade Stalin” Economic problems of socialism in the USSR” and measures to improve the ideological work of party organizations”. The theoretical positions on the ways of building communism, formulated by J. Stalin, were immediately announced by the leadership of the program of great social transformation. According to the established tradition in the country, the western Ukrainian regional committees of the party informed the Central Committee about the progress of the tasks set by the party and the government. Thus, only in December 1952, the Rivne Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine held monthly courses for secretaries of primary party organizations, a ten-day seminar for secretaries of district party committees, and a five-day seminar for heads of propaganda and agitation departments and propagandists devoted to the study of J. Stalin’s book “Economical problems of socialism in the

²²⁵ ЦДАВО України. Ф. Р-582. Оп. 24. Спр. 87. Арк. 38.

²²⁶ Там само. Ф. 166. Оп. 15. Спр. 109. Арк. 3.

USSR”²²⁷. Ideological factors, despite the scale and financial costs, did not stimulate the peasantry to labour activity. The real state of life in the village collectivized by the Stalinist regime remained a powerful means of “persuasion”.

Thus, in view of the active political and ideological terror of the party, state and law enforcement agencies in terms of the collectivization of agriculture in the Western region, the results of this activity were tragic. Until the mid-1950s, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army resisted the violent actions of the Stalinist dictatorship. “The Bolshevik oppressors”, stated one of the documents of the underground, “sentence the collective farmers to years of imprisonment for a few ears of corn, which they dare to pluck in order to escape starvation, the Bolshevik exploiters completely rob the collective farmers from the products of their labor, paying them grams of bread for their workday, they pushed the Ukrainian collective-farm peasantry to the bottom of poverty and suffering”²²⁸. The chairman of the revolutionary Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists Ya. Stetsko, describing the communist ideology of the early 1950s, wrote: “... the immanent content of this ideology is the economic, spiritual and moral collective farm”²²⁹.

The population of the Western Ukrainian region was captured by the communist ideology, which, along with the use of force by state structures, ensured the ruin of the village. In the mountainous and Polesie regions, in contrast to the lowlands, in addition to the passive resistance of the peasantry, there was more organized resistance from the OUN underground and the UPA rebels. The dominant number of collective farms functioned for reporting, and not for real economic production, while their wages were lower. The inhabitants of these regions, especially the highlanders (Hutsuls), focused on handicrafts and, as a rule, illegal sales in resort areas and regional centers.

“Successes” in ideological work depended crucially on the activities of state security agencies, military units and overcoming armed resistance by the OUN field network, huts and hundreds of UPA. At the cost of enormous efforts and numerous sacrifices, party organizations and state authorities imposed “socialist transformations”

²²⁷ ДАРО. Ф. П-400. Оп. 2. Спр. 139. Арк. 27.

²²⁸ Мірчук П. Українська Повстанська Армія... С. 435.

²²⁹ Стецько Я. Українська визвольна концепція. Твори. Ч. 1. Мюнхен: Видання Організації Українських Націоналістів, 1987. С. 292.

on the western Ukrainian village in the early 1950s. Stalin's totalitarian regime partially cracked down on those who resisted or were potential opponents of its policies in the western Ukrainian region.

The Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist ideology became a monopoly and was propagated by all means. Party policy in the countryside was supported by ideologized literature, art, the press, cinema, and radio broadcasting. An important role in this process was played by the political departments of the MTS, which, together with party organizations, "educated" the peasantry in the socialist spirit. The main difference between the collectivization of agriculture in the Western Ukrainian region was the absence of a significant split of the peasantry along the "class principle", the lack of a conscious asset (poor organizations like *komnezams*), whose hands carried out collectivization in Ukraine. State bodies faced the resistance of the entire peasantry as a whole, which supported all segments of the population.

The slogans of Ukrainian nationalism found a wide response among the population of the western regions of Ukraine. In the context of the decade-long war against the OUN and the UPA, the coercive nature of collectivization became even more brutal. The Soviet government transferred these methods of struggle to the rural population, which was the rear of the revolutionary liberation movement. Fighters for the independence of Ukraine were branded by totalitarianism as "faithful dogs and helpers of the Germans in the enslavement of their people". The Communist Party's propaganda apparatus purposefully formed a negative image of the "Western Banderites" as "Nazi thugs", "servants", "beasts of the inhumans", "executioners of their people" etc.

It was the UPA that prevented the total deportation of Western Ukrainians from their homeland, as they did with the Chechens, Ingush, Kalmyks, Tatars and other peoples of the USSR. Totalitarianism failed to carry out a planned, regular famine in the territories controlled by the armed units of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army under the leadership of Commander-in-Chief R. Shukhevych. At the same time, the agitation and propaganda office of the OUN underground put up a desperate resistance and had a certain influence on public sentiment. There was still hope for a military conflict between the "world of capitalism and socialism".

Totalitarianism uncompromisingly instilled its ideological views in patriotically educated Western Ukrainians. Tasks, directions, ways and

forms of agitation and propaganda work among the population of the region were developed by the top party and Soviet leadership. Its purpose was to distract the masses from the idea that difficult living conditions were created for them artificially. The Stalinist regime used various mechanisms to influence the minds of citizens – from propaganda to mass terror. The agitation and propaganda work was carried out through rallies, meetings, conferences, congresses, excursions, election campaigns, etc. However, the majority of peasants remained supporters of the Ukrainian national idea, religion and traditional economic principles.

Oleh Maliarchuk

SOCIAL SECTION OF IDEOLOGICAL AND PROPAGANDA INFLUENCE STALINIST REGIME ON DROHOBYCH REGION IN THE FIRST POST-WAR YEARS

The Stalinist regime used various means of ideological “processing” of the population to establish itself in the western regions of Ukraine. Loud, stereotypical but falsified accusations of “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism”, “Ukrainian-German fascism”, “Nazism” are still used today to zombie the population, justifying Russia’s large-scale aggression against Ukraine. Therefore, it is important to analyze the tasks and mechanisms of spreading anti-national and anti-state ideology and propaganda in the historical context within specific regions in order to develop effective and efficient ways to counter it.

The task of the totalitarian government, which was restored/established in the western regions of Ukraine in the first postwar years, was the unification of public consciousness, ensuring maximum social support for the Sovietization of the region, especially in the struggle against national liberation movement. The general situation in the region immediately after the expulsion of German troops was marked by destruction, economic problems, and demographic losses. In the western oblasts, the OUN underground and popular UPA armed groups fought against the Soviet regime.

The task of transforming all spheres of people’s existence at that time, even for the totalitarian government, given the traditional way of life, religiosity and beliefs of the local population, which was extremely negative towards the Soviet government, was not easy. Therefore, the primary tasks of the local authorities were to organize large-scale political work, to launch an ideological offensive. This was an attempt to prove the impossibility of successful resistance to the regime, to discredit the liberation movement, and to “tear the bulk of the population away from the influence of Ukrainian-German nationalists”. The “appeals” of the republican party leadership (January 12, February 14, October 14, November 27, 1944), which became a kind of agitation and propaganda among the population of the region, were in fact completely directed against “Ukrainian nationalists”²³⁰. At the same time,

²³⁰ Павленко І. А. Архівні джерела про роль М.С. Хрущова в організації боротьби з українським національно-визвольним рухом у Західних областях УРСР (1944 – 1949). URL: <http://www.archives.gov.ua/Publicat/AU/2001-1-2-03.php>

the regime carried out large-scale forceful, repressive methods of struggle against the liberation forces and nationally-conscious Ukrainians.

The Soviet apparatus, which was rapidly resuming its activities, was to implement the Sovietization plans of the system in the region. The formation of government and administration in the Drohobych region was based on the resolutions of the Central Committee of the CP (B) U, which focused on sending to the western region of tested personnel who worked there before the war, actively involved members of the Soviet guerrilla and underground movements demobilized from the army. Tempered in battle, they now had to fight on the ideological front. Political distrust of the locals was one of the reasons that the governing bodies were formed exclusively from sent personnel who were introduced to the nomenclature of the region²³¹. At the end of 1944, 1952 party-Soviet, economic, educational, medical and other workers were sent to the cities of the region – Drohobych, Stryi, Sambor, Boryslav. In the districts of the region – 928 people²³². Visitors from other regions of Ukraine and the USSR were to become the backbone of the system in the “nationalist-infected region” and carry the communist ideology to the masses. The vast majority of them did not know the language, local features. And only in order to be closer to the people in political influence on him, the party and Komsomol activists of the region, according to the secretary of the Drohobych regional committee S. Oleksenko, had a “party duty” to speak Ukrainian²³³. Place of birth, social and national origin, language of communication, partisanship gradually became signs of “political reliability” of the population of the region, divided it into “own” and “foreign”.

The propaganda and agitation department at the Central Committee of the CP (B) U had the main function of agitation and propaganda management, as well as the corresponding structural subdivisions in the Communist Party committees at various levels. The responsibilities of full-time lecturers, agitators, instructors, and propagandists included

²³¹ Першина Т. Формування управлінських кадрів в Західній Україні в 1944 – 1948 рр.: регіональні особливості. *Сторінки воєнної історії України. Збірник наук. статей*. К., 2009. Вип. 12. С. 300.

²³² Державний архів Львівської області (далі – ДАЛО). Ф. П-5001. Оп. 2. Спр. 107. Арк. 1, 5–19.

²³³ Там само. Спр. 51. Арк. 33.

not only “organizing and conducting political rallies, popularizing Bolshevik programmatic principles, but also the formation of citizens’ stable moral and political beliefs of the Soviet people”²³⁴.

The branched party structure was to become an instrument of the Soviet system for asserting its power and influencing the population. Party, Komsomol, trade union organizations, were created everywhere: in all organizations, enterprises and institutions, educational and cultural educational institutions, party-state and law enforcement agencies of Drohobych region. This became a kind of measure of the success of socio-political work of the government in the region. According to official statistics, at the beginning of 1945, 193 primary, 27 district and 4 city party organizations were organized in the Drohobych region, consisting of 1,716 members and 481 party candidates²³⁵. There are differences in party documents regarding the number of party members and the Komsomol. In particular, the report of the secretary of the regional committee S. Oleksenko states that at the end of 1944 there were 1,200 Komsomol members in the Drohobych region, and the report to the secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (B) U Khrushchev in early 1945 provides data on 919 Komsomol members²³⁶. Most likely, the desired was presented as real. But in general, as G. Starodubets notes, during the first postwar years there was an obvious trend of quantitative growth of Bolshevik party organizations in the western region of Ukraine²³⁷. At the beginning of July 1946, there were 4,546 communists in the Drohobych region²³⁸.

The party-Komsomol assets of the region were constantly replenished mainly due to business trips from the eastern regions of Ukraine and the USSR. The majority of the local population was apolitical. In 1945, of the 4,970 people who worked at Drohobych’s enterprises and institutions, only 7% were party members, and the city’s Komsomol organization numbered 490 Komsomol members, of whom 399 were

²³⁴ Стародубець Г. Місіонери червоної влади: (партійно-радянська номенклатура західноукраїнських областей в 1944 – на поч. 1946 рр. Житомир: Полісся, 2016. С. 46.

²³⁵ ДАЛЮ. Ф. П-5001. Оп. 6. Спр. 89. Арк. 24.

²³⁶ Там само. Оп. 2. Спр. 51. Арк. 31; Оп. 6. Спр. 89. Арк. 24.

²³⁷ Стародубець Г. Місіонери червоної влади: (партійно-радянська номенклатура західноукраїнських областей в 1944 – на поч. 1946 рр. С. 31.

²³⁸ Там само.

from the eastern regions of Ukraine²³⁹. The creation of Komsomol cells, especially in the countryside, was hampered by the national liberation movement. In October 1944, six teachers' and only one student Komsomol organization was established in 864 schools in the Drohobych region²⁴⁰. Of the 260 Komsomol organizations in the region during this period, only 44 were rural²⁴¹. As a result of pressure from party and Komsomol bodies and repressive measures, as well as other circumstances not always related to ideological convictions, Western Ukrainian youth gradually joined the Komsomol. However, a certain part with Komsomol tickets was a part of the OUN underground youth groups²⁴².

It was the Communists and Komsomol members as the “most conscious” who bore the main burden of socio-political and social-organizational work on the ground, in individual groups. But to convince others of the benefits of the “Soviet way of life”, to instill “ideals of Leninism” required appropriate theoretical knowledge, educational level, culture of behavior, and they were very low for party functionaries and activists in the region. At the end of 1945, among the secretaries of the primary party organizations in the region, there were 14 with higher education, 72 with secondary education, and 81 with lower education. Among the secretaries of the district committees of the CP (B) U, these indicators were, respectively: 13, 37, 26²⁴³. Not surprisingly, one of the district party secretaries in a political class could not explain the difference between materialists and idealists. To him, materialists were swindlers engaged in theft, self-sufficiency, and so on, and idealists were honest people²⁴⁴. Due to the “importance of the ideological front” and its fighters, a system of party educational institutions began to be formed for the training and retraining of personnel for ideological and propaganda work at the level of the republic and oblasts. In 1945, the regional party school began to operate in

²³⁹ ДАЛО. Ф. П-5002. Оп. 1. Спр. 29. Арк. 4.

²⁴⁰ ДАЛО. Ф. П-5001. Оп. 2. Спр. 86. Арк. 5.

²⁴¹ Там само. Оп. 6. Спр. 89. Арк. 24.

²⁴² Нагірняк М. Я. Лаврецький Р. В. Політична та ідеологічна боротьба органів комуністичної партії у процесі утвердження режиму у Західній Україні (1944 – 1945 рр.). *Військово-науковий вісник*. 2013. Вип. 20. С. 72.

²⁴³ ДАЛО. Ф. П-5001. Оп. 6. Спр. 89. Арк. 18–19.

²⁴⁴ Рубльов О. С., Черченко Ю. А. Сталінщина й доля західноукраїнської інтелігенції, 20–50-ті роки ХХ ст. К.: Наук. думка, 1994. С. 214.

Drohobych²⁴⁵. In the party schools there was a “preventive ideological reset of the consciousness of the nomenklatura”²⁴⁶. In parallel with the party schools, there were political schools, most of which were non-partisan, party cabinets, several-month party courses, and propagandist courses. In 1946, a holistic structure of party education was formed: the Higher Party School (VPSH) under the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), republican, regional and oblast party schools, retraining courses at the VPSH and local schools, and the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee (b)²⁴⁷. In 1947, 12,371 people had already been trained and retrained in the region, but the plan was fulfilled by only 49.5%²⁴⁸. At the beginning of 1947, the training of leading party and Soviet personnel from the Drohobych region (61 people) was carried out at six-month courses in Kyiv and Lviv party schools, party interregional courses in Chernivtsi, where party and Komsomol secretaries, propagandists, propaganda, heads of party cabinets, chairmen and deputies of city committees²⁴⁹. Ideological training of leading party and state cadres in these schools was carried out through the study of the history of the Communist Party, political economy, Marxist-Leninist philosophy, the international and domestic situation of the USSR²⁵⁰. The truthfulness and correctness of the acquired knowledge was not in doubt and was to be effectively planted among the whole society of that time.

A whole system of socio-political measures was developed for the mass ideological influence on the population. Their most common form was lectures. Rallies, meetings, conferences, seminars, and conversations were regularly held, and circles were organized to study the works of Stalin, the classics of Marxism-Leninism, and independent political education was mandatory. All of them were tied exclusively to “topical political issues”. It is difficult to say how reliable the official data on the number of political events in the region, as a rule, the

²⁴⁵ ДАЛО. Ф. П-5002. Оп.1. Спр. 45. Арк. 15.

²⁴⁶ Крупина В. Номенклатура повоєнної України: кількісно-якісна характеристика. *Україна ХХ століття: культура, ідеологія, політика*. 2009. Вип. 15(1). С. 271.

²⁴⁷ Штейнле О. Освітньо-культурний рівень владної верхівки радянської України (1945 – 1953 рр.). *Наукові праці історичного факультету Запорізького національного університету*. 2010. Вип. XXVIII. С. 259.

²⁴⁸ ДАЛО. Ф. П. 5001. Оп. 10. Спр. 103. Арк. 105.

²⁴⁹ Там само. Оп. 8. Спр. 125. Арк. 1–8.

²⁵⁰ Штейнле О. Освітньо-культурний рівень владної верхівки радянської України (1945 – 1953 рр.). С. 260.

reports recorded their mass and number, because otherwise it could not be. During August-October 1944, 436 lectures and 3,036 reports for 313.6 thousand people were given by the regional party activists, propagandists of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and lecturers of the Drohobych regional committee of the party²⁵¹. In total, by February 1945, 17,000 meetings on various political topics had been held in the region, covering 1,300,000 people, and 485 political schools and groups had been organized, in which 11,000 Communists, Komsomol members, and non-partisans had studied²⁵². Carrying out various political measures and responding to them gave the population the opportunity to study the mood of local residents, systematically reported on them to the highest party bodies, the Soviet secret services²⁵³. It turned out that most forms of ideological zombies of the population of Drohobych were formal, were on paper, had an external effect. In October 1945, at a meeting of the regional party activists, the emphasis was on “poorly organized lecture work”²⁵⁴. The spread of communist ideology was the task of constructing a new Soviet political consciousness of the region’s population. The authorities constantly reminded about their achievements and advantages and almost never spread about the problems. Over time, this shaped the appropriate type of behavior of the population.

To achieve the effectiveness of ideological influence, this influence was applied and specially developed for certain categories and groups of the population of the region. The “social and ideological work” among the intelligentsia was of particular importance to the party-Soviet leadership. The expectation was that the intelligentsia should not only approve of the government’s policies and actions, but also actively promote the benefits of Soviet reality among the region’s residents, and become “at the forefront of the struggle against thieving German-Ukrainian nationalist gangs”. In 1944 – 1945, 70 reports were read directly for the intelligentsia of the Drohobych region, 600 meetings were held, and the involvement of its 800 representatives in socio-political and public work was considered as a special success²⁵⁵. On January 20-22, 1945, the first regional meeting of the intelligentsia was

²⁵¹ ДАЛО. Ф. П-5001. Оп. 2. Спр. 53. Арк. 2.

²⁵² ДАЛО. Ф. П-5001. Оп. 6. Спр. 89. Арк. 24.

²⁵³ Там само. Арк. 4.

²⁵⁴ Там само. Арк. 28.

²⁵⁵ Там само. Арк. 24.

held in Drohobych. It was organized in the tradition of Soviet gatherings, with obligatory speeches by representatives of various professional groups of intellectuals, party and state activists of the region, greetings from pioneers, the artistic part, appeals to the intelligentsia of the region, letters to the highest party and state leadership²⁵⁶. The report of the first secretary of the regional committee S. Oleksenko “Ukrainian-German nationalists – the worst enemies of the Ukrainian people”, with a falsified digression into Ukrainian history, became the leitmotif of the meeting and a manifestation of political problems of the government²⁵⁷. The report on ideological and political work among teachers of Drohobych region provides data that in early 1947 they independently studied the biographies of Lenin, J. Stalin – 1,927 teachers, in groups – 1,581, in political school – 153 Short course VKP (b) independently studied 1,046, studied in circles – 1581, in political school – 179²⁵⁸. But despite all efforts, the party structures failed to quickly achieve the desired intentions of the intelligentsia. In February 1945, the secretary of the Drohobych City Committee, Kizyum, complained: “When teachers and doctors hold meetings, they hold meetings very apolitically. I have visited teachers’ conference several times and not a word was mentioned about nationalists”²⁵⁹. There were cases when visiting teachers moved to the positions of the Ukrainian liberation movement. The report of the Drohobych OUN supra-district leadership on schooling in the Skole district stated that 40% of teachers sent from eastern Ukraine were in favor of the insurgent movement²⁶⁰. At party conference in 1946, in his report, the secretary of the Drohobych regional committee of the KP (B) U emphasized: “The emergence of nationalist tendencies on the part of some local nominees in our city is planned mainly by the intelligentsia in schools, colleges, especially electromechanical”²⁶¹.

In 1947, the Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge was established in Drohobych. The vast majority of members of the society were visiting specialists, and the local intelli-

²⁵⁶ Там само. Оп. 2. Спр. 33. Арк. 20–205.

²⁵⁷ ДАЛЮ. Ф. П-5001. Оп. 6. Спр. 33. Арк. 134–166.

²⁵⁸ Там само. Оп. 8. Спр. 109. Арк. 50.

²⁵⁹ Там само. Ф. П-5002. Оп. 1. Спр. 152. Арк. 9.

²⁶⁰ Галузевий державний архів Служби безпеки України (далі – ГДА СБУ). Ф. 13. Спр. 376. Т. 78. Арк. 237.

²⁶¹ ДАЛЮ. Ф. П-5002. Оп. 1. Спр. 70. Арк. 37.

gentsia was not particularly active²⁶². In 1948, the Drohobych City Council submitted data that 300 members of the intelligentsia were campaigning among the peasants²⁶³. The educational and creative intelligentsia was actively used in propaganda activities during the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR, local councils, and workers' deputies. Thus, during the 1946 elections in the region, a specially created brigade of artists from the Drohobych Regional Philharmonic gave concerts for the workers of the region²⁶⁴. In January 1946, at a pre-election regional meeting of the city's teachers, a teacher of a secondary school №1 was noted, who herself conducted 6 classes with voters. Meetings with famous Ukrainian Soviet writers were organized in Drohobych²⁶⁵. In February 1950, Yuriy Smolych, L. Pervomayskiy, S. Voskresenskiy, O. Pidsukha came to the city, in April – Pavlo Tychyna, V. Sosiura M. Rylsky, M. Bazhan, Y. Yanovsky, P. Voronko²⁶⁶. They not only acquainted Drohobych residents with their work, but also convinced them in the benefits of the Soviet way of life.

In the first postwar years, the Soviet system deepened and expanded the directions of the so-called ideological and political education of the intelligentsia. The ideological resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the Central Committee of the CP (b) U on literature, art, and science adopted in 1946 – 1948, which in their content were a direct violation of civilized norms and principles in cultural policy, targeted party leadership at all levels to launch a campaign against “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism”, “bowing to foreigners”, “rootless cosmopolitanism”. In practice, this meant a biased assessment and baseless accusations of many figures in education, science, and culture, especially in the western regions of Ukraine.

Accusatory publications in the press, public attacks at various meetings were the usual measures of ideological “education” of the intelligentsia. During the post-war ideological campaigns, and especially the “struggle with the historical school of Hrushevsky and his students”, “rootless cosmopolitanism”, instead of an objective, true history, they

²⁶² Там само. Спр. 152. Арк. 121.

²⁶³ Там само. Арк. 122.

²⁶⁴ Радянське слово. 1946. 11 березня.

²⁶⁵ Там само. 6 січня.

²⁶⁶ Там само. 1950. 25 лютого; 1950. 5 квітня.

pushed the “Moscow-centric”, falsified history of Ukraine²⁶⁷. Transcripts of individual lectures on history and Marxism-Leninism were to be sent within ten days to the Office of the Ministry of Higher Education for inspection, the lectures also were visited by inspectors of the Ministry and the Department of Higher Education under the Council of Ministers of the USSR and even a representative of the Central Committee of the CP (b) U and the Drohobych City Committee of the party. In the 1947/48 academic year, there were more than 20 such examinations, according to the report²⁶⁸. The state of teaching of Ukraine history at the Drohobych Teachers’ Institute was inspected by the Department of History of the Lviv Pedagogical Institute on behalf of the Department of Higher Education of the Ministry of Education of the Ukrainian SSR²⁶⁹. On December 18th, 1947, this issue was heard at the board of the Ministry²⁷⁰. To show how everything was distorted, falsified, imposed only certain ideological clichés, absurd in nature, here is just one example. At an open meeting of the party organization of the institute in April 1949, history teacher G. Lisnichenko was criticized for being a lecturer on “The Patriotic War of 1812”. she did not mention the Great Patriotic War. The critics were most outraged by the fact that the teacher tried to defend her rightness, despite the fact that it was a “clear mistake”. P. Kozik’s lectures were also criticized for “separation from the present”²⁷¹. As a result, the party meeting decided: “Resolutely fight and expose to the end any attempts to disobey the foreign bourgeois culture of Western Europe, Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism, whatever forms they did not hide”²⁷². Literary teacher M. Kovalenko was criticized at the Academic Council of the Higher Educational Institution in 1948 for “teaching that is devoid of ideas”. In 1949 on the meeting “the cosmopolitans and anti-patriots were exposed and defeated”, S. Yarzhemsky, a teacher of literature, was criticized, he “embarked on a path of low homage to the bourgeois decaying culture of the West and made Russian public opinion and Russian classical literature dependent on Western European”, the head of the Depart-

²⁶⁷ Дашкевич Я. Боротьба з Грушевським та його львівською школою за радянських часів. Український історик. 1996. № 1–4 (128–131). Вип. XXXIII. С. 69.

²⁶⁸ ДАЛЮ. Ф. Р-2018. Оп. 1. Спр. 5. Арк. 16.

²⁶⁹ Там само. Оп. 3. Спр. 3. Арк. 92.

²⁷⁰ Там само. Арк. 258.

²⁷¹ Там само. Арк. 22.

²⁷² Там само. Арк. 26.

ment of Mathematics V. Savron was criticized “for the promotion of idealism”. Senior Lecturer of literature M. Nekhotyashchy was criticized for admitting Herzen and Belinsky, outstanding consciences of the Russian Social Democrats, without remorse enrolled in the students of Western Europe in his articles²⁷³.

Constant ideological and propagandistic treatment of the intelligentsia with simultaneous criticism of its manifestations of even loyal activity and control of its political credibility, allowed the totalitarian system to constantly keep it in fear, finally subdue, have a reason for open repression against it.

Separate subdivisions in party-Soviet structures were created to account for, control, and ideologically influence the women’s environment. From 1945, special departments of work with women worked at the regional, city and district committees of the Drohobych region. Created women’s councils and delegate meetings of women with different sections (agricultural, industrial, cultural, health, sanitation, school, trade) had to provide the impression of women’s democracy in cities and villages, enterprises and organizations, institutions of the region²⁷⁴. In fact, they were clearly subordinated to women’s departments and higher party-Soviet structures. The Drohobych regional committee of the party reported that in 1945–1946 720 delegate meetings and women’s councils were organized in the region, involving 15,138 delegates and 4,490 members of women’s councils; in 1946 – 1947 these figures were: 882 delegate meetings, 16,450 delegates, 4,915 members of women’s councils; in 1947 – 1948 these figures were: 985 delegate meetings, 21,200 delegates, 5880 members of women’s councils²⁷⁵. Women’s councils and delegate meetings were to be established everywhere. But due to the resistance of the Ukrainian liberation forces, in the spring of 1947 they were not yet present in 20 village councils of the region²⁷⁶. In their work, Soviet women’s structures were guided by relevant party and government resolutions, decrees, numerous orders and decisions of party-state bodies at various levels, which set out the main approaches to official policy on women in the western regions of Ukraine, even special instruction manuals

²⁷³ Там само. Арк. 21.

²⁷⁴ ДАЛО. Ф. П-5001. Оп. 8. Спр. 257. Арк. 6.

²⁷⁵ Там само. Оп. 9. Спр. 282. Арк. 3.

²⁷⁶ Там само. Оп. 8. Спр. 257. Арк. 5.

were developed²⁷⁷. Lecture propaganda has also become the most common means of influencing women. Lectures on “topical socio-political issues” (this meant the “most progressive Soviet system”, Stalin’s Constitution, the tasks of Stalin’s postwar Five-Year Plan, the benefits of the collective farm system, “fascist nationalist ideology”, the international situation and the like) were given in cities and villages, enterprises, institutions, shops, collective farms, before the screening of movies and other mass events, separately for peasants, collective farmers, workers, employees, female delegates, housewives, deputies, mothers with many children, women whose husbands died at the front. The regional women’s department reported that during 1945 – 1948, 23,600 reports and lectures were organized for the region’s female audience²⁷⁸. In 1951, the reported figures were almost half as high as 2,357,396 women listened to 44,356 reports and lectures²⁷⁹. Again, meetings, conference, and seminars were held for the general public and for various categories of women, and groups to study the biographies of Bolshevik leaders, their works, plans for five years, the content of the Soviet Constitution, and other party documents. Women “politically hardened” in party and political schools, the evening university of Marxism-Leninism, and had to master Marxist-Leninist theory on their own. They themselves became full-time and freelance lecturers and agitators, held various conversations and meetings, read newspapers and fiction with women and the general public²⁸⁰. Women took part in a variety of political and ideological events and campaigns initiated by the central and local party-Soviet leadership. Whether in the collection of signatures under the Stockholm Appeal of the Standing Committee of the World Congress of Proponents of Peace on the Prohibition of Atomic Weapons, or actively buying government bonds to rebuild and develop the economy²⁸¹. Participation in amateur art, sports, activities in public organizations such as the Red Cross, OSOaviahim, MODR (International Organization for Aid to Revolutionary Fighters) was actively encouraged among the female population²⁸². A special role in ideologizing the female environment, promoting the

²⁷⁷ Там само. Оп. 9. Спр. 282. Арк. 50–53.

²⁷⁸ ДАЛЮ. Ф. П-5001. Оп. 9. Спр. 282. Арк. 3.

²⁷⁹ Там само. Оп. 15. Спр. 238. Арк. 1.

²⁸⁰ Там само. Арк. 44–46.

²⁸¹ Радянське слово. 1950. 7 липня; Радянське слово. 1950. 7 травня.

²⁸² ДАЛЮ. Ф. П-5001. Оп. 8. Спр. 257. Арк. 2; Оп. 15. Спр. 238. Арк. 4.

happy fate of Soviet women was given to district, city, regional and republican meetings of women's activists. Therefore, delegates to women's meetings were pre-selected, their biographies and behavior were carefully checked²⁸³. Like all Soviet meetings, they were held according to a pre-designed and usually the same scenario. Ideological stereotypes about women's equal opportunities for women and men in Soviet society, women's political rights, and the great concern of the party and the state were best propagated through concrete life examples. In their speeches, the women shared their experiences, made new, sometimes unrealistic commitments (motivated by the atmosphere). Speaking from the rostrum about their lives, they always emphasized the difficult situation in aristocratic Poland and how it had improved during the Soviet era. At the regional meeting of women of Drohobych region, held on January 10–11, 1945, the deputy of the Verkhovna Rada of the USSR M. Gisyak asked the audience: "What was a woman in capitalist Poland, in pre-revolutionary Russia?". And she herself answered: Now, once an ignorant, degraded woman... I work as the head of the department of Stryj public education...²⁸⁴. An employee Gel of the railway junction in Sambir emphasized: "You know how we lived in aristocratic Poland - the poor. Poor daughters. Happiness for me came in the Soviet Union. They took me to a rest home²⁸⁵. I have been staying there there for a month. Such arguments for persuasion persisted in subsequent years. At the republican meeting of women activists in the western, Izmail and Zakarpattia regions in July 1950, the head of the Ivan Franko collective farm in the Drohobych region, Sofia Khudoba, said: "In the memory of our women still fresh sufferings they suffered from the Polish lords... Only under Soviet rule I felt the fullness of life of a happy, free Soviet woman"²⁸⁶. The participants in the women's assembly were on full state support. For two days, 71,060 rubles were spent on food, transportation, settlements, and "cultural expenses" of the participants in the regional meeting of women collective farmers, which took place in Drohobych in early May 1950²⁸⁷. For some women, this was the first opportunity to come to the city, an opportunity, as one of the delegates honestly admitted from the

²⁸³ Там само. Спр. 257. Арк. 8.

²⁸⁴ ДАЛО. Ф. П-5001. Оп. 6. Спр. 387. Арк. 4–5.

²⁸⁵ Там само. Оп. 8. Спр. 257. Арк. 10.

²⁸⁶ *Радянське слово*. 1950. 18 липня.

²⁸⁷ ДАЛО. Ф. П-5001. Оп. 15. Спр. 238. Арк. 78.

rostrum, to get manufactories (fabrics) and something to “get for the children”²⁸⁸. Various excursions, concerts, performances, meetings with famous people were organized for the participants, which was to strengthen the patriotic mood of women²⁸⁹. Therefore, after returning home, those who “showed special trust” themselves became propagandists of the “happy Soviet life”, were obliged to share publicly only positive impressions of what they heard and saw, to write articles in newspapers. Especially many ideological and propaganda events took place on the eve and on the day of the main women’s holiday in the Soviet Union – March 8th. Solemn meetings, concerts, celebrations and awards of women leaders of production and collective farms took place in the region²⁹⁰.

An important lever of influence on the female environment in the western regions of Ukraine, convincing evidence of political rights and equal opportunities with men, was the involvement of women in all postwar election campaigns (the first postwar elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR took place in February 1946, the Verkhovna Rada 1947, later in December 1950 and February 1953) primarily as agitators, members of election commissions, candidates for deputies at various levels. In the Drohobych region in the early 1950s, there was one woman among the deputies – a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, four – the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, seventeen – the regional council and 3257 – local councils²⁹¹. But democracy, or equal opportunities for all in realizing their political ambitions for women, were again only propaganda, zombie slogans of the Soviet system. There were no random deputies women, especially at higher levels, and their candidates were carefully selected based on their social background, family ties, place of work and occupation, and participation in public and political life²⁹². Opportunities were given only to those who wanted to become a propaganda example of a real Soviet woman. Indicative in this sense is the life of the deputy of the Verkhovna Rada of the USSR Yulia Ivanovna Vivchoryk. The general information about her was given like: she came from a poor peasant family, lost her father early, was forced to work from the age of fourteen, and married an

²⁸⁸ Там само. Оп. 6. Спр. 387. Арк. 129.

²⁸⁹ *Радянське слово*. 1950. 18 липня.

²⁹⁰ *Радянське слово*. 1946. 8 березня.

²⁹¹ ДАЛЮ. Ф. П-5001. Оп. 10. Спр. 173. Арк. 14.

²⁹² Там само. Оп. 9. Спр. 282. Арк. 4.

equally simple boy. Since the formation of Soviet power she worked as a foreman of the gardener's brigade of the village artel of the village Khlopchytsy, chairman of the women's council, in 1947 was elected deputy to the Verkhovna Rada, worked as head of the Rudkiv district department of social security. The leitmotif of all publications about her was the thesis that only "under Soviet rule a former laborer can rise to the rank of statesman"²⁹³. Political, educational and organizational measures of the Soviet system among women in Drohobych did not always have the expected results. The reports of women's departments often mention, albeit in one line, аище "serious shortcomings in some areas in the establishment of mass political work among women and their involvement in active social and political activities"²⁹⁴. At the end of 1949, among the 1,339 Communist women in the region, only 47 were from the western regions of Ukraine, and among 9,232 Kom-somol members, 4,016 were local²⁹⁵. Most local women, often outwardly displaying loyalty to the government, maintained their convictions, supported and participated in the national liberation movement, for which they were severely repressed. In October 1947, the Drohobych Regional Committee reported to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine that as a result of the largest operation to evict "OUN families" from the Drohobych region, 4,559 families of 14,486 people were deported to remote areas of the Soviet Union, among whom 6410 were women²⁹⁶.

Party and trade union organizations, women's councils (Партійні, профспілкові організації, жіночих ради) in the first postwar years, actively promoted the involvement of women in the reconstruction process, in industrial production, construction, transport, collective farms, the acquisition of previously exclusively male professions. As M. Smolnitska rightly points out, the equalization of women's rights with men in Soviet society actually took place due to the equalization of women with men as a "labor force" in the national economy²⁹⁷. The

²⁹³ *Радянське слово*. 1950. 8 березня.

²⁹⁴ ДАЛО. Ф. П-5001. Оп. 10. Спр. 173. Арк. 42.

²⁹⁵ Там само. Арк. 41.

²⁹⁶ Попп Р. П. Депортаційно-переселенські процеси в Дрогобицькій області (1944 – 1953 рр.). *Наукові праці історичного факультету Запорізького національного університету*. 2014. Вип. 38. С. 204.

²⁹⁷ Смольницька М. Гендерна політика в УРСР: правове закріплення та напрямки реалізації (середина 1940-х – перша половина 1960-х рр.). *Україна ХХ століття: культура, ідеологія, політика*. 2012. Вип. 17. С. 88–89.

following figures testify to the consolidation in society of such a guise of a Soviet woman as a working woman: in 1949 women accounted for 12% of all industrial workers in the Drohobych region, in 1950 – 23%²⁹⁸. From 1946 to 1952, the number of women in the workplace doubled²⁹⁹. In addition to the general figures for women employed in the industry, the reports indicated the percentage of local women workers (in 1949 it was 50%). The stratum of local women workers, which was virtually non-existent in the region before, was supposed to be the main support for the system by its social nature. Women's labor enthusiasm was driven, as a rule, not by economic but by ideological factors, in particular by involvement in the so-called "socialist competition". In all reports on socio-political work among women in production teams, there are always convincing figures. Thus, at the beginning of 1949, according to official data, there were 907 "Stakhonovite" and 1,290 "udarniks (shock workers)" in the region, and what was important for the party leadership of the city, that 40% of them were local³⁰⁰. In order to promote women's socialist industrial initiatives more widely, they were widely covered by the media at various levels. The regional newspaper *Radyanske Slovo* constantly published articles about women's exploits both in the region and in all parts of the Soviet Union³⁰¹. Photographs of women udarniks in the factory shop, construction, in transport in the field should have further motivated the to ahead of schedule early and overfulfillment of production plans and collection of agricultural products (from January to the summer of 1949 the newspaper published 22 such photos), women leaders and activists were frequent heroes of the newspaper column "People of the Soviet Drohobych"³⁰². After that, they became famous, recognizable, had to become authoritative in their teams. Radio appearances and numerous posters called for labor achievements³⁰³. Ideological influence on women was enhanced by honorary honors and awards. Women leaders of industrial and collective farm production, activists of socio-political life, mothers with many children – were awarded state awards. In 1953, in the Drohobych region, 1,595 people were awarded

²⁹⁸ ДАЛЮ. Ф. П-5001. Оп. 10. Спр. 173. Арк. 12.

²⁹⁹ Там само. Оп. 13. Спр. 238. Арк. 52.

³⁰⁰ ДАЛЮ. Ф. П-5001. Оп. 10. Спр. 173. Арк. 2.

³⁰¹ Радянське слово. 1946. 17 серпня.; 30 серпня.

³⁰² Там само. 1950. 3 січня.; 25 січня; 11лютого; 22 серпня.

³⁰³ ДАЛЮ. Ф. П-5001. Оп. 10. Спр. 173. Арк. 15.

the Order of Lenin, the Red Banner of Labor, the Badge of Honor, the Order of Labor Valor, and the Order of Merit, including 736 women³⁰⁴. In the first postwar years, 160 people were awarded the Order of the Mother-Heroine, 3,865 women received the Order of Mother's Glory, and 13,225 were awarded the Motherhood Medal³⁰⁵. The awards were usually presented in public in a solemn atmosphere, and much was written about them in the local press. All party and state measures, in particular, to strengthen the protection of motherhood and childhood, the fight against illiteracy among women, have always had a political connotation. However, as G. Starodubets rightly points out, despite all the propaganda efforts, in the Western Ukrainian society of the post-war decade, a positive image, in particular of women collective farmers, evoked two completely opposite associations. On the one hand, there were "service activists" whose achievements were mainly based on postscripts and artificially inflated figures, and on the other hand, there was a "simple collective farmer" who worked hard on the collective farm without getting paid for her work³⁰⁶.

Ideological and political education was conducted among repatriated citizens of the USSR, former prisoners of war and migrants who were in filtration camps and resettlement sites in the Drohobych region. This category of the population, which had been abroad for a long time and saw life differently than in the Soviet Union, was under the special control and "guardianship" of the authorities. In 1945, the Drohobych Regional Committee sent an agitation brigade of 10 party and Komsomol activists to the Mosty, Khyriv, and Sudovov-Vyshnyansky filtration and resettlement points. In addition, 27 lectures were given, which numbered up to 55,000 people, organized 304 talks and red corners, a library³⁰⁷.

Special attention was paid to young people in the conditions of military-political confrontation in the region. Speaking at the Drohobych Regional Party, Secretary of the Regional Committee S. Oleksenko stressed: "We will not use young people, they will be

³⁰⁴ Там само. Оп. 17. Спр.137. Арк. 1–2.

³⁰⁵ Там само. Арк. 2.

³⁰⁶ Стародубець Г. Моделі фемінності в гендерній політиці сталінського режиму. *Проблеми гуманітарних наук: збірник наукових праць ДДПУ імені Івана Франка*. Серія Історія. 2020. № 5/47. С. 400–401.

³⁰⁷ ДАЛО. Ф. П-5001. Оп. 6. Спр. 89. Арк. 54–55.

used by nationalists against us”³⁰⁸. The main direction of political work with young people was determined by numerous party-Soviet resolutions. These documents became a guide in the development of ideological and political education of young people in their places. The main task facing the Soviet system was to distract young people from the influence of “German-Ukrainian nationalists”³⁰⁹. All sorts of “Appeals” and amnesties were announced to the young patriots who were in the OUN-UPA. With the development of ideological campaigns in the country, political and educational work among young people “aimed at educating Soviet patriotism, love for the Bolshevik Party, for the great Stalin... To combat low-level worship of foreign science and culture, to promote Russian and especially Soviet science”³¹⁰.

Involvement in Komsomol organizations was to be an effective means of ideological influence on young people. It was propagated that the Komsomol was a “reserve and assistant of the party in the matter of involving young people in socialist construction”. Especially ideological and approved young people were accepted into the communist ranks. The pace of organization of Komsomol party cells did not satisfy both the top and the local Soviet party leadership. They were formed mainly from non-residents, so they could not fully play the role of a tool for instilling a totalitarian model of political mobilization. The report on the activities of schools in the Drohobych region in the 1944/1945 academic year stated that “In many schools there was insufficient work on educating students of Soviet patriotism, materialist worldview, education of hatred for the enemy of the Ukrainian people namely German fascism and its allies, traitors, Ukrainian-German nationalists. Komsomol and pioneer organizations grow very slowly and cover a small number of students”³¹¹.

Young people did not accept ideological attitudes due to national consciousness and ideological and political beliefs, as well as because the political and educational structures of the UPA and the OUN underground launched a broad propaganda campaign against the Komsomol. Terrorist actions were often used against Komsomol

³⁰⁸ Там само. Ф. П-5001. Оп. 2. Спр. 51. Арк. 31.

³⁰⁹ Нагірняк М. Я., Лаврецький Р. В. Політична та ідеологічна боротьба органів комуністичної партії у процесі утвердження режиму у Західній Україні (1944 – 1945 рр.). *Військово-науковий вісник*. 2013. Вип. 20. С. 72.

³¹⁰ ДАЛЮ. Ф. Р-2018. сч. Оп. 7. Спр. 7. Арк. 4.

³¹¹ Там само. Ф. П-5001. Оп. 2. Спр. 83. Арк. 24.

leaders³¹². So, in the report of OUN from the Mykolayiv region for the period from December, 1946 to February, 1947 it is noted: “local youth doesn’t join Komsomol, except for some persons”, that at the beginning of 1947 “in the Mostyska district the Komsomol was only in the district center, the Komsomol members were only easterners”³¹³.

In 1947, out of 764 students of working-class youth schools in the Drohobych region, 132 were members of the LCSY (Leninist Communist League of Youth), and only 57 members out of 2,531 were from rural youth schools³¹⁴. Speaking at a meeting of the Academic Council of the Drohobych Teachers’ Training Institute in February 1949, the vice-rector emphasized: “The growth of the Komsomol organization and the issue of anti-religious work are at a low level. The students directly state that they go to church, that they are afraid to join the Komsomol”³¹⁵. Propaganda, ideological pressure, repression, contributed to the gradual growth of the Komsomol. In the 1951/1952 academic year, out of 388 full-time students, 335 were members of the Komsomol³¹⁶.

Regarding the socio-political education of young people, they used the set of tools we have already mentioned: lectures, political information, seminars, talks, organization of clubs. Scientific and theoretical conferences, meetings, gatherings devoted to important socio-political events, to anniversaries of Soviet leaders were constant. Young people were involved in demonstrations, solemn rallies held to celebrate important historical dates and events, Soviet holidays. Excursions to the eastern regions of Ukraine and the USSR, which were organized for the youth of the region, were to instill Sovietness. The main provisions of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine were proclaimed in the press and on the radio. Literature, art, and cinema were put at the service of ideology. Young people also had to engage in political self-education. The transition of students to the “correct” socio-political position was to be facilitated by the appointment of nominal scholarships, which were determined not only by excellent education, but also

³¹² Нагірняк М. Я., Лаврецький Р. В. Політична та ідеологічна боротьба органів комуністичної партії у процесі утвердження режиму у Західній Україні (1944 – 1945 рр.). *Військово-науковий вісник*. 2013. Вип. 20. С. 72.

³¹³ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 12. Спр. 376. Т. 76. Арк. 76, 114.

³¹⁴ ДАЛО. Ф. П-5001. Оп.8. Спр. 108. Арк. 78.

³¹⁵ ДАЛО Ф. Р-2018. Оп. 47. Спр. 48. Арк. 22.

³¹⁶ Там само. Оп. 1. Спр. 65. Арк. 65.

by a Komsomol member or a communist active in socio-political work³¹⁷.

All forms of ideological and political influence on young people were marked by systemicity and frequency. In 1947, the Boryslav Pedagogical School reported on the following areas of its political educational work: “lectures, reports, conversations were organized by teachers, students, as well as lecturers were invited from the city CP (b) U, the regional committee of the CP (b) U, the Central Committee of the CP (b) U; newspapers (magazines) were read systematically (daily) by agitators on courses and in dormitory rooms; 12 reports, 13 lectures, 15 talks were held for the students of the school; the staff of the school took part in all demonstrations on the day of revolutionary holidays. The school column has always been exemplary and prepared; during the year cultural trips to the cinema and theater for a concert were organized”³¹⁸.

Ideological influence on the youth was exercised through the educational policy of the party. The Soviet system tried to create conditions for all children, adolescents, young men and women to attend school, continue their education in secondary and higher educational institutions, and, consequently, be constantly imbued with party-communist ideas. That is, communist ideology was instilled primarily through the content of education, which was implemented in curricula, programs, textbooks, which were unified, developed under the constant supervision of party bodies. In the report of the Drohobych Teachers’ Training Institute for 1947/1948 academic year noted the working programs of the Department of History “were built to ensure an effective struggle against the recurrence of bourgeois ideology, the ideology of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism on the historical front”³¹⁹. The curriculum of the Faculty of History in the first postwar years provided for the study of 17 normative disciplines. The study of the history of the ancient world took 198 hours, the history of the Middle Ages – 216 hours, the history of modern times – 170 hours, the history of the USSR – 370 hours, the history of Ukraine – 108 hours and methods of teaching history –

³¹⁷ Там само. Оп. 17. Спр. 17. Арк. 31.

³¹⁸ ДАЛЮ Ф. П-5001. Оп.8. Спр. 114. Арк. 32.

³¹⁹. Там само. Ф. Р-2018. Оп. 1. Спр. 5. Арк. 27.

60 hours³²⁰. As we can see, the study of the history of the USSR took 3.5 times more hours than Ukraine. An important role was given to the following social sciences: the foundations of Marxism-Leninism, the Constitution of the USSR³²¹. The last ones had an exclusively ideological orientation, nurtured in future teachers a communist worldview, “Soviet patriotism”. They later “had to instill” the same views in their students. The main tasks of the departments of Marxism-Leninism were to “connect Marxist-Leninist theory with the modernity of international events, with economic and political issues of our country, education of communist consciousness, selfless love and loyalty to the socialist homeland”³²².

The commission from the party’s regional committee, which inspected the teaching of history, methods of history and the Constitution at the Boryslav Pedagogical School, stressed that “teaching these subjects is at a low ideological, political and scientific level”, “lessons are apolitical”, and “The original sources of the classics of Marxism-Leninism are not used”³²³.

The system of extracurricular educational work with pupils and students allowed to control young people after classes. At the fourth Drohobych City Party Conference, it was even emphasized that “overloading of public and other non-educational work is allowed in schools”³²⁴.

The contingent of pupils and students in the first postwar years was constantly increasing. At the same time, the penal authorities closely monitored the entrants and students. The Higher Education Administration Directive from the 10th of October 1946, classified as “Secret”, required the submission of information “on the party, national and age composition of all students”³²⁵. Constant inspections and purges revealed active members of the OUN-UPA underground, “class-hostile elements” who were usually the children of wealthy peasants and priests, and had family ties to members of the OUN and UPA and

³²⁰ Попп Р. Историчний факультет Дрогобицького Державного педагогічного університету імені Івана Франка у перші повоєнні (1944 – 1953). *Східноєвропейський історичний вісник*. Дрогобич: Посвіт. 2018. Вип. 6. С. 192.

³²¹ ДАЛО. Ф. Р-2018. Оп. 1. Спр. 15. Арк. 31.

³²² Там само. Спр. 5. Арк. 27.

³²³ ДАЛО. Ф. П-5001. Оп. 8. Спр. 114. Арк. 18.

³²⁴ Там само. Ф. П-5002. Оп. 1. Спр. 152. Арк. 124.

³²⁵ Там само. Ф. Р-2018, Оп. 3. Спр. 3. Арк. 26.

their supporters. In order to focus on the effectiveness of ideological pressure and the real moods and reactions of young people to all the changes that took place in the western regions of Ukraine in the first postwar years, the practice of whistleblowing was actively encouraged in all groups. The shaking of students' ideology, loyalty to the existing regime and repressive measures of the regime led to a small number of locals among the students. According to some data, in September 1947, only 83 students of the Drohobych Teachers' Training Institute were local³²⁶.

Officially, all ideological and political actions among young people were actively supported by them, young people took an active part in community service, but in fact their formalism and ostentation were not particularly perceived by locals. A report on state exams at the Drohobych Teachers' Training Institute in 1948 stated that "the political development of students who grew up and graduated from high school in Western Ukraine was much weaker"³²⁷. In one of their reports, the Ukrainian insurgents point out that the evidence that the student youth did not accept communist propaganda, in particular, is that in the village of Monastyrets, Sambir district, schoolchildren tore eyes at portraits of Lenin and Stalin, and in the Chukva village threw a portrait of Stalin in the oven³²⁸. The active anti-religious campaign did not have the expected results in the western regions of Ukraine, and the vast majority of young people did not renounce their religious beliefs. Paradoxically, worldview of young people combined two incompatible spiritual and moral categories at the time – communist orientation and faith in God.

The young people saw that what was being proclaimed, and what they were trying so hard to persuade, was different from what was really happening in the region. Ideological pressure, coercion, repression, difficult living conditions, were the real realities of life at that time. For some, this situation provoked fear, which in turn led to the concealment of their true beliefs, fostered humility or hatred for the injustice and cruelty of the Soviet government, while others provoked natural resistance. During the period from July 1, 1951 to April 20, 1952 in the Drohobych region, Soviet special services liquidated 12

³²⁶ Там само. Оп. 1, Спр. 10. Арк. 74.

³²⁷ Там само. Ф. Р-2018 сч. Оп-15. Спр. 15. Арк. 1.

³²⁸ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 12. Спр. 378. Т. 76. Арк. 76, 343.

nationalist youth groups with 35 members: 17-20 years old – 12 members, 21-25 years old – 17 members, over 25 years old – 3 members³²⁹.

In the first postwar years, the rural population of Drohobych region was under special ideological and repressive pressure. The peasantry was the social support of the Ukrainian liberation movement, so the ideological and propaganda measures of the Soviet system among the peasants were an important means of combating it. The OUN's report on the situation in the region states that very often all attempts to organize Soviet rallies in the villages were unsuccessful. The information in the underground reports shows that the peasants could be gathered only by using force, coercion, and it is said that the peasants avoided entering the collective farm in different ways: they fled to the woods during the meeting, hid in neighboring villages, set fire to and destroyed collective farm property, prayed and did not leave the church, so as not to sign the entry into the collective farm³³⁰. Of course, all attempts to oppose the system ended in brutal violence against civilians. The underground stressed that when "propaganda is unsuccessful", the authorities use "increasing terror and provocation"³³¹. Local peasants learned about the real collective farm paradise from private conversations with people from the eastern regions of Ukraine, where they talked about the famine and its terrible consequences³³². There was no better anti-propaganda against the collective farm system.

In the course of the propaganda campaign for the collectivization of agriculture in the western regions of Ukraine, the authorities widely used various manipulative technologies. Thus, in the columns of newspapers, in the speeches of officials often appeared figures that should indicate the mass and voluntary nature of collective farms in Western villages, widely covered peasant meetings, which also expressed only gratitude to the fairest government and praised the collective farm system. The speeches of the leading collective farmers in front of the peasant audience, the trips of the delegations of the peasants of the western regions of Ukraine to the collective farms of the eastern Ukrainian region were widely practiced. Such speeches by agitators "from the people" served as a kind of tool used by the authorities to

³²⁹ Ільницький В. Діяльність молодіжних націоналістичних організацій у Дрогобичі (1945 – 1952). *Дрогобицький краєзнавчий збірник*. 2017. Спец.вип. 3. С. 309.

³³⁰ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 12. Спр. 376. Т. 78. Арк. 187.

³³¹ Там само. Арк. 478.

³³² Там само. Арк. 43, 375.

paint in positive colors a gray-black background during such unpopular state events as the collectivization of the village³³³. Communist ideologues consistently and purposefully instilled vulgarly interpreted slogans such as: “The collective farm is the only way to a prosperous life”, “The kulak is a fierce enemy of the working peasant”, “He who is not with us is against us”, and so on. affirmed hateful man morality, social confrontation³³⁴.

Radio and movie were to become an effective means of promoting the “happy life of workers in the Soviet Union” and the “heroism of the Soviet people” among the rural population of Drohobych, because it was strange. In the first half of 1946, 185 movie sessions were organized in the villages of Drohobych region³³⁵. Ukrainian insurgents opposed watching of Soviet propaganda films. Having information about the arrival of the movie in the village, they took measures to prevent watching³³⁶. They also reported that the movies are usually watched by easterners and children³³⁷.

With the expulsion of fascist troops from the western regions of Ukraine, Stalin’s totalitarian regime was restored here. To ensure its functioning, to overcome the resistance of the Ukrainian liberation forces, the regime used repressive and forceful methods, strict ideological control. Massive ideological and propaganda influence in the first postwar years was carried out both in general and on certain social groups of the population of Drohobych region. All his tools were aimed at discrediting the OUN and UPA, instilling in the minds of the communist-Bolshevik ideology, believing only in the positive Soviet political, economic and cultural changes in the region and creating a positive image of its bearers. Considering the complexity and specificity of different social categories in the region, the Stalinist regime in their ideological and propaganda treatment, resorted to manipulation,

³³³ Starodubec G., Popp R. The Policy of Sovietization of the Western Regions of Ukraine in 1944 – 1953 through the Propagandist Symbols and Rituals. *Studia Historica Nitriensia*. 2020. Vol.: 24. Number: 2. P. 418.

³³⁴ Сеньків В. Радянські форми та методи колективізації західноукраїнського села (1944 – 1952 рр.). *Наукові праці історичного факультету Запорізького національного університету*. 2013. Вип. XXXV. С. 168.

³³⁵ Вурловська М. Кіно у повсякденному житті мешканців Дрогобиччини у повосенний період (1944 – 1958). *Проблеми гуманітарних наук: збірник наукових праць ДДПУ імені Івана Франка. Серія Історія*. 2017. № 40. С.17.

³³⁶ Там само. С. 18.

³³⁷ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 12. Спр. 376. Т. 76. Арк. 44.

outright lies, which pretended to be indisputable truth, cultivated a constant search for enemies of the Soviet system, even potential. Critical comparisons with reality or doubts about the ideals and information promoted by the Stalinist regime, and especially negative statements about it, led to repression.

Ruslana Popp

REPRESSIONS OF SOVIET AUTHORITIES REGARDING MILITARY AND CIVIL PERSONS WHO STAYED IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY (1944 – 1953): SEARCH IN THE MEMORY SPACE

The Soviet government repressions against its own citizens, who, due to the circumstances of World War II, found themselves in the territories occupied by the enemy or in military captivity, have been silent for a long time. Since the 1990s, the process of filling in the so-called “white spots” in national history and forming a real picture of events that took place at the final stage of the war and in the first years after its completion in the memory began. Access to previously closed archival funds was opened, eyewitness accounts and participants of those events were recorded, and the writing of this important page of the national history began. Actually, the memory policy in Ukraine regarding Soviet repressions does not lose its relevance to this day, because until all domestic and foreign documents are investigated, until the full lists of repressed people are reproduced and all the circumstances of references are clarified, this issue will remain relevant.

The issue of repression of the Soviet government against its own citizens of the period under study was first raised by Russian researchers V. Zemskov, I. Govorov, A. Shevyakov back in the early 1990s. They were the first to gain access to and publish documents from the Moscow archives that shed light on the scale and methods of repressions. Among Ukrainian historians, the first researchers of the repressive Soviet system were I. Bilas, B. Yarosh, V. Baran, V. Serhiichuk and others, who published articles and solid monographs on this topic.

The issue of Soviet repression is extremely multifaceted, as it covers numerous social and age groups, is time-consuming and has a number of stages. That is why, now, it seems possible to name several dozen researchers working on this issue. Among the authors of the most recent publications, the following researchers should be noted: V. Ilnytskyi, V. Danylenko, V. Baran, M. Kucherepa, M. Lytvyn, O. Maliarchuk.

In the current article, the authors seek to identify and analyze the features of the Soviet government’s repressions against citizens who stayed at the occupied territory and in enemy captivity during World War II and track the formation of memory of repression in the domestic memory space.

Huge human losses at the beginning of the German-Soviet war, the fact that thousands of soldiers and officers of the Soviet army were encircled or captured by the enemy, already in 1941 raised the question of the attitude of the military and political leadership of the USSR to the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army who came out of the encirclement or escaped from captivity. The espionage mania and suspicion inherent in the Stalinist regime towards its citizens, which in any way got out of its control, would seem to have promised them nothing good.

Even in the pre-war years, precedents were created for reprisals against military personnel who were in captivity. For example, during the so-called “Winter War” of 1939 – 1940, Finnish military captured more than 5 thousand soldiers and commanders of the Red Army. After the conclusion of peace in 1940, 5,359 captured Red Army soldiers voluntarily returned to the USSR (only 99 persons refused to repatriate)³³⁸. And it was then, in 1940, that the attitude of the Soviet leadership to the Red Army soldiers who were in captivity was determined. After the end of the Soviet-Finnish war, the Finnish side handed over to the Soviet authorities 5.5 thousand soldiers who were captured³³⁹. All those who were transferred by the Finnish side to the Soviet Union were sent to the Yuzhskiy special camp of the NKVD created by the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU in April 19, 1940, to check their behavior in captivity. The camp was surrounded by barbed wire and guarded by NKVD convoy troops. Prisoners were deprived of the right to letter writing and meet with relatives³⁴⁰.

Since the very beginning of the German-Soviet war, the attitude of the Soviet leadership towards prisoners of war was determined quite clearly: all military personnel and civilians who even briefly found themselves behind the front line fell under suspicion. Soldiers and

³³⁸ Говоров И. В. Фильтрация советских репатриантов в 40-е гг. XX века: цели, методы, итоги. URL: http://portalus.ru/modules/rushistory/rus_readme.php?subaction=showfull&id=128742 (дата звернения: 23.03.2019)

³³⁹ Земсков В. Спецпоселенцы (1930 – 1959 гг.). *Население России в 1920 – 1950-е годы: численность, потери, миграции: Сб. научн., трудов.* Москва 1994. С. 146–147.

³⁴⁰ Судьба военнопленных и депортированных граждан СССР. Материалы комиссии по реабилитации жертв политических репрессий. *Новая и новейшая история*, 1996. № 2. С. 92.

commanders, who, risking their lives, fought their way through the battles to join the Red Army in difficult conditions were suspected of treason against the motherland. Lone soldiers as well as small groups of encircled soldiers (who broke through the front line) were met as quite likely traitors of the motherland. A significant part of the officers who came out of the encirclement were convicted by military tribunals under Article 193-21 for “unauthorized retreat”. The practice of convicting military personnel who were behind the front line in absentia as traitors was spread. A sufficient reason for such a decision was the data obtained promptly about their alleged anti-Soviet activities. The verdict was passed without trial, investigation or verification, sometimes only on one defamatory statement³⁴¹.

However, in the realities of the initial stage of the German-Soviet war, in the conditions of huge human losses of the Red Army during military operations, the use of such practices was considered too costly. The need to compensate for the losses of personnel in combat units and use the experience of already shelled prisoners of war, was considered an irrational waste of human resources under the above-mentioned circumstances. At the same time, the punitive authorities assumed that the German special services were using people from their entourage to send their agents to the Soviet rear area. Besides, the authorities were afraid that former encircled soldiers and prisoners of war might infect the current units with panic moods.³⁴²

Therefore, a compromise decision was made: to conduct a thorough filtering of all those who returned from captivity and encirclement in order to identify enemy spies, saboteurs and traitors of the motherland among them. To solve this problem, the State Committee of Defense Resolution No. 1069-cc of December 27, 1941, created special camps within the framework of the Department for Prisoners of War Affairs of the NKVD of the USSR to check all “former Red Army servicemen who were captured and encircled by the enemy”. There were from 15 to 30 special camps during different periods of the war. Special checking of military personnel in them was carried out by special departments of camps consisting of military counterintelligence officers.

³⁴¹ Стрільчук Л. Доля військовополонених і депортованих громадян СРСР у роки Другої світової війни та після її закінчення. *Науковий вісник Волинського державного університету імені Лесі Українки. Історичні науки*. 1998. № 1. С. 95.

³⁴² Білас І. Репресивно-каральна система в Україні. 1917 – 1953. Книга перша. Київ: Либідь, 1994. С. 133–134.

However, the purpose of their activities had changed significantly compared to 1940. This time, they faced the specific task of identifying among those who are filtered by the special contingent (terminology of those years) of fascist agents, persons who voluntarily encircled and fled the battlefield, and not abstract “alien elements”³⁴³.

Russian researcher I. Govorov claims that during the period from 1941 to 1944, 354,592 military personnel, including 50,441 officers, passed through NKVD special camps. The special checking of 302,991 military personnel, including 44,774 officers, was completed. Upon completion of the checking, 249,416 of them were sent for further service in the Red Army (including 2,219 privates and sergeants and 16,163 officers – in penal companies and battalions), 30,749 (including 20 officers) – to work in industrial enterprises, 5,294 persons – to serve in the NKVD troops, 5,347 persons died during the inspection or were sent to the hospital due to illness. Among those checked, 11,566 persons were arrested by the military counterintelligence authorities. (About 3.5%), including 2083 as agents of enemy intelligence and counterintelligence, the rest – on charges of desertion, unauthorized abandonment of a unit in a combat situation, unauthorized retreat, voluntary surrender³⁴⁴. Therefore, a simplified procedure for filtering military personnel who were encircled or held in military captivity was developed in the active army during 1942.

Among the former prisoners of war and encircled soldiers arrested by the special forces, along with real traitors of the motherland and deserters, there were also many soldiers and commanders involved on falsified charges. SMERSH officers were most biased in filtering against representatives of the Red Army command staff, who were checked longer and more thoroughly and were held criminally liable much more often than ordinary military personnel. Such facts were a logical consequence of the situation in the 1930s, the practice of the Soviet special services, which distrust of their own citizens became one of the main principles of their functioning³⁴⁵.

³⁴³ Земсков В. К вопросу о масштабах репрессий в СССР. *Социологические исследования*. 1995. №1. С. 118–123.

³⁴⁴ Говоров И. В. Фильтрация советских репатриантов в 40-е гг. XX века: цели, методы, итоги. URL: http://portalus.ru/modules/rushistory/rus_readme.php?subaction=showfull&id=128742 (дата звернення: 23.03.2019).

³⁴⁵ Стрільчук Л. Доля військовополонених і депортованих громадян СРСР у роки Другої світової війни та після її закінчення. *Науковий вісник Волинського дер-*

Long before the beginning of the liberation of occupied territories, the NKVD of the USSR order No. 001683 of April 12, 1941, “On operational and Chekist maintenance of territories liberated from enemy troops” was issued. According to the order, the territorial state authorities and special departments of the NKVD were tasked with immediate arresting and bringing to justice “traitors and provocateurs who were in the service of the German occupation authorities and assisted them in making anti-Soviet steps and persecuting party and Soviet activists and honest Soviet citizens”. Most of the residents of the liberated territories, who were forced to participate in the life of the occupation regime in order to survive, could fall under such vague wording. According to archival documents, not only employees of occupation institutions and the police were often arrested as “enemy elements”, but also cleaners, salesmen, janitors who worked in German organizations, and just men of military age who for some reason did not get into the army³⁴⁶.

On February 18, 1942, an instruction of the NKVD, which clearly regulated the categories of persons subjected to repression in the liberated territories was issued. All suspects in cooperation with the fascist regime were subject to mandatory filtering, which was to be carried out by district and city departments of the NKVD. During the filtering, officers and agents of the German special services, members of magistrates formed by the invaders, local governments, prefects, policemen and other employees of the occupation administrative bodies, members of anti-Soviet organizations and military formations organized by the Germans, owners of brothels for Germans were identified and arrested³⁴⁷.

The remaining categories of persons who cooperated with the occupation regime: owners and residents of the houses in which the occupation institutions were located, members of the CPSU and the Komsomol voluntarily registered with the occupation administration, women who had intimate relations with officers, soldiers and officials of the German army, all without exception persons who served in institutions

жовного університету імені Лесі Українки. Історичні науки. Луцьк, 1998. № 1. С. 95–96.

³⁴⁶ Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України. (ЦДАГО Укр.). Ф. 1. Оп. 3. Ч. 1. Спр. 2. Арк. 57–59.

³⁴⁷ Політика пам’яті в Україні щодо радянських репресій у західних областях (1939 – 1953): колективна монографія. Відп. ред. В. Ільницький. Львів – Торунь: Liha-Pres, 2021. С. 120–123.

and enterprises created by the Germans (except for those forcibly mobilized), all persons who voluntarily provided services to the Germans, whatever the nature of these services, and family members of persons who voluntarily left with the Germans, as well as citizens of military age those who evaded mobilization in the Red Army were registered as agents, and later sent for additional verification to NKVD special camps and were arrested only if they received materials about their active treacherous work³⁴⁸.

These instructions are reflected in the NKVD-NKGB directives No. 437/89 and 494/49, which introduced a new filtration procedure in the areas liberated from occupation. In accordance with it, the search, arrest and investigation of agents of German special services, employees of punitive and police bodies, members of anti-Soviet organizations fell on the shoulders of state security agencies. Other categories of accomplices, traitors and Hitler's henchmen fell under the jurisdiction of employees of the internal affairs bodies³⁴⁹. Direct work on filtering in the liberated territories was entrusted to the Main Directorate for combating banditry of the NKVD of the USSR and its local apparatuses—departments for combating banditry (OBB) under the regional departments of the NKVD³⁵⁰.

Under their leadership, local NKVD district departments identified, registered and conducted inspections of persons suspected of assisting the invaders. The exposed traitors were subject to immediate arrest. As for the accomplices, only the so-called “active accomplices”, that is, those who actively supported the Hitler regime, were supposed to be arrested here. The remaining accomplices were suggested to be sent for further verification to NKVD special camps³⁵¹. In the event that, even during this check, the facts of treacherous activities on their part were not revealed, they were sent to the army or to work in industry after the filtration was completed. Only “accomplices” associated with the So-

³⁴⁸ ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 3. Ч. 1. Спр. 2. Арк. 12.

³⁴⁹ Земсков В. Н. ГУЛАГ (историко-социологический аспект). *Социологические исследования*. 1991. № 6-7. С. 32.

³⁵⁰ Strilchuk L. Cauzele caracterului forțat al repatrierii ucrainenilor din zonele occidentale de ocupație în URSS, după al Doilea Război Mondial (1945 – 1951). *Codrul Cosminului*. XXII. 2016. No. 2. P. 269–270.

³⁵¹ Білас І. Репресивно-каральна система в Україні. 1917 – 1953. Книга перша. Київ: Либідь, 1994. С. 168–169.

viet army, underground and guerilla fighters during the occupation were exempt from being sent to special camps.

In practice, it was not uncommon for local NKVD and NKGB officers to make mass arrests of all those suspected of aiding the Nazis, without paying much attention to the existence of evidence of their guilt. Representatives of the filtration authorities, as a rule, did not take into account such circumstances as the forced nature of participation of certain groups of the population in cooperation with the invaders, for example, in the restoration of bridges, repair of railways or other objects, when the civilian population at gunpoint was forced to work on the restoration of destroyed infrastructure. During 1943 – 1944, the central bodies of the NKVD–NKGB had to regularly give instructions to their local apparatuses to release from prison and send to special camps those “accomplices” who do not have materials about their criminal activities³⁵².

Another category was the population that came under the close attention of the Soviet punitive authorities, there was the population that supported the Ukrainian national liberation movement, such as members of the UPA or simply as sympathizers of this movement. The powerful repressive apparatus of the totalitarian Soviet regime was thrown to destroy the UPA. For this purpose, regular troops, police forces and security services were involved, as well as an extensive party, Soviet, and Komsomol workers. The authorities, having returned to Western Ukraine, could not accept the broad support of the UPA by the Western Ukraine population. Meanwhile, the national liberation movement had significant social roots and broad support from the population.

In the Ukrainian SSR, the struggle against the UPA was personally led by M. Khrushchev, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(B)U. On January 10, 1945, the Central Committee of the CP (B)U adopted resolution “On strengthening the fight against Ukrainian-German nationalists in the western regions of Ukraine”. The Central Committee of the CP(B)U defined March 15, 1945, as the deadline for the abolition of the nationalist movement in the western regions of

³⁵² Надольський Й. Сталінська депортаційна політика і зміни етнічної структури населення західних областей України. *Друга світова війна і доля народів України. 2-га Всеукраїнська наукова конференція. 30-31 жовтня 2006 року, м. Київ. Тези доповідей.* К., 2006. С. 71–72.

Ukraine³⁵³. In total, 26,304 soldiers and officers were stationed in the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR. In addition, two more divisions of 2,278 and 2,958 men were later transferred to the Volyn and Rivne regions. 22 tanks, five armored trains with 7,700 soldiers and officers were involved in the fight against the UPA³⁵⁴. All those suspected of involvement in the UPA were arrested and sent to filtration camps.

Ukrainian historian, researcher of the Soviet totalitarian regime I. Bilas in his monograph “Repressive and Punitive System in Ukraine. 1917 – 1953” provides data based on documents of the State Archive of the Russian Federation, and certify that as of January 1, 1945, that is, in less than six months, after the expulsion of the German invaders from Western Ukraine, the repressive Stalinist authorities killed 124,336 people who participated in the national liberation movement³⁵⁵.

According to the above facts, the Soviet leadership was suspicious of all categories of persons who lived in the territories occupied by the enemy, whether it was military captivity, or encirclement, they were taken to forced labor in Germany, or just being on terror that fell under occupation. Thus, a significant part of Soviet citizens had to pass humiliating checks and filtering, and both categories: repatriates from the eastern and western zones of occupation and citizens who were in their places of pre-war residence, but had the misfortune, even for a short time, to be under German occupation. All of them were forced to prove their loyalty and trustworthiness to the Soviet security forces by passing filtration in special camps.

The issues raised in this article only partially reveal the complex and multifaceted process of repression of the Soviet government against its own citizens. The authorities’ distrust of people who lived in Western Ukraine was particularly acute, as they were, in fact, the least supporters of Soviet ideology and in the short pre-war period became more likely to become staunch opponents of the Soviet power than its supporters. Mass support by residents of Western Ukraine for the Ukrainian national liberation movement, commitment to the Greek

³⁵³ Ярош Б. О. Тоталітарний режим на західноукраїнських землях 30-50-ті роки ХХ століття (історико-політичний аспект): монографія. Луцьк: Надстир’я, 1995. С. 88.

³⁵⁴ Білас І. Репресивно-каральна система в Україні. 1917 – 1953. Книга перша. Київ: Либідь, 1994. С. 177.

³⁵⁵ Ibid. С. 178.

Catholic Church (which the authorities accused of supporting the German occupants), a large number of political refugees from the western regions, among the ranks of the Soviet displaced persons, also testified to the rejection of Soviet reality by a significant part of west Ukrainian society.

All this prompted the top political leadership of the USSR to establish absolute control over the Western Ukraine lands as soon as possible, and all possible methods were used for this. The resistance provided by the UPA only increased the confrontation between the authorities and people of the Western Ukraine lands. That is why the flywheel of repression with particular cruelty and scale swept through the expanses of Western Ukraine. Of course, during the Soviet period, the mentioned confrontation, as well as the repression of the authorities against residents of the western regions of Ukraine, was not mentioned either in scientific literature or fiction. The ideological taboo was imposed on this issue, and the fear of persecution and punishment led to the silence of historical facts.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, in the context of the revival of Ukrainian statehood, the process of exposing “white historical spots” has begun, accompanied by numerous publications, the opening of archives, collected testimonies of victims of repression and eyewitnesses of the events under study. Meanwhile, many of those who suffered from the repression were no longer alive. It was quite difficult to fill in the gaps in the memory. Brought up on Soviet ideology and Soviet historical myth, the post-war generations needed a lot of time to rethink the historical past, and not everyone was able to do it.

As practice has shown, the transformation of the memory space of post-war generations was rather slow, although not only historians worked in this direction. During the 1990s, the first feature films and books appeared that reveal the tragedy of post-war repressions, in particular, in Western Ukraine. The problem of Soviet repression is written out on the pages of textbooks, the names of the fighters for the national state silenced in the USSR, along with the names of those repressed by the authorities, come out of oblivion. And although three decades have passed since the emergence of independent Ukraine, despite the volumes of written works, the memory space is still far from fully formed and requires constant and painstaking correction.

Liudmyla Strilchuk, Oleksandr Dobrzhanskyi

REPRESSED EDUCATORS OF DROHOBYCH REGION (THE SECOND HALF OF THE 1940s): PROSOPOGRAPHICAL ASPECTS

The study of the repressive activities of the Soviet authorities in the western Ukrainian region during the first postwar years requires clarification of the social and prosopographical aspects of the problem. It is known that one of the directions of prosopographic research is the creation of collective biographies of persons united on a certain basis: family, professional, social, political, ethnic, and so on. As one of the key targets of Soviet repression in the area was the educational intelligentsia, prosopographic studies of its persecuted, arrested, convicted, and deported by Stalinists became important. Without exaggeration, the processing of archival and criminal cases of repressed teachers has an exceptional role. In this section we will consider the biographies of three teachers repressed by the Soviet regime in the 1940s in the Drohobych Region of the USSR: Fedir Vyshyvanyi, Olena Voryk, Varvara Zhurbenko.

Fedir Khomovych Vyshyvanyi was born in 1890 in the village of Lishchyn of Bibrsk Povit (District) in Eastern Galicia. His father died in 1894 and his mother Anastasia was left with three children³⁵⁶. A few years after her husband's death, she married a local peasant, Yurii Tykhyi. She also had three children from her second marriage³⁵⁷. In 1902, Fedir Vyshyvanyi graduated from a four-grade elementary school in the village Lishchyn and entered the Academic Gymnasium in Lviv³⁵⁸. From 1910 to 1914 he was educated at the Physics and Mathematics Department of the Faculty of Philosophy of Lviv University. About a year after his studies, he worked in a private Ukrainian gymnasium in Dolyna³⁵⁹. Around the same time, F. Vyshyvanyi's political views were outlined: while studying at the university, he joined the Radical Party³⁶⁰.

³⁵⁶ Архів Управління Служби безпеки України у Львівській області (далі – АУС-БУ ЛО). Спр. 38108. Арк. 15–16.

³⁵⁷ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Арк. 16.

³⁵⁸ Головка М. В. Невідомі імена в історії вітчизняної методичної думки: внесок Федора Вишиваного у розвиток дидактики фізики. URL: http://lib.iitta.gov.ua/107261/1/golov_2011.pdf

³⁵⁹ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Арк. 19.

³⁶⁰ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Арк. 63.

During the First World War, F. Vyshyvanyi was mobilized into the Austro-Hungarian army³⁶¹ (late 1915). Then he took an active part in the cultural and educational activities of the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen, taught physics and mathematics in the “stage gymnasium” for Sich Riflemen in their places of residence, and from 1916 to 1917 he also worked as a primary school teacher in the village of Litovezh of Volodymyr-Volyn District, which he organized himself³⁶².

At the beginning of the Ukrainian-Polish war (November 1918), F. Vyshyvanyi joined the Ukrainian Galician Army (hereinafter – UGA) and took part in the battles for Lviv. However, due to illness, he was forced to go home for treatment to the village Lishchyn³⁶³. After staying in his native village for two or three months, he again went to the UGA, where he was appointed “a commander in the formation of a military convoy” in Khodoriv³⁶⁴. Most likely, F. Vyshyvanyi performed certain functions at the organizational and material department of the UGA Initial Team, which from the end of January to May 23, 1919, was located in Khodoriv³⁶⁵.

After the UGA withdrew from the territory of the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic in the summer of 1919, F. Vyshyvanyi moved to the territory of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. On August 1, 1919, he was awarded the rank of chetar (lieutenant)³⁶⁶. In the early 1920s, the UGA surrendered to the Red Army. F. Vyshyvanyi handed over his convoy to the Bolsheviks and was sent to Zhmerynka, where he headed the assembly point of the Red Ukrainian Galician Army (RUGA). Here he came under the influence of Bolshevik propaganda and joined the Communist Party³⁶⁷.

In Zhmerynka F. Vyshyvanyi met his future wife Natalia Fesak from Poltava region³⁶⁸. In the autumn of 1920, the young couple

³⁶¹ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Арк. 19–20.

³⁶² Головка М. В. Невідомі імена в історії вітчизняної методичної думки: внесок Федора Вишиваного у розвиток дидактики фізики. URL: http://lib.iitta.gov.ua/107261/1/golov_2011.pdf; Лазарович М. Легіон українських січових стрільців: формування, ідея, боротьба. Тернопіль: Джура, 2005. С. 234–235, 336–337, 400.

³⁶³ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Арк. 20.

³⁶⁴ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Арк. 20–21.

³⁶⁵ Українська Галицька Армія (матеріяли до історії). Т. 1. Вінніпег, 1958. С. 75, 414.

³⁶⁶ Українська Галицька Армія ... Т. 2. С. 330.

³⁶⁷ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Арк. 63.

³⁶⁸ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Арк. 17–18.

moved to Kharkiv, where F. Vyshyvanyi worked as an inspector of the organizational department of the People's Commissariat of Education of the USSR, organizing local departments of public education and schools. From October 1920 he also worked as a teacher at the G. Skovoroda Pedagogical School in Kharkiv, and from March 1921 he was the headmaster of the same school. Later, F. Vyshyvanyi reorganized the school into a pedagogical technical school, which he headed until 1929³⁶⁹.

From January 1924, F. Vyshyvanyi worked part-time as an assistant at the Department of Physics, Faculty of Social Education, Kharkiv Institute of Public Education³⁷⁰. In 1928/29 academic year Pedagogical College named after G. Skovoroda joined the Kharkiv Institute of Public Education as a "junior concentrate department"³⁷¹. It was during this period of F. Vyshyvanyi's life and activity of his scientific work in the field of didactics of physics began. As early as 1924, he translated the textbook "Primary Physics" by O. Zinger into Ukrainian, which he revised and supplemented with new methodological materials. In 1927 he published a textbook for teachers and students "Physics of the first centre of labour school", and concluded a syllabus for self-education of teachers of Physics published in pedagogical journals "Shlyah Osvity" ("The Path of Education"), "Radyanska Osvita" ("Soviet Education"), "Dytyachyi Ruh" ("Children's Movement")³⁷².

At the turn of the 1920s and 1930s, the Soviet repressive and punitive system reached its peak. The persecution of representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia began, in connection with which cases of affiliation with "counter-revolutionary organizations" were fabricated. In these circumstances, F. Vyshyvanyi also came under suspicion and in 1928 – 1929 agreed to "secretly cooperate" with the Soviet authorities³⁷³. However, the role of a sexton did not save him from repression: in 1931 he was arrested and charged with belonging to the Ukrainian Military Organization (hereinafter – UMO).

³⁶⁹ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Арк. 21–22; Головка М. В. Невідомі імена ... URL: http://lib.iitta.gov.ua/107261/1/golov_2011.pdf

³⁷⁰ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Арк. 22–23.

³⁷¹ Бакіров В. С. Харківський національний університет ім. В. Н. Каразіна: віхи історії // Краєзнавство. 2006. № 1–4. С. 126.

³⁷² Головка М. В. Невідомі імена ... URL: http://lib.iitta.gov.ua/107261/1/golov_2011.pdf

³⁷³ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Арк. 47зв.

The main fault of F. Vyshyvanyi was his activity in the cooperative publishing house “Rukh”, which task was to publish works of Ukrainian literature exclusively in Ukrainian. It is known that it published complete collections of works by V. Vynnychenko, I. Franko, B. Hrinchenko³⁷⁴. The editor and board member of the Rukh publishing house were Ivan Lyzanivskiy, who, by the way, studied at the University of Lviv at the same time as F. Vyshyvanyi and was Ivan Franko’s secretary from 1910 to 1912. Later he became a member of the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries and was a member of the Central Council (1917 – 1918)³⁷⁵. It is possible that I. Lyzanivskiy attracted F. Vyshyvanyi to work in the publishing house.

During the investigation, I. Lyzanivskiy testified against F. Vyshyvanyi as a participant in the UMO during a face-to-face meeting. The arrested Kharkiv journalist Vsevolod Dnistrenko gave the same testimony. Therefore, for belonging to the UMO and conducting “counter-revolutionary nationalist work” F. Vyshyvanyi was sentenced to three years in a labour camp (LC). He served his sentence in Krasnopyshe LC until 1934³⁷⁶.

After his release, F. Vyshyvanyi returned to Kharkiv. For some time he worked at various jobs, and in 1935 he went to the North Caucasus region of Russia to Kislovodsk, where he worked for about a month at the meteorological station. Soon F. Vyshyvanyi got a job as a teacher of Physics at a secondary school in the village of Dyvne Apanasenkivskiy district³⁷⁷. F. Vyshyvanyi’s job description, signed by the director of this school on May 10, 1936, was preserved. It was noted that the teacher knows the course of Physics and Mathematics well, and has good organizational skills, makes necessary equipments for teaching in high school³⁷⁸.

In 1938, F. Vyshyvanyi moved to the city of Nevynnomysk, where he worked as a teacher of Physics at S. Kirov secondary school³⁷⁹. In

³⁷⁴ Васьківська О. Книговидавнича діяльність в УСРР у 1926 р.: тенденції та особливості розвитку // Вісник Книжкової палати України. 2016. № 2. С. 40.

³⁷⁵ Подоляка Н. Розстріляний за професійну діяльність: редактор і видавець Іван Лизанівський у громадсько-політичному і видавничому русі // Український інформаційний простір. 2018. Ч. 2. С. 125, 127.

³⁷⁶ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Арк. 23, 31–32.

³⁷⁷ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Арк. 23–24, 73зв.

³⁷⁸ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Без пагінації.

³⁷⁹ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Арк. 24, 27, 73зв.

the summer of 1942, German occupation troops entered Nevytnomysk. During the occupation, F. Vyshyvanyi, as a connoisseur of the German language, was offered the position of a translator in the military commandant's office of the city. During August-September 1942, the teacher agreed and translated the orders of the authorities for the local population, and for the commandant – various appeals, requests and complaints of residents³⁸⁰.

In October 1942, F. Vyshyvanyi was appointed the head of the Nevytnomysk district. In this position, he organized local authorities in the district centre and the countryside. Under the district administration, he created departments of agriculture, finance, public education, health care and others. The mayor of Nevytnomysk was subordinated to him. At the end of 1942, F. Vyshyvanyi held a meeting of peasants in Nevytnomysk, at which the decision to liquidate the collective farms was announced³⁸¹.

As early as January 1943, German troops withdrew from the North Caucasus, so F. Vyshyvanyi had to evacuate. He left for Kryvyi Rih, and from there to Kyiv (March 1943). For some time F. Vyshyvanyi lived in Kharkiv (June-August 1943). Here he met his old acquaintances with whom he worked in the People's Commissariat in the 1920s: Professor Mikhailo Mishchenko, Associate Professor Ivan Krylov. With their help, he got a job as a deputy head of the city department of public education, at the same time a head of German language courses. During his stay in Kharkiv, F. Vyshyvanyi also met with the lawyer Volodymyr Dolenko³⁸². It is known that V. Dolenko was an active participant in the Ukrainian revolution of 1917 – 1921, in 1930 he was convicted at the trial of the “Union for the Liberation of Ukraine”³⁸³.

As Soviet troops advanced, F. Vyshyvanyi was forced to leave Kharkiv. In September 1943 he and his daughter Anastasia arrived in his native village of Lishchyn. A few months later, he organized two groups of students (21 people) to prepare for high school. With the arrival of the Soviet authorities in the summer of 1944, F. Vyshyvanyi was appointed the head of the educational work of Novostrilishchansk secondary school³⁸⁴. In his autobiography, which he submitted to the

³⁸⁰ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Арк. 24–25, 33, 39.

³⁸¹ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Арк. 33зв–34, 48зв–49.

³⁸² АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Арк. 27, 34, 39, 49зв–50, 89зв.

³⁸³ Семенко Ю. Памяті В.А. Доленка. Мюнхен, 1975. С. 29.

³⁸⁴ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Арк. 28, 81зв.

district department of education on August 20, 1944, he certainly did not mention his work in the structures of the German occupation administration in Nevinnomysk and Kharkiv³⁸⁵.

Three months later, F. Vyshyvanyi was appointed the director of Novostrilishchansk Secondary School. He worked in this position for about a year, but on December 5, 1945, he was transferred to the position of the director of the secondary school in Zhydachiv. And on April 17, 1946, was appointed the inspector of Drohobych regional department³⁸⁶. Undoubtedly, such a rapid growth of F. Vyshyvanyi is explained by his professionalism and experience, as well as the lack of a sufficient number of trained teachers in the postwar Drohobych region. However, F. Vyshyvanyi worked as an inspector for only one month, because on May 14 he was detained by the Soviet state security bodies in Drohobych³⁸⁷.

At that time, F. Vyshyvanyi was wanted as an accomplice of the German occupiers³⁸⁸. However, his arrest was primarily related to the activities of his daughter Anastasia, who was also detained in Zhydachiv on May 14, 1946. The fact is that A. Vyshyvana, living with her father in the village Lishchyn, in early 1944 joined the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (hereinafter – OUN) and married Hryhoriy Gamkalo- “Maiskyi” – an organizational officer of the Horodok (Lviv) district of the OUN³⁸⁹.

As A. Vyshyvana admitted, her father did not approve her participation in the OUN underground³⁹⁰. Despite this, he helped his daughter in every possible way, in particular, he tried to help her enter the Lviv Medical Institute (September 1944), to obtain legal documents³⁹¹. F. Vyshyvanyi communicated with his rebel son-in-law H. Gamkalo twice. Back in the autumn of 1943, Fedir Vyshyvanyi had a meeting with the OUN district leader Vasyl Kostyk-“Dniprov”, who was a distant relative of his. They talked about life in the USSR (collective

³⁸⁵ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Без пагінації.

³⁸⁶ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Арк. 28.

³⁸⁷ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Арк. 15.

³⁸⁸ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Без пагінації.

³⁸⁹ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Арк. 18, 35–36, 41, 72, 87, 59–60, 114; Мороз В. Під псевдонімом “Майський”. Новий Час. 25.07.2011 р. URL: <https://www.newtime.lviv.ua/index.php/newtime-osobustosti-kt/614-2011-07-25-13-29-54>

³⁹⁰ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Арк. 81зв.

³⁹¹ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Арк. 45зв, 85, 87зв.

farms, oppression of the intelligentsia), as well as the OUN struggle for Ukrainian statehood³⁹².

After his detention, F. Vyshyvanyi remained in custody, and on June 6, an arrest warrant was issued for him³⁹³. Between May 14 and September 13, 1946, he was interrogated 15 times, sometimes three times a day. It is important that during the interrogations F. Vyshyvanyi confirmed his hostility to the Soviet authorities, in particular, through the conduct of discriminatory national policies³⁹⁴. During the interrogation on June 13, 1946, he stated: “No, I am not a member of the OUN, but I consider the struggle of Ukrainian nationalists to be right, because, in my opinion, it is fair, because I believe that the Ukrainian population in the western regions has no rights”³⁹⁵.

On September 19, 1946, the investigation of the case of F. Vyshyvanyi and his daughter was completed. The indictment provided for charges under Art. 54-1a and 54-11 of the Criminal Code of the USSR³⁹⁶. The trial of the Military Tribunal of the Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian District in the case of Fedir and Anastasia Vyshyvanykh took place on October 29, 1946. Both pleaded guilty to the charges. However, F. Vyshyvanyi stated that he was not a member of the OUN and asked the tribunal to show leniency to his daughter. The verdict of the tribunal was severe: 20 years of hard labour for F. Vyshyvanyi and 10 years of LC for Anastasia, as well as deprivation of both rights for 5 years and confiscation of property³⁹⁷. The teacher’s life ended in prison on October 27, 1951.

In April 1955, the case of F. Vyshyvanyi was reviewed by the Office of the Ministry of Justice in Drohobych region. It was found that the court incorrectly applied to F. Vyshyvanyi Art. 54-11 of the Criminal Code of the USSR, because his membership in the OUN was not proven. However, the measure of punishment is still recognized as appropriate³⁹⁸. A. Vyshyvana was rehabilitated in 1995. The following year, the Lviv Regional Court, because of the prosecutor’s office, considered the case of F. Vyshyvanyi and found the conviction of his con-

³⁹² АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Арк. 36–363в, 37–373в, 41–413в, 56–58.

³⁹³ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Арк. 5.

³⁹⁴ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Арк. 413в.

³⁹⁵ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Арк. 403в.

³⁹⁶ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Арк. 141–142.

³⁹⁷ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Арк. 152–1543в, 155–159.

³⁹⁸ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Арк. 1703в.

viction under Art. 54-11. Charges under Art. 54-1a the court reclassified to Art. 53-3 of the Criminal Code of the USSR and decided to consider F. Vyshyvanyi sentenced to five years³⁹⁹.

Olena Petrivna Voryk was born in 1927 in the village of Strashevychi near the town of Staryi Sambir⁴⁰⁰. After receiving a seven-grade primary education, during the German occupation, she entered the women's tailoring craft school (with Ukrainian as the language of instruction) in Sambir⁴⁰¹. This school was founded at the end of 1941 and had a two-year term of study⁴⁰². At that time, the organization "Educational Community of Ukrainian Youth" (ECUY) was active in the school⁴⁰³. As is known, the ECUY was formed during the years of German occupation under the auspices of the Ukrainian Central Committee and implemented the basics of formation education.

Daryna Temnyk was the head of the ECUY branch at Sambir Tailoring School⁴⁰⁴. O. Voryk also joined this organization. As she later mentioned, some members of the ECUY were also involved in the OUN⁴⁰⁵. Eventually, in April-May 1944, O. Voryk herself joined the OUN and received the pseudonym "Lypa"⁴⁰⁶.

In the summer of 1944, Soviet troops again entered Drohobych, and the restoration of Soviet power began. Being in the need for teachers, the Soviet authorities organized short-term teacher training courses in Drohobych to train primary school teachers. O. Voryk decided to get a pedagogical education, so from August to November 1944, she attended these courses. In November of the same year, she was assigned to work at the primary school in the village Coblo Stare, Staryisambir district, Drohobych region. Soon the teacher was transferred to the position of the head of the primary school in the village Humenets⁴⁰⁷. In January 1945 she joined the Komsomol⁴⁰⁸.

³⁹⁹ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 38108. Арк. 183–183зв.

⁴⁰⁰ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П-27482. Арк. 3.

⁴⁰¹ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П-27482. Арк. 25.

⁴⁰² Як працює Український Окружний Комітет у Самборі // Самбірські вісті. 1941. Ч. 34. 30 листопада. С. 1; Українські професійні школи в Генеральній Губернії // Краківські вісті. 1943. Ч. 157(895). 22 липня. С. 5.

⁴⁰³ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П-27482. Арк. 25зв.

⁴⁰⁴ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П-27482. Арк. 26зв–27зв.

⁴⁰⁵ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П-27482. Арк. 26зв.

⁴⁰⁶ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П-27482. Арк. 25зв–26.

⁴⁰⁷ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П-27482. Арк. 33, 49зв, 80зв, 149–150зв.

⁴⁰⁸ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П-27482. Арк. 149–150зв.

At the same time, O. Voryk continued her underground activities as an ordinary member of the OUN, following the orders of the district leader of the OUN women's network, Marta Koltunyak-“Tetiana”⁴⁰⁹. However, in January 1945 she was appointed “a district leader of the women's network”. Since then, O. Voryk received the pseudonym “Myroslava”⁴¹⁰. We assume that she was a member of the “women's network” in Staryi Sambir district leadership of the OUN.

The territorial scope of the OUN Women's Network, which was subject to O. Voryk-Myroslava, included part of Staryi Sambir (Posada Dolishnya) and the villages of Koblo Stare, Volya Koblyanska, Strashevychi, Berezhnytsia and Sozan⁴¹¹. In each of these settlements, there was a centre of “women's network” of the OUN, headed by the a village leader. O. Voryk kept in touch with all the villagers with the help of her subordinates, or personally⁴¹².

The main task of the villagers was to collect products for URA units operating in the Carpathian forests. They brought or handed over the collected food to O. Voryk, who in turn handed it over to M. Koltunyak-“Tetiana” or Ivan Kurchyk-“Shumskyi”, a household referent of the Staryisambir district branch of the OUN⁴¹³. From I. Kurchyk “Myroslava” received spirits, money and things necessary for the insurgent hospital. She passed all this to the URA nurse Kateryna Kocherhan⁴¹⁴. In addition, O. Voryk-“Myroslava” obliged the village and subordinate members of the OUN villages to collect monetary membership fees, to study the “Decalogue of the Ukrainian nationalist”⁴¹⁵.

At the end of April 1945, Myroslava received an order to disband the OUN women's network⁴¹⁶. In May 1945, O. Voryk ceased to perform the functions of the district leader (referent) of the “women's network” of the OUN⁴¹⁷. During this time she continued to teach. However, in the summer of 1945, the teacher came into the view of

⁴⁰⁹ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П-27482. Арк. 26.

⁴¹⁰ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П-27482. Арк. 13зв, 15.

⁴¹¹ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П-27482. Арк. 17, 36.

⁴¹² АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П-27482. Арк. 17, 36.

⁴¹³ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П-27482. Арк. 17зв.

⁴¹⁴ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П-27482. Арк. 37зв.

⁴¹⁵ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П-27482. Арк. 14, 17, 21.

⁴¹⁶ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П-27482. Арк. 21зв.

⁴¹⁷ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П-27482. Арк. 21.

Soviet special services. In August of that year, she was detained by officers of Staryisambir District Department of the KGB and detained for almost two weeks on suspicion of belonging to the OUN. However, due to a lack of evidence, the teacher was soon released⁴¹⁸.

At the beginning of 1946, in preparation for the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the “Great Blockade” began. Every settlement in the western regions of Ukraine was under the control of Soviet troops, and numerous inspections, raids, and searches were conducted. It was under such circumstances that O. Voryk was arrested, although the case played a significant role in this. On February 2, 1946, Soviet soldiers detained Stefania Lesyk, who was carrying food (flour, meat, candy), tobacco, and a man’s watch. The detainee was handed over to the officers of the Staryisambir Regional Department of the KGB. During interrogations, S. Lesyk confessed to belonging to the OUN, and told about some underground activists, in particular the village of Stefania Terebukh⁴¹⁹. As early as February 3, 1946, the enkadebists arrested S. Terebukh, who told about interrogations about O. Voryk-“Myroslava”.

On February 7, 1946, O. Voryk was arrested. The first interrogation was conducted by Major Volynin, the head of the Staryisambir Regional Department of the KGB. The teacher initially denied her membership in the OUN, but during subsequent interrogations, she confessed and told about her activities in the underground, and testified about other OUN members with whom she cooperated⁴²⁰.

In March 1946, O. Voryk and several other underground activists were transferred to Drohobych, where interrogations continued⁴²¹. On April 19, 1946, Investigator Zhmiljov issued an “indictment” against a group of detainees, according to which O. Voryk was accused of acting as the district leader of the OUN “women’s network”; recruiting new members and organising OUN cells in the villages; met regularly with senior leaders; collected from the population food, money and various things for the URA; was in charge of liaisons, through which she sent messages and various nationalist literature to other members of the OUN; had connections with URA soldiers, to whom she handed over food, money, and medical supplies. In general, the teacher was incrim-

⁴¹⁸ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П-27482. Арк. 33–33зв.

⁴¹⁹ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П-27482. Арк. 78зв-79зв.

⁴²⁰ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П-27482. Арк. 12–20зв.

⁴²¹ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П-27482. Арк. 33–39.

inated crimes under Articles 54-1a and 54-11⁴²² (“betrayal of the homeland” and “participation in a counter-revolutionary organization”). On May 24, 1946, the Military Tribunal (MT) of the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Drohobych region sentenced the teacher to 15 years of hard labour, deprivation of rights for 5 years, confiscation of property⁴²³.

O. Voryk was serving her sentence in the Bereg Camp in Magadan. After Stalin’s death and the rehabilitation of prisoners began, she requested a retrial. As a result, the prosecutor’s office found that the case file did not prove that the teacher, as a member of the OUN, had committed any crimes against Soviet citizens. In June 1955, the sentence for O. Voryk was changed – the sentence was reduced to 10 years of imprisonment in the LC and deprivation of rights for 3 years⁴²⁴.

After her release, the former teacher moved to her parents, who were repressed in 1947 and evicted to a special settlement in Kopeysk, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Russia⁴²⁵. There she married and lived all her life. Only after the collapse of the USSR was rehabilitated.

Varvara Stepanivna Zhurbenko was born on December 7, 1925, in the village of Morozivka, Oleksandrivka district, Kirovohrad region, in the family of a poor peasant. In 1932, due to mass famine, the Zhurbenkos moved to Crimea and settled in Evpatoria. Two years later, they moved to Kamyanske (since 1936 – Dniprodzerzhynsk). In 1942 she received a general secondary education⁴²⁶.

In the autumn of 1942, during the German occupation, V. Zhurbenko went to Dnipropetrovsk and entered the university⁴²⁷. It should be noted that the formation of Ukrainian State University in Dnepropetrovsk took place on September 22, 1941⁴²⁸. Soon the girl moved to Dnepropetrovsk Transport Institute⁴²⁹.

While studying at the institute, V. Zhurbenko maintained close relations with Nadiya Voronina from Dniprodzerzhynsk. Nadiya was a

⁴²² АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П-27482. Арк. 129–132.

⁴²³ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П-27482. Арк. 159зв–160.

⁴²⁴ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П-27482. Арк. 196–197.

⁴²⁵ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П-27482. Арк. 179–180зв.

⁴²⁶ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П 19194. Арк. 15–15зв, 71.

⁴²⁷ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П 19194. Арк. 35.

⁴²⁸ Чепурко О. О. Історія Державного українського університету у м. Дніпропетровськ (1941 – 1943): постановка наукової проблеми // Гілея. 2015. Вип. 95. С. 85.

⁴²⁹ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П 19194. Арк. 15, 35.

successful student and helped Varvara in the study. In January 1943, V. Zhurbenko visited N. Voronina's apartment, where a meeting of OUN members was taking place at that time. A girl named Halyna read aloud nationalist literature and discussed the formation of an independent Ukraine. Several other girls took part in the meeting, including student Nila Sidorenko. N. Voronina instructed V. Zhurbenko to distribute five leaflets of nationalist content in the city, and also provided her with several brochures for acquaintance, one of which was devoted to S. Petliura's struggle for Ukrainian statehood⁴³⁰.

However, V. Zhurbenko was a student in Dnipropetrovsk for a short time. In February 1943 she returned to Dniprodzerzhynsk and got a job in the state farm № 12⁴³¹. With the return of the Soviet authorities, V. Zhurbenko entered Dniprodzerzhynsk Pedagogical School in October 1943, graduating in 1944⁴³². Later, the People's Commissariat of Education of the USSR sent her to work in Drohobych region, wherefrom in October, 1944 she worked in an incomplete secondary school in the village Hidnovychi⁴³³. In 1945 V. Zhurbenko joined the Komsomol⁴³⁴.

Correspondence with N. Voronina played an important role in the further tragedy of V. Zhurbenko's life. At the end of 1944, the teacher received a short letter from her ex-friend. Then she wrote a reply, saying that she was well settled in the new place, told about her work at school, including the celebration of the October Revolution Day. Soon a letter arrived again from N. Voronina, in which she rebuked Varvara for the celebration. In addition, Nadiya asked whether Varvara had met "western" Galyna in Western Ukraine (a girl who held a meeting in January 1943 at an apartment of N. Voronina)⁴³⁵.

Then, on January 20, 1945, V. Zhurbenko wrote a second letter to N. Voronina. It was the letter that reached the Soviet state security services and became one of the pieces of evidence for the accused teacher. In the letter, the attention of the MGB staff was drawn to the words of anticipation: "... when a happy moment comes, when forests and mountains and people sing, and now nothing to laugh, nothing to

⁴³⁰ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П 19194. Арк. 17–17зв.

⁴³¹ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П 19194. Арк. 15, 35.

⁴³² АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П 19194. Арк. 15.

⁴³³ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П 19194. Арк. 15зв.

⁴³⁴ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П 19194. Арк. 6.

⁴³⁵ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П 19194. Арк. 16зв, 19зв.

play happily, and you have to wait for a moment, of course, waiting without folding your arms, and helping with work and soon happy moment will come”⁴³⁶. Then V. Zhurbenko wrote about the life of Western Ukrainian peasants, who are provided with homes, livestock and poultry, and beautiful clothes. It is noteworthy that the teacher twice mentioned God in her letter, on the one hand noting that He (the Lord) would send happiness and endow the people with “all the good in the world”, and on the other hand, describing the prosperous life of peasants in Drohobych, emotionally said: “Yes, it seems to me that we will never live like this, God punishes us for being so unbelieving and not only us, but our whole nation in general”⁴³⁷.

On October 2, 1946, MGB officers detained and interrogated V. Zhurbenko. The interrogation was conducted by Lieutenant Sukhov, who claimed that the girl had been recruited to the OUN while studying in Dnipropetrovsk and had carried out “nationalist work” under the leadership of N. Voronina. The teacher had to talk about “nationalist leaflets” and the presence of OUN members in January 1943. However, she completely denied her affiliation with the OUN, claiming that no one had recruited her and that she had never been a member of the organization. Lieutenant Sukhov tried to find out about the contacts with the OUN and URA that V. Zhurbenko allegedly established in the Drohobych region. However, the teacher completely denied her connections with the underground and the insurgents⁴³⁸.

Further, the case was handled by the investigator of the Drohobych Region State Security Service, Junior Lieutenant Berdak. From October 15 to November 15, 1946, he conducted 11 interrogations of V. Zhurbenko, sometimes interrogating the arrested woman twice a day: day and night. Already during the second interrogation (on the night of October 15-16), she admitted that she had been recruited to the OUN by student N. Voronina⁴³⁹. The investigator attached two important documents to the case: excerpts from the interrogation transcripts of Anna Nimets and Nelly Sydorenko, who allegedly testified to Varvara’s affiliation with the OUN⁴⁴⁰.

⁴³⁶ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П 19194. Арк. 53.

⁴³⁷ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П 19194. Арк. 53зв.

⁴³⁸ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П 19194. Арк. 15–21.

⁴³⁹ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П 19194. Арк. 26–27.

⁴⁴⁰ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П 19194. Арк. 45, 46–46зв.

The investigation into the case of V. Zhurbenko ended in November, 1946. The investigator Berdak issued an “indictment” stating that the teacher had pleaded guilty to charges under Art. 54-1a and 54-11 of the Criminal Code of the USSR⁴⁴¹. On December 20, 1946, a court session of the Military Tribunal (MT) of the Drohobych Region Ministry of Internal Affairs took place, during which V. Zhurbenko stated that she did not know whether N. Voronina belonged to the OUN. When the head of the MT read her confession from the interrogation report, the defendant said: “I admit that I signed this protocol because the investigator threatened, I signed it, but these are incorrect testimonies, I did not tell it to the investigator during the investigation. I did not say that Voronina recruited me to the OUN, I only said that Voronina was the leader then, but whether the leader of the OUN or something else – I do not know”⁴⁴². Nevertheless, MT issued a verdict that repeated the “indictment” and sentenced her to 10 years of LC, 5 years of deprivation of rights and confiscation of property⁴⁴³.

V. Zhurbenko was serving her sentence in one of the camps of the Dubravny camp administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (“Dubravlag”) in Mordovia. In November 1954, she wrote a request for pardon to the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Admitting guilt, she emphasized the commission of the crime at the age of 17 and assured that this would never happen again⁴⁴⁴. The convict’s request was sent to the Office of the Ministry of Justice (MJ) of the USSR in Drohobych region, where, after investigating the archival and investigative case of V. Zhurbenko, they found out that the teacher was not a member of the OUN. Therefore, it was proposed to reduce the sentence to 8 years⁴⁴⁵. V. Zhurbenko was released on May 25, 1955. She later lived in the village of Berelokh, Susuman district, Magadan region of Russia⁴⁴⁶.

In 1959, V. Zhurbenko (under the surname of her husband – Lantsut) wrote a complaint, that she had not committed any crime, and the investigator falsified the case, forcing her to sign false interrogation

⁴⁴¹ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П 19194. Арк. 45, 46–46зв.

⁴⁴² АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П 19194. Арк. 61зв.

⁴⁴³ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П 19194. Арк. 64–65.

⁴⁴⁴ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П 19194. Арк. 71.

⁴⁴⁵ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П 19194. Арк. 72–74.

⁴⁴⁶ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П 19194. Арк. 89–89зв, 93, 95.

reports by threats and beatings⁴⁴⁷. The case was reopened and transferred to the KGB Office in Lviv Oblast. During the investigation, it became clear that A. Nimets and N. Sidorenko did not testify against V. Zhurbenko. It also turned out that N. Voronina was an agent of the Soviet special services and died in 1945⁴⁴⁸.

On March 3, 1960, the Military Board of the Supreme Court of the USSR decided to overturn the sentence and close the case of V. Zhurbenko for lack of *corpus delicti*.⁴⁴⁹ This decision put an end to the former teacher's 14-year history of exile for uncommitted crimes.

Summing up, we note that the biographies of three teachers who were repressed in the 1940s in the Drohobych region represent three most common categories of teachers repressed by Soviet special services in the western regions of Ukraine.

Fedir Vyshyvanyi represents a group of “older” educators who were participants (or at least witnesses) of the Ukrainian liberation struggle of 1917 – 1921, and were repressed for their activities by the Soviet authorities before the German-Soviet war, and therefore perceived the German occupation as liberation from Bolshevik regime. This social group of teachers was not an active participant in the Ukrainian liberation movement of the 1940s and 1950s, but due to its sympathy for the anti-Soviet struggle and some relations with OUN members and URA soldiers, it aroused suspicion and repression by the Soviet administration.

Olena Voryk represents a group of educators who were active participants in the liberation movement of the 1940s and 1950s. They were members of the OUN and sometimes became URA fighters. By the way, this group should include teacher Stepan Stebelskyi, a graduate of the Sambir Teachers' Seminary, who commanded a hundred URA “Drummer-5” and the tactical unit “Makivka” URA-West. Undoubtedly, the repression of this category of Western Ukrainian teachers was a direct consequence of their anti-Soviet activities.

Varvara Zhurbenko represented the third, least numerous, category of repressed teachers. This group included both teachers from the eastern regions of Ukraine and some local educators with pro-Soviet

⁴⁴⁷ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П 19194. Арк. 100–101зв.

⁴⁴⁸ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П 19194. Арк. 102–131.

⁴⁴⁹ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. П 19194. Арк. 136–138.

views. However, given the critical assessments of Soviet reality, certain sporadic contacts with representatives of the Ukrainian liberation movement, or the provocative activities of Soviet intelligence agents, they came under repressive pressure from the Bolshevik totalitarian system.

It should be noted that the archival and criminal cases of F. Vyshyvanyi, O. Voryk, and V. Zhurbenko are meaningful, though to some extent typical illustrations of the brutal formation of “enemies of the people” by the Soviet repressive and punitive system.

Mykola Haliv, Anna Ohar, Viktoriia Mazuryk

RELIGIOUS RESTRICTIONS RIGHTS AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE REPRESSIVE CONFESSIONAL POLICY OF STALINIST TOTALITARIANISM IN THE WESTERN REGIONS OF UKRAINE IN THE FINAL STAGES OF WORLD WAR II AND IN THE FIRST POSTWAR YEARS: HISTORICAL MEMORY THROUGH THE PRISM OF ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS

The proposed research topic allows in scientific-theoretical and historical-applied dimensions to introduce into the English-language public historical discourse new archival documents that expand existing knowledge about religious repression as part of the policy of the Soviet totalitarian regime in Western Ukraine during this period.

Positively evaluating previous monographs⁴⁵⁰ and articles⁴⁵¹ devoted primarily to exposing Stalin's repressions against the largest religious denomination in the western regions of Ukraine, the Greek Catholic Church, we consider it expedient to introduce new archival information on the persecution of Greek Catholics, removal from the religious life of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Autonomous Orthodox Church and religious restrictions rights of the faithful of the Roman Catholic Church.

⁴⁵⁰ Андрухів І. О. Релігійне життя на Прикарпатті: 1944 – 1990 роки. Історико-правовий аналіз. Івано-Франківськ : [б.в.], 2004. 344 с.; Войналович В. А. Партійно-державна політика щодо релігії та релігійних інституцій в Україні 1940 – 1960-х років: політологічний дискурс. Київ: Світогляд, 2005. 741 с.; Войналович В. А., Кочан Н. І. Релігійний чинник етнополітичних процесів у Галичині: повоєнна радянська доба і сучасність. Київ: ІПіЕНД ім. І. Ф. Кураса НАН України, 2018. 408 с.; Стоцький Я. Держава і релігії в західних областях України: конфесійна трансформації в контексті державної політики: монографія. Київ: ФАДА, ЛТД, 2008. 510 с. та ін.

⁴⁵¹ Байдич В. Римокатолицизм у контексті розвитку державно-церковних стосунків в СРСР (1920–1960-ті рр.). *Історія України: Маловідомі імена, події, факти*: Збірник статтей. 2010. Вип. 36. С. 294–315; Гуркіна С. Архимандрит Климентій Шептицький: маловивчені сторінки життя 1944 – 1947 рр. *Сторінки воєнної історії України*: Збірник наукових статей. 2011. Вип. 14. С. 203–215; Концур-Карабінович Н. Становище Українсько греко-католицької церкви в 1940-х роках. *Карпати: людина, етнос, цивілізація*. 2017 – 2018. Вип. 7–8. С. 293–299; Чернописька В. Роль К. Шептицького в розв'язанні церковно-релігійних проблем Східної Галичини у період конфесійно-релігійних трансформацій (1944 – 1946 рр.). *Вісник Національного університету "Львівська політехніка"*. Серія: Юридичні науки: збірник наукових праць. 2017. № 876. С. 32–39 та ін.

Based on the available historiographical base of the study, the historical and political characteristics of the influence of the repressive religious policy of the Soviet government in the western regions of Ukraine at the final stage of World War II and the first postwar years deserve separate consideration.

Formulation of the goals of the article (task setting). The purpose of the proposed study is a comprehensive historiographical and source analysis of the impact of repressive policies of Stalinist totalitarianism on the state of public memory of the inhabitants of the western Ukrainian region at this chronological stage.

In accordance with the goal it is necessary to solve the following research tasks:

- to point the military-political preconditions that determined the vector of radical change in the nature, institutions and practices of religious life in the western regions of Ukraine at the final stage of World War II and in the first postwar years;
- to analyze with the help of new archival sources the features of religious consciousness as part of the public memory of the inhabitants of the western Ukrainian region during the restoration of Soviet totalitarian control with its unifying religious policy in favor of one denomination – the Russian Orthodox Church;
- to conduct a comparative chronological and subregional study of the transformation of the ethno-confessional situation in the western regions of the USSR under the influence of ideological, propaganda and repressive-punitive activities of Stalinism at the end of World War II and after the new international legal status of the Soviet Union during the war, a nationalized religious structure – the ROC.

Leading Ukrainian historians in the study of the Second World War in general and especially the role of repressive and punitive organs of the Stalinist totalitarian regime Dmytro Vedenev and Oleksandr Lysenko emphasize that the rise of religious feelings of Soviet citizens, the significant role of the church in mobilizing spiritual forces. historical traditionalism forced Stalin to reconsider previous policies. Promoting the revival of religious life by the occupying authorities in the occupied territories, about which the Soviet leadership constantly received intelligence, and the obvious political importance of the religious question required an adequate response from the Soviet government. The

“struggle for the faithful” became another part of the ideological confrontation between the communist USSR and Nazi Germany⁴⁵².

Religious life, which during the years of German occupation was characterized by the desire to preserve ethno-confessional identity, in particular through the formation of new religious institutions, could not escape the attention of Stalin’s totalitarian regime.

According to I. Andrukhiv, with the restoration of the Soviet regime in Western Ukraine, Metropolitans A. Sheptytsky and J. Slipiy sought compromise ways to preserve the church and normalize relations with the authorities, believing that the regime “corrected” and its policy towards the GCC would not be so strict. As in 1939 – 1941, calling on the clergy to “get closer” to the Soviet system and “support it in every possible way”⁴⁵³. Moreover, in the first months after the restoration of the Soviet regime in Western Ukraine, the NKVD and the KGB did not resort to mass repressions against the Greek Catholic Church (GCC). At least one can speak of two priests who were arrested on charges of collaborating with the German occupiers⁴⁵⁴.

In particular, as of July 1, 1945, there were 359 Greek Catholic and 111 Roman Catholic priests in the Ternopil region, who met the religious needs of the faithful in 539 and 131 churches, respectively⁴⁵⁵. According to the letter of the Commissioner of the Council for Religious Cults at the SNC of the USSR on the Ukrainian SSR P. Vilkhov dated July 24, 1945, there were 2326 active Greek Catholic and 652 Roman Catholic communities in Ukraine, where religious needs were met by 1694 and 428 priests⁴⁵⁶.

⁴⁵² Веденеев Д. В., Лисенко О. С. Религиозные конфессийные объекты оперативной разработки немецких и радянских служб (1943 – 1945 гг.). Украинский исторический журнал. 2012. № 4. С. 107.

⁴⁵³ Андрухів І. О. Політика радянської влади у сфері релігії та конфесійного життя на Прикарпатті в 40–80-х роках ХХ століття. Історико-правовий аналіз: автореф. дис. ... д-ра іст. наук: спец. 07.00.01 “Історія України” / Ужгородський національний університет. Ужгород, 2006. С. 15.

⁴⁵⁴ Ліквідація УГКЦ (1939 – 1946): Документи радянських органів державної безпеки / упор.: С. Кокін, Н. Сердюк, С. Сердюк; за заг. ред. В. Сергійчука. Київ: ПП Сергійчук М. І., 2006. Т. I. С. 14.

⁴⁵⁵ Державний архів Тернопільської області (далі – ДАТО). Ф. П-1 Тернопільський обласний комітет КП(б) України. Оп. 1. Спр. 283. Арк. 42, 79.

⁴⁵⁶ Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України (далі – ЦДАГО України). Ф. 1 Центральний комітет Комуністичної партії (більшовиків) України. Оп. 23. Спр. 1639. Арк. 12.

Secret reports recorded numerous facts at the beginning of the open disapproval of the activities of the so-called Initiative Group by the majority of Greek Catholic priests, which in relief reflect the relevant layer of public consciousness. Thus, according to one such information from July 11, 1945, the priest of the Church of the Assumption in Lviv, Fr. V. Figol argued that "... the conference in San Francisco (an international conference held from April 25 to June 26, 1945 in San Francisco, which, among other things, launched the United Nations (UN) – In Gulay) must decide that every nation must have a Church of its own accord. We will adhere to this. If we are offered to convert to Orthodoxy, we will write a statement with the people to keep us Greek Catholics. The Stalinist Constitution defines freedom of religion, and we want that"⁴⁵⁷.

On November 13, 1944, Bishop H. Khomyshyn of Stanislaviv addressed the faithful with a message, emphasizing: "Without proof of guilt, without trial, unknown people of different nationalities kill defenseless men, elders, as well as women and children in different places. has its roots mainly in national hatred..." , and called for an end to the massacre⁴⁵⁸ . The forced appeals of Metropolitan J. Slipy and Bishop H. Khomyshyn "to return from the wrong path" did not have any positive reaction among UPA soldiers. Moreover, many priests and monks of the GCC took a direct part in the underground national liberation movement. Under the conditions of the establishment of the Stalinist totalitarian regime, despite certain contradictions, Greek Catholicism and the Ukrainian national idea mutually strengthened each other in opposition to other, different ethnic or confessional identities⁴⁵⁹ .

According to the Ukrainian theologian O. Lysenko, the Orthodoxization of Greek Catholic lands was carried out by creating the Lviv Orthodox Diocese, which was to unite the Orthodox parishes of Lviv, Drohobych, Stanislaviv, and Ternopil regions, headed by a Ukrainian bishop; granting the right of missionary activity to the clergy of this diocese; organization among the Greek Catholic clergy of the initiative group, which was to announce a break with the Vatican and

⁴⁵⁷ ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1. Оп. 23. Спр. 1639. Арк. 38.

⁴⁵⁸ Там само. Спр. 887. Арк. 31.

⁴⁵⁹ Чорнописька В. Діяльність Клементія Шептицького в період німецької окупації (1941 – 1944 рр.)... С. 253.

ensure the transition of the Uniate clergy to the Moscow Patriarchate⁴⁶⁰.

On December 10, 1945, out of 327 Greek Catholic priests, 255 joined the so-called Initiative Group⁴⁶¹.

Deployment of repression, including the arrest of the first 78 priests and laity, who actively opposed the activities of the so-called The initiative group could not help but influence the mood of the local Ukrainian population of Galicia, especially the intelligentsia. Thus, according to Professor I. Kryp'yakevych: "The arrest of a priest is an arrest of the people's spirit. The arrest of the metropolitan is the arrest of the whole of Galicia Galicia ... The masses are fighting against the Soviet government, though passively. But they are struggling. If the metropolitan is arrested, it is necessary to show charges, to calm down not only the Ukrainian people, but the public conscience of the whole of Europe"⁴⁶².

There were many examples of public, often spontaneous, support for arrested Greek Catholic priests among the local population. Thus, in the letter of the first secretary to the Lviv regional committee of the CP (b) U I. Hrushetsky addressed to the head of Soviet Ukraine M. Khrushchev dated May 8, 1945, the example of a forest industry engineer from Nemyriv (Lviv region) J. Chizhyk was given. Priests Treshnivsky and Koziy began collecting signatures from the population to the KGB about their release, but he was arrested⁴⁶³.

It is also interesting to analyze the mood among the top Orthodox clergy, which quickly headed to the western regions of Ukraine. For example, he was ordained a bishop on April 22, 1945. After being acquainted with the address of the so-called Initiative Group, Makarii (Oksiuk), Bishop of Lviv and Ternopil, criticized: "... Kostelnyk, but also to evoke the idea that Orthodoxy is the "Moscow faith" ... In general, one must be careful with Kostelnyk so that he does not provoke any intrigue"⁴⁶⁴.

⁴⁶⁰ Лисенко О. Є. Конфесійні аспекти міжнаціональних стосунків на території України (1943 – 1945). *Друга світова війна і доля народів України: матеріали 2-ї Всеукр. наук. конф., м. Київ, 30–31 жовтня 2006 / ред. Ю. А. Левенець (співголова) та ін. Київ: Зовнішторгвидав, 2007. С. 114.*

⁴⁶¹ ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1. Оп. 23. Спр. 1639. Арк. 7–8.

⁴⁶² Там само. Арк. 111.

⁴⁶³ Там само. Спр. 1641. Арк. 7.

⁴⁶⁴ Там само. Спр. 1639. Арк. 38–39.

Numerous appeals, leaflets and messages were sent to the western regions to agitate the Greek Catholics in the direction of their transition to the bosom of the ROC. Thus, 10,000 copies of the address of Patriarch Alexy of Moscow and All Russia “To the Pastors and Believers of the Greek Catholic Church, Residents of the Western Regions of the Ukrainian SSR” were sent to the newly appointed Bishop of Lviv and Ternopil Macarius (Oksiuk). The text of the appeal was agreed with V. Molotov on March 19, 1945. In his address, Patriarch Alexy expressed regret over the separation of Greek Catholics from Orthodoxy, criticized the activities of the Greek Catholic Church and its leadership and called on them to break ties with the Vatican. you into darkness, spiritual destruction, due to your religious mistakes “and return to the” arms of your mother-in-law – the Russian Orthodox Church”⁴⁶⁵.

One such address, addressed to Bishop Macarius of Lviv and Ternopil, was published on June 24, 1945, on the day of Pentecost. In it, the bishop called on Greek Catholics to return to the faith of their grandparents and parents, and Orthodox Catholics to pray for the return of Greek Catholics to Orthodoxy⁴⁶⁶.

Using the Orthodox clergy to liquidate the Greek Catholic Church, the Soviet government sought to strengthen its influence in Western Ukraine. Most members of the initiative group were forced to join it due to pressure from the Soviet authorities. The clergy themselves have repeatedly pointed this out. Dean of the UGCC V. Lysko recalled a conversation in the MGB, in which he was told: “... If you do not follow Kostelnyk, you will rot here⁴⁶⁷, and pointed to the floor. Similar threats were made against Kostelnyk himself, blackmailing him with previous anti-Soviet activities and the future fate of his sons, who had voluntarily joined the SS Halychyna division. They were in British captivity and he did not know that they were alive or that they were not going to be extradited⁴⁶⁸.

⁴⁶⁵ Там само. Спр. 1638. Арк. 35.

⁴⁶⁶ Боднарчук П. Соціорелігійне життя України в середині 1940-х – на початку 1950-х рр. *Повоєнна Україна: нариси соціальної історії (друга половина 1940-х – середина 1950-х рр.)*: Колективна монографія / Відп. ред. В. М. Даниленко: У 3-х частинах. Ч 3. К.: Інститут історії України НАН України, 2010. С. 106.

⁴⁶⁷ Без зерна неправди: Спомини отця-декана Володимира Лиска. Львів, 1999. С. 73.

⁴⁶⁸ Бошорків Б. Т. зв. «саморозпуск» Української Греко-Католицької Церкви в 1946 р. у світлі розсекречених архівних документів. *Сучасність*. 1998. № 1. С. 108.

The members of the initiative group appealed to the USSR government to approve its composition and authorize the right to lead the reunification of the Greek Catholic Church with the ROC. This statement and the answer of the Commissioner of the Council for the ROC in the USSR were published in the Lviv regional newspaper “Free Ukraine: on July 6, 1945. This newspaper also published an article by K. Guslisty, senior researcher at the Institute of History of Ukraine, against the church union” They were followed by other anti-Union publications.

Information about the activities of Greek Catholics was tightly filtered. Even G. Kostelnyk’s pamphlet “The Apostle Peter and the Popes of Rome or the Dogmatic Foundations of the Papacy, published in Lviv in 1945 and directed against the union, was perceived by some Soviet officials as reactionary⁴⁶⁹. Thus, A. Likholat’s review of this book submitted to M. Iovchuk, Deputy Head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.), Stated that the author was not “a staunch opponent of the Roman Church; on the contrary, he is a Roman”⁴⁷⁰. Likholat noted that the book could only harm the political education of the population of the western Ukrainian regions and add even more confusion to the relationship between Orthodox and Greek Catholics⁴⁷¹.

Publication by V. Rosovych (pseudonym of the writer J. Galan, who was killed in his Lviv apartment by OUN members a few years later) on April 8, 1945 in the local newspaper “Vilna Ukraina” in the article “With a cross or a knife?” accusing part of the Greek Catholic clergy of collaborating with the Nazi German occupiers became the propaganda beginning of a large-scale campaign against the GCC.

In the spring of 1945, 78 priests and laity were arrested, who actively opposed the so-called reunification In particular, on April 11, 1945, the entire episcopate of the Greek Catholic Church in the territory of the USSR was arrested: Metropolitan J. Slipiy, Bishops G. Khomyshyn, M. Budka, M. Charnetsky, and I. Lyatyshevsky⁴⁷².

⁴⁶⁹ Боднарчук П. Соціорелігійне життя України в середині 1940-х – на початку 1950-х рр... С. 107.

⁴⁷⁰ ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1. Оп. 30. Спр. 217. Арк. 3.

⁴⁷¹ Там само. Арк. 5.

⁴⁷² Ліквідація УГКЦ (1939 – 1946): Документи радянських органів державної безпеки... С. 20–21.

The first mass arrests of the Greek Catholic clergy provoked a negative reaction from the laity. Among the negative statements of the Ukrainian intelligentsia about the activities of the initiative group of priests and the rejection of the Greek Catholic rite, for example, we can mention the words of Professor of Lviv Pedagogical University M. Dumka: “Union is our Ukrainian cause, national cause”⁴⁷³.

Along with repressive actions, the Soviet security forces began ideological preparations for the liquidation of the Greek Catholic Church, focusing on those priests who, at least, did not openly oppose the new regime. However, at first even Fr. G. Kostelnyk, who was considered a possible leader of the movement for the transition of the GCC to the ROC, did not live up to the expectations of the secret services. Thus, on April 18, 1945, in the submitted essay “How can the Galician Greek Catholic Church be converted into the Orthodox Church?” he still justified the impossibility of converting Greek Catholics to Orthodoxy⁴⁷⁴.

It is worth noting the generalization of researcher Oksana Volynets that the liquidation of the UGCC was accompanied by arrests of the church diocese, which was caused by several reasons, first: the leadership of the Soviet state and the eparchy of the ROC MP understood that the UGCC episcopate with the ROC MP; secondly: the authorities sought to discredit the UGCC diocese in the eyes of the people, accusing them of anti-Soviet activities and cooperation with the Nazis; thirdly: the liquidation of the UGCC and the spiritual elite was aimed at destroying the most influential and authoritative institution of civil society in Galicia, which was the UGCC, which formed not only national, religious and cultural, but even worldviews of Galician Ukrainians, while performing extremely important socially integrating and educational functions

On the initiative of Fr. K. Sheptytsky initiative 60 priests of the Lviv Archdiocese and all the abbots of Greek Catholic monasteries sent a letter to V. Molotov, in which they asked to release the bishops and, accordingly, to stop the “reunification”, emphasizing that the clergy do not support the initiative group, does not recognize it as the governing body of the UGCC, and all participants in this action are considered traitors to the church⁴⁷⁵.

⁴⁷³ ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1. Оп 23. Спр. 163. Арк. 40–41.

⁴⁷⁴ Ліквідація УГКЦ (1939 – 1946): Документи радянських органів ... С. 23.

⁴⁷⁵ Чорнописька В. Роль К. Шептицького в розв’язанні церковно-релігійних проблем ... С. 36.

At the beginning of December 1945, 11 male and 10 female Greek Catholic monasteries continued to function in the Lviv region, with 160 monks and 314 nuns, respectively⁴⁷⁶.

At the end of 1945 and the beginning of 1946, according to archival documents, 2,290 Greek Catholic churches of the UGCC were registered, of which 568 were in Drohobych, 567 in Stanislavska, 522 in Lviv, 539 in Ternopil, and 2 each in Chernivtsi and Volyn regions. At that time, 1,294 representatives of the Greek Catholic clergy were counted⁴⁷⁷. Of these priests, 859 (66 %) joined the initiative group⁴⁷⁸. As we can see, this network of Greek Catholic churches concerned mainly Galicia.

The active national position of the region's largest religious denomination, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, stood in the way of Soviet plans to accelerate the region's accelerated integration into the All-Union space. By 1946, the UGCC had 2,950 priests, 1,090 monks and 520 nuns in the western regions of the USSR, and used 4,444 churches⁴⁷⁹.

February 24 and 25, 1946, after the ordination of Bishops Fr. Anthony Pelvetsky and Mykhailo Melnyk in the western regions of Ukraine actually began the structuring of the ROC – the formation of two new dioceses. Thus, in these regions there were the following dioceses: Lviv-Ternopil – Bishop and Archimandrite of the Assumption Pochaiv Lavra Macarius; Stanislavsko-Kolomyiska – Bishop Anthony; Sambir-Drohobych – Bishop Michael⁴⁸⁰.

Summing up, Ukrainian political scientists emphasize that the destruction of Greek Catholic structures has led to the formation of a fundamentally different configuration of the confessional landscape both in Galicia and throughout Ukraine. The forced appearance of a huge Ukrainian Catholic enclave within the ROC led to the spread of its Ukrainizing influence throughout the Ukrainian exarchate and even the strengthening of autonomous sentiments⁴⁸¹.

⁴⁷⁶ ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1. Оп. 23. Спр. 1639. Арк. 7–8.

⁴⁷⁷ Там само. Спр. 1640. Арк. 156.

⁴⁷⁸ Там само. Спр. 1639. Арк. 157.

⁴⁷⁹ Головин Б. П. Мученики та ісповідники Української Церкви ХХ століття. Нариси. Статті. Дослідження. Тернопіль : Просвіта, 2000. С. 22.

⁴⁸⁰ Стоцький Я. Держава і релігії в західних областях України: конфесійна трансформації в контексті державної політики... С. 129.

⁴⁸¹ Войналович В. А., Кочан Н. І. Релігійний чинник етнополітичних процесів у Галичині: повоєнна радянська доба і сучасність... С. 394.

In 1939, the Roman Catholics of the western regions of Ukraine belonged to the Lviv Archdiocese of the Roman Catholic Church under the leadership of Metropolitan B. Twardowski. After the death of Metropolitan B. Twardowski on November 22, 1944, his place at the head of the archdiocese was taken by Archbishop E. Bazyak⁴⁸².

Volodymyr Baidych rightly notes that the Vatican's sharp anti-communist course at the end of the war and the divergent political interests of the USSR and the Vatican testified to the inevitability of further aggravation of relations between the USSR and the Vatican, held hostage by the Roman Catholic Church⁴⁸³.

I. Bulyha proceeds from the fact that the Orthodox Church in Volyn during the Second World War was faced with the need to ensure the conditions of its own survival. Therefore, part of the Orthodox communities of the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church (PAOC) in Volhynia was forced under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate, which led to an internal split in Orthodoxy during the Nazi occupation and deepened the institutional crisis of religious self-identification of the Orthodox population⁴⁸⁴.

The Orthodox Church, which managed to preserve its structure, sacred and social authority in Volyn in the previous days, found itself at the center of the political struggle. This led to the transformation of religious and institutional development, the split in Orthodoxy, in particular, the Autonomous Orthodox Church (APC) and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC). The internal differentiation, the dualism of Orthodoxy, the sharp rivalry, the struggle for spheres of influence and the protectorate of the Nazi authorities had a negative effect on the social atmosphere and led to confusion and uncertainty among the laity⁴⁸⁵.

⁴⁸² Стоцький Я. Держава і релігія в західних областях України: конфесійні трансформації в контексті державної політики 1944 – 1964 років... С. 133.

⁴⁸³ Байдич В. Римо-католицизм у контексті розвитку державно-церковних стосунків в СРСР (1920 – 1960-ті рр.)... С. 305.

⁴⁸⁴ Булига І. І. Особливості трансформації християнських конфесій в умовах тоталітарних режимів на Волині періоду Другої світової війни: автореф. дис.. канд. філософ. н.: спец.: 09.00.11 – релігієзнавство / Житомирський державний університет імені Івана Франка. Житомир, 2010. С. 10.

⁴⁸⁵ Булига І. І. Особливості трансформації християнських конфесій в умовах тоталітарних режимів на Волині періоду Другої світової війни: автореф. дис.. канд. філософ. н.: спец.: 09.00.11 – релігієзнавство / Житомирський державний університет імені Івана Франка. Житомир, 2010. С. 11.

The Stalinist totalitarian regime could not ignore the religious life, which during the years of German occupation was characterized by the desire to preserve ethno-confessional identity, in particular through the formation of new religious institutions. The large-scale plan to create a single Orthodox space within the Soviet Union provided for a number of measures. Thus, “Instruction № 58”, prepared by the Chairman of the Council for the Russian Orthodox Church and personally endorsed by J. Stalin on March 17, 1945, provided, in particular, to take measures to eliminate the autocephaly of the Polish Orthodox Church for its full accession to the Moscow Patriarchate”. Authorities organized Orthodox fraternities in Lutsk and Lviv, giving them the right to carry out missionary and charitable activities, and the task of the fraternities was to “strengthen Orthodoxy and oppose its Catholicism”⁴⁸⁶.

With the arrival of the Red Army, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church virtually ceased its activities. In March 1944, the Moscow Patriarchate sent Bishop Pitirim Kursky to the Volyn eparchy to join the local clergy, both autocephalous and autonomous. In the middle of 1944, there were already 258 churches of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and only 30 of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church in the Rivne region. At the end of July of the same year, continued pressure on the Autocephalous Church resulted in only 10 of its communities remaining in the region, while the number of ROC religious organizations reached 328⁴⁸⁷. In 1945, the newly created (since February 1945) Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Alexy and the Holy Synod renamed the Volyn-Lutsk diocese into Volyn and Rivne, which united 708 parishes⁴⁸⁸. In the neighboring Ternopil region, the main part of the 144 priests and 140 Orthodox churches was concentrated in the northern Dederkaliv, Lanivets, Kremyanets and Pochaiv districts,

⁴⁸⁶ Лисенко О. Є. Конфесійні аспекти міжнаціональних стосунків на території України (1943 – 1945). *Друга світова війна і доля народів України: матеріали 2-ї Всеукраїнської наукової конференції*, м. Київ, 30–31 жовтня 2006 / ред. Ю. А. Левенець (співголова) та ін. Київ: Зовнішторгвидав, 2007. С. 114.

⁴⁸⁷ ДАРО. Ф Р-204. (Уповноважений Ради у справах Руської православної церкви при Раді Міністрів Української РСР по Ровенській області). Оп. 11. Спр. 1. Арк. 6, 12.

⁴⁸⁸ Милуш В. Православна церква на Волині у 40–50 рр. XX ст. *1939 рік в історичній долі України і українців: матеріали Міжнародної наукової конференції*, 23–24 вересня 1999 р. / ред. кол.: К. К. Кондратюк (гол. ред.) та ін. Львів: Видавничий центр ЛНУ імені Івана Франка, 2001. С. 220.

which bordered or were part of the historical “Great Volhynia”⁴⁸⁹, which were part of the newly formed Mo patriarchate, which carried out a new administrative division of regions and districts. From the former Volyn-Zhytomyr diocese, two departments were formed – Zhytomyr and Ovruch, Volyn and Lutsk, and part became part of the Ternopil diocese, which emerged instead of the closed Kremyanets⁴⁹⁰. At the time of the restoration of Soviet power in the Lviv region, there were three Orthodox churches and four priests, led by the rector of the Church of St. George in Lviv, Archpriest G. Boechko⁴⁹¹. In the Stanislaviv region, seven priests were sent to five Orthodox churches⁴⁹².

During the “Sovietization” of the then Rivne and Volda regions of the USSR in 1944, local parishes together with the clergy were subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchate, because during the war they were part of the Ukrainian Autonomous or Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Churches. The leadership of the ROC refused to recognize the spiritual authority of the bishops who visited the occupation. To strengthen control over the spiritual life in Volhynia, the patriarchate decided to entrust the leadership of the newly created Volyn-Rivne diocese to Bishop of Russian origin Bishop Nikolai (Chufarovsky). In the first months after the liberation of Volhynia, state security arrested several dozen Orthodox clergymen accused of collaborating with the occupation regime or Ukrainian nationalists⁴⁹³.

Thus, Soviet archival documents record that as of July 1, 1944, there were 258 parishes of the so-called Patriarchal Church (ROC) in the Rivne region, 25 parishes of the so-called Renewalists, and 30 of the Autocephalous Church.

In 1944 – 1945, there were still some misunderstandings between the clergy, based on different ecclesiastical jurisdictions during the years of occupation. If the supporters of the Autonomous Church in fact immediately with the liberation of Volhynia recognized their affili-

⁴⁸⁹ Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління (далі – ЦДАВО України). Ф. Р-4648 (Уповноважений Ради у справах Руської православної церкви при РНК СРСР по Українській РСР). Оп. 1. Спр. 2. Арк. 139.

⁴⁹⁰ Милусь В. Православна церква на Волині у 40–50 рр. XX ст... С. 219.

⁴⁹¹ ЦДАВО України. Ф. Р-4648. Оп. 2. Спр. 4. Арк. 199.

⁴⁹² Там само. Оп. 1, Спр. 2. Арк. 135.

⁴⁹³ Федчук О. М. Волинська духовна семінарія в умовах радянської тоталітарної системи (1945 – 1964 рр.): автореф. дис... канд. іст. н.; спец.: 07.00.01 – історія України / Східноєвропейський національний університет імені Лесі Українки. Луцьк, 2018. С. 7–8.

ation with the Moscow Patriarchate, then among the former “Polycarpians” were such clergymen who for some time continued to call their parishes autocephalous.

At the end of 1944, there were about 300 Orthodox parishes in Volhynia. In December 1944, M. Didenko was appointed Commissioner of the Council for the ROC in the Volyn region. He immediately intervened in the internal life of the diocese, recommending that the bishop agree with him on staff appointments. M. Didenko had a negative attitude towards the Volyn clergy, considering him disloyal to the established regime. Despite the efforts of the Commissioner of the Council to prevent the intensification of church life in Volhynia, in general, the Soviet government in the mid-1940s did not interfere with the organizational formation of the Volyn-Rivne diocese. For their part, the clergy sought to bring loyalty to the status quo⁴⁹⁴.

In total, during 1944 alone, several dozen clergy and clergy were arrested in the Volyn-Rivne diocese. According to some estimates, in the Rivne region, which together with the Volyn region was part of one diocese, 133 priests and clergy were killed or repressed during 1944 – 1951⁴⁹⁵.

During the interwar period in the western regions of Ukraine there were about 5 thousand believers of the Armenian rite, who had 10 parishes, which served 20 priests. In particular, the largest concentration in the mentioned period was the concentration of Armenian Catholics in the Stanislavsky region: 2130 believers, 6 parishes, 6 churches and 7 priests⁴⁹⁶.

The repressive measures also resulted in the liquidation of the Armenian Catholic Archdiocese in Lviv. In September 1945, a member of the chapter and secretary of the vicar general, K. Romashkan, was arrested, and in November of the same year, vicar general D. Kaetanovich, as well as a member of the chapter, V. Kvapinsky, and deacon-monk S. Drobat. Two priests – I. Lyakhovsky and F. Yakubovych, who went into illegal status – managed to escape arrest⁴⁹⁷.

⁴⁹⁴ Там само. С. 8.

⁴⁹⁵ Булига І. Православні конфесії в системі державно-церковних змін на Волині завершального періоду Другої світової війни... С. 79–86.

⁴⁹⁶ Стоцький Я. Держава і релігія в західних областях України: конфесійні трансформації в контексті державної політики 1944 – 1964 років... С. 141.

⁴⁹⁷ Войналович В. А. Партійно-державна політика щодо релігії та релігійних інституцій в Україні 1940 – 1960-х років: політологічний дискурс... С. 613.

Thus, at the final stage of the Second World War, Stalin's, as before, Hitler's regime used the whole arsenal of means to restore its own total control over the organized manifestations of the spiritual life of the inhabitants of the region. An important component of the government's activities, and especially of its repressive and punitive bodies, was the restriction of the Church's influence, the repression of many priests and active believers, and the beginning of the liquidation of the GCC. In addition, the great importance of restoring the school network, the opening of religious institutions in the countryside, which, although under strict communist and ideological control, still met the basic needs of local residents and newcomers from other regions of the USSR in this area.

Vasyl Gulay, Vira Maksymets

THE INFLUENCE OF THE POLITICAL REPRESSION OF 1944 – 1946 ON THE SPIRITUAL SERVICE OF FATHER MARKIAN (MATVIJ) KOHUT (OSBG)

In the current conditions of rehabilitation of church leaders of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (hereinafter UGCC), there is a need to study the victims of political repression of the Soviet occupation regime Basilian monks who sacrificed their lives to preserve the national church because they refused to sign an act of unification with Russian church. The Ukrainian church elite (church leaders) and ordinary clergy and believers have been persecuted, and imprisoned for their steadfast and critical positions. In these brutal conditions of Stalin's repression, the most conscious Ukrainian patriots were destroyed, who were not only among the common people but also among the Basilian monastics. Although the Basilian Order tried in every way to be outside the political process, however, the independent position of its leaders was contrary to the official religious policy of the Soviet government. Accordingly, this led to the liquidation of Basilian monasteries in the western lands and the imprisonment of monasticism. Nowadays, there is a need to restore the historical memory of the innocent tortured monks of the Order of St. Basil the Great (OSBM) through a systematic study of investigative cases concluded by the Soviet punitive authorities and preserved to this day and in need of wide scientific and public review.

The figure we chose was the subject of a special study⁴⁹⁸. Some researchers, studying the history of the Basilian Order and the tragic fate of the Greek Catholic clergy, pay attention to famous figures of the Galician province⁴⁹⁹. So, we chose the figure of Fr. Markiyian Pelekh remains unexplored in Ukrainian church historiography, as for a long time the criminal case remained secret and inaccessible in the archives

⁴⁹⁸ Грім Є. (ЧСВВ) Отець Маркіян Матей Когут, ЧСВВ. *Місіонар*, квітень 2011. С. 31–32.

⁴⁹⁹ Ваврик М. По василіянських монастирях. Торонто: В-во. Отців-василіян, 1958. 286 с.; Патрило І. Нарис історії Галицької Провінції ЧСВВ. *Записки ЧСВВ* Рим: В-во отців-василіян, 1992. Сер. II. Сек. I. Т. 48. С. 301–382; Прах Б. Духовенство Перемиської єпархії та Апостольської адміністрації Лемківщини: у 2-х томах. Львів: В-во УКУ, 2015. Т. II. С. 739, 825–827; Стасів К. Чернеча офіра Христові й Вітчизні. Жовква: Місіонер, 2018. 518 с.

of the KGB (SBU)⁵⁰⁰. Today there is an opportunity to process these materials and introduce them into wide scientific circulation, as well as supplement them with documents of personal origin⁵⁰¹. General documents on the liquidation of the UGCC and OSBM were partially introduced into scientific circulation, where we find fragmentary mentions of the figure in question⁵⁰². Certain personalized information can be found in the catalogues of the Basilian monasticism of the Galician province of OSBM⁵⁰³. The outlined historiographical and source array of information allows a comprehensive examination of the activities of Hieromonk Markian and the circumstances of his arrest, trial and imprisonment.

We aim to supplement the biographical information about Fr. Markian (Matthew) Kohut with information about the course of the judicial investigation and his unshakable Christian worldview.

Matei (monastic name Markian) was born on April 12, 1908, in the village of Laskivtsi (modern Terebovlya district of Ternopil region) in the family of Gavriil (born in 1880) and Ksenia (born in 1885) from the Vavryk family. He came from a family of middle peasants. He had no siblings. He was a Ukrainian by nationality. He had the status of a conscript, but it is unknown when and where he joined the army. He did not belong to any political party. He had no criminal record at the time of his arrest by Soviet punitive authorities. He received higher spiritual education. From 1914 to 1920 he received his primary education at a local rural four-year school, which he continued at the Basilian Missionary Institute at the Buchach Monastery⁵⁰⁴.

On September 14, 1924, he entered the Basilian Order and underwent ascetic training at the Krekhiv Novitiate, where he took his first

⁵⁰⁰ Архів Управління Служби безпеки України у Львівській області (далі АУСБУ ЛО). Спр. 26909.

⁵⁰¹ Центральний державний історичний архів України у м. Львів. Ф. 684. Оп. 1. Спр. 1693, рецензія василіанина Когута Маркіяна на публікації Оскарда та інших дослідників про життя та діяльність святого Василя Великого (1932 – 1933 рр.), 18 арк.; Ф. 684. Оп. 1. Спр. 704, особова справа Когута Маркіяна-Матвія, 14 арк.

⁵⁰² Реабілітовані історією. У двадцяти семи томах. Львівська область. Книга перша. Львів: Астролябія, 2009. С. 240.

⁵⁰³ *Catalogus Ordinis Basiliani Sancti Josaphat provinciae Haliciensis SS. Salvatoris ineunte anno 1939*, Leopoldis, 1939, n. 46; *Catalogus Ordinis Basiliani Sancti Josaphat provinciae Haliciensis SS. Salvatoris ineunte anno 1940 – 1941*, Leopoldis, 1943, n. 47.

⁵⁰⁴ Грім Є. (ЧСВВ) Отець Маркіян Матей Когут, ЧСВВ. *Місіонар*, квітень 2011. С. 31.

monastic vows (January 14, 1927). He studied at the Lavra Basilian Monastery (1927 – 1929). He received his theological education in various monastic schools: philosophy in Dobromil (1929 – 1931), theology in Kristinopol and Zhovkva (1931 – 1933). After completing his monastic studies, he took the lifelong monastic vows of a professor (May 15, 1933, Kristinopil). Later, in August 1933, he received sub-deacon, deacon and priestly ordinations from the hands of Bishop Josaphat Kotsilovsky of Przemyśl in the Zhovkva Monastery. After that, he was sent to study at the University of Warsaw, where he studied Slavic philology for three years and at the same time attended the Higher School of Journalism. After graduation, he returned to Lviv, where he studied some theological subjects. He was later appointed leader of the Marian service, the Third Order of St. Basil the Great, and the Children’s Eucharistic service in Lviv. In addition, he was actively involved in editorial work in the children’s supplement to “Missionary” – “Little Missionary”. Writing for children⁵⁰⁵. During the first Soviet occupation (1939 – 1941) he lived at the Lviv Basilian Monastery of St. Onuphrius⁵⁰⁶. During the German occupation, he moved to Zhovkva monastery in 1943, where he served as a master of the novitiate school, pastor of the parish and employee of the monastery printing house⁵⁰⁷.

He was arrested by the UNKD of Lviv region on May 31, 1945, in Zhovkva for failing to support the conversion to Orthodoxy and writing “anti-Soviet” articles for the Missionary. After his arrest, he spent almost a year in Lviv’s Prison “in Lontskyi”. Convicted on February 27, 1946, at a closed meeting of the internal prison of the NKVD troops of Lviv region under Article 54-10 Part 2. Criminal Code of the USSR up to 10 years of imprisonment, 5 years of deprivation of rights, with confiscation of property. He was imprisoned in the town of Inta (Komi Republic), where he worked on the construction of northern railways and woodworking enterprises⁵⁰⁸. After the end of his impris-

⁵⁰⁵ Грім Є. (ЧСБВ) Отець Маркіян Матей Когут, ЧСБВ. *Місіонар*, квітень 2011. С. 31.

⁵⁰⁶ *Catalogus Ordinis Basiliani Sancti Josaphat provinciae Haliciensis SS. Salvatoris ineunte anno 1939*. Leopoldis, 1939. N. 46.

⁵⁰⁷ *Catalogus Ordinis Basiliani Sancti Josaphat provinciae Haliciensis SS. Salvatoris ineunte anno 1940 – 1941*. Leopoldis, 1943. N. 47.

⁵⁰⁸ Архів Управління Служби безпеки України у Львівській області. Спр. 26909. 186 арк.

onment (he served 9 years and 2 months and 12 days) in August 1954, he returned to Lviv, where he maintained relations with the underground Greek Catholic Church⁵⁰⁹.

Due to constant KGB surveillance, he was forced to move to the Donetsk region in 1956, where he worked as a fireman at a mine near Horlivka. From 1957 he lived in Volodymyr-Volynskiy, where he worked as a night watchman at the Dashava-Minsk gas pipeline station. He was engaged in pastoral and writing work underground. On suspicion of illegal activity, he was forcibly relocated in 1962 to Karaganda (Kazakhstan), where he worked as a fireman at the hospital for six years. In 1968 he returned to Volodymyr-Volynskiy, where he lived for twenty years and conducted underground services. After the UGCC came out of the underground, he lived in the Kristinopol Monastery (modern Chervonohrad), where he conducted active pastoral work: he conducted the Apostolate of Prayer and the Virgin Mary service, was a confessor and clergyman of students of the theological lyceum. He also conducted fruitful literary work: he wrote dramatic works for various religious holidays, which were demonstrated by a drama group organized by him. He died on January 8, 1998, in Chervonohrad at the age of 90. He was buried in the cemetery of the village of Bendyuga near Chervonohrad. On January 11, 1998, for fidelity to the Church of Christ and the Apostolic Service, he was posthumously awarded a medal and a diploma of the Holy Father John Paul II⁵¹⁰.

He was a connoisseur of foreign languages: Russian, Polish, Greek, Latin, English, French, and German. He was engaged in translation work: he translated from Greek and published “Conversations of St. Basil the Great to the well-wishers on classical literature”, and worked on the work of Father William Faber “Seven Sciences of Spiritual Growth”.

As a student, he wrote his first article, entitled “The Significance of the Reform of the Basilian Order of 1882”. After completing his studies in Warsaw, the Good Shepherd and Missionary magazines often published his brief descriptions of significant events in church life and obituaries on deceased Basilians. During the underground, Fr. Markian edited and published the newspaper “Bdzhola” (“Bee”) (30 issues).

⁵⁰⁹ Стасів К. Чернеча офіра Христові й Вітчизні. Жовква: Місіонер, 2018. С. 25.

⁵¹⁰ Грім С. (ЧСВВ) Отець Маркіян Матей Когут, ЧСВВ. *Місіонер*, квітень 2011. С. 31.

After the revival of the magazine “Misionar” (“Missionary”) (1992), he joined its editorial board. In the pages of this magazine and the Canadian magazine “Svitlo” (“Light”) published his articles and memoirs about the activities of the UGCC in the underground⁵¹¹. Unfortunately, not all of Fr. Markian and those works that are published need to be described to compile a bio-bibliographic publication.

Father Markiyan Kohut was also a poet and was published under the pseudonyms M. Sonyashnyk and M. Zoryan. A review of his early poetic work was given by the literary critic Fr. Theodosius (Theophilus) Kostruba. He emphasized the originality of Fr. Markian and the features of his literary styles. Author’s fables, ballads, legends, religious and patriotic thoughts, and poems for children were published in various pre-war publications of the German occupation: “Pravda” (“The Truth”), “Nash Pryjatel” (“Our Friend”), “Ukrainskyi Beskyd” (“The Ukrainian Beskyd”), “Misionar” (“The Missionary”), “Misionarchyk” (“The Little Missionary”). During the period of exile and underground poetry brought Fr. Markian consolation, and relief from life’s troubles and allowed him to fill his free time. However, much of his poetry is still preserved in manuscript collections. In 1996, his poem “Liturgy in Chains” was published, which he began to write while still in prison. A collection of his akathists (New Akathists Missionary, 1995) was also published⁵¹². In general, the literary work of Fr. Mariana needs special research. We will focus on the circumstances of the arrest, search and imprisonment, based on the investigation.

At the time of his arrest and search (May 31, 1945) he was a hieromonk (priest-monk) at the Church of St. Trinity in Zhovkva and lived in Zhovkva Basilian Monastery. He suspected that while living in the mentioned monastery, where anti-Soviet literature was published, he systematically wrote articles criticizing the leaders of the party and government of the Soviet Union, and called for the struggle against the existing Soviet system⁵¹³.

On May 31, 1945, a resolution was issued to choose the measure of imprisonment of the suspect to avoid obstacles in the investigation. Kohut was suspected of a crime under Art. 54-1 “a” of the Criminal

⁵¹¹ Тама само. С. 32.

⁵¹² Грім С. (ЧСВВ) Отець Маркіян Матей Когут, ЧСВВ. *Місіонар*, квітень 2011. С. 32.

⁵¹³ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 26909. Арк. 81.

Code of the USSR and taking into account that he can evade the investigation and the court arrested⁵¹⁴.

During a search of the cell, Fr. Markian found a military ticket, a certificate from the place of work, a certificate from the monastery, various certificates (4 pieces) and three books. There was also a description of things that were in the same cell: one desk, one dining table, two bookshelves, one wardrobe, three chairs, one metal bed, one dressing table, two pillows, one mattress, one quilt, a fur coat, three black coats, two black shirts, one black hat, four undershirts, one outer shirt, one pair of boots. All these things were transferred to the custody of Fr. Platonid Martyniuk to the sealed cell of the Zhovkva monastery⁵¹⁵.

During the first interrogation (Lviv, June 9, 1945), he sincerely admitted his guilt, noting that “I am guilty before the Soviet Union because I came to my anti-Soviet behaviour as a nationalist and it was no coincidence that during the German occupation there were the facts of my anti-Soviet behaviour. Ask you to allow me to tell in detail...”⁵¹⁶.

At the second interrogation (Lviv, August 28, 1945) he already insisted on his involvement in anti-Soviet activities, stating that “I have never been involved in anti-Soviet activities and therefore I cannot say anything about it”. The investigator insisted that the suspect provided false information, as it is known that the Zhovkva Monastery, where Fr. Markian, carried out anti-Soviet activities during the German occupation. However, Fr. Markian continued to insist that he knew nothing about the anti-Soviet activities of the Zhovkva Monastery, where he lived and worshipped. As for his anti-Soviet activities, he noted that during the German occupation he was a correspondent for “The Missionary” magazine, which was published by the Zhovkva Basilian Monastery where he lived and served. During the occupation, he wrote articles for this magazine on religious and artistic topics. He has written five articles. In 1941 he wrote an article for the magazine “The Missionary” “Mariinsky Conference at the windows of the NKVD”. In 1944 he wrote the article “Life of the late monk Lana, who lived in Lviv”. The article was an artistic passage “Chudesna Iskra” (“A Wonderful Spark”). He wrote a poem “Holy Virgin”. He wrote an obituary

⁵¹⁴ АУСБУ ЛЮ. СПП. 26909. Арк. 82.

⁵¹⁵ Там само. Арк. 87.

⁵¹⁶ Там само. Арк. 90.

on the death of two monks of the Zhovkva Monastery, entitled “In the Court of God”.

He acknowledged that of all these articles, only one “Mariinsky Conference at the Window of the NKVD” had anti-Soviet themes, for which he acknowledged his responsibility as the author. He told investigators that he had personally written the non-anti-Soviet article, entitled The Mariinsky Conference, but that German censorship had made adjustments and changed the title and content of the manuscript to give it an anti-Soviet character. Although “The Missionary” was a religious publication, it published anti-Soviet articles.

He tried to prove to the investigation that the Zhovkva Monastery was not engaged in anti-Soviet activities, but was only obliged to publish the magazine “The Missionary” and the calendar “Missionary”, where German censorship forced to publish articles on anti-Soviet issues. He wrote articles only on religious topics.

He openly stated that he had not delivered any political sermons on anti-Soviet issues during the German occupation. He informed the investigation that he had not read and did not know the content of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky’s appeal to the Ukrainian people for local support for the Ukrainian national government, which was formed in June 1941⁵¹⁷.

During another interrogation (Lviv, October 1, 1945), he said that he was acquainted with Volodymyr Hradyuk, the archpriest of the Basilian monasteries in Western Ukraine. However, the investigator insisted and presented the testimony of Volodymyr Hradyuk dated September 28, 1945, that in August 1945 Kohut wrote a poem of anti-Soviet content for the magazine “The Missionary” entitled “Glory to the Martyrs” and signed under the pseudonym Zoryan. However, the suspect Kohut M.G. did not confirm this testimony. He said that the three books found during the search did not belong to him, but were taken from the monastery library, as evidenced by the seals on their pages⁵¹⁸.

During interrogation (Lviv, October 22, 1945), he denied that he belonged to the Writers’ Union of Ukraine under the Central Ukrainian Committee. However, the investigator presented him with a certificate issued in his name. Under these circumstances, Kohut M.G. explained

⁵¹⁷ АУСБУ ЛЮ. Спр. 26909. Арк. 91.

⁵¹⁸ АУСБУ ЛЮ. Спр. 26909. Арк. 97.

to the investigator that he had never joined the Writers' Union himself, but that he had been recorded by Fr. Roman Lukan, hieromonk of the Lviv monastery of St. Onuphrius, and he made this certificate for him. Lukan himself died in 1943 in a car accident⁵¹⁹.

On October 8, 1945, the prosecutor of the Lviv region passed a resolution to extend the term of investigation and detention of Kohut M.G. until October 30, 1945, because the investigation was joined to the group case of Zhovkva monks (Savchyn, Pelekh, Pasika, Kurman) and therefore there was a need for additional documentary research⁵²⁰.

On November 9, 1945, the investigator reviewed the case of Kohut M.G. on crimes committed under Art. 54-10 of the Criminal Code of the USSR. Recognized the preliminary investigation in the case completed, and the data obtained are sufficient for transfer to court, according to Art. 20 of the CPC, announced this to the accused, presented it for review and asked the suspect if he had anything to add to the investigation. The accused Kohut Matviy Gavrylovych got acquainted with the materials of the case and did not express a desire to add anything, any appeals or wishes.

On February 27, 1946, he was convicted by the military tribunal of the NKVD troops of Lviv region under Art. 54-10 part II of the Criminal Code of the USSR on the imprisonment for 10 years, restriction of rights for 5 years and confiscation of all personal property for participation in the publishing of Zhovkva monastery printing house and publishing a large amount of anti-Soviet nationalist literature and its distribution among the population⁵²¹.

The case was reconsidered in April 1955, remained unchanged, as well as in 1957, and the complaint was also unsatisfactory.

Matvyi Gavrylovych Kohut was covered by Art. 1 of the Law of the USSR of April 17, 1991 "On the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression in Ukraine" for denying the collective directives confirming the accusation and prosecution (October 16, 1992). This certificate of rehabilitation was sent to Kohuta M.G. during his lifetime on October 16, 1992⁵²².

Based on the collected and analyzed biographical information about Fr. Markian (Matthew) Kohut managed to find out that political re-

⁵¹⁹ Там само. Арк. 98.

⁵²⁰ Там само. Арк. 178.

⁵²¹ АУСБУ ЛО. Спр. 26909. Арк. 186.

⁵²² Там само. Арк. 321.

pression, persecution and repeated forced relocations did not break his religious and national beliefs, but on the contrary strengthened his Christian worldview. After surviving imprisonment, deprivation of rights and double resettlement, he was able to wait patiently for the revival of the UGCC and the Ukrainian state. During the period of Ukraine's independence he did not stand aside from spiritual processes, but on the contrary, actively contributed to the cultural and educational revival of religious customs and traditions that were banned during the previous period of the atheistic Soviet totalitarian-repressive system. Thanks to his memories of life in labour camps, we can learn more about the inhumane conditions of survival and activities of the UGCC in the underground.

Yurii Stetsyk, Antonina Boichuk

GOOD NEIGHBOURS: RELATIONS BETWEEN VOLYN CZECHS AND UNDER- GROUND OF OUN AND UPA

The estimate of Ukrainian nationalists activity, traditionally starting from the Soviet period, has always been ambiguous in the Czech Republic. The people concerned in the question, who frequently speculated on the matter, were less interested in its credibility. In addition, the historical events, which had happened in the distant North-West Ukrainian region, called Volyn, were not taken into consideration. Although, that territory was a motherland for dozens of thousands of the Czechs, who were fated to become an inalienable part of its history.

Despite the compact residence of national colonies, the Volyn Czechs had always been friendly to their Ukrainian neighbors. They had also a favorable attitude towards the Ukrainian striving to gain the statehood. Some amount of the Czechs even joined the Ukrainian liberation struggle. In particular, they formed their own military subdivision – the Czech Insurgent Army, which operated on the territory of Dubno, Zdolbuniv and Kremenets districts. Specifically, the Volyn Czechs had become well-known as skilled specialists in the establishing of material supply of the insurgent units. Some underground members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (hereinafter – OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (hereafter – UPA) had the Czech ancestors or were connected to them through their nationally mixed families.

Another noticeable side of the topic was negotiations on a cooperation between the Ukrainian liberation movement leaders and the Volyn Czechs. Those negotiations had different results. In the south of Rivne region they were more successful but in the current Volyn region territories they were less effective.

Eventually, the majority of the Volyn Czechs joined the 1st separate Czechoslovak Brigade under the command of Colonel Ludwik Svoboda.

The interpretation of preconditions for the Volyn Czechs position in the Ukrainian liberation struggle is impossible without a brief examination of their past.

The Polish uprising defeat of 1863 had drastically changed the attitude of the Russian authorities to the Catholic landowners. In Volyn region the Poles began to sell their lands massively and cheaply. That

fact was a reason for the appearance of the first Czech colonists here in the early 60's of the nineteenth century. Moreover, the Russian Empire authorities considered them as exemplary landowners who would raise the overall level of agricultural technology and agricultural culture⁵²³.

After adoption of a special resolution of the Committee of Ministers "On the settling of the Czechs in Volyn" on June 10, 1870 by Emperor Alexander II, the colonization process increased significantly. The document had anticipated that those colonists who accepted a Russian citizenship, would be granted a privilege in acquiring land, permission to establish their own schools, exemption from taxes and military service⁵²⁴.

On 1897, Volyn province^{525*} had been already inhabited by 27670 Czechs, who represented more than a half of all inhabitants of that nationality in the Russian Empire. 18323 of those representatives were Orthodox, 7916 – Catholics and 1424 – Protestants⁵²⁶.

According to the census of 1931, the territory of Volyn voivodeship (predominantly in the southern provinces) was inhabited by 30977 of the Czechs (28465 of whom lived in villages). In most cases they settled densely and tried to maintain friendly relations with all other nationalities⁵²⁷.

Nevertheless, a balanced lifestyle of the Volyn Czechs was disrupted by the tragic events of the Second World War. Due to the fact that the Czechs were a relatively small and wealthy group in the area with many other nations, they traditionally tried to stand aside from any conflicts. At the same time, they emphasized their loyalty to all representatives of the authorities who controlled their residence territory.

⁵²³ Шпиталенко Г. Релігійне життя волинських чехів у другій половині XIX – на початку XX ст. // Чехи на Волині: історія і сучасність. Житомир: Видавництво ЖДУ імені І. Франка. С. 44-45.

⁵²⁴ Шпиталенко Г. Соціально-економічне і духовне життя чехів Волині (друга половина XIX – початок XX ст.). Автореф. дис. канд. іст. наук: 07.00.01; Прикарпат. ун-т ім. В. Стефаника. Івано-Франківськ, 2003. С. 14.

^{525*} The administrative unit of the Russian Empire. Currently includes territories of Volyn, Rivne, Zhytomyr and northern Ternopil regions of Ukraine

⁵²⁶ Шпиталенко Г. Релігійне життя волинських чехів у другій половині XIX – на початку XX ст. // Чехи на Волині: історія і сучасність. Житомир: Видавництво ЖДУ імені І. Франка. С. 63.

⁵²⁷ Марчук І. Переговори між керівництвом ОУН(Б) на Волині та чеським підпіллям восени 1943 року // Дрогобицький краєзнавчий збірник. Спецвипуск II. Дрогобич: Просвіт, 2015. С. 219.

Although, despite their caution, the Czechs, as well as the other Volyn residents, failed to escape persecution of the Soviet authorities⁵²⁸.

The relations between the Volyn Czechs and the Ukrainian nationalists commenced simultaneously with an appearance of their first underground cells. Accordingly, at the beginning of 1941 the NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs of Soviet Union) apparatus uncovered the OUN "piatirka" (a group of five soldiers) in Ivanychi district, center of Volyn region. The insurgent organization included a local Czech by the name of Ivan Albel⁵²⁹.

In fact, such cases were rare. To a large extent, their close cooperation with Ukrainian nationalists was caused by family ties. One of the OUN leaders of Rivne region, Sviatoslav Tytkov ("Roman")⁵³⁰⁵³¹, and also, Oleksandr Shtefel, an OUN member, who was from the village Kniahyninek situated near Lutsk, both were originated from the Czech-Ukrainian families⁵³².

⁵²⁸ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 5. Спр. 51794. Арк. 204–211, Ф. 6. Спр. 75667. Арк. 10–91.

⁵²⁹ Трагедія українсько-польського протистояння на Волині. 1938 – 1944 років. Іваницький і Локачинський райони / Упорядник І. Пушук. Луцьк, 2010. С. 16.

⁵³⁰ Tytkov Sviatoslav Vasyliovych ("Roman", "Tverdyi"), was born in 1921, in Molyliany village, Ostroh district, Rivne region. He was a member of the OUN from 1938. He illegally moved to territory of Poland, which was occupied by Germans in the autumn of 1939 and returned home in 07.1941. He worked as a school principal in Ivanivka village, Korets district, Rivne region. His next positions were an interpreter in the German police and an employee of "Tsukrotrest". From the summer of 1942 he worked as an interpreter in the criminal police of Rivne city. In 10.1942 he started his underground activity. From 08.1943, he was a deputy of the Korets subdistrict SB OUN (Security Service) referent. He became a referent in 1944. From 02.1945 he was a head of the Korets subdistrict of the OUN. From 01.1946, he was an SB referent of the regional "Odesa" leadership. He was killed on 12.07.1948 in a gun battle with an operative group of the MGB (Ministry of State Security in Soviet Union) near Samostrily village, Korets district.

⁵³¹ Галузевий державний архів Служби безпеки України (далі – ГДА СБУ). Ф. 2. Спр. 417. Арк. 290.

⁵³² Трагедія українсько-польського протистояння на Волині. 1938 – 1944 років. Луцький район і м. Луцьк / Упорядник І. Пушук. Луцьк, 2009. С. 159.



Sviatoslav Tytkov (“Roman”)

It was known, that Oleksiy Prysiazhniuk (“Mitla”)⁵³³⁵³⁴, an OUN Security Service adviser of the North-Western Ukrainian territories, had a wife by the name of Nina Beshta, who was a Czech from the village Plonka, Lutsk district. Theodor Sholomytskyi (“Styr”)⁵³⁵, an

⁵³³ Prysiazhniuk Oleksiy Vasyliovych (“Volia”, “Gryts”, “Karuspun”, “Klym”, “Makar”, “Mitla”, “Paliy”) was born in Polonka village, Lutsk district, Volyn region, in 1915. He studied at the Polish State Gymnasium named after Tadeusz Kościuszko (1931 – 05.1935). In 1936 he graduated from the Lutsk Ukrainian gymnasium, where he joined the OUN, and starting from 1937 he was a head of the Youth League of the OUN of Lutsk county. He was arrested in 1938 by the Polish police and released in 09.1939. In order to escape arrest by the NKVD bodies he switched into an illegal position. His parents were deported to Omsk region in 05.1941. From 1941, he was a head of the OUN of Rivne district. He lived in Korets town, Rivne region, and was an owner of a dinnerware shop called “OKO” (it was a confidential apartment of the OUN underground). He was a commander of the SB OUN in Volodymyr-Volynsky district from the spring of 1943. From the end of 1943, he was a deputy of the North-West Ukrainian territories (PZUZ) head, “Bezridnyi”. From 01.1944, he became a counterintelligence department head of the SB Military headquarters of the UPA-North. He headed the OUN territory leadership on PZUZ. He died on 24.03.1945 in a battle with the NKVD operational group of Klevan district department at Novostav hamlet, which is situated near Sukhovets village of Kostopil district of Rivnen region. Posthumously, dated 04.1948, he was given the rank of the Lieutenant-Colonel of the SB Counterintelligence. That was announced in the UHVR (Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council) order from 11.10.1952. He was rewarded by the Silver Cross of Merit, and later by the Golden Cross of Merit.

⁵³⁴ Пушкар Н. “Кучма” і... “Мітла” // Волинська газета. 2009. 15 жовтня.

⁵³⁵ Sholomytskyi Fedir, (“Styr”, “Fedir Odrach”), was born on 13.03.1912 in Mistytychi village, Pinsk region (Belorussia). In 1921 he entered the Polish school in Vilnius, and later graduated from Vilnius University. He worked as a teacher in Pinsk region. At the beginning of 1940 he moved to Lviv region, and on 14.12.1940 he illegally crossed the border near Sryi town of Lviv region. He dwelled in Sanok, Krakow and Berlin. From 11.1941 he worked as an editor of the “Visti Kovelshchyny” newspaper. In order to rescue himself from an arrest by the Gestapo in 08.1942, he moved he acted

OUN Socio-political adviser of Kovel circuit, was married with a Czech woman from Khupychiv village, Turiisk district⁵³⁶. In addition to those facts, one Volyn Czech with his Ukrainian wife worked as orderlies at the UPA “Morozenko” kurin (regiment) (Kremenets territories)⁵³⁷.



*Oleksiy Prysiazhniuk together with his wife Nina Beshta and her college friends
(1930-s picture)*

in the underground. From 13.03.1943 he worked at the publishing department of the military base of the UPA “Sich” (Vovchak village, Turiisk district, Volyn region). He was a tutor on the UPA political trainings and published a magazine called “Informator”. He worked at the UPA propaganda department of “Kolky Republic” (06 – 10.1943). He was an editor of the underground typography in Svynaryn village of Turiisk district (10 – 11.1943). His Czech wife and 14-year-old son were captured by the Poles in Kupychiv village, Turiisk district. Subsequently, they were released and in 1946 moved to Czechoslovakia. Near Oziutychi village of Lokachi district, Volyn region in 01.1944 he was arrested by the Soviet partisans. He avoided a death execution by escaping from his convoy. He arrived to Lviv on 28.05.1944. From Lviv he traveled to Prague, and then to Bavaria (Federal Republic of Germany). He moved to Manchester (United Kingdom) and emigrated from there to Canada in 1953. He settled in Toronto and wrote over 200 articles, reports, literary works for Ukrainian diaspora newspapers. He died on 7.10.1964 from a stroke in Toronto city (Canada).

⁵³⁶ Марчук І. Короткий життєпис Федора Одрача // Український визвольний рух. Львів, 2004. 36. 4. С. 25.

⁵³⁷ Літопис УПА. Т. 43: Боротьба з агентурою: Протоколи допитів Службою Безпеки ОУН в Тернопільщині. 1946 – 1948. Торонто; Львів, 2006. С. 963.

Notwithstanding the traditional neutrality, the majority of the Volyn Czechs had a favorable attitude towards Ukrainian striving to gain the statehood. For instance, Yevhen Manko (“Yashchur”)⁵³⁸⁵³⁹, an OUN Kovel circuit “providnyk” (a chief), lived in a Czech family in Kupychiv village, Turiisk district, Volyn region in the autumn of the year 1942. At the same time, the local Czech poet, Josef Toman-Tomanek, wrote his pro-Ukrainian patriotic poems which were calling for armed struggle for gaining an independent state⁵⁴⁰.

The local Czechs, in every available occasion, emphasized their loyalty after appearance of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (hereafter – UPA) and its gradual taking control under considerable territories in the spring of 1943. For example, in early March 1943, Leonid Stupnytskyi (“Goncharenko”)⁵⁴¹ a head of the UPA military circuit

⁵³⁸ Manko Yevgen Andriyovych (“Mykola”, “Sereda”, “Yashchur”), was born in 1920 in Sadiv village, Lutsk district, Volyn region. From 1940 he was a deputy of the OUN head of Torchyn district. From 1942 he was a head of the OUN in Kovel circuit. From 05.1943, he headed the OUN in Horokhiv district. From 09.1943 he was a political leader of the “Bohun” military circuit. After a foundational assembly of the People’s Liberation Revolutionary Organization (NVRO) on 17.07.1944, he sharply opposed its formation and refused to join it. From 08.1944 he headed the OUN of Rivne district. From 12.1944 he became a head of the OUN propaganda department in Lutsk circuit. He blew himself up with a grenade, surrounded on 3.09.1945 by NKVD operational group in Sadiv village (he was revealed by a hostess of the house he visited).

⁵³⁹ Архів Управління СБ України у Волинській обл. Ф. П. Спр. 5455. Арк. 35.

⁵⁴⁰ Томанек Й. Квіти гніву. Вірші з України. 1939 – 1942. Переклад з чеської П. Марченка. Нью-Йорк: Видавництво книжок і музики “Голос”, 1968. 18 с.; Томан-Томанек Й. Квіти гніву: вірші, хроніка. Луцьк, 1999. 64 с.

⁵⁴¹ Stupnytskyi Leonid Venedyktovych, (“Goncharenko”, “Shymansky”), was born on 10.06.1891 in Romanivtsi village of Romanivtsi district, Zhytomyr region. He served as an officer in the Russian imperial army and from the summer of 1917 – in the UNR (Ukrainian National Republic) Army. He settled in 1922 in Ostrog, Rivne region and worked as a plantations inspector of the Babyn sugar factory of Goshcha district. At the beginning of 03.1940, because an arrest threat by the NKVD departed, he moved to Lviv with his son, Yuri. He secretly tried to go to Poland but was arrested by border guards and sentenced to 5 years of imprisonment. His family was deported to Kazakhstan. He was released from the Brest prison on 23.06.1941 by the Germans. He returned to Volyn in 07.1941. There he headed the headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian kurin (a hut) called Holodnyi Yar in Rivne city. From 08.1941 he became a training commander of the Ukrainian people’s police in Rivne, in 12.1941, switched to the Rivne fire protection regiment, and in 1942 resigned and headed the Rivne Assistance Committee. At the beginning of 03.1943, under an arrest threat by the Gestapo, he went into the underground. From 04.1943 he was in the UPA. From 09.1943 he headed the Regional Military headquarters of the UPA Main Team. He taught tactics at the

“Zagrava”, and his son, Yuri, were hiding in a Czech colony near Kolesnyky village, Hoshcha district, Rivne region. For several days they had been waiting there for an agreed meeting with “Chornomorets” sotnia (hundred of soldiers)⁵⁴².

According to the analysis of the UPA creation period, an OUN PZUZ military advisor officer, Vasyl Sydor (“Kregul”)⁵⁴³ recalled:

pidstarshynska (officers’) school of the UPA “Druzhynnyky”. From 05.1944 he was an operational officer of the UPA-South headquarters. He blew himself up by a grenade on 30.07.1944 near Derman village, Zdolbunivsky district, Rivne region, surrounded by NKVD secret police forces. Posthumously, dated 30.07.1944, he was promoted to the rank of general-khorunzhyi of the UPA.

⁵⁴² Ступницький Ю. Спогади про пережите. К.; Торонто: Літопис УПА, 2000. С. 43.

⁵⁴³ Sydor Vasyl Dmytrovych (“Verkhovynets”, “Vyshyti”, “Zov”, “Kindrat”, “Kravs”, “Kregul”, “Lisovyk”, “Rostyslav Vyshyti”, “Shelest”), born on 24.02.1911 in Spasiv village, Sokal district, Lviv region. He was an OUN battle head in Sokal district, later became an organizational leader of the OUN in Sokal district. He was arrested by the police in 02.1935 and sentenced to 4 years in prison in Lviv. After the release in 11.1936, he became a head of the military unit of the OUN Regional leadership on PZUZ. He organized an OUN sabotage and terrorist group called “Vovky” on Gorohiv territories in 07.1937. He was again arrested by the police on 5.08.1937. During his stay in the Lviv Prison called Brygidky, (1938 – 1939) he headed the organization of the Ukrainian prisoners. He was released in 09.1939 and from 02.1940 worked at the Government of Labor in Krakow (fall 1939 – summer 1940). He was a military leader of the OUN regional leadership of Lviv (summer and autumn 1940). He was a trainer of communications technology at military trainings in Krakow (12.1940 – 12.1941). He was a military head of the OUN leadership (31.03 – 3.04.1941). He was a commander of a sotnia (hundred of soldiers) in the Nachtigall Battalion (06 – 07.1941). He was a commander of the 2nd sotnia in the lieutenant rank of the Yevhen Konovalts battalion (10.1941 – 03.1942) and of the 201st guard battalion which was acting on the territory of the Minsk region of Belorussia (04. 12.1942). From the summer of 1941, he became a member of the main military headquarters of the OUN Leadership. In the autumn of 1942 he arrived in Polissya as a representative of the OUN Leadership. He was arrested by the Germans, but was soon released. He was in charge of the military unit at the OUN Leadership (02 – 05.1943). He organized and headed the Volyn regional military headquarters. He became a head of the UPA Main leadership military headquarters (05 – 08.1943). He was a commander’s deputy the OUN leadership (1943). He was a mayor of UPA from 8.07.1943 and a member of the OUN Main Council and UPA Main military headquarters from 08.1943. From 26.01.1944 he became an UPA-West commander’s deputy of the UPA Main Team (26.01.1944 – 04.1949). He was a member of the OUN Leadership on PZUZ (1944 – 1949) and the Ukrainian lands (1947 – 1949). In 1945 he was awarded the Silver Cross of First Class Military Merit. In 1946 he was awarded a rank of the UPA colonel. From 1947 he was a head of the Carpathian OUN regional leadership and an OUN general judge. He died on 17.04.1949 in a secret hiding place on Yaiko mountain hillside, near

“the struggle of the UPA units was based on a self-defense of the Ukrainian population, regardless of nationality, religion, etc. (for example, about 40 thousand of the Volyn Czechs were very supportive of the liberation struggle, they worked closely with the UPA)...”⁵⁴⁴.

The sociopolitical report for August of 1943 of the Volodymyr-Ghorohiv circuit stated: “...The Czechs of Ivanychi district sympathize with our struggle, the Czechs near Ghorohiv (couple hundreds from the population) are interested in our movement and have a favorable attitude. They subordinate to our organization and cooperate with us, moreover, they create their own stanytsias (units)”⁵⁴⁵.

The authors of contemporaneous UPA reports stated that Czech citizens voluntarily helped the rebels and fulfilled household duties entrusted to them⁵⁴⁶. In May 1943 the Czech community of Kupylich village collected and offered a large amount of medicines to the “Sitch” division, which was situated in Vovchak village, Turiisk district, Volyn region⁵⁴⁷. In addition, the “Sich” division had a tanner workshop and a meat-shop functioning and managed by the Czechs who were the specialists in the sphere⁵⁴⁸. An economic adviser of the OUN in Dubno subdistrict, Yosyp Pavliuk (“Venus”)⁵⁴⁹ recalled the

Yasen village of Rozhniativ district of Ivano-Frankivsk region, during a sudden attack made by the MGB operational group.

⁵⁴⁴ Марчук І. Переговори між керівництвом ОУН(Б) на Волині та чеським підпіллям восени 1943 року // Дрогобицький краєзнавчий збірник. Дрогобич: Просвіт, 2017. С. 224.

⁵⁴⁵ Літопис УПА. Нова серія. Т. 11: Мережа ОУН(Б) і запілля УПА на території ВО “Заграва”, “Турів”, “Богун” (серпень 1942 – грудень 1943 рр.). К.; Торонто, 2007. С. 91.

⁵⁴⁶ Стародубець Г. Українське повстанське запілля (друга пол. 1943 — поч. 1946 років). — Тернопіль, 2006. С. 112.

⁵⁴⁷ Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади (далі – ЦДАВО) України. Ф. 3838. Оп. 1. Спр. 127. Арк. 3.

⁵⁴⁸ Літопис УПА. Т. 5: Волинь і Полісся. Кн. 3. Спомини учасників / Ред. С. Штендери. Торонто, 1984. С. 176.

⁵⁴⁹ Pavliuk Yosyp Dmytrovych (“Venus”, “Doctor”), was born in 1893 on Berezyuny hamlet near Berehy village of Dubno district, Volyn province. He worked in Kozyn district financial department (1940 – 06.1941). From 1944, he was an economic advisor of the OUN in Dubno district. He was arrested on 6.07.1951 on Berezyuny hamlet by the MGB operative group of Kozyn district department. He was convicted up to 25 years of imprisonment on 18.09.1951 by the MVS (Ministry of Internal Affairs) military tribunal in Rivne region. His punishment was served in Olzheras village, Kemero-vo region (Russia). After his release, he lived in Ozhenyn village, Ostroh district of Rivne region.

help which the UPA had been receiving from the local Czechs: “A homemade alcohol of 85% strength was produced for medical needs of the Ukrainian Red Cross (UChH). The Czechs, who were residents of the area, helped a lot in the production of such alcohol. They independently engineered an appropriate equipment for the alcohol manufacture and constructed a proper device for measuring an alcohol percentage... The Czechs predominantly were very supportive of our movement and took an active part in various groups of craftsmen that produced items required by the UPA. Cheski Vovkovyi village was the main center of different workshops and machine tools. The saddlery workshop gained the greatest popularity as there the Czechs produced excellent saddles and harnesses for the UPA”⁵⁵⁰.

The part of the Volyn Czechs was vigorously engrossed in the UPA advancement. A brother of Kupychiv village council chief, by the name of Juzef Kucher, lead the UPA miners school in spring of 1943. Thereafter, he headed a cavalry riy (9 – 15 soldiers) of a division named after Bohun (Volodymyr territories, Volyn region)⁵⁵¹. It is also known that the UPA “Bohun” division unit (southern Volyn) included the local Czechs: Tadeush Glosa (“Chodaka”), a native of Pustoivanne village, Radyvyliv district, Rivne region⁵⁵², and also a soldier shooter “Grim”⁵⁵³.

Together with the Ukrainian insurgents, they had been conducting an armed struggle and dying in the fight against the enemy. According to the report on 31 of August, 1943, the Germans hanged a local Czech, by the name of Oleksandr Shtepan⁵⁵⁴, for the cooperation with the UPA. In the late summer of 1943, near Velykyi Stydyn village, Kostopil district, Rivne region, a soldier, who was a participant of the “Druzhynnyky”, a hundred of the UPA soldiers who belonged to

⁵⁵⁰ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 13. Спр. 376. Т. 64. Арк. 130.

⁵⁵¹ Спогади Легнер Емілії Йосипівни, 1905 року народження, уродженки с. Купичів Турійського р-ну Волинської обл. Записано 2 квітня 2005 р. Антоною-ком М.М.

⁵⁵² Патрляк І. “Встань і борись! Слухай і вір...”: українське націоналістичне підпілля та повстанських рух (1939 – 1960 рр.). Львів: Часопис, 2012. С. 391.

⁵⁵³ Літопис УПА. Нова серія. Т. 2: Волинь і Полісся: УПА та Запілля. 1943 – 1944. Документи і матеріали. Упорядники: О. Вовк, І. Павленко. Київ-Торонто, 1999. С. 391.

⁵⁵⁴ ЦДАВО України. Ф. 3838. Оп. 1. Спр. 118. Арк. 67.

the regiment of Ivan Klymyshyn (“Kruk”)⁵⁵⁵, was killed in the battle with the red partisans. That soldier’s alias was “Hvyliya”⁵⁵⁶ and he was a Czech by nationality.

The attempts to create Czech national divisions in the UPA structure had also occurred. Maksym Skorupskiy (“Maks”)⁵⁵⁷, a colonel of the UPA, recalled that he had met with a Czech self-defense in Gilcha village, Zdolbuniv district, Rivne region, they had called themselves the Czech Insurgent Army⁵⁵⁸. Shortly afterwards, the Czechs transformed into a squadron in the UPA regiment of Yakiv Yakovliv

⁵⁵⁵ Klymyshyn Ivan Tymofiiiovych, (“Kruk”), was born in 1919 in Vereshchaky village, Lanivtsi district, Ternopil region. He graduated from the Vyshhorod Seminary. He was a member of the OUN from the 1930s and was arrested repeatedly by the Polish police. He illegally traveled to Krakow in 11.1939, where he participated in the OUN military training. From 07.1941 he returned home and created a subdivision of self-defense. He was a military leader of the Kremenets circuit of the OUN (1942 – 1943). He was a head of the Kremenets mobile regiment of the “Bohun” military circuit, which was defeated by the Germans. Subsequently, he led a raiding UPA regiment which moved back to Podilia. He was shot on 7.05.1944 by an NKVD agent in the Kruhlyk forest in Kremenets territories.

⁵⁵⁶ Ступницький Ю. Спогади про пережите. К.; Торонто: Літопис УПА, 2000. С. 58.

⁵⁵⁷ Scorupskiy Maxym Antonovych (“Max”, “Yurko”) was born on 15.08.1915 in Antonivtsi village, Shumsk district, Ternopil region. He graduated from the Vyshnivets craft school. Then he studied agronomy in Bilokrynynsia village, Kremenets district, Ternopil region. In 1939 he traveled to Poland and joined the OUN (m) in Krakow. He trained at Werkschutz (Germany). He was a head of the Vyshnivets district of the OUN (m) (1941 – 1942). From 1.05.1943 he was a lieutenant of the OUN (m) squadron of Kremenets district. After the squadron was disarmed on 6.07.1943, it moved to the UPA side. From 26.07.1943, he headed a squadron of the Dubno UPA regiment. From 09.1943 he was a commander of the mobile squadron of the “Tiutiunnyk” military circuit. From 17.10.1943 he was a commander of the UPA regiment. From 8.01.1944 he became a commander of the officers’ school of the “Bohun” military circuit. From 02.1944 he was a supervising and training lieutenant of the “Bohun” military circuit. From 03.1944, he was a commander in one of the regiments of the “Bohun” military circuit. In 04.1944 he was defeated by the Red Army unit near the town of Zolochiv, Lviv region. He immigrated to Austria and worked for the American intelligence. He founded an intelligence school in 1947 in the town of Staufenberg. In 1948 he lived in Salzburg. He emigrated in 1950 to the United States and lived in Minneapolis. He worked on the railway and also on a furniture factory. He was an author of memoir and died of a kidney and bone cancer on 30.12.1981 in Trenton, New Jersey.

⁵⁵⁸ Скорупський М. Туди, де бій за волю. К., 1992. С. 198.

(“Yurko”)⁵⁵⁹, they located in Vovkovyi village, Demydivka district of Rivne region⁵⁶⁰.

In appeal for the Volyn Czechs cooperation, the UPA headship produced couple of leaflets specially designed for the Czechs, which are “To Ukrainian Czechs!”⁵⁶¹ and “Czechs!”⁵⁶² (Author – detailed information in the Appendix). In addition, they tried to attract to their side the Soviet partisan detachment of captain Yan Nalepka (“Riepkín”)⁵⁶³. The detachment consisted of Czechs and Slovaks who escaped from the German army and went underground. On September 24, 1943, a representative of the UPA General Staff arrived in Karpylivka village, Rivne district, Rivne region. He suggested to them that they should join the UPA, declaring: “we have subdivisions which consist of different nations – Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Frenchmen, even Czechoslovaks. Even though there are a few of them, but they still created their national legion... All nations occupied by the Germans created an alliance in England which simultaneously fights with the Bolsheviks. The UPA

⁵⁵⁹ Yakovliv Yakiv (“Karlo”, “Kvatyrenko”, “Rasputin”, “Yurko”), was born in 1918 in Kulchyn village, Kivertsi district, Volyn region. He served in the Red Army (1940 – 1941). Since 1942 he was a platoon of the agricultural school in Lutsk. He switched to the UPA on 20.03.1943. He headed a squadron in the UPA in 05.1943. From the autumn of 1943 he became a commander of the “Khmelnitskyi” regiment. He participated in raids on Zhytomyr region territories. He was an UPA lieutenant from 24.04.1945. From the spring of 1946 he was a member of the North-East Territories Leadership. He suffered from tuberculosis. He was killed on 25.10.1946 in a secret hiding place which was surrounded by the NKVD troops in Korets district, Rivne region.

⁵⁶⁰ Пагіря О. Між війною та миром: відносини між ОУН і УПА та збройними силами Угорщини (1939 – 1945). Торонто; Львів: Літопис УПА, 2014. Т. 12. С. 155.

⁵⁶¹ Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань (далі – ЦДАГО) України. Ф. 57. Оп. 4. Спр. 370. Арк. 57.

⁵⁶² ГДА СБУ. Ф. 13. Спр. 376. Т. 64. Арк. 24.

⁵⁶³ Nalepka Yan (“Riepkín”), was born on 20.09.1912 in Smižany village of Smižhansky, Spišská Nová Ves district of Eastern Slovakia. He graduated from the Teachers’ Seminary in 1931 and worked as a rural teacher. From 1934 he served in the army of Czechoslovakia. He had a military rank of lieutenant and in the summer of 1941 was sent by the German authorities to the Eastern Front. He created an underground group in the 101st Slovak regiment. In 05.1943 he switched to the Soviet partisans’ side. He created and headed a sabotage unit in the Alexander Saburov partisan group. The “Riepkín” soldiers took part in the liberation of Ovruch, a city in Zhytomyr region, from the Germans. He died on 16.11.1943 and was buried in a mass grave of Sadrirske cemetery in Chernivtsi. Posthumously on 2.05.1945 he was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union and on 5.05.1945 – Hero of the Slovak National Uprising. He was awarded the Order of the White Lion of the 1st class.

representative is also the alliance participant and one promises them full moral and material support”⁵⁶⁴.

Nevertheless, the vast majority of the Volyn Czechs attempted to avoid any underground movements. Even such measured position did not always rescue them from German repression. In the report from 13 of July 1943 of the Lutsk circuit stated that the Germans burned Malyn village of Mlyniv district, Rivne region (624 Czechs and 115 Ukrainians died)⁵⁶⁵. All circumstances of the tragedy are still unknown. It was assumed that the Malyn Czechs had supported bounds with the Red partisans and that became the cause of the tragedy⁵⁶⁶. According to Stepan Dranytskyi-Semeniuk’s (“Matvii”) memoirs, he was a former OUN leader of the Ostrozhets district, the only force that was going to rescue the Czech village was the UPA⁵⁶⁷. The subdistrict combat group of the UPA self-defense, headed by Andriy Gavryliuk, tried to protect Malyn. However, in the unequal battle with Germans all the 16 insurgents died and only one survived⁵⁶⁸. At the same time, the UPA subdivision “Chumak” (40 soldiers), which also tried to protect Malin, was defeated by the German punitive detachment⁵⁶⁹.

The magazine “Do zbroi” (“To arms”) published by political department of the UPA had informed about events on 24 July of 1943: “In Tulychiv (the south part of Kovel territory) the German-Polish gang killed dozen of people and burned the village. The gang destroyed the neighboring Czech colony. The UPA department together with the village self-defence acted on protection of the persecuted Czechs, who had long-established peaceful and friendly relationships with the Ukrainian population. They resisted the thieves and participated in the battle. 180 of German and Polish killed thieves covered a field of battle, 8 cars were burned. The department gained arms, clothes, provision, field kitchen and a stolen property was returned”⁵⁷⁰.

⁵⁶⁴ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 2. Спр. 78. Арк. 110.

⁵⁶⁵ Літопис УПА. Нова серія. Т. 11: Мережа ОУН(б) і запілля УПА на території ВО “Заграва”, “Турів”, “Богун” (серпень 1942 – грудень 1943 рр.). К.; Торонто, 2007. С. 69.

⁵⁶⁶ Жарчинська О. Малин воскресий із попелу // Вісник (Луцьк). 2013. 15 липня.

⁵⁶⁷ Семенюк С. “...І гинули першими”. Нотатки волинського підпільника. Луцьк: Терен, 2010. С. 81.

⁵⁶⁸ Денишук О. Злочини польських шовіністів на Волині. Книга перша. Рівненська область. Рівне, 2003. С. 113–114.

⁵⁶⁹ Архів УСБУ у Рівненській обл. Ф. 5. Спр. 10918. Арк. 11–12.

⁵⁷⁰ Літопис УПА. Нова серія. Т.1: Видання Головного командування УПА. К.; Торонто, 1995. С. 92.

In a trial to avoid repression, the Volyn Czechs were loyal to all sides of the confrontation in Volyn. In socio-political review of the “Bohun” military circuit (south part of Rivne region) stated on 31st of October 1943: “The Czechs citizens are one of the national minority, dwelling in the region, with whom we found a common ground. Since they are loyal towards us as land possessors here and support our national Ukrainian liberation struggle. To tell the truth, they try to be loyal for everyone, as they are toward us, also they treat Germans favorably. Notwithstanding their hatred of Germans, they still wish to live in peace...”⁵⁷¹.

At the same time, the Czechs tried to create their own anti-German underground organizations. The SB OUN (OUN Security Service) almost immediately detected that fact. The SB OUN information report on June 13, 1943 stated that a meeting of 13 representatives of the Czech settlements in Volyn took place in the village of Moskovshchyna, Mlyniv district, Rivne region. On that meeting the Czechs created an anti-Nazi organization “Blanik” and chose its leadership⁵⁷².

Myrohoshcha village of Dubno district, Rivne region was an actual center of the Czech underground movement. It was planned that the main direction of the Czech underground activities would be to prepare an uprising against the Germans. For that purpose, they organized military training of young people, carried out an intelligence work and accumulated weapons and military equipment. In August 1, 1943, the publication of the underground newspaper “Glashatai” was started. Also a network of the underground cells was created. It was planned that the network would cover 5 circuits, which would be split into 3 – 6 divisions, and those consequently would be divided into 3 to 9 subdivisions. As of the end of summer 1943, about 40 “Blanik” cells had been already functioning. Most of them were located in Czech villages around Dubno, Rivne, Lutsk, and also Kozyn⁵⁷³. A leader of the organization was a teacher, Volodymyr Knop (“Vlcheka”), and his deputies

⁵⁷¹ Державний архів Рівненської обл. (далі – ДАРО). Ф. Р-30. Оп. 2. Спр. 32. Арк. 65.

⁵⁷² Шульга С. “Бланік” – організація Руху опору волинських чехів // Друга світова війна і доля народів України: Матеріали Всеукраїнської наукової конференції. К.: Сфера, 2005. С. 122.

⁵⁷³ Солдатюк М. Чехи в Мирогощі – організація “Бланік” // Чехи і Дубенщина. Матеріали Міжнародної науково-теоретичної конференції, присвяченої 60-річчю репатріації чехів на етнічну Батьківщину. Дубно, 2008. С. 66, 71–72.

were: an editor of the Czech magazine, Josef Raisek (“Vinaritski”) and an engineer Irzhy Raisek (“Broz”). All three lived in Myrohoshcha village⁵⁷⁴.

During that particular period, the OUN and UPA underground on Volyn territories were highly interested in the activities of the Czech community. For instance, in the report on propagation work at the departments of the UPA “Eney” group, it was noted that the insurgents were interested in the issues “Do the Czechs have their partisan formations on the UPA territories?” and “Do the Czechs have their national departments within the UPA?”⁵⁷⁵.

The activation of the Czech underground in Volyn prompted a leader of the Zapillia UPA Rostyslav Voloshyn (“Gorbenko”)⁵⁷⁶ to

⁵⁷⁴ Shulga S. The Czechs in the conflict of 1943 in Volyn: the participation issue // Gilea: scientific newsletter. Kyiv, 2018. Issue 133 (6). P. 46.

⁵⁷⁵ Літопис УПА. Нова серія. Т. 2. Волинь і Полісся: УПА та запілля. 1943 – 1944. Документи і матеріали. Упорядники: О. Вовк, І. Павленко. Київ-Торонто, 1999. С. 370, 378.

⁵⁷⁶ Voloshyn-Bereziuk Rostyslav Pavlovych (“Barylko”, “Gorbenko”, “Ivan Chepiga”, “Levchenko”, “Pavlenko”, “Stetsenko”), was born in a railway worker family on 3.11.1911 in Ozeriany village, Dubno district, Rivne region. He graduated from the Rivne Gymnasium in 1929. On 1.04.1930 he entered the Law Faculty of Lviv University. He was a member of the OUN Executive Office in Rivne circuit. He was arrested on 21.08.1933 by the Polish police of Dubno county and, due to the lack of evidence, was released. He was arrested again on 14.06.1934 in Lviv on suspicion of being involved in the OUN network and was in Kraków prison until 21.11.1934. He was arrested on 22.01.1935 in Lviv. From 20.02.1935 he was imprisoned in the Bereza Kartuska prison but released due to illness on 29.05.1935. A week later he was arrested again. He was in the Lviv prison (4.06 – 6.08.1935). He was a co-editor of an underground youth newspaper “Yunak” and the journal “Studentskyi visnyk”. On 5.08.1937 he was again arrested by the police. He was in the Ostroh prison until 05.1939, and then – in Bereza Kartuska prison (01 – 18.09.1939). He was arrested on 20.10.1939 by NKVD bodies and was in Rivne prison. He was released on 5.07.1940 and recruited as an agent under an operational pseudo “Pavlov”. The eviction of his family (parents, wife, son and daughter) was canceled. He was a deputy head of the Rivne region leadership (07 – 09.1941). He was a head of the OUN PZUZ regional leadership (25.08 – 09.1941). He was arrested by the Gestapo and remained in Kraków prison (09.1941 – 06.1942). After his dismissal, he worked as a deputy director of the circuit Cooperatives Office in Rivne. He came into the underground in 12.1942. In the spring of 1943 he joined the UPA. He headed the OUN Revolutionary Court in Derman village. From the summer of 1943, he was a rear commander of the UPA headquarters. He was a general secretary of the UHVR Ministry of Internal Affairs. He died on 22.08.1944 in a battle with the NKVD forces near Nyzhniy Gai village, Drohobych district, Lviv region (during a transition of the front line).

establish contacts with the “Blanik” organization. Due to the fact that the Czech underground center was situated in Dubno territories, the task was assigned to an intelligence cell of the UPA-South group headquarters. In particular, to a chief of intelligence, Adam Kysil (“Nemo”)⁵⁷⁷ and his deputy – Vasyl Koreniuk (“Modest”)⁵⁷⁸⁵⁷⁹. The first negotiations with the Czech population had been conducted by them in the summer of 1943. The both sides agreed on neutrality and assumed that the Czechs would create their own armed subdivisions

⁵⁷⁷ Kysil Andrii Arkhyrovych, (“Golubenko”, “Dolnytskyi”, “Nemo”), was born in 1912 in Derman-1 village of Zdolbuniv district, Rivne region. He graduated from Rivne Gymnasium and was fluent in English, French, German, and Hungarian languages. He worked as a personal secretary of the ambassador of the Polish Sejm in Ostroh (1934 – 1936). He was twice arrested by the Polish police and served his punishment in the Bereza Kartuska. In the autumn of 1939 he got to work for the department of the Rivne Regional Executive Committee. He illegally crossed the Soviet-German border near Chełm (Poland) city and settled in Germany. In the summer of 1941 he returned to the city of Rivne as an interpreter for the German army. He worked for the “Tsentsosoiuz” trade network. He lived in Kostopil, Mizoch and Zdolbuniv of Rivne region. Later he worked as a deputy director of the procurement office in Rivne city. According to the OUN’s order, he went into the underground in 06.1943. He headed the diplomatic department at the OUN PZUZ regional leadership. He was an intelligence chief of the UPA “South” headquarters. From 01.1944 he was a representative of the UPA in negotiations with Hungarian troops. He had a military rank of the major of the UPA. He moved to Khust city of Zakarpattia region in 07.1944 and in the end of 09.1944 – Budapest. He was in charge of the Hungarian scouts and saboteurs training. In the spring of 1945 he moved to Bavaria. Subsequently he emigrated to Canada where he died on 6.07.1982 in Montreal city.

⁵⁷⁸ Koreniuk Vasyl Semenovych, (“Modest”, “Paliy”) was born in 1919 in Uyzidtsi village, Zdolbuniv district, Rivne region. He graduated from Lviv Gymnasium and joined the OUN. He worked as a teacher of physical education in Kunyn village, Zdolbuniv district (1938 – 1939). In 1939 he graduated from the Orthodox theology studio in Warsaw. He worked as a director of the Kunyn village school (1939 – 1941). He was a deputy of the Kunyn village council. In 1940 he was mobilized to the Red Army. In the summer of 1941 he was captured by the Germans and worked for them as an interpreter. In 1942 he returned home. In the spring of 1943 he switched to the UPA. He was an intelligence department officer of the UPA “South” Military Staff. From 1944 he was a deputy chief of the Military Intelligence of the “Bohun” Military District. From 1945, he was an officer of the OUN security service of PZUZ. He was awarded by the Silver Cross of Merit on 8.10.1945. He was killed on 12.12.1945 in a battle with the division of NKVD troops in Romaniv village, Lutsk district, Volyn region. Posthumously he was awarded a rank of the UPA major of counterintelligence.

⁵⁷⁹ Марчук І. Переговори між керівництвом ОУН(Б) на Волині та чеським підпіллям восени 1943 року // Дрогобицький краєзнавчий збірник. Дрогобич: Просвіт, 2017. С. 220.

and fight the Germans independently of the UPA. A runner called “Verba” had been operating at the UPA headquarters of the “Bohun” group specifically for communication with the Czechs. He assisted in the contact with the Czech community in Yosypivka village⁵⁸⁰.



Adam Kysil (“Nemo”)



Vasyl Koreniuk (“Palii”)

The first official negotiations between the “Blanik” representatives and the UPA “South” headquarters of the intelligence unit occurred on October 24, 1943, in Derman village, Zdolbuniv district, Rivne region. At that time, the village served as a so-called capital of the Ukrainian “insurgent republic”. The meeting was settled by a Czech by the name of Krejch from Gilcha village, Zdolbuniv district, he was an authority figure of a considerable influence among local Ukrainians⁵⁸¹. Before the negotiations started, the UPA team had produced leaflets in the Czech and Ukrainian languages. Those leaflets had an appeal for joining the Czech Insurgent Army, which was a part of the UPA and was headed by a Czech, Antonin Nekhutnyi⁵⁸². One of the leaflets called

⁵⁸⁰ Архів УСБУ у Рівненській області. Ф. 4. Спр. 11266. Арк. 12.

⁵⁸¹ Шульга С. “Бланік” – організація Руху опору волинських чехів // Друга світова війна і доля народів України: Матеріали Всеукраїнської наукової конференції. К.: Сфера, 2005. С. 123.

⁵⁸² Солдатюк М. Чехи в Мирогощі – організація “Бланік” // Чехи і Дубенщина. Матеріали Міжнародної науково-теоретичної конференції, присвяченої 60-річчю репатріації чехів на етнічну Батьківщину. Дубно, 2008. С. 72.

for a united struggle against Germany, the Soviet Union and Poland, which were eternal enemies of the Czechs and Ukrainians⁵⁸³.

The Czech delegation on the negotiations included three representatives – Knop, Tsilts and Lizalek. According to the previous agreements, they arrived without any weapon on an ordinary rural cart pulled by a white horse. At a certain distance from Derman village, they were met by the UPA representatives and escorted to a one-story brick house which belonged to Iosyp Shevchuk⁵⁸⁴. It was the very place that negotiations had started and lasted for about two hours. The Czech representatives recalled: “Two Banderivets (both well dressed in civilian clothes) came out of the opposite door. After we had introduced ourselves the negotiations started. Yerzhy Lizalek first spoke on behalf of our delegation. He spoke the Czech language... From the other delegation the negotiator was a middle-aged man with an alias “Nevidomyi”. We were surprised that he had refused to get help from an interpreter... At subsequent meetings with Antonin Bochko, who headed the “Blanik” security department, “Nevidomyi” reported that he was a graduate of the Philosophical Faculty of Charles University in Prague ... The negotiations were objective, calm and filled with respect from both sides”⁵⁸⁵. The Czechs claimed they understood a state creation aspirations of Ukrainians, but they decided to adhere to neutrality. They explained their position as an adhering to the instructions of the Czech government in London, which was an ally of the Soviet Union. For their nearest future plans, the Czechs stated that they would probably oppose the Germans. However, they were going to do that as part of the Czechoslovak troops under the command of Ludvík Svoboda. The “Blanik” leaders declared that they did not support the creation of the Czech Insurgent Army and could not agitate the Czechs to join it. They stated that they know about Antonin Nekhutnyi’s connec-

⁵⁸³ Сергійчук В. Український здви́г: Волинь. 1939 – 1955. К.: Українська видавнича спілка, 2005. С. 128–130.

⁵⁸⁴ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 65. Спр. С-9079. Т. 1. Арк. 268–269.

⁵⁸⁵ Солдатюк М. Чехи в Мирогощі – організація “Бланік”. *Чехи і Дубеничина. Матеріали Міжнародної науково-теоретичної конференції, присвяченої 60-річчю репатріації чехів на етнічну Батьківщину*. Дубно, 2008. С. 71–72.

tions with the Germans and advised the ounivtsi (OUN members) to treat him with caution⁵⁸⁶.

In response, the UPA representative Grygorii Frydryh (“Nevidomyi”)⁵⁸⁷ said that he had understood the Czechs’ position and would report it to his leadership. He also asked the Czechs to help Ukrainian farmers with agricultural machinery in the grain threshing. After the negotiations, “Nevidomyi” continued to coordinate the relationship between the UPA and the “Blanik” organization. For example, he agreed with the Czech representative from Ozerky village, Mizoch district, that the horses which were taken by the Germans from Derman village and left in Ozerky, would be returned back to Ukrainian owners. One night at the end of November 1943, near Gilcha village, the Czech detachment of the UPA was shot by an unknown group of people. “Nevidomyi” immediately arrived to that place to clarify the situation. It became apparent that a Czech self-defense group was created by the Germans, in order to protect the place from the partisans. However, that group did not take part in the shooting. “Nevidomyi” agreed with the Czech self-defense group that in case of the Germans appearance, they would give out a red rocket signal to the UPA unit.

⁵⁸⁶ Марчук І. Переговори між керівництвом ОУН(Б) на Волині та чеським підпіллям восени 1943 року. *Дрогобицький краєзнавчий збірник*. Дрогобич: Прoсвіт, 2017. С. 221.

⁵⁸⁷ Frydryh Grygorii Kindratovych, (“Nevidomyi”), was born in 1916 in Derman-2 village, Zdolbuniv district, Rivne region. He graduated from the Law Faculty of Lviv University in 1938. He worked as a school teacher in Ostroh city. Since the beginning of 1941 he was a director of the school in Khoriv village, Ostroh district, Rivne region. From 07.1941 he was a communal department head of the Ostroh City Council. From 08.1942 he became a judge of Mizoch district. He moved his activity into the underground in 08.1943. He worked at the UPA “South” intelligence cell led by Andriy Kysil (“Nemo”). There he was responsible for the UPA negotiations with the Czechs and Hungarians. On 15.01.1944 he caught typhus and came back home for care. In the autumn of 1943 he acted as a staff member of the diplomatic referendum of the Rivne OUN district. He was arrested on 15.11.1944 by an operational group of the Mizoch district NKVD department. On 14.05.1945 he was convicted by the NKVD military tribunal to 20 years of imprisonment. He served his punishment in “Berlag”, Magadan region (Russia) and was released in the spring, on 4.05.1955. After his liberation resided in a special settlement called Garmanda, situated in Severo-Evensky district of Magadan region. He worked at a collective farm called “Shliah Lenina”. In the spring of 1956 he settled in Ostroh city, Rivne region. He was rehabilitated on 14.01.1993 by the prosecutor’s office of Rivne region.

УССР
 МИНИСТЕРСТВО ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ
 УПРАВЛЕНИЕ МГБ ПО РОБЕНСКОЙ ОБЛАСТИ

ДЕЛО ПОДЛЕЖИТ ВОЗВРАТУ В АРХИВ
 УКГБ РОБЕНСКОЙ ОБЛАСТИ

РЕГИСТРАЦИЯ
 10.11.62

ДЕЛО № 1352

По обвинению Фридрих
Григорий Кондратовича
по ст. 54а, 54-11 ч. 1 ст. 54б

В _____ / _____ томах
 Том №: _____

Начато „ „ _____ 195 г.
 Окончено „ „ _____ 195 г.

_____ 195 г.

№ 3872

УЧТЕНО В 1962 ГОДУ
 № 1266

A cover of Grygorii Frydryh archival and criminal case

In addition to that, he analyzed the complaints filed by the Czech representatives against the Ukrainian insurgents actions. One such incident happened in Botsianivka village, where the insurgents tried to expropriate the provision from the Czech residents by using weapon. The complaint was received from a head of the “Blanik” organization in Mizoch district, a teacher by the name Dzhus, from Borshchivka village. He stated that the rebels of the “Nemo” UPA department had seized horses from couple of owners. Immediately after that complaint,

the property was returned to the Czechs. Another situation occurred during an election of the village elder of Buderazh, where a mixed Ukrainian-Czech population lived. At Dzhus insistence, each of the communities chose its own leader⁵⁸⁸.

In the beginning of December 1943, a Czech squadron situated in Vovkovyi village, Demydivka district of Rivne region, was visited by a delegation of the UPA “South” team and the allied Hungarian soldiers. They organized a military parade and an inspection of the local tanner workshop and the meat-shop of the UPA. From there they left for Glyboka Dolyna village, where they examined an artillery unit of “Bereza”⁵⁸⁹. However, the cooperation between the Volyn Czechs and the UPA had been already coming to its end.

A few days after the described visit, the next meeting occurred between the “Blanik” organization representative in Zdolbuniv county, Dzhus, and the head of the UPA “Nemo” intelligence unit. After the agreements between Edvard Beneš and Joseph Stalin, the Czechs had radically changed their position. They decided to break any ties with the UPA and move towards their own government. What is more, the Czechs were wary of being drawn into a conflict with the Poles. Therefore, they urged their compatriots not to join the UPA units. Specifically, for that position announcement, according to Volodymyr Knop, the “Blanik” issued leaflets “Mission of our national minority in Ukraine” and “Declaration of Czechs in Ukraine”⁵⁹⁰.

After that, the attitude of the Volyn Czechs to the UPA had changed significantly. For example, an overview of “Bohun” district’s events № 11 on December 16, 1943 reported that the Czechs from Vovkovyi village were hostile to the participants of the UPA “Bereza” squadron, who had been located in the village. They refused to heat the homes and provide products. Moreover, one of the Czechs, Yosyp Martynovskyi, called the insurgents “holopy” (villeins)⁵⁹¹. At that time, the overwhelming majority of the Volyn Czechs were aimed at

⁵⁸⁸ Архів УСБУ у Рівненській області. Ф. 4. Спр. 11266. Арк. 12–14.

⁵⁸⁹ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 13. Спр. 372. Т. 48. Арк. 96.

⁵⁹⁰ Марчук І. Переговори між керівництвом ОУН(Б) на Волині та чеським підпіллям восени 1943 року // Дрогобицький краєзнавчий збірник. Дрогобич: Провіт, 2017. С. 223.

⁵⁹¹ Літопис УПА. Нова серія. Т. 11: Мережа ОУН(Б) і запілля УПА на території ВО “Заграва”, “Турів”, “Богун” (серпень 1942 – грудень 1943 рр.) / Упорядник: В. Ковальчук. Київ-Торонто, 2007. С. 534, 650.

the cooperation with the Soviet partisans. In the summer of 1943 the “Blanik” established a connection with representatives of the Sydir Kovpak’s partisan units⁵⁹². On October 20, 1943, in the “Information message”, made by an intelligence chief of the OUN “Ozero” security service in Rivne sub-district, was noted that at night the Novokraiv Czech colony had been visited by unknown armed people who spoke Russian. They got an intelligence data and provision from the locals⁵⁹³.

A part of the Volyn Czechs was aimed at a cooperation with the Poles. The sociopolitical review of Lutsk circuit for August 1943 informed: “Recently some accident of the Czechs becoming secret agents have occurred. They have relations with Poles and Germans. That happens not everywhere but it exists...15.VIII.43 in Lavriv village the Germans arrested 12 people, 6 of them were taken to Lutsk, and 5 in unknown direction. In addition, the Germans shot three of those men right away. That was done as a result of a complaint made by a Czech who had connections with the Poles”⁵⁹⁴. In the summer of 1943 Emilii Nauch, who was a Czech from Gilcha village of Zdolbuniv district, helped Cheslav Konchevskiy to establish a connection with the Polish underground in Zdolbuniv city⁵⁹⁵. The SB OUN tried to prevent that connection establishment. For instance, on October 9, 1943, by order of Ivan Yavorskiy (“Kherson”), a security service head in Mlyniv district, Olga Rudyk, a Czech by nationality, was shot in Ivankiv forest, due to the fact that she had collaborated with the German intelligence⁵⁹⁶. A similar incident took place in Krupa village, Lutsk district⁵⁹⁷.

The most significant example of the Czechs and Poles alliance occurred in Kupychiv town, Kovel district (Volyn region). In particular, after evacuation of the German garrison to Kovel on September 9, 1943, the Czechs from Kupychiv town found themselves in an epicenter of the Ukrainian-Polish opposition⁵⁹⁸. The Polish military base Za-

⁵⁹² Shulga S. Czechs in the conflict of 1943 in Volyn: the problem of participation // Gilea: scientific bulletin. Kyiv, 2018. Issue 133 (6). P. 48.

⁵⁹³ Там само. С. 640.

⁵⁹⁴ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 13. Спр. 376. Т. 71. Арк. 36.

⁵⁹⁵ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 65. Спр. С-9137. Т. 1. Арк. 180.

⁵⁹⁶ Архів УСБУ у Рівненській обл. Ф. 4. Спр. 10406. Арк. 15.

⁵⁹⁷ ЦДАВО України. Ф. 3883. Оп. 1. Спр. 124. Арк. 23.

⁵⁹⁸ Ольховський І. Кривава Волинь. Книга друга. Українсько-польське протистояння на теренах Турійського району у 1939 – 1945 роках. Луцьк, 2011. С. 114.

smyky was situated on the north and the UPA base called “Sitch” – on the south.

The Czechs discussed the situation and decided to send a delegation headed by a parson Yan Ielinek to Kovel commandant of Kraiova Army (hereinafter referred to as AK) department at Zasmyky⁵⁹⁹. Evidently, such Czech decision was formed under the influence of a fact that the Germans had recently burned the neighboring village of Tulychiv, which the UPA subdivisions were not able to protect. In addition to that, the majority of Czechs same as Polish were Catholics.

After those events the divisions of AK of Vladyslav Chermynskyi, Mikhal Phialka and Stanislav Kandzelev arrived to Kupyshiv from Zasmyky. The 27th Volyn AK infantry division placed their headquarters at a house of a Czech, by the name of Buialskyi⁶⁰⁰.



A house of Czech Buialskyi in Kupyshiv, where in the autumn of 1943 the 27th Volyn Kraiova Army infantry division placed their headquarters

⁵⁹⁹ Tošner S. Kupučov se bránil // Zpravodaj Sdrúeni Čechů z Volyne a jejich přátel. 1992. 2 listopada.

⁶⁰⁰ Ільющин І. Волинська трагедія 1943 – 1944 рр. К., 2003. С. 224.

Notwithstanding their alliance with the Poles, for sometime the local Czechs succeeded to avoid the conflict with Ukrainians. During the next couple of days the UPA kurin (regiment) from “Sitch” lead by Porphyrii Antoniuk (“Socenko”)⁶⁰¹ unsuccessfully tried to dispossess Kupyshiv from the Poles. It led to reconciliation between the local Czechs and Poles, and a creation of a self-defence division which included 32 people who were headed by Bohuslav Yaedvin and Oleksandr Duhachek. They managed to purchase a machine gun, rifles and several pistols from soldiers of the Hungarian garrison at Kovel⁶⁰². After that some Czechs such as Prokupa, Yaroushek, Prohatskyi and Mylovsh joined the AK units in their attacks on neighboring Ukrainian villages⁶⁰³. The Czechs condemned such individuals and right after the Poles had left Kupyshiv, they restored friendly relationships with Ukrainians.

A part of the Czech colonies managed to maintain neutrality during the period of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict. As the epitome of neutrality was a self-defense of the Dolynka colony, Poryck (now Ivanychi) district of Volyn region, which was at the epicenter of a cruel confrontation⁶⁰⁴.

⁶⁰¹ Antoniuk Porfyrii Florovych (“Klishch”, “Socenko”) was born on 19.09.1909 in Byskupychi Ruski village, Volodymyr-Volynskyi district, Volyn region. He served in the personal cavalry regiment of Marshal Jozef Pilsudski. He graduated from the junior officers’ school, where he received the Corporal rank (1931 – 1932). He was able to stay in the army, but because of the refusal to change his religion was transferred into reserve troops. He worked as a carpenter. From 1942, he was a head of the German estate in Olesk village, Liuboml district, Volyn region. He joined the UPA on 26.03.1943 with the other Ukrainians, who were the estate guards. He organized and headed the 1st Mazepa’s squadron (40 riflemen). He founded and headed the UPA “Sitch” base in the Svynaryn forest, Turiisk district. From the summer of 1943 he was a chief of the Military staff of the 3rd Bohun detachment of the “Tury” Military district. From 18.11.1943 he was an acting commander of the Bohun detachment (a thousand soldiers). From 5.01.1944 he was a commander of the Sviatoslav kurin, which on 20.01.1944 was defeated by the 1st Ukrainian partisan division under the command of Peter Vershygora. He conducted three series of informal negotiations with the German representatives on the exchange of prisoners and the cessation of repression against the local population. That was a reason why he fell under an investigation of the SB OUN. According to the verdict of the Military Field Court, he was shot on 7.03.1944 at Pocheckajka hamlet near Krasnostav village, Volodymyr-Volynskyi district.

⁶⁰² Купчинський М. Купичів – минуле і сучасне: історико-краєзнавчий нарис. Луцьк, 2003. С. 57.

⁶⁰³ Пушук І. Трагедія українсько-польського протистояння на Волині 1938 – 1944 років. Турійський район. Луцьк, 2009. С. 91.

⁶⁰⁴ Трагедія українсько-польського протистояння на Волині 1938 – 1944 років. Іванічівський і Локачинський райони. Упорядник І. Пушук. Луцьк: Волинська обласна друкарня, 2010. С. 16.

In addition, the Czechs often rescued their Ukrainian neighbors from the Poles⁶⁰⁵. A resident from Dolynka village, Ivanychi district, Volyn region, Volodymyr Nagorny, recalled that during an attack of the Polish policemen on the village, which occurred in the summer of 1943, a neighboring Czech family helped him to hide⁶⁰⁶. A resident of Polonka village, Lutsk district, Volyn region, Olga Prysiazhniuk recalled that after the Poles had burned her house, her Czech neighbors helped her family with provision⁶⁰⁷.

It should be noted, that during the Polish-Ukrainian conflict there were cases of robbery and even assassinations made by Poles to certain Czechs. For example, in early December of 1943 a Polish police detachment from Rozhyshe town committed an attack on the Czech village of Bashowa. They destroyed a small UPA unit that tried to protect the village. Then they burned Bashowa and steered its residents' cattle to Rozhyshe⁶⁰⁸.

Rare crimes against the Czechs were committed by the OUN and UPA underground. However, they had never been specifically aimed against the Czechs as it was mentioned by Jared McBride⁶⁰⁹.

Every crime against the Czechs, which was known to the OUN and UPA underground leaderships, was always severely punished. For instance, in the summer of 1943, the UPA "Revolutionary Court" sentenced a deputy commander of the UPA "Strilets" squadron to the death penalty, due to the fact, that he had murdered a Czech family in Derman village, Zdolbuniv district, Rivne region⁶¹⁰.

Among the Volyn Czechs there also was a certain small number of criminals. The report to his senior, which was filed by an employee of SB by the alias of "Zenon", who was a member of the intelligence agency of the "Bohun" military circuit (South part of Rivne region), on

⁶⁰⁵ Лавер О. Про людські втрати в українсько-польському етнічному конфлікті в роки Другої світової війни. *Проблеми історії України: факти, судження, пошуки. Міжсвідомчий збірник наукових праць*. К., 2001. Вип. 9. С. 57.

⁶⁰⁶ Трагедія українсько-польського протистояння на Волині. 1938 – 1944 років. Іваничівський і Локачинський райони / Упорядник І. Пушук. Луцьк, 2010. С. 24.

⁶⁰⁷ Трагедія українсько-польського протистояння на Волині. 1938 – 1944 років. Луцький район і м. Луцьк / Упорядник І. Пушук. Луцьк, 2009. С. 271.

⁶⁰⁸ Архів УСБУ у Волинській обл. Ф. 4. Спр. 1098. Арк. 13.

⁶⁰⁹ McBride J. Contesting the Malyn Massacre: The Legacy of Inter-Ethnic Violence and the Second World War in Eastern Europe. Pittsburgh, 2016. S. 18–19.

⁶¹⁰ Микола Андрощук – "Вороний". Записки повстанця. Торонто; Львів, 2011. Кн. 13. Арк. 24.

18 of December 1943 stated that the local Czech Stepan Melnyk, over an OUN membership coverage, engaged into robbery of the local villagers⁶¹¹. The misuse of a held position was present as well. The other review from the “Bohun” locality on 30 of November 1943 notified: “Recently the speculation had been actively lead by the Czechs who had used the difficulty of the Ukrainian villagers to go to towns. The Czechs greatly overcharged Ukrainians for goods...”⁶¹².

The majority of the Czechs adopted a strong pro-Soviet position on the Red army units approach to Volyn region. The red partisan band of the 3rd Moldavian unit, which raided on Dubno territory in January 1944, repeatedly reported that, unlike the Ukrainians, the local Czechs always welcomed them and voluntarily assisted⁶¹³.

The Czechs met the front-line troops of the red army as their liberators. They massively joined the Ludovic Svoboda brigade. The people were coming by entire families: fathers with sons, those who were over the maximum age limit tried to reduce their age data and the ones underage, conversely pretended to be older⁶¹⁴. Even a chief of the OUN Women section in Ovadniv district, Galyna Berezovska joined the Svoboda brigade and moved to Czechoslovakia as its member⁶¹⁵. Andrii Bukhalskyi, who was the OUN member of the Ukrainian-Czech origin from Derman village, Mizoch district, Rivne region, did likewise. After his demobilization from the Svoboda brigade, he settled in the city of Zatec in the North Czech Republic⁶¹⁶.

Such a “euphoria”, caused by the Bolsheviks return, was not approved by the Ukrainian nationalists. In the “Vistky” newspaper from Lutsk and Senkevychi districts, Volyn region, from 15th of February 1944 was stated “The red live in a great accordance with the Czechs as they drink and eat bread together. They red do not rob the Czechs and do not take away their horses”⁶¹⁷. As a result of that hostility some amount of clashes had happened. At night of April 12, 1944, in My-

⁶¹¹ ДАРО. Ф. Р-30. Оп. 2. Спр. 15. Арк. 207.

⁶¹² Літопис УПА. Нова серія. Т. 2: Волинь і Полісся: УПА та Запілля. 1943 – 1944. Документи і матеріали. К.; Торонто, 1999. С. 457.

⁶¹³ Українські повстанці в документах радянських молдавських партизанських з’єднань / упорядник В. Ковальчук. Торонто; Львів, 2014. Кн. 29. С. 65, 79, 86, 89.

⁶¹⁴ Гофман І. Чехи на Волині. Основні відомості. Прага, 1998. С. 22.

⁶¹⁵ Царук Я. Володимирщина у боротьбі за незалежність. Луцьк, 2012. С. 103.

⁶¹⁶ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 65. Спр. С-13515. Т. 4. Арк. 4.

⁶¹⁷ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 13. Спр. 376. Т. 75. Арк. 20.

rotyn village, Zdolbuniv district, Rivne region, the UPA members took away a large number of cows and pigs from a farm of a wealthy Czech, Wilhelm Elenyk. At that time, they were fusilladed by the Czechoslovak soldiers led by Captain Yanko, who spent the night nearby. As a result of that shooting, one UPA member was injured and captured. The next day, the Czechs handed him over to the the NKVD department of Zdolbuniv district⁶¹⁸. On November 8, 1944, the OUN members had come to a house of a Czech, Volodymyr Vyltel, situated in Novyny Cheshski village of Mlyniv district, Rivne region, and under threat of weapons with them they took: a head of the regional machine-tractor station Dudar and a mechanic Gerasimov⁶¹⁹. At night of December 26, 1944, an UPA unit of 30 soldiers took 3 horses and 2 pigs from Borshchivka Cheshska village, Mizoch district (now Zdolbuniv), Rivne region⁶²⁰.

Simultaneously, another part of the Volyn Czechs continued to cooperate with the OUN underground movement. For instance, in March 1944, a head of the UPA “Tury” group, Mykola Koltoniuk-Yakymchuk (“Oleg”)⁶²¹, retreated his pregnant wife, Zinaida Drany-

⁶¹⁸ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 2. Спр. 76. Арк. 2.

⁶¹⁹ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 2. Спр. 125. Арк. 160.

⁶²⁰ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 2. Спр. 160. Арк. 133.

⁶²¹ Koltoniuk-Yakymchuk Mykola Homovych (“Basył”, “Grysha”, “Danylo”, “Oleg”, “Shchupak”) was born on 23.02.1914 in Ryzhanivka village, Zvenyhorodka district of Cherkasy region. In 1915 his family moved to Pidubtsi village, Lutsk district, Volyn region. He joined the “Vidrodzhennia” (renaissance) association in 1933. In the autumn of 1933 he was arrested by the police and after interrogation was released. From 05.1934 he was a member of the OUN. From 10.1934 he was a combat commander of the OUN cell. In the spring of 1937 he was mobilized to the Polish Army and in 06.1939 he deserted the army. For that he was captured by the police and sent to prison in Krakow. After his release he returned home. He was engaged in the collection of weapons for the OUN cell in 1939. At the end of 09.1939 he joined the police but just a week later he quitted. He headed the OUN network in Pidubtsi county. From the end of 09.1940 he was a financial director of the Volyn Regional Executive Office of the OUN. From 25.06.1941 he was a commandant of the Ukrainian Police in Lutsk city. He started his underground activity as a result of the OUN members’ arrests performed by the Germans in the autumn of 1941. He was appointed as an organizational leader of the OUN leadership in Volyn region. He supervised the UPA units creation in Volyn and Polissia territories. From 3.07.1943 he was a commander of the rear of the “Tury” Military circuit. From 15.09.1943 he was a head of the mobilization department of the UPA-North headquarters. From 15.03.1944 he headed the OUN regional communication on PZUZ. From 17.07.1944 he was a khorunzhyi of the 1st degree (officer’s rank) in the OUN. He was honored with the Silver Cross of Merit on

tska ("Olia")⁶²², who also was an underground member, to Maleve village, Demydivka district of Rivne region, in order for her to be able to live with the Czech family of Vladek Steglik. There under the guise of being their relative Zinaida got legalized. On April 16, 1945, she gave birth to her daughter, Olia, and after that she remained to dwell in the Czech family where she helped the Steglik's with their household work. Eventually, she had to leave the Steglik's home a year later because they had been aimed to leave for their historic homeland⁶²³. In the report of the UNKVD of Rivne region on August 18, 1944, it was noted that the majority of the village heads in Mizoch district cooperated with the UPA. The same situation was in the Czech village council of Uizdtsi village⁶²⁴. On October 21, 1944, the NKVD operative group of Dubno district department surrounded a house of Gendryh, who was a resident of the Czech colony. In the Gendryh's attic three UPA members were hiding under the straw. At the suggestion to surrender they started shooting. After that, the NKVD officers burned the Czech's house where all three underground members died in a fire⁶²⁵.

At that very time, the OUN Security service lead an extensive liquidation of people who could have cooperate with the Soviet authori-

8.10.1945. He was suspended on 10.08.1946 from his post as a result of his refusal to obey an order. After that he acted independently and expected a sentence of the OUN Court. He was killed by MGB group on 29.07.1947 which surrounded him in a secret hiding place near Borohiv village, Kivertsi district, Volyn region.

⁶²² Dranytska Zinaida Ivanivna ("Olia") was born in 1920 in Piddubtsi village, Lutsk district, Volyn region. After her graduation from a primary school in 1936, she studied at the private Jewish sewing school called Katkits Rivke in Lutsk city on Boleslaw Chrobry street, № 14. In the fall of 1940 she was arrested by the NKVD department of Teremno district and accused of an anti-Soviet agitation. She was convicted in 01.1941 by the Volyn Regional Court up to 6 years of imprisonment. She was released on 22.02.1941 from the Lutsk prison, together with her father, Ivan Ilyich. She married on 10.10.1943 with Mykola Koltoniuk-Yakymchuk ("Oleg"). From the spring of 1946 she was involved into the underground activity with her husband. On 29.07.1947 she was captured in a kryivka (underground hiding place), situated in Borohiv village, by the NKVD operational group of Teremno district department. She was convicted on 6.03.1948 to 10 years of imprisonment and served her punishment in the Karaganda region (Kazakhstan). She was released on 27.01.1955 and returned home to Piddubtsi village. She was rehabilitated on 3.04.1992 and died on 10.08.2002.

⁶²³ Державний архів Волинської обл. (далі – ДАВО). Ф. 4666. Оп. 2. Спр. 5754. Арк. 19.

⁶²⁴ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 2. Спр. 132. Арк. 14.

⁶²⁵ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 2. Спр. 153. Арк. 65.

ties. That process did not exclude the Czechs⁶²⁶. The SB instruction from the 1st of January 1944 of the Zdolbuniv territory indicated that “The Czechs who were the secret Bolshevik’s agents and communists should be liquidated but with as much obscurity as possible, in order to withhold any evidence about the activity. The Czechs arrests may be done without accord with their leadership. Nevertheless, the arrest should be launched only after gathering all the necessary materials, in order not to be discredited...”⁶²⁷. For instance, in the August of 1944 the OUN members killed a Czech family the Gradetsias (consisted of 4 people) and Joseph Mashek for their relations with the red partisans⁶²⁸. It is worthy to emphasize that the Volyn Czechs did not suffer any persecution for their nationality. The SB terror towards some of them was caused exclusively by their active support of the Soviet authority. According to the OUN reports, the Czechs of Rachyn village, Morochne district established an extermination group and “sincerely cooperated with the Bolsheviks”. Moreover, they agitated against “Revolutionary Liberation Movement” in Morotyn village, Zdolbuniv district. In Shpakiv village, Rivne region three underground members, who on 14th of October 1945 arranged with a local Czech to buy a boar, were ambushed by the NKVD. All three of them had got serious injuries as a result of a close distance fight. Two of fighters shout themselves and the one who had more energy escaped⁶²⁹. In January 1946, it was also known that the NKVD department was situated and operated in Ulbariv Cheshskyi village, Mizoch district, Rivne region⁶³⁰.

Nevertheless, in general the OUN underground continued to consider the Volyn Czechs as their friends. In July 17, 1944, at the Great Congress of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (hereinafter – the UHVR) it was noted that the Czechs of Dubno and Lutsk districts supported the OUN struggle. Moreover, the eagerness for cooperation emerges from the average people⁶³¹.

⁶²⁶ Архів УСБУ у Рівненській обл. Ф. 5. Спр. 10406. Арк. 113.

⁶²⁷ Державний архів Рівненської області. Ф. Р-30. Спр. 32. Арк. 280.

⁶²⁸ Пушук І. Трагедія українсько-польського протистояння на Волині 1938 – 1944 років. Турійський район... С. 97.

⁶²⁹ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 13. Спр. 376. Т. 22. Арк. 162–163.

⁶³⁰ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 2. Спр. 416. Арк. 149.

⁶³¹ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 26. Оп. 1. Спр. 5. Арк. 65.

In October 1944 at a meeting in Lanivtsi district, Ternopil region kurinnyi UPA Vasyl Galian (“Bystryi”) noted: “We do not care about person’s nationality whether one is a Czech, Polish or Russian if one supports the struggle for Independent Ukraine”⁶³².

Simultaneously, the UPA members were observing the events in Czechoslovakia. It was stated in the “Notes on Political Instructions” for the Volyn OUN underground, published in May 1945: “A newly created Moscow-based government supports the Communist Party and all pro-Russian moods in Czechoslovakia. In addition to that, the Red Army has the same task with the occupation of Czechoslovakia ... Czechoslovakia, same as Yugoslavia, is currently the territory of the political struggle between Anglo-American and Moscow-Bolshevik imperialists. In that struggle, the local population has not yet taken a certain position on one of the sides (in its total amount)”⁶³³.

In general, in the OUN and UPA underground publications the Volyn Czechs were depicted as Ukrainian allies. In the “Informator” magazine Ch. 1 of 1946, issued by the OUN leadership on PZUZ, it was stated: “Numerous Czech colonists, who had settled in Ukraine more than 100 years ago, live with Ukrainians as a friendly family and in a good-neighborly relations. They have a favorable attitude towards our movement and help us as much as possible. In every matter that affects the common-neighborly life, they consult with us”⁶³⁴. The OUN’s attitude was tolerant even to those of the Czechs who were employed in the Soviet authority bodies. At night of December 1946, four armed OUN members came to the house of a Czech Vatslav Rebel, who was a head of Kopche village council, Teremne district. To the question “Why does he works so hard for the state?” Vaclav responded that he only did his job. They replied that if only he were not a Czech but a Ukrainian, they would “speak to him in a completely different way”⁶³⁵.

A deputy head of the General Secretariat of the UHVR, Osyp Diakiv, noted in the OUN brochure called “An important step towards the liberation of the peoples enslaved by Stalinist imperialism” that the Volyn Czechs “the same as during the Hitler occupation, the Czechs are and were the UPA proponents, who also cooperate with Ukraini-

⁶³² ГДА СБУ. Ф. 2. Спр. 107. Арк. 138.

⁶³³ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 13. Спр. 376. Т. 15. Арк. 662–663.

⁶³⁴ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 13. Спр. 376. Т. 22. Арк. 162–163.

⁶³⁵ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 72. Спр. 28. Арк. 73–75.

ans, during the Bolshevik occupation. They are persecuted by NKVD same as the Ukrainians are”. He mentioned an event which happened on 22nd of April 1946 in Sophiivka village, Verba district, Rivne region, as a vivid example to his words. The NKVD apparatus destroyed 16 Czech houses and arrested the homeowners⁶³⁶.

In July 10, 1946, an agreement on the exchange of people was signed in Moscow between the USSR and Czechoslovakia. It was supposed that they would relocate the Czechs from the territory of the former Volyn province, and their territory would be taken by the Ukrainians-Rusyns from Czechoslovakia⁶³⁷. In the Senkevychivka district MVS (Ministry of Internal Affairs) report from November 1946, it was stated that the local Czechs greeted the news about resettlement and encouraged the resettlement commission⁶³⁸.

As reported in the underground OUN magazine “Informator”, within all the year of 1946 the Volyn Czechs had been discussing a possibility of their departure. Many of them initially hesitated because they knew how much the Czech Republic was “free” and “independent”⁶³⁹. However, a huge influx of hungry people to Volyn territories from the eastern regions of Ukraine, absolutely dispelled any of their uncertainties⁶⁴⁰.

In the autumn of 1946, a “resettlement commission” arrived from Czechoslovakia. Its aim was to arrange the departure of Czechoslovaks to their homeland. The OUN underground attempted to establish contacts with its members. In Zalissia village, Mizoch district, Rivne region an insurgent nicknamed “G.” had a meeting with a representative of the commission on 15 of January 1947. He informed about his desire to meet through a local Czech who owed a house. He discovered a clerk with a gun in hands. However, no conflict took part there. They

⁶³⁶ Літопис УПА. Нова серія. Т. 17: Осип Дяків – “Горновий”. Документи і матеріали. К.; Торонто, 2011. С. 354.

⁶³⁷ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 2. Спр. 587. Арк. 2–3.

⁶³⁸ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 72. Спр. 27. Арк. 313.

⁶³⁹ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 13. Спр. 376. Т. 22. Арк. 163.

⁶⁴⁰ Антонюк Я. Голод 1946 – 1947 рр. за документами підпілля ОУН // Минуле і сучасне Волині і Полісся. Голодомор в Україні 1946 – 1947 років: причини, перебіг, наслідки. Західна Україна в контексті голодомору. Науковий збірник. Випуск 59. Матеріали Всеукраїнської наукової конференції приуроченої 70-річчю трагедії українського народу – голодомору 1946 – 1947 років, м. Луцьк, 25–26 листопада 2016 року. Упорядники: А. Бондарчук, А. Силук. Луцьк, 2016. С. 10–18.

dined together leading a “friendly conversation” about the OUN campaign aims. Subsequently, the “commission” member alerted the insurgent to the fact that there were his three armed colleagues at the other part of the village together with five Bolsheviks.

The other OUN message stated that the Czechs from Uizdtsi village, Mizoch district, who were very familiar with the immigration rules, did not allow the Bolsheviks to steal their property. The Czechs “had sold every single item of their household, starting from the furniture and ending with their gateways, door and window hinges straw and even dung” such a pragmatism was admired. It was ascertained that only some aged Czechs stayed because they were frightened to die on the way or the women who were married with Ukrainians.

As at June 1, 1947, there were 10.511 families (34.058 people) registered to immigrate to Czechoslovakia. Including the regions: Rivne region – 6425 families (20149 people), Volyn region – 2477 (7856), Zhytomyr region – 1177 (4432), Kamianets-Podilskyi region – 432 (1618) and north districts of Ternopil region – 78 (266)⁶⁴¹.

Judging from the letters written by the first who repatriated, the Czechs immigrated primarily together with the Svoboda Army (Liberty Army) had been the best settled on a new place. The other ones were settled not so bad and felt no regret leaving their households⁶⁴².

Some of the OUN underground members used the Czechs resettlement as a means of their own legalization. In 1947, a Czechs from Verba town, Rivne region, Olexandr Dus, secretly brought his son-in-law, Stepan Ostapchuk, who was involved in the OUN underground, to the Czech Republic, under the straw of his cart⁶⁴³. Joseph Chapek, a Czech from Sofiiivka village, Dubno district, Rivne region, did the same way with two Ostapchuk brothers. He brought two OUN members together with their families to Czechoslovakia where Petro Ostapchuk got a job as an engineer in construction, and Mykhailo Ostapchuk became a veterinarian⁶⁴⁴.

In the same 1947, with the help of Iuzef and Ivan Linger, who were the Czechs from Ivaniichi village, Verba district, Rivne region, an

⁶⁴¹ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 2. Спр. 587. Арк. 121.

⁶⁴² ГДА СБУ. Ф. 13. Спр. 376. Т. 22. Арк. 233.

⁶⁴³ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 2. Спр. 2814. Арк. 38–45.

⁶⁴⁴ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 2. Спр. 2860. Арк. 269–270.

SB OUN referent of Dubno district, Mykhailo Furmanets (“Orlik”)⁶⁴⁵, traveled to Prague. In the capital of Czechoslovakia, he settled down to work as a tram driver⁶⁴⁶. Shortly after, his wife Maria Dyvyshek, who was an OUN member and a Czech by nationality, was taken out by the Czech family of Mykola Vaganov and joined him in Czechoslovakia⁶⁴⁷. In addition, according to the KGB data, a head of the OUN in Zdolbuniv district, Mykola Myskiv (“Chornota”)⁶⁴⁸ illegally departed for Czechoslovakia⁶⁴⁹. He took the members of his boivka (a combat group) with him: Mykola Kovtoniuk (“Bereza”) and Fedir Savytskiy (“Nezivai”). Their arrival to Libčany town of Hradec Králové region in Czech Republic was detected in letters to fellow villagers from the former Zdolbuniv district inhabitants, the Czechs Yuzef Zivol and Vladek Kucher⁶⁵⁰.

The Czechs were replaced by 2036 (9091 people) Ukrainian families which arrived from Czechoslovakia. 1904 families (8143 people) were set in Rivne region and 700 families (3321 people) – Volyn region⁶⁵¹. They received 5-6 hectares of land and housing from the government. Many of Ukrainians were unsatisfied with their new dwelling and claimed that their left households had been much better. They were strongly influenced by the Soviet propaganda and stated that they would help Soviet authority to fight militarily with the Ukrainian nationalists. Moreover, in the area the repatriated Ukrainians supported creation of collective farms which were naively imagined by them

⁶⁴⁵ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 2. Спр. 2838. Арк. 244. Furmanets Myhailo Onysymovych (“Orlyk”) was born in 1923 in Ivannie village, Dubno district, Rivne region. From 1940 he studied at the Dubno Forestry College, where he joined the OUN. In order to avoid of being arrested by the Germans, he switched to an underground position in 1942. He was appointed to be a military commander of the OUN subdistrict. Subsequently, he became a head of the SB OUN in Dubno district. In 1947 he immigrated to Prague.

⁶⁴⁶ Пасічник О. Хто він, Орлик ? *Вісник Дубенщини*. 1992. 23 грудня.

⁶⁴⁷ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 2. Спр. 2838. Арк. 244.

⁶⁴⁸ Misko Mykola Lukianovych (“Boiko”, “Chornota”) was born in 1922 in Gilcha Ukrainka village, Zdolbuniv district, Rivne region. From 1942, he was a commandant of the Ukrainian police in Копытків village, Zdolbuniv district. At the end of 06.1943, he headed the SB OUN of Zdolbuniv subdistrict. He became a khorunzhyi of UPA on 24.05.1945. According to one of the versions, he died on 10.12.1945 in the ambush made by the NKVD forces in Kunyn village, Zdolbuniv district. According to another version he immigrated to the Czech Republic.

⁶⁴⁹ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 65. Спр. С-13515. Т. 3. Арк. 5.

⁶⁵⁰ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 2. Спр. 2838. Арк. 255–256.

⁶⁵¹ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 2. Спр. 587. Арк. 121–122.

“with rose colour glasses”. Having an unclear imagination of the “Stalin’s well order”, they expressed “democratic” towards it⁶⁵². It came as no surprise that the OUN underground treated the Rusyn immigrants with a lack of confidence⁶⁵³. Almost immediately after arriving in Volyn and seeing so called “Communist Paradise”, most Ukrainians, who came from Czechoslovakia, wanted to go back⁶⁵⁴. Some of them really went to cooperation with the NKVD bodies⁶⁵⁵. Although, among the Rusyns settlers, were those who supported the ideas of the OUN. For example, in Myrohoshcha village, Dubno district, Rivne region, Yosyp Balyk distributed the OUN leaflets, and also called on his compatriots to return to Czechoslovakia. In Hrushvytsia village, Rivne region Andriy Bobrytskyi established a communication with the OUN underground, he was a Rusyn from Prešov region⁶⁵⁶.

The relation of the Ukrainian liberation underground to the few Volyn Czechs, who decided not to leave Ukraine, continued to remain friendly. In the most its amount those of them who remained were people of an advanced age, who just wanted to live their last years calmly in their own homes. Some of them supported the OUN underground. For instance, at night of July 19, 1949, four OUN underground members organized a meeting, headed by “Dyvnyi”, which was held at the old Czech house in Pidtsurkiv village, Zdolbuniv district, Rivne region. On that meeting they discussed an international situation and their future prospects of the struggle. During a speech, delivered by “Dyvnyi”, he said that a war between the Soviet Union and the Anglo-American bloc would begin soon. Therefore, it was necessary to save their resources and concentrate on the construction of durable bunkers⁶⁵⁷.

It was known that a Volyn Czech, by the alias of “Veno”, headed functioning of an OUN underground printing house of Kremenets circuit, named after Taras Shevchenko⁶⁵⁸. According to a report for No-

⁶⁵² ГДА СБУ. Ф. 13. Спр. 376. Т. 22. Арк. 234.

⁶⁵³ Ванат І. Волинська акція. Обмін населенням між Чехословаччиною і Радянським Союзом навесні 1947 року. Пряшів, 2001. С. 72–73.

⁶⁵⁴ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 1. Спр. 106. Арк. 2.

⁶⁵⁵ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 1. Спр. 107. Арк. 63.

⁶⁵⁶ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 1. Спр. 105. Арк. 281, 314.

⁶⁵⁷ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 2. Спр. 1357. Арк. 107.

⁶⁵⁸ Марчук І. Повстанська друкарня імені Тараса Шевченка. *Волинь*. 2018. 4 грудня.

vember 1949, there were 3 thousand leaflets of 5 different kinds, for December it was up to 22370 pieces, for January 1950 – 21 thousand leaflets and appeals⁶⁵⁹. The printing house had been constantly increasing its production capacity. The various leaflets and pocket-sized brochures were issued there. The activity of the publishing center attracted the attention of the MGB organs of Ternopil region. Based on their undercover intelligence data, they found that the printing house was situated in a bunker near Teremne village, Ostroh district, Rivne region. In June 5, 1950, two MGB operative-military groups of Shumsk district department, headed by Lieutenant Khrenov and Captain Sakharov, surrounded the already mentioned area. The underground members from the bunker, were offered by the MGB group to surrender but they refused the offer and opened fire as a response. All of the underground soldiers were killed as a result of the shooting. After that the MGB employees seized the weapons and equipment from the bunker: 1 hand machine gun, 1 German assault rifle, 3 pistols, 157 bullets, 3 typewriters, manual machine for printing, leaflets' matrices cast in metal, 5 kg of typographical fonts (letters cast in metal), set frames for fonts arranging and more than 8 thousand copies of the various OUN leaflets. Among the dead they were able to identify two technical staff employees – Mykola Tamavskiy (“Nazar”) and Hryhoriy Skorskiy (“Mytka”)⁶⁶⁰. According to the documents of the OUN from MGB employees report, the third who had died was the head of the printing house, the Czech “Veno”⁶⁶¹.

According to data of KGB authorities, even on Czechoslovakia territory, the Volyn Czechs continued to be interested in the fate of the OUN and UPA underground members they were familiar with. Thus, in January 18, 1951, a letter written by Anna Shved, who was a resident of Vildshtein village, Hebskiy district of Czechoslovakia, was received by her mother in Shklyn village, Senkevychivka district, Volyn region. The letter was about Anna's arrangements in a new place. Anna Shved wrote: “My life is good here, I have enough of everything I need. For all my life, I have not lived as well as now”. Meanwhile, the letter contained encrypted words that were written in a context of everyday topics. For instance, “mushrooms” meant the underground

⁶⁵⁹ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 13. Спр. 398. Т. 11. Арк. 71.

⁶⁶⁰ Ніколасва Н. Підпільні друкарні ОУН та їх ліквідація каральними органами СРСР в 1944 – 1954 рр. Торонто-Львів, 2012. С. 72.

⁶⁶¹ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 13. Спр. 372. Т. 80. Арк. 11.

members, and “pigs” were the Soviet representatives⁶⁶². In November 1956, residents of Teshnytsia village, same Hebskyi district – Zhachek and Tseiburka, who immigrated in 1947 from Verba district, Rivne region, asked a KGB agent “Olia” about the fate of the OUN members, Leontii Drozdovskyi, Terentyi Antoniuk and Volodymyr Syrotyuk⁶⁶³.

In March 1957, a resident of Derman village, Zdolbun district, Rivne region, Mykola Kravchuk moved to his brother Porfyrii in Prague (Mechyslav street, 18). Previously, Porfyrii had maintained a contact with the OUN underground⁶⁶⁴.

In 1958, the state security bodies of Czechoslovakia arrested a former SB head of Dubno district, Mykhailo Furmanets (“Orlyk”), who resided under false documents of a Czech settler, Volodymyr Dyvyshchek⁶⁶⁵. In July 1960, he was questioned by the district prosecutor in Plzeň city, where the prisoner was kept in single jail cell. Due to the emotional turmoil caused by his arrest, “Orlyk” started to experience nervous disorders and in August 1960 tried to commit suicide. Eventually, in May 15, 1961, the state security organs of Czechoslovakia appealed to the USSR KGB with a proposal to transfer the prisoner. However, the Soviet side refused their offer. They explained that the KGB decision was influenced by the fact that the crimes he had committed were in the long past (17 years ago), and also his mental state was not well⁶⁶⁶. Unfortunately, the fate of Mykhailo Furmanets is unknown.

Despite being on a distance from the land of their ancestors, the Volyn Czechs are trying to maintain contact with it. For a long time, a newspaper “Kupychivskyi golos” had been publishing in Prague. Even these days the groups of Czech tourists visit their former settlements in Volyn⁶⁶⁷.

According to the 2001 census, there are less than 6 thousand of Czechs in Ukraine, and only about 2 thousands of them live in Volyn.

⁶⁶² ГДА СБУ. Ф. 2. Спр. 1589. Арк. 84.

⁶⁶³ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 2. Спр. 2814. Арк. 36–37.

⁶⁶⁴ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 65. Спр. С-13515. Т. 3. Арк. 32.

⁶⁶⁵ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 1. Спр. 1640. Арк. 38–40.

⁶⁶⁶ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 1. Спр. 1641. Арк. 119–124.

⁶⁶⁷ Рудецкий П., Златогорський О. З історії чеської колонії у с. Купичів Турійського району (за матеріалами експедиції Волинського краєзнавчого музею 2002 р.). *Минуле і сучасне Волині й Полісся: народна культура – шлях до себе*. Луцьк, 2003. С. 118.

In particular, in Dubno district, Rivne region more than 300 citizens have the Czech roots. In 1991, the Czech association “Stropovka”⁶⁶⁸, was founded in Rivne city, and in Volyn the Volyn Regional Association of Czechs “Matitse Volynska”⁶⁶⁹ functions in Lutsk.

The OUN and UPA underground had always considered the Czechs as their allies. That is why they tried to encourage them in collaboration. The Czech Insurgent Army served as a part of the UPA. Many of the Czechs provided support for the OUN, and some of them had been fighting with weapons against the Soviet authorities up until 1950. During the exchange of population, some of the Volyn Czechs made an effort to save the OUN members, whom they were familiar with. Under the guise of relatives, they transported the ounivtsi to Czechoslovakia and legalized them.

All things considered, the old tradition of good-neighbouring between Ukraine and the Czech Republic is predicted to develop and continue in the future. Furthermore, any other country is not able to destroy firm friendship between the Ukrainians and Czechs.

DOCUMENTS

Liberty for Nations and Individual! To Ukrainian Czechs!

The Czechs and Ukrainians suffer a similar fate from the modern imperial war. We witness the world is burning in the blaze of an invasive bloodshed fire which was caused by Moscow-Bolshevik and German imperialisms. They have pounced on each other as they were bloodthirsty predators first having trampled over many smaller but more viable nations' liberty.

The young National Ukrainian Republic fall a victim to the Moscow imperialists in 1919, influencing the fate of the other nations dwelling on its territory and You, Czechs, as well. 20 years after the Czech Republic (Cz.S.R.) became a victim of the German predators. The decay of the Czech Republic was more or less a repercussion caused by the former Poland assistance. Poland stimulating its appetite for imperialism aspired to make it on the expense of the Czechs' territory by making rootless claims to the Czech Republic lands.

⁶⁶⁸ Якель Р. Чеська епопея Волині // Дзеркало тижня. 2013. 21 червня.

⁶⁶⁹ Електронний ресурс – <https://www.facebook.com/matricevolyn/>

The Czech Republic destruction has commenced a grisly imperialistic dance aimed at the invasion of new expanses and enslaved nations. Such a competition has been transformed into the war between the USSR and Germany.

Ukraine is the main prize for the competition of both belligerent parties nowadays. In the struggle for the occupation of Ukraine both invaders have sacrificed millions of victims. Covering the truth by the "liberation" slogans they are robbing our country. All of us can feel a burden of this war even though the front line is far away from us.

More than 3 years of war have been spent under the Moscow domination and now we have German possessors at our Western Ukrainian lands, gnawing at Your skin as well. Your households are demolished, your wealth is stolen.

Czechs! The recent events have vividly pointed out the attitude of the Moskal-Bolsheviks, Germans and Poles towards You. The last hands have smashed their mask down and affirmed their genuine demeanor. This is a demonstration of their veritable self-being as conquering imperialists, robbers of our territories, as those who want to enslave us.

There is no chance for it to happen! Poland has already received its betraying role, the payment from its former ally, German, in the process of Czech Republic division.

The others queue up for their turn!

The Great Ukrainian Nation, even suffering through all the blows from its enemies, is still powerful and has not abandoned its revolutionary struggle. According to the current reality, all Ukrainian Nation is under the flag of the Ukrainian Nationalists who are led by Stepan Bandera.

The high time is coming for the 45 million Nation at the European East to grow from a strong blow into the dominant Ukrainian State. The other national states, which are nowadays enslaved, will emerge together with Ukraine.

Czechs of Ukraine! The history does not include controversies between the Ukrainians and Czechs. We always live in good relationships. It was long time ago, it was from the Ukrainian Nations side in 1918 year, it was when the state law confirmed You were equal with the Ukrainians in UNR (Ukrainian National Republic), it was a daily reality. We, the Ukrainians, are also aware that the Czech authority

had a favorable attitude towards our political immigration and gave the Ukrainian students an access to the higher education and so on.

First of all, we address You, those who live in Ukraine. Your future fate is strongly connected to the consequences of the Ukrainian Nation fight for Independent Ukrainian State. You may become the absolute owners of your work and property only in Ukrainian State, because our struggle slogan is “Liberty for nations and individual!”.

All of those, who fight together with Ukrainians or support them in fight, accelerating this way our victory, will have the same rights as Ukrainians in Ukrainian State.

The social order of Ukrainian State guarantees You, that those who rises with us to fight with the common enemy – the Moscow Bolshevism, German Hitlerism – will be provided, by the power of a state law, with a right for private ownership, freedom of the economic, cultural and national development and all civil rights.

That is why, all the Czechs who live in Ukraine should help the Ukrainian Nation in its liberation struggle.

We encourage all the Ukrainian Czechs to start helping Ukrainian revolutionaries in their struggle for Independent Ukrainian State.

We encourage the Czech revolutionary organizations acting in Ukraine to establish close relationships with the OUN, in order to conduct a struggle against predatory invaders.

Stand under the flags of the Ukrainian National Revolution and support it as by this You accelerate creation of Your own Czech National State on Your territory and gain the appropriate rights in Ukrainian State.

Long life for the friendship between the Ukrainian and Czech nations!

Out you go with the German and Moscow imperialisms which are provoking famine and destructions!

Long life for the Ukrainian National Revolution as a representative of a new fair order in the East of Europe as a guarantee of development of enslaved nations!

*Glory to Ukraine – Glory to the heroes!*⁶⁷⁰

*Liberty for nations and individual!
Czechs!*

⁶⁷⁰ ЦДАГО України. Ф. 57. Оп. 4. Спр. 370. Арк. 57.

Five years ago, bandits of Hitler ignobly destroyed Your young state, Masaryk's glorious deed, and made slaves of Your hard-working nation. The weapon, which was taken from You at that time, helped Hitler to step triumphantly around Europe. Your great cultural achievements were captured by the German gestapo hands.

All Your tries to escape from under the Hitler's boot, were cruelly suppressed by the invader. Your intelligentsia was sent to prisons and concentration camps and most part of those people was shot, among them there were many priests and even one bishop.

The German invaders detest You and by all means want to destroy You completely.

Recently the Germans together with Poles have tortured to death and shot all the Czechs at Malyn village at Dubno territory; the innocent victims were tortured and burnt in ruins of the village which was set on fire.

Czechs! We have the same fate. You are, the same as we were, subjected to death penalty by the invaders. Should we voluntarily let them to put us in a grave? Or should we silently stand by and wait the moment when the bandits of Hitler come to our houses and shoot us at our own homes?

No, never! Let's unite our forces for common defense and beat German rabble at the first occasion it shows up in Ukraine.

Czechs! The Ukrainian-Czech friendship has been known not from today. In 1918 year Ukrainian National Republic guaranteed You the same rights as for Ukrainians by the state law. Moreover, Your authority as well gave friendly protection to our political emigration after the destruction of our state in 1920.

The Ukrainian nation remembers the old friends and at any moment we are certainly ready to extend a helping hand in order to help them fight against our common enemy. That is why, waste no time and rise together with us to the fight, search for connections with the Ukrainian revolutionary movement. Create separate armed divisions of a self-defense together with Ukrainian Insurgent Army for common struggle against the occupant. Our fate is in our hands. Thus let's forward to victory!

Long life for friendship between the Ukrainian and Czech nations!


Out you go with the German and Moscow imperialisms which bring death and decay to nations!

Long life for Independent United Czech State!

Long life for Independent United Ukrainian State!

September 1943.

*Ukrainian Insurgent Army
"Tury" Group⁶⁷¹*



Yaroslav Antoniuk

⁶⁷¹ ГДА СБУ. Ф. 13. Спр. 376. Т. 64. Арк. 24.

SOVIET AND NAZI REPRESSIVE POLICIES TOWARDS UKRAINIAN LAWYERS OF THE STANISLAV REGION DUR- ING WORLD WAR II

The beginning of the Second World War marked the beginning of severe trials on the Western Ukrainian lands. Because of the blows of the German Wehrmacht and the Red Army, the Polish state ceased to exist, and its territory was divided by the two dictators. The Ukrainian part of the Galician lands that had been under the Polish rule got under the Soviet influence; therefore, Soviets immediately introduced their communist regime and order. The process of “Sovietization” was carried out under the control of established Party committees, military commissioners, bodies of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), as well as by Soviet party specialists. Yet, it was the punitive bodies that were assigned a special role in this process: their system of society control combined with violence created a reliable mechanism of communist power establishment dealing with integration of Galician lands and squashing their resistance. The as Being a daring and therefore dangerous leader of the public opinions of the Western Ukrainian population, it was the Ukrainian intelligentsia that became the primary “subject” of Soviet repression. Although there was a significant decrease in the amount of outright Ukrainian lawyers’ persecution cases, the Gestapo, the repressive body of the Nazis, still kept a watchful eye on lawyers. The research article focuses its attention on the fate of Ukrainian lawyers of the Stanislaviv region: those ones who were active public figures, organizers of the local Ukrainian national life during the Polish rule period, and became “redundant” under the Soviet order.

The geographical boundaries of the study are limited to Stanislaviv region (now Ivano-Frankivsk region, Precarpathian region a.k.a. Prykarpattia). In December 1939, there was introduced a new administrative-territorial structure: it abolished the system of voivodeships and counties. Instead, the former Stanislav Voivodeship was transformed into the Stanislav region, which initially consisted of 10 counties: Horodenka, Dolyna, Kalush, Kolomyia, Kosiv, Nadvirna, Rohatyn, Sniatyn, Stanislav, and Tlumach counties⁶⁷². As of January, 1940 the

⁶⁷² Клапчук В. Адміністративно-територіальний поділ території сучасної Івано-Франківської області: від короля Казимира III Великого до незалежної України. *Карпатський край*. (Івано-Франківськ). 2012. № 2. С. 10.

counties were renamed into districts. The communist authorities also renamed the city of Stanislaviv into Stanislav.

One can find a lot of works of modern historiography concerning the policy of the two aggressive states in Galicia (Halychyna) during World War II as the sources and researches are numerous and sufficiently thorough. However, the issue of particular socio-professional groups in the given period on the given territory is severely understudied: one still needs to researched and systemized information on fates of legal representatives (in our case, lawyers) on the territory of a separate administrative-territorial unit (Stanislav Region (Oblast) of the Ukrainian SSR). Surely, several collective and generalizing works authored and co-authored by I. Bilas, I. Andrukhyv, P. Arsenych, I. Hlovatskyi, and V. Huk, contain some references concerning repressed lawyers (yet, this mentions rather state than shed light). There is also some research work on the communist repression of Ukrainian lawyers in Stanislaviv region in 1939 – 1945 done by Stepan Kobuta. The research paper relies heavily on the memoirs of eyewitnesses, and participants of the events, that were published abroad in a number of diaspora historical and memoir collections, as well as on archival documents of the Ivano-Frankivsk Region State Archives and the Security Service of Ukraine Archives in the Ivano-Frankivsk Region.

In their essence totalitarian regimes repressions were designed not only to punish outright opponents, but also to sow fear, humiliation and obedience in potential (prospective) victims. The mass character and scale of terror paralyzed the people's will to resist, forced them to unreservedly follow the new authority and obey it. The "neutralization" the well-known public figures underwent, the majority of them lawyers, not only deprived the population of reputable human rights defenders, but also ruined the very notion the protection of human rights.

On the eve of the Red Army invasion to Western Ukrainian lands, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, L. Beria, issued an order (No. 001064 dated from September 8, 1939), according to which NKVD regiments were to carry out their statutory functions following the troops' invasion, yet, they also had to seize all state archives, primarily the police and military bodies archives, and arrest the "most reactionary" representatives of state administrations, as well as

the leaders of “counter-revolutionary” parties and organizations⁶⁷³. The Communist authorities regarded the Ukrainian intelligentsia as enemies; consequently, lawyers made it to the top of this list. The first month of the Soviet presence in Galicia (late September-October 1939) saw arrests of more than 250 prominent representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, later they were repressed or eliminated⁶⁷⁴. Among the prisoners there were authoritative Ukrainian lawyers such as S. Biliak, M. Zaiats, R. Dombchevskyi, K. Levytskyi, D. Levytskyi, L. Ozarkevych, Yu. Olesnytskyi, V. Starosolskyi and many others.

According to later data, taking into account the amount of surviving Ukrainian lawyers who were in emigration, it is estimated there were 78 Ukrainian lawyers and prospective lawyers detained, arrested and imprisoned in Galician region during 1939 – 1941⁶⁷⁵. Their list is far from complete, since during the research there came to light another dozen of the names and it was possible to identify more lawyers who had been victims of the NKVD at the particular period of time.

The very fact that NKVD forces managed to seize documents and archives of the local Polish police in September 1939 in Stanislaviv had a great impact on the increasing rate of arrests of particular people, as the documents included data on a number of leaders of Ukrainian county organizations⁶⁷⁶. In the first week after the invasion in various cities of the former Stanislaviv Voivodeship there were imprisoned over a dozen and half district attorneys representing different political views. Their arrests took place in conditions when the NKVD territorial departments of was not fully formed and the archives of Polish services were not studied thoroughly. That meant that NKVD forces arrested people according to some lists made beforehand, and only later did they look for the legal basis for the victims’

⁶⁷³ Андрухів І., Француз А. Правда історії. Станіславщина в умовах терору і репресій: 1939 – 1959 роки, історико-правовий аспект. Документи і матеріали. Івано-Франківськ: Нова Зоря, 2008. С. 18–19.

⁶⁷⁴ Там само. С. 26.

⁶⁷⁵ Західня Україна під більшовиками ІХ. 1939 – VI. 1941. Збірник, ред. М. Рудницька. Нью-Йорк: Наук. т-во ім. Шевченка, 1958. С. 472–476.

⁶⁷⁶ Радянські органи державної безпеки у 1939 – червні 1941 р.: документи ГДА СБ України. Ред. кол.: Г. Боряк, Вас. Даниленко (відп. ред.), С. Кокін, О. Лисенко, І. Матяш, Н. Миронець; Упорядн.: Вас. Даниленко, С. Кокін, НАН України. Інститут української археографії та джерелознавства ім. М. С. Грушевського; Служба безпеки України; Галузевий державний архів. К.: Вид. дім “Києво-Могилянська академія”, 2009, С. 211.

imprisonment. According to the materials of several criminal cases, detainees were not interrogated immediately: these procedures took place well after the arrest, in a few days. It was not uncommon for military prosecutors to retroactively issue arrest warrants.

Thus, Stanislav lawyer Julian Olesnytskyi was detained on September 23, 1939, the arrest order was issued by the investigator on October 9, 1939, the first interrogation was conducted on September 30, 1939⁶⁷⁷. However, the case includes a document dated May 4, 1940, which stated that Yu. Olesnytskyi was detained and sent to prison by the military prosecutor of the Red Army, there was no arrest warrant issued at that time and it was absent from the criminal case⁶⁷⁸. Other studied and researched criminal cases included similar inconsistencies.

Lawyer Yu. Olesnytskyi was accused of being a member of to the UNDO (Ukrainian National Democratic Association), conducting anti-Soviet and nationalistic work. Soviet investigators stubbornly ignored the Yu. Olesnytskyi's explanation that he had been the head of the county committee of the UNDO in the 1920s and left the party along with his political activities in 1933. He was also accused of working for the local branch of "Prosvita", an organization listed among the anti-Soviet nationalist organizations by the investigating authorities. Having heard the news about the arrest of a well-known lawyer and public figure city dwellers and regular county citizens collected signatures for his release. In total, more than a thousand people signed the petition, but the "liberators" ignored public opinion. After several weeks of investigation, which was carried out in the Stanislaviv prison, Yu. Olesnytskyi was sent to Moscow only to be held in the Lefortiv prison. There had already been kept a number of arrested National Democrats, including the patriarch of Ukrainian Galician politics Kost' Levytskyi. It was the latter's case that the investigators tried to combine with the testimony of Yu. Olesnytskyi. Having obtained the information necessary for the investigation of Yu. Olesnytskyi, the authorities transported him to Kyiv and on October 25, 1940, he was sentenced to 8 years of camps by the resolution of the Special Meeting

⁶⁷⁷ Державний архів Івано-Франківської області (далі: ДАІФО). Ф. Р-2157. Оп. 2. Спр. 4712-П. Арк. 1, 2, 8.

⁶⁷⁸ Там само. Арк. 1а.

at the NKVD of the USSR. He died while serving his sentence in a camp near the Sama village of the Sverdlovsk region in Russia⁶⁷⁹.

The case of Yu. Olesnytskyi was somewhat connected to the one of his former lawyer assistant (concipient) Yaroslav Yasenyskyi who was arrested in October 1939. Unfortunately, there was no specific data found concerning the investigative procedure he faced and the criminal charges brought against him. According to some indirect data, Ya. Yasenyskyi was repressed and sent to serve his sentence in the faraway parts of the Soviet state.

Among the other famous Stanislav lawyers put behind the bars was Mykola Bykh. He also used to be a member the UNDO, he was a representative of the central committee of the party, and served as an ambassador to the Polish Sejm. His case was worth a separate criminal proceeding, and unlike Yu. Olesnytskyi, the lawyer was sentenced by the Stanislav Regional Court. In February 1940, he received a 7-year sentence in prison with the confiscation of property “for anti-Soviet activity”. On August 22, 1944 M. Bykh died imprisoned in a camp near the city of Ukhta in northern Russia; the place of his burial remains unknown⁶⁸⁰.

Another figure facing the trials similar to the repressed Stanislavian lawyers was prospective lawyer, legal apprentice Osep Krushelnytskyi, arrested on October 21, 1939, and charged with counter-revolutionary activities. Unlike the above-mentioned people who belonged to the National Democratic Camp, he was a supporter of the left-wing Ukrainian movement, a participant of pro-communist actions under the Polish regime. He was a part of the Krushelnytsky family known in Stanislav; together with his elder brothers Leontiy and Pavlo he was among the popularizers of jazz and choral music in the city. Despite his Soviet order affiliations, on February 28, 1940, O. Krushelnytsky received the capital punishment from the Stanislav Regional Court: he

⁶⁷⁹ ДАІФО. Ф. Р-2157. Оп. 2. Спр. 4712-П. Арк. 3–15, 60–77; Кобута С., Кобута Л. Станиславівський інтелігент Юліан Олесницький (1878-1941). *Матеріали Всеукраїнської наукової конференції “Другі Грабовецькі історичні читання”*. Івано-Франківськ, 2019. С. 271–281.

⁶⁸⁰ Альманах Станиславівської землі. Збірник матеріалів до історії Станиславова і Станиславівщини. Ред. Б. Кравців. Т. 1. Нью-Йорк – Торонто – Мюнхен, 1975. С. 638; Реабілітовані історією: у двадцяти семи томах. Івано-Франківська область. Книга перша. Упорядник, автор передмови Лук’ян Вардзарук, Івано-Франківськ: Місто НВ, 2004. С. 338.

was sentenced to the death through being shot. The convict filed a cassation appeal to the Supreme Court of the USSR. To help the former lawyer Stanislav's workers collected dozens of signatures under the letter of support; they emphasized his repeated active participation in legal trials on defense of workers' rights during the Polish regime. As a result, the regional court sentence was mitigated: O. Krushelnytsky had to serve 10 years in the correctional camps with the confiscation of his property and he was to face rights restriction for another 5 years after his release⁶⁸¹.

Lots of county cities and towns of the Stanislaviv region witnessed mass detentions of local lawyers. Following the arrival of Soviet troops in Horodenka, Roman Komarynskyi, a lawyer, was the first one to be arrested (he was the chairman of the UNDO county committee, a member of "Prosvita" and other Ukrainian societies)⁶⁸². Shortly after, because of his case they detained his colleague Ostap Kulchytskyi-Dashynych (the son-in-law of Teofil Okunevskyi, a prominent city lawyer and public figure), who was also a member of the UNDO, the secretary of the county organization, and a patron of Ukrainian societies. Both of them were accused of anti-Soviet activities, allegedly carried out in the 1930s. After some time, they were sent from the district prison to the prison in Stanislav. While working on the Komarynskyi's case, NKVD officers arrested his eldest son, who was a grammar school student at that time; after his detention he disappeared without a trace. The contemporaries of the events assumed that he was tortured to death and buried secretly so as to hide all loose ends. On April 20, 1940, the Stanislav Regional Court sentenced R. Komarynsky to five years in prison and three years of rights restriction. He served his sentence in northern Russia in the Arkhangelsk region, where he died in 1941⁶⁸³. Besides the lawyer himself, there were repressed his wife and daughter: both were sent to Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan. The wife died in exile, and the daughter returned to Horodenka having served her term⁶⁸⁴.

⁶⁸¹ Архів Управління Служби Безпеки України в Івано-Франківській області (далі – Архів УСБУ в Івано-Франківській області). Спр. 15327. Арк. 50–71.

⁶⁸² Арсенич П. Галичани – жертви більшовицьких репресій. Івано-Франківськ: Нова Зоря, 2006. С. 18.

⁶⁸³ Архів УСБУ в Івано-Франківській області. Спр.12313П. Арк. 136.

⁶⁸⁴ Городенщина. Історико-мемуарний збірник. Ред. М. Г. Марунчак. Нью-Йорк – Торонто – Вінніпег, 1978. С. 614.

The same court sentenced O. Kulchytskyi-Dashynych to 3 years of camps and 3 years of rights restriction. The lawyer was deported to a camp in Kazakhstan, and shortly after he died in Semipalatinsk. In the spring of 1940, his three children were taken to Kazakhstan as members of the family of the convict⁶⁸⁵. The entire property of the lawyer was confiscated including three capital stone houses, an agricultural enterprise, machines and tools of production.

In November 1939, two more lawyers, Vasyl Kassiyan and Vasyl Yashan, were arrested in Horodenka. They were kept imprisoned for several months, and then unexpectedly released. Having gotten back his freedom, V. Kassian (a supporter of leftist ideas) instantly left Horodenka together with his family; thanks to his previous connections in Lviv, he managed to across the Soviet-German border and went to the German-occupied Polish territory⁶⁸⁶.

The fate of V. Yashan was somewhat different. After the Soviet authority was established, he stopped his legal practice and started to cooperate. Having spent three months in detention, he was allowed to work as a lawyer on civil cases in Horodenka in the regional bar association founded at the end of 1939. However, his conduct was constantly monitored by the NKVD⁶⁸⁷.

Among the six city human rights activists of Horodenka, it was only Theodor Matejko and Roman Morozevych who managed to avoid being arrested. The former fled the town with his family immediately after the Soviet occupation, they lived in Europe for several years, and in 1949 moved to Canada. R. Morożiewicz also moved to Poland, he lived on the Polish territory controlled by the Germans, yet after the Wehrmacht invasion in 1941 he returned home⁶⁸⁸.

In the neighbouring county town of Sniatyn, on September 23, 1939, Soviets arrested Hryhorii Hankevych, a local lawyer, a former deputy of the Polish Sejm from the UNDO, and an active public figure. He was held in the Stanislav Prison, and on February 7, 1940, the Stanislav Regional Court sentenced him to 10 years in prison and 5 years of rights restriction. His further fate is not clear and rather contradictory.

⁶⁸⁵ Архів УСБУ в Івано-Франківській області. Спр. 12313-П. Арк. 136; Городенщина. Історико-мемуарний збірник. С. 693.

⁶⁸⁶ Городенщина. Історико-мемуарний збірник. С. 597–598.

⁶⁸⁷ Яшан В. Під брунатним чоботом: німецька окупація Станіславівщини в Другій світовій війні, 1941 – 1944. Торонто, 1989. С. 270.

⁶⁸⁸ Там само. С. 256.

The historical material collection “Rehabilitated by history” compiled in Ivano-Frankivsk informed of the lawyer’s death while he was serving his sentence⁶⁸⁹. However, a similar publication issued in the Ternopil region stated that included H. Hankevych remained alive, was released in the summer of 1941, and left for Slovakia, and then moved to Austria⁶⁹⁰.

Horodenka lawyers arrests were carried out practically at the same time with the series of arrests of prominent lawyers in Kolomyia. On September 23, 1939, the NKVD caught Ivan Novodvorskyi; on September 25, they detained lawyers Anton Kuzmych and Ivan Mohylnytskyi, the leaders of the county organization of the Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party (USRP). Under the Polish rule, both human rights activists represented interests of left-wing and communist organizations members, they used to promote socialist postulates. After the Bolsheviks arrival, I. Mohylnytskyi was elected the head of the workers’ committee of the Horodenka district for several days; he welcomed the “liberators”. However, on the occupied territory lawyers faced standard charges of anti-Soviet and nationalist activities, as a result, they received pretty harsh sentences. On March 25, 1940 the Stanislav Regional Court convicted I. Novodvorskyi to 6 years of camps and 3 years of exile. He served his term in the camp of the city of Ukhta, and he died there⁶⁹¹. Both A. Kuzmych’s and I. Mohylnytskyi’s cases took longer time to investigate; their cases were sent to the Zhytomyr Department of the NKVD. On March 29, 1941, a special NKVD council of the Ukrainian SSR decided on their punishment: 8 years of correctional labor camps service⁶⁹². A. Kuzmych was sent to the Irkutsk region, where he died in 1944, while I. Mohylnytskyi served a term in Pechora camps in the northern Russia. Being released in 1946, he was the only lawyer of the Precarpathian region (Prykarpattia) who had been imprisoned before the war and returned home⁶⁹³.

⁶⁸⁹ Реабілітовані історією: у двадцяти семи томах. Івано-Франківська область. Книга перша. С. 530.

⁶⁹⁰ Реабілітовані історією. Тернопільська область. Т. 1. Тернопіль: ВАТ “ТВПК” Збруч”, 2008. С. 549.

⁶⁹¹ Архів УСБУ в Івано-Франківській області. Спр. 8475П. Арк. 42; Андрухів І., Арсенич П. Українські правники у національному відродженні Галичини: 1848 – 1939 рр. Івано-Франківськ, 1996. С. 51.

⁶⁹² ДАІФО. Ф. Р-2157. Оп. 2. Спр. 4691П. Арк. 6–12, 130–138.

⁶⁹³ Андрухів І. Арсенич П. Українські правники у національному відродженні Галичини. С. 49.

On October 21, 1939, a task force squad arrested Osyp Kohut, a local lawyer of the town of Bohorodchany. As a former chairman of the USRP county committee, he was accused of anti-Soviet propaganda, allegedly having been led during the 1930s, as well as of publicly opposing Soviet politics in the Ukrainian SSR, and support of separation of the Soviet Ukraine from the USSR. In March 1940, the Stanislav Regional Court sentenced him to 4 years of camps. O. Kohut filed a cassation appeal and won the trial: according to the decision of the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR of April 4, 1940 he was to be released from prison for lack of evidence. However, the repressive system did not want to admit their mistakes. On May 24, 1940, O. Kohut faced new charges and the further investigation lasted another year. In May 1941, the Special NKVD Council of the Ukrainian SSR sentenced him to 8 years in labor camps, and he died there⁶⁹⁴. Among the detainees there also were lawyers from the town of Solotvyn – brothers Omelian and Mykhailo Gordynskyi; they were arrested and deported to the faraway territory of the USSR in the spring of 1940, and their fate is unknown⁶⁹⁵.

The high mountainous Hutsul provinces also witnessed arrests of lawyers. In the autumn of 1939, Mykola Nykolaichuk and Valerian Banakh, prominent local lawyers as well as public and political figures from the town of Nadvirna were detained. M. Nykolaychuk, a former Sich rifleman, who was active in public work and acted as the chairman of the county UNDO, was accused of anti-Soviet activity and sent to the north of the USSR⁶⁹⁶. Fellow lawyer and civil rights activist V. Banakh was one of the leaders of the local “Prosvita” as well as the head of the county sports society “Luh”. Arrested in November 1939, he was held in Kolomyia prison. In February 1940, the regional court sentenced V. Banach to 6 years in prison and 2 years of rights restriction for counter-revolutionary activities. The convict filed a cassation appeal: it was accepted by the judicial board of the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR in April 1940 and the case was sent for re-trial by a different set of judges. However, in June 1940, the new court failed to change the previous sentence significantly: it was still 6 years of correctional camps without confiscation of property. V. Banakh was

⁶⁹⁴ ДАІФО. Ф. Р-2157. Оп. 2. Спр. 4715П. Арк. 21–28.

⁶⁹⁵ Західня Україна під більшовиками. С. 474.

⁶⁹⁶ А ми тую стрілецькую славу збережемо... Коломия: “Вік”, 1999. С. 258.

taken to Starobilsk in September 1940, and his traces were lost for good⁶⁹⁷.

Punitive bodies persecuted lawyers in almost every county town. In Kalush, lawyers Ivan Sokhatsky and Ivan Aronets were arrested. I. Sokhatskyi belonged to the category of reputable “county organizers”, his public activities earned him the 5-year sentence of camp imprisonment in Yakutia, where he died⁶⁹⁸. His 17-year-old daughter Nadia was also arrested and detained without trial in the Stanislav prison, she was tortured to death. Lawyer I. Aronets got arrested on October 1, 1939. He was charged with standard anti-Soviet activities accusations, and in April, 1940, the regional court sentenced him for 6-year imprisonment and 3 years of rights restriction⁶⁹⁹.

Almost all of the arrested lawyers were charged under Article 54 of the Criminal Code of the USSR, they were accused of anti-Soviet activities and propaganda, actions aimed at undermining the Soviet order and power. According to found in the recently declassified criminal cases against Ukrainian lawyers, they were incriminated for their related to their active participation in the political and public life of Galicia in the 1930s, being in the leadership of the central and county committees of Ukrainian political parties, defending the national and cultural rights of Ukrainians in the Polish state. That means that these lawyers, who had been legal citizen of a different state in 1930s, were brought to justice for actions, deeds, or opinions that were not related directly to the USSR, quite often these charges were not Soviet-related even indirectly. During their trials, among the witnesses there appeared long-term ideological opponents of the defendants, they often represented left-wing, communist organizations (Selrob (Agricultural Workers Party), Communist Party of Western Ukraine). Some of the charges were based on “testimonies” of people who were already detained, so they provided investigators with the necessary “evidence” against the arrested lawyers.

The analyses of criminal cases against lawyer showed the low educational and legal level of the NKVD employees: it was revealed through the nature of their questions and threats, attempts to artificially

⁶⁹⁷ Архів УСБУ в Івано-Франківській області. Спр. 806П. Арк. 50–58, 74–79.

⁶⁹⁸ Західно-Українська Народна Республіка 1918 – 1923. Енциклопедія: До 100-річчя Західно-Української Народної Республіки. Т. 3: П – С. Івано-Франківськ: Манускрипт-Львів, 2020. С. 476–477.

⁶⁹⁹ Архів УСБУ в Івано-Франківській області. Спр. 5726П. Арк. 43–57.

brand the suspects with the ideological labels “nationalist”, “bourgeois”, “imperialist lapdog”. Highly educated lawyers, often with doctoral degrees, were interrogated by illiterate lieutenants and senior sergeants of the NKVD, whose knowledge of legislation was limited to standard clichés of department circulars. Prolonged detention as well as physical methods of interrogation used on detainees made them “plead guilty” regarding being mistaken in their political beliefs; however, most of the prisoners denied their involvement in anti-Soviet activity. There were cases when prosecutors or courts refused to work with the proposed investigation conclusions the numerous inconsistencies in the evidence base or absence of some crucial evidence, as well as due to the low legal validity of the invectives expressed. Such cases had to be “strengthened” or “rewritten”.

It was either the court decision or the decision of the Special Council of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR that carried out the procedure of sentencing and punishment. There could be found numerous eyewitness memories concerning the introduced Soviet model judicial system, later on they appeared in diaspora publications. In the beginning of the Soviet aggression on Western Ukrainian lands, it was up to military judges and prosecutors of the Red Army to look into all the cases without dividing them into administrative, criminal or civil ones. Investigations and trials were carried out by means of violence and coercion on the side of Bolshevik “liberators”, and their defendants (victims) often disappeared in prisons for good without ever being able to return⁷⁰⁰.

One could help not but notice the general low qualification level of the Soviet judges sent to the annexed Galician lands. They had no legal education, and demonstrated low erudition and morality levels; instead of relying on the Soviet laws they often were led by political expediency and acted on the instructions of party and state bodies⁷⁰¹. The vast majority of court decisions were issued against the interests of the accused; however, once in a while the Supreme Court would review a regional court decision and demand the case to be re-investigated. In such cases, it was the Special Council (committee) that would hold the renewed trial and make a decision. The thing was that while regular court would sentence the defendants to the prison/camp term lasting

⁷⁰⁰ Західня Україна під большевиками. С. 362.

⁷⁰¹ Там само. С. 363–364.

3 to 6 years, the Special Council established punishments in between 6 to 8 years of correctional labor camps.

The case of lawyer Ivan Lutsiv from the town of Dolyna could serve as a typical example of such “justice”. Arrested on December 24, 1939, he was accused of nationalist activity and membership of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. Although the detainee denied his relationship with the OUN in every possible way (he was a member of the UNDO and “Prosvita”), the duration of the investigation was constantly prolonged. Since I. Lutsiv kept denying all the charges against him, his case was transferred to the Zhytomyr NKVD Department. On March 1, 1941, the Special Council of the NKVD in the USSR sentenced him to 8 years in camps, where I. Lutsiv died⁷⁰².

Not all those arrested lived long enough to face a trial. Lawyer Mykhailo Yurkiv from the town of Zhuravno (now in the Lviv region) was detained on September 27, 1939, and imprisoned in Stryiska prison. In the spring of 1940, he died there under the unexplained circumstances. M. Yurkiv’s family members were also repressed. First, they were deprived of their property and evicted from home, and in the spring of 1940 they were sent to special settlements in Kazakhstan⁷⁰³.

Soviet punitive bodies found their way to repress Stanislaw lawyers working in other places: Vasyl Band in Monastyrsk, Roman Dombchevskyi in Mykolaiv, Volodymyr Mysak in Nadvirna, Andrii Cholii and Mykhailo Fedunkiv in Burshtyn, and Volodymyr Hryniv in Buchach. The NKVD resorted to all kinds of accusations against elderly lawyers who had retired from professional and public activities a long time before. In Kosiv, they arrested and exiled 80-year-old Danylo Kulyk, his peer Longyn Ozarkevych, a native of the Sniatyn district, was deported to Siberia from the town of Horodok in the Lviv region. Almost all convicts had their property and dwellings confiscated, and members of their families often fell victims to punitive bodies.

Such an approach left little hope for the justice of the Soviet court. This system had no room for professional lawyers relying on the provisions of laws, protecting their client’s rights defenders would rather thrive on the political expediency. Legal defense as an institution of the judicial system was practically non-existent; Soviet authorities needed

⁷⁰² ДАІФО. Ф. Р-2157. Оп. 2. Спр. 4616П. Арк. 27–35.

⁷⁰³ Коханевич О. Невідомі фрагменти великої історії: Людина з великої букви. Новий час. (Львів). URL: <http://www.newtime.lviv.ua/index.php/newtime-osobustosti-kt/2905-2017-01-26-09-52-36>. (дата звернення 19.08.2018).

neither knowledge nor skills of local lawyers. Therefore, the majority of lawyers non-repressed in the first weeks of the arrests of 1939 tried either to flee to the territory under the German occupation or to change their sphere of activity and profession.

Relying on the data found, we can estimate that almost three dozen of Stanislav lawyers managed to get to the Western countries in different ways. It was easier for those of the German descent, or who were married to people with German roots. They received the status of Volkdeutsch (people of German origin), while special commissions of German representatives helped them to officially move to Germany or to the occupied territory of the Polish state controlled by German troops. The same opportunity was given to former officers fighting for the German and Austrian armies during the World War I, so some used this German proposal to their advantage. As a result, among the fugitives fleeing to Germany and Poland there were Lev Rubinher, Ivan Turianskyi, Yaroslav Shipailo from Kolomyia, Petro Zvolynskyi and Ostap Ploschanskyi from Bolekhiv, Theodor Beley, Osip Boichuk, Ivan Volianskyi, Volodymyr and Theodor Hayetskyi, Hryhorii Onuferko, Andrii Perehinets from Stanislav, Volodymyr Murovych from Zabolotiv, Stepan Hrubskyi from Rozhnyativ and others.

However, German offers and kinship did not guarantee a successful departure. Take the case of Oleksa Deresh: a few days after the Soviets got to the town of Dolyna, they arrested this local Ukrainian lawyer, a well-known public and political figure, the head of the UNDO County Committee, a long-term member and philanthropist of the “Prosvita”, “Sokil”, “Ridna Shkola” societies. He was kept in the Stryi prison and all the German commission attempts to put him on the fugitive lists of people leaving for Germany (the lawyer’s wife was of German origin) led to a local conflict with the Soviet authorities. The Soviets assured their German counterparts that they were not aware of O. Deresh’s whereabouts. It was only the voiced threat to complain to Berlin that local officials allowed to “discover” the lawyer in the detention facility. In early January 1940, O. Deresh was released, but he had no faith in the normal life prospects under the new government. His house was turned into the military unit headquarters, and his family was allowed to keep only one small room. The military commissioner tried to reassure O. Deresh saying he “is a good and capable man, and it is not advisable to go to Germany, because here in the Soviet Ukraine, there is a great career chance”, yet, it was an insidious attempt to keep a

well-known Dolyna activist from emigration. Nevertheless, in late January 1940, the lawyer and his family left for Germany, he lived in Saxony until the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, and later returned to work in Dolyna⁷⁰⁴.

It was almost at the same time when the Deresh family left for Germany, that the family of Kateryna Hrynevych (Katria Hrynevychivna), a famous Ukrainian writer, managed to do the same. Her younger son Yaroslav Hrynevych worked as a lawyer in Nadvirna. With the Soviet arrival, his legal activity came to an end, and scared of being arrested, he settled down as a local forestry worker in the mountain village of Rafailiv. In early January 1940, K. Hrynevych's mother managed to convince her grandson of the urgent need to leave for Germany (there was an arrangement to forge documents to prove their German origin). Several days later, in Lviv, they got together with K. Hrynevych elder son Volodymyr (he was a former judge in Horodenka, and a lawyer in Chortkiv), and being under the threat of arrest, the Hrynevychs managed to flee to Germany⁷⁰⁵. The memoirs of Adolf Slyzh, a Lviv judge and a native of the Kolomyia district, vividly described those extreme difficulties connected with fleeing from the Soviet occupation zone, as well as communist reality threats and the rampant banditry the forced returnees had to face⁷⁰⁶.

The similar risky adventure was undertaken by Ivan Zavalykut, a lawyer from Kolomyia and a former deputy of the Polish Sejm. After Soviet troops arrived in Kolomyia, he was involved in the preparation of the elections to the People's Assembly of Western Ukraine. Immediately after the election, being afraid of arrest, the lawyer left for Stanislav, then Lviv, and from there he managed to move across the Soviet-German border to Zamość, Poland, where he got back to his job as a lawyer⁷⁰⁷. Another lawyer who managed to get to Poland was Stepan Kuzyk. This former Polish MP, a lawyer from Rohatyn, and one of the

⁷⁰⁴ Стрийщина: Історично-мемуарний збірник Стрийщини, Скільщини, Болехівщини, Долинщини, Рожнятівщини, Журавенщини, Жидачівщини і Миколаївщини. Т. III. Нью-Йорк, Париж, Сідней, Торонто, 1993. С. 259–260.

⁷⁰⁵ Гриневич Я. Катря Гриневичева: Біографічний нарис. Торонто, 1968. URL: <http://www.divczata.org/yaroslav-grinevich-katrya-grinevicheva8.html>

⁷⁰⁶ Слиж А. Мої літа. Спогади. Львів: "Манускрипт-Львів", 2014. С. 63–68.

⁷⁰⁷ Тернопільський енциклопедичний словник. Т. 1: А – Й. Тернопіль: ВАТ ТВПК "Збруч", 2004. С. 591.

heads of the cooperative Ukrainian Bank emigrated in Krakow in early October 1939⁷⁰⁸.

Those lawyers who managed to escape from the Soviet regime had the opportunity to continue their careers abroad or work in Ukrainian public organizations; they supported their families and were active participants in public and cultural spheres.

Those lawyers who remained in the territories controlled by the Soviets had to change their profession in order to survive in the conditions of goods and products shortage, constant fear of arrest or deportation. Mykhailo Lytvynovych, a well-known lawyer in Stanislav, was expelled from their home together with his family and they constantly suffered threats of arrest. In July 1941, it was M. Lytvynovych who took over the mission of recording the numerous crimes of the NKVD in the Stanislav Prison; he managed to gather documentary evidence of the brutal Soviet terror of 1939 – 1941. Under the German governance, the civil lawyer worked as a judge of the Stanislav Court⁷⁰⁹.

Unable to continue working in the legal profession, educated lawyers tried to find themselves in the sphere of education. For instance, the successful lawyer Oleksa Kossak got a job as a teacher of the Russian language in one of the schools in Kolomyia⁷¹⁰.

In Kosiv local lawyers Ivan Bybliuk and Ostap Koptsiukh had to start teaching. Having thorough knowledge of chemistry and biology (in his youth he studied at the Faculty of Medicine), I. Byliuk got a position of a teacher of chemistry, then he was appointed a director of the Kosiv Ten-Year School for Adults, and a head teacher of the local orphanage. Constantly waiting for arrest, O. Koptsiukh had to live off occasional schooling. In the early days of the German-Soviet war, the town community elected him as the interim head of the town administration; he even managed to organize the Red Army deserters into a local military unit to defend the city from criminal elements. Under the German occupation, he served as a judge of the local court⁷¹¹.

However, Petro Rondiak, a well-known Kosiv lawyer, who had been engaged in cultural affairs for thirty years, left for Turka in the

⁷⁰⁸ Рогатинська земля. Збірник історично-мемуарних, етнографічних і побутових матеріалів. Т. 1. Нью-Йорк, Париж, Сідней, Торонто, 1989. С 577–578.

⁷⁰⁹ Андрухів І. Арсенич П. Українські правники у національному відродженні Галичини. С. 45–46.

⁷¹⁰ Там само. С. 40.

⁷¹¹ Пелипейко І. Містечко над Рибницею: книжка про Косів. С. 52–53.

Lviv region in October 1939, fearing arrest for his public work in a mountain town⁷¹².

Other well-known Ukrainian lawyers lived through the similar experience. One of the prominent lawyers and socio-political figures of Galicia Ivan Makukh from Tovmach (currently Tlumach) at the age of seventy had to hide from communist proponents in the winery of his son-in-law and daughter in the Ternopil region, acting as a common gardener. Not being able to take hold of him as the former minister of ZUNR, NKVD officials arrested and sent his elderly wife to prison⁷¹³. Sniatyn lawyer Theodozii Komarynskyi lived under a false name for a year, as he did not want to repeat the tragic fate of his brother R. Komarynskyi⁷¹⁴. One of the leaders the Ukrainian Rifleman movement in Galicia, a former lawyer in Kolomyia and Yabluniv Kyrylo Triyovskyyi also suffered from the constant threat of arrest. Miraculously, he survived the communist repression and died a natural death in November 1941.

Less than a dozen former human rights defenders remained in their professional sphere officially. In Stanislav their list included Stepan Shlapak, Osyp Levytskyi and Oleksandr Maritchak. In Horodenka, there was the above-mentioned V. Yashan. In Kolomyia, there continued to work Roman Stavnychy, a lawyer known for his social and cultural activity. He managed to pull it through thanks to his status of the activist, who had been a permanent conductor of the choir “Kolomyia Boyan” in the 1930s; he had also created and headed the Ukrainian music orchestra, acted as a founder and chairman of the M. Lysenko music society. R. Stavnychy continued his professional activity in the Kolomyia court under the Soviet and German rules; during 1941 – 1942 he combined his work with the post of the secretary of the Ukrainian district administration in Kolomyia. In 1944 he left for Germany, and then moved to the USA⁷¹⁵.

The arrival of Soviet power on Western Ukrainian lands in September 1939 embarked the beginning of repressions against the local population with the end of the communist totalitarian regime establishment on the occupied territories. Ukrainian lawyers were prosecuted as they

⁷¹² Там само. С. 351.

⁷¹³ Макух І. На народній службі. Спогади. К., 2001. С. 508–510.

⁷¹⁴ А ми тую стрілецькою славу збережемо... С. 174.

⁷¹⁵ Андрухів І. Арсенич П. Українські правники у національному відродженні Галичини. С. 60–61.

represented the idea of legal defense: the very idea the Soviet judicial system practically stamped on. Out of the eight dozen lawyers who worked in the Stanislaviv region in the early autumn of 1939, almost 30 became victims of the NKVD terror, and it was only I. Mohylnytskyi and (possibly) G. Hankevych who escaped death.

The outbreak of the German-Soviet war led to the escape of the Soviet army and the German power establishment. In the first weeks of the war, the remaining Ukrainian lawyers tried to organize local government. Thus, V. Yashan became the head of the Horodenka county government in, a week later he was a part of the Ukrainian regional government, and worked there for three years. In July, 1941 his colleague M. Lytvynovych took on the mission of recording numerous crimes of the NKVD in the Stanislav Prison: there was collected documentary evidence of the brutal Soviet terror of 1939 – 1941. Under the German government, the lawyer occupied the position of a judge in the Stanislav civil court⁷¹⁶. In the first days of the war, the local community of Kosiv elected a temporary head of the town administration – O. Koptukh. As it was mentioned earlier, he managed to organize a military unit to defend the city from criminal elements. During the German occupation, he worked as a judge of the local court, and in 1944 he left for the West⁷¹⁷.

In August 1941, the town of Deliatyn got itself an official mayor – Ostap Navrotskyi, a local lawyer. He performed these duties for two months, and later on provided legal assistance to people trying to balance the needs of fellow citizens and Nazi politics. A lawyer from Kolomyia, L. Rubinger had quite a similar fate. After the German occupation, he returned to Galicia and worked for a while as a district procurator in Chortkiv, and in early 1943 he moved to Kolomyia. There he got a position as a town official, trying to protect the citizens from the terror of the Gestapo. The Nazis' extermination of local Jews prompted his resignation and departure for Germany⁷¹⁸.

Despite the blatant colonial nature of the occupation regime, the Germans still allowed the judicial system to function. Consequently, some of the lawyers returned to their native lands. In Stanislav this concerned lawyers O. Boichuk, I. Volianskyi, and H. Onuferko, in

⁷¹⁶ Там само. С. 46.

⁷¹⁷ Пелипейко І. Містечко над Рибицею: книжка про Косів. С. 53.

⁷¹⁸ Коломия й Коломийщина: збірник споминів і статей про недавнє минуле. Філадельфія, 1988. С. 881.

Dolyna – Ya. Hrynevych and O. Deresh, in Rozhnyativ – S. Hrubskiy and R. Kurbas; Bolekhiv witnessed returns of P. Zvolynskiy and O. Ploshchanskyy, while V. Kassiy and T. Komarinskyy and others came back to Horodenka. Lawyers R. Stavnychy and O. Kossak resumed their legal work in Kolomyia, while others changed their specialization: V. Kassiy opened a notary office, M. Lytvynovych and T. Hayetskyi worked as judges, R. Morozevych worked on cooperative cases. Since the occupation authorities carried out their criminal penalties without following legal procedures, lawyers were mostly engaged in civil cases. Their public work was kept to a minimum, and they had to demonstrate loyalty to the regime.

While the majority tried to cautiously play by the new rules, some lawyers got caught by the Gestapo. In the winter of 1942, O. Kossak, a lawyer from Kolomyia, was unjustly accused of association with the OUN secret workers; he was arrested and detained in the prisons of Kolomyia and Chortkiv for almost a year. The Ukrainian Central Committee's senior officials V. Kubiiovych and K. Pankivskyy tried to facilitate his release, but on November 27, 1942, O. Kossak was shot near the village of Yahilnytsia near Chortkiv, along with another 50 detainees⁷¹⁹. In 1943 in Dolyna they arrested Ya. Hrynevych; he spent several weeks in the Gestapo's detention facilities. Somehow he was released, and not to test his luck, he left for Germany for the second time⁷²⁰. R. Morozevych was person arrested in Horodenka, in January 1944. He was engaged in the cooperative process. As a former lawyer, he came to Halych in order to legally defend his arrested brother, but he also lost his freedom⁷²¹. His further fate remained unknown. In December 1942, another lawyer, Yaroslav Samotovka, a member of the OUN group (the A.Melnyk proponents' part of the OUN) disappeared without a trace. Reportedly, he was arrested in Dnipropetrovsk and tortured to death by the Gestapo.

However, the majority of lawyers, who continued to work even under the German regime, escaped persecution. On the eve of the Red Army offensive in 1944, they left for the Western countries, fleeing

⁷¹⁹ Волошинський Б. Український правник доктор Олекса Косак. *Літопис Бойківщини*. 2017. №2/93 (104). С. 18–27.

⁷²⁰ Гриневич Я. Катря Гриневичева: Біографічний нарис. Торонто, 1968. URL: <http://www.divczata.org/yaroslav-grinevich-katrya-grinevicheva8.html>

⁷²¹ Яшан В. Під брунатним чоботом: німецька окупація Станіславівщини в Другій світовій війні. С. 256.

from the upcoming Communist regime. After the restoration of the Soviet power in the region, there were around a dozen former lawyers of the pre-war period left. Some of them were caught by the NKVD and repressed. One of them was Matrenchuk, a lawyer from the village of Verkhovyna (Zhab'ie). He was detained at the Slovak border at the attempt to leave the country; he was imprisoned and his fate remained unknown. In Bolekhiv they arrested P. Zvolynskiy and O. Navrotskyi. Back in 1940, P. Zvolynskiy, a Bolekhiv lawyer, managed to leave for Germany (his wife was of German origin); there he lived in a camp for displaced people and had to engage in hard physical work. In 1943 his family returned home and he found a job as an accountant. He did not participate in the public life of the town and hoped that Soviets would spare him. In August 1944, P. Zvolynskiy was appointed an accountant of a Soviet industrial enterprise; yet, soon enough he was arrested along with his family. The Special Council at the Ministry of National Security of the USSR sentenced him to one year of correctional work; having served his term, P. Zvolynskiy returned to the town and passed away there in 1954.

In the first months of the German occupation lawyer O. Navrotsky was appointed an official in Deliatyn; he performed the duties of the mayor of the town until the end of October 1941. Afterwards he worked as a lawyer, and later he was arrested after the return of the Soviet regime to Bolekhiv in 1944. He was accused of collaboration with the Nazis, support of the Jews elimination, and other crimes. In December 1945 the Military Tribunal of the NKVD of the USSR sentenced O. Navrotsky to 10 years of correctional camps and five years of rights restriction. The wife filed an appeal to the Prosecutor's Office of the Ukrainian SSR. Re-opening and reinvestigation of the case found no evidence proving his involvement with the Nazi crimes; therefore, his term of imprisonment was reduced to six years⁷²². However, the lawyer did not see to be released.

In Kosovo, in the winter of 1945, the former lawyer Mykhailo Bodnar was arrested. As a lawyer, he often defended representatives of left-wing political organizations, so he expected the new communist authorities to take into account his previous professional activity. Instead of staying in the profession, he was forced to switch to the educational system, and he worked as a teacher, an inspector of the district

⁷²² Архів УСБУ в Івано-Франківській області. Спр. 8212 П. Арк. 94–107.

education department. Having clearly seen the real state of affairs and methods of socialist “legality”, he was naïve enough to write a critical letter to Yo. Stalin regarding the practice of Soviet constitutional legislation in Galicia. It cost him his freedom and life: M. Bodnar was imprisoned, later he died in captivity⁷²³.

In conclusion, during World War II, the usual ways of the functioning of the judicial system were eliminated, and the majority of lawyers, in particular, advocates, lost the opportunity to perform their professional and civil functions. The Soviet regime pursued a blatant repressive policy regarding lawyers. Their main goal was to break any attempt to legally defend the civil and personal rights of the accused; they wanted to enforce legal nihilism into public consciousness, to impose the discourse about the absolute right of the state to use violence, and in this way they tried to root out all doubts in the lawfulness of repressive measures. Those criminal cases that were revised in the early 1990s by the Prosecutor’s Office bodies of independent Ukraine along with the rehabilitation cases of the illegally convicted proved the incredible level of artificiality of the charges against lawyers. The lawyers’ professional status was virtually destroyed, and only half a dozen former Galician defenders were involved in the Soviet judicial system. Those lawyers who managed to leave for the Western countries saved themselves and their families from arrests. Almost all Stanislav’s lawyers who survived of communist persecution lived through the World War II and continued their activity in the post-war Western countries.

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⁷²³ Пелипейко І. Містечко над Рибницею: книжка про Косів. С. 55, 356.

REPRESSIONS OF THE POLISH POPULATION OF UKRAINE'S WESTERN AT THE FINAL STAGE OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR: ARCHIVAL MATERIALS AND MODERN INTERPRETATIONS OF PUBLIC MEMORY

The proposed research topic is important in the theoretical and methodological and applied historical dimension, allowing through critical analysis of archival sources, which were left out of the attention of previous authors, to offer a historical retrospective of the public consciousness of the Polish population of the western regions of Ukraine at the final stage of the Second World War – from the time of the suppression of the Polish armed underground of the Army Krayova to the completion of the movement of the vast majority of Poles in the region to pro-Soviet Poland in the process of so-called exchange of Polish and Ukrainian population between Soviet Ukraine and the Polish National Liberation Committee.

Comprehensive historiographical analysis of scientific literature on the outlined issues can be the subject of a separate monographic survey, where, among other things, we should pay attention to the works that can be considered basic for modern Ukrainian historiography⁷²⁴.

Based on the analysis and modern Ukrainian historiography, it seems appropriate to introduce new archival sources into wide English-language scientific use, which can supplement the dominant Polish historiographical retrospective with ideas about mass consciousness and individual practices of acceptance / rejection of new Soviet ethnic realities by Poles in Western Ukraine.

The aim of the proposed study is the historical and political characteristics of the repressive policy of Soviet totalitarianism in the

⁷²⁴ Гулай В. Міжетнічна комунікація в Західній Україні у роки Другої світової війни: монографія. Львів: Видавництво Львівської політехніки, 2011. 460 с.; Льюшин І. І. Протистояння УПА і АК (Армії Крайової) в роки Другої світової війни на тлі діяльності польського підпілля в Західній Україні. Київ : Інститут історії України НАН України, 2001. 288 с; Калакура О. Я. Поляки в етнополітичних процесах на землях України у ХХ столітті. Київ: Знання України, 2007. 508 с. Сергійчук В. Депортація поляків з України. Невідомі документи про насильницьке переселення більшовицькою владою польського населення з УРСР в Польщу в 1944–1946 роках. Київ, 1999. 192 с. та ін.

western Ukrainian region at the final stage of World War II in the public memory of the Polish population.

In accordance with the goal it is necessary to solve the following research *tasks*:

- to point to a set of preconditions that determined the nature of the military-political situation in the western regions of Ukraine at the final stage of World War II;
- to focus on the place and role of the Polish population in the life of the western Ukrainian region in the second half of 1944 – 1945 in the conditions of restoration of the Soviet political regime with its integral element – repressive and punitive bodies of the NKVD, NCDB “SMERSH”
- to emphasize the prospects of interdisciplinary, primarily historical and political, areas of further research to fill and specify the relevant public English-language scientific narrative.

In our opinion, definition of the concept of “politics of memory” can be used as a starting point, proposed by Kyiv political scientist O. Volyanyuk: “Politics of memory – a set of political actions designed to reconcile and mutually accept different interests in the field of interpretation of the past; complex interaction of a number of policy actors aimed at supporting or reviewing certain elements of public memory; a real space for the creation of new political relations based on the interpretation and representation of the social past⁷²⁵”.

In turn, public memory is a form of storing meaningful information, symbols, images, normative stereotypes, precedents, and so on. It directly or indirectly depends on existing political institutions, which carry out the construction of political space, its past, present and future⁷²⁶.

At the final stage of World War II, the retention of Lviv as part of Poland’s eastern frontiers was considered by most of the Polish population and underground activists to be a natural reward for their participation in the struggle against Hitler’s Germany. A large-scale operation of the Army Krayova which called “Storm” (“Burza”) was to en-

⁷²⁵ Волянюк О. *Політика пам’яті*. Політологія: навчальний енциклопедичний словник-довідник для студентів ВНЗ I-IV рівнів акредитації / За ред. Н. М. Хоми. Львів: “Новий Світ-2000, 2014. С. 480.

⁷²⁶ Волянюк О. Феномен суспільної пам’яті у площині демократизації політичного життя. *Науковий вісник Ужгородського університету*. Серія: Політологія, Соціологія, Філософія. 2009. Вип. 13. С. 21.

sure the more important, first of all military-tactical, positions of the Poles in determining the future eastern borders of Poland. The “Burza” plan provided for the mobilization of AK units at the time of the approach of the front and the withdrawal of German troops, the emergence and transfer of power in a particular area before the entry of Soviet troops⁷²⁷. The political task of this action was to present to the Soviet authorities AK units as the rightful owners of this territory, representatives of the underground Polish state and the Polish government in exile⁷²⁸.

Despite the illusory euphoria of the liberation of “Polish” Lviv, the Soviet command tried to use Polish troops for its own purposes. On July 25, during a meeting at the headquarters of the Soviet troops, the commander of the Lviv district of the AK, brigade general V. Filipkovskiy expressed his desire to form an infantry division and continue the joint struggle against Germany. The next day, about 150 officers of the future unit were presented to the Soviet command at the district headquarters. However, as soon as the last German troops left the city on July 27, the Soviet command demanded the immediate disarmament of Polish forces. On July 29, detachments that took part in the fighting with the Germans laid down their arms. Almost immediately after the Red Army entered Lviv, 47 active members of the AK were arrested, including 29 officers who were interned⁷²⁹.

It should not be forgotten that the Polish Committee of National Liberation⁷³⁰, formed by the Krayova People’s Council from members of the Polish Workers’ Party and the Union of Polish Patriots on July 19–21, 1944, was submitted as a body of “temporary executive power to lead the liberation struggle of the Polish people, to ensure its inde-

⁷²⁷ Czubiński A. *Polska i Polacy po II wojnie światowej (1945–1989)* / Antoni Czubiński. Poznań: Wydawnictwo naukowe UAM, 1998. S. 24.

⁷²⁸ Піскунович Г. Польське підпілля на південно-східних кресах Другої Речі Посполитої у 1939 – 1945 рр. *Україна–Польща: важкі питання: матеріали II Міжнародного семінару істориків “Українсько-польські відносини в 1918 – 1947 роках”*. Варшава, 1998. Т. 1–2. С. 184; Węgierski J. *W Lwowskiej Armii Krajowej*. Warszawa: Instytut wydawniczy PAX, 1989. S. 193.

⁷²⁹ Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України (далі – ЦДАГО України). Ф. 1. Центральний Комітет Комуністичної партії (більшовиків) України. Оп. 23. Спр. 926. Арк. 85.

⁷³⁰ Czubiński A. *Polska i Polacy po II wojnie światowej (1945–1989)*. Poznań: Wydawnictwo naukowe UAM, 1998. S. 25.

pendence and the restoration of the Polish state”⁷³¹, which was published a few days later in the town of Kholm, occupied by the Red Army, from which the PCNL received the second name “Kholmsky”. Its democratic slogans became a screen for the terrorist activities of the NKVD and related Polish security services ⁷³².

The fate of the Polish population of Western Ukraine and the Ukrainians of Poland was decided on September 9, 1944, when an agreement was signed between the government of the USSR and the Polish National Liberation Committee on mutual evacuation of the population. According to Art. 1 of this agreement, it was necessary to “begin the evacuation of all Poles and Jews who were Polish citizens before September 17, 1939 and wish to move to Poland”. It was emphasized that “evacuation is voluntary and therefore coercion cannot be applied either directly or indirectly”⁷³³.

The main reason for signing this agreement was the desire of both parties to remove those national groups that did not “fit” into the desired national structure of the population of the two states, by relocating them to the ethnic homeland. However, the real intentions were carefully concealed by Soviet propaganda. Commenting on the signing of the agreement on September 9, 1944, the newspaper “Soviet Ukraine” in its editorial called it “a new step towards further strengthening the Polish-Soviet friendship, a new manifestation of the spirit of mutual respect and brotherhood that characterizes the relationship between the Ukrainian people and the reviving democratic Poland”⁷³⁴.

Moscow and Warsaw argued before the West that the evacuation was a manifestation of humanism, a desire to end any Ukrainian-Polish strife. By relocating Poles, the Soviet government sought to prevent the formation of a serious opposition in the person of the Polish national minority and was given a chance to relocate Russians and members of other nationalities to the western regions of the USSR in order to

⁷³¹ Вільна Україна. 1944. № 72. 6 жовтня. С. 2.

⁷³² Дильонгова Г. Історія Польщі 1795 – 1990 / пер. з пол. М. Кірсенка. Київ: Вид. дім “Києво-Могилянська академія”, 2007. С. 153.

⁷³³ Депортації. Західні землі України кінця 30-х – початку 50-х рр. Документи, матеріали, спогади / Упорядники: Ю. Ю. Сливка та ін.; відп. ред. Ю. Ю. Сливка. У трьох томах. Том 1. 1939 – 1953. Львів: Ін-т українознавства ім. І. Крип’якевича НАН України, 1996. С. 287.

⁷³⁴ Радянська Україна. 1944. 12 вересня

pursue a policy of russification. The resettlement of Ukrainians from Poland eliminated the danger for Moscow of a center's emergence of active Ukrainian emigration outside the USSR. In turn, the expulsion of Ukrainians meant for the Polish leadership, led by Moscow, an opportunity to find a bridge of unity with the broad Polish public⁷³⁵.

The reaction of the Polish population in the western Ukrainian region to the signing of the Lublin Agreement was generally negative. For example, an employee of the Rivne city water supply system, Vaszek, said: "I would rather be killed by the Bandera people, but I have nothing to do in Poland". Yana Kukurska from Lviv said: "It is good that England helped us sign an agreement with the Ukrainian SSR on the resettlement of Poles to Poland. When we'll move to Poland, we will form our government with the help of England, and we will force the Red Army to leave Western Ukraine, and later we will return to our Lviv"⁷³⁶.

However, the illusions of the Polish population quickly began to disappear. In a letter to J. Stalin dated September 29, 1944, M. Khrushchev proposed to pursue the following policy toward Polish citizens: "In all higher and secondary schools to use textbooks and teach only in Ukrainian and Russian. In the Soviet Union, schools for Polish children are organized in which teaching is conducted in Polish and according to Polish curricula. That is, education is conducted in the spirit of the Polish bourgeois-nationalist state. The Poles raised the question of organizing such schools in Lviv as well. They were denied this and offered to hold classes in all Ukrainian and Polish schools according to the programs approved by the People's Commissar of Education of the Ukrainian SSR. We also consider it necessary to repeal the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "On the prohibition of mobilization of the Polish population from the western regions outside the region to work in industry in the eastern regions of the USSR and other republics of the Soviet Union". The Polish population must be involved in all the responsibilities assigned to the other population of Soviet Ukraine. This means that we

⁷³⁵ Безсмертя. Книга Пам'яті України. 1941 – 1945 / Гол. ред. кол.: І. О. Герасимов (голова) та ін. Київ: Пошуково-видавниче агенство "Книга Пам'яті України", 2000. С. 573.

⁷³⁶ Сергійчук В. Депортації поляків з України. Невідомі документи про насильницьке переселення більшовицькою владою польського населення з УРСР в Польщу в 1944 – 1946 роках. Київ: Українська Видавнича Спілка, 1999. С. 55, 58.

will mobilize the Polish population, both men and women, who are living in the western regions of the USSR, in industry, for the construction of defense facilities and to participate in other activities along with the Ukrainian population”⁷³⁷.

The position of local authorities on the Polish population was expressed by the secretary of the Lviv regional committee of the CP (b) U I. Hrushetsky, speaking at a meeting of the Polish intelligency in Lviv on December 6, 1944: “With regard to the Polish population as citizens of the Soviet Union, we will conduct all our activities without any amendments, all Soviet laws must be binding on them, which means that the mobilization of the Polish population to work in restoring the national economy in the eastern regions will extend, both for Poles and Ukrainians. This means that the improvement of culture will be carried out according to Soviet laws and Soviet rules”⁷³⁸.

Analyzing the special reports of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR on the political mood of the Polish population of Western Ukraine, it can be argued that at least two (optimistic and pessimistic) visions of the future at the level of rumors have spread among them. Let’s illustrate this with the example of Lutsk residents. If the housewife Abramovich believed that “...Poland should have an eastern border on the Dnipro river, so dictate to the Soviets our allies – England and America. The Red Army will liberate Polish territory from the Germans, and then it will be occupied by the Polish army”, then another resident of Khokhol was convinced: “The Poles were taken to the Red Army, but they will not serve there and will create their own Poland, and the Soviets, if they won’t go – we will cut them”, and at the same time the Polish Plata only pessimistically stated: “Hard times have come for Poles. One liberators came to us – the Germans, took all our youth to Germany. Now came other liberators – the Soviets, robbed everyone and the last people are taken to Siberia...”⁷³⁹. The West’s help was extremely common among the Polish population. As

⁷³⁷ ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1. Оп. 23. Спр. 892. Арк. 139.

⁷³⁸ Культурне життя в Україні. Західні землі. Документи і матеріали / Ред. кол.: Ю. Ю. Сливка (відп. ред.) та ін. Т. I. 1939 – 1953. Київ: Наукова думка, 1995. С. 232.

⁷³⁹ Сергійчук В. Депортації поляків з України. Невідомі документи про насильницьке переселення більшовицькою владою польського населення з УРСР в Польщу в 1944 – 1946 роках ... С. 29–30.

Martyniak, a professor at the Lviv Medical Institute, said shortly after the restoration of Soviet power in Lviv: “It is not yet known where the Soviet-Polish border will pass. I have heard that the British and the Americans are pushing for the border to be 60 km east of Lviv, which will this remain behind Poland”⁷⁴⁰.

In Lviv on All Saints’ Day, November 1, 1944, about 4,000 local Poles gathered at the graves of Polish soldiers who died in the battles for Lviv during the Ukrainian-Polish war of 1918 – 1919. They honored their memory by singing patriotic songs and anti-Soviet appeals, for which the six most active participants were detained by Soviet security forces⁷⁴¹. On the night of November 24, 1944 on the str. Mickiewicz in Drohobych were posted leaflets urging not to leave “Polish land” and in support of “democratic Poland”⁷⁴².

Після 24 листопада 1944 р. Дрогобич In particular, the leaflet emphasized: “Poles – do not leave the Polish land! Do not sign up for a trip to the west! Do not give your land to anyone! Poland was, is and will be here! Get rid of the sellers of Polish lands! Long live democratic Poland!”⁷⁴³.

Even at the end of 1944, Józef Wężyniak, the head of the Drohobych forestry, seemed to be pragmatically thinking: “... Why should I go to Poland. The war will continue between the Soviets, Britain and America. Drohobych Oil Refinery № 2 belongs to the British, so Poland will be here, so no need to go”⁷⁴⁴.

Zygmund Kindevych, the architect of the Drohobych City Communal Economy, sadly remarked on the public memory of the Polish population of the western Ukrainian region about the basements of the Soviet regime’s functioning: “The soviets have remained the same as before. Russia knows how to conduct politics. It throws bones to Ukrainians and Poles and gets all the benefits of life”⁷⁴⁵.

Another resident of Drohobych, blacksmith Marek Zhuravsky, demonstrated the opposite example of ideas about the international

⁷⁴⁰ Державний архів Львівської області (далі – ДАЛО). Ф. П-3 Львівський обласний комітет Комуністичної партії (більшовиків) України. Оп. 1. Спр. 63. Арк. 19.

⁷⁴¹ Там само. Арк. 55–56.

⁷⁴² ДАЛО. Ф. П-5001 Дрогобицький обласний комітет Комуністичної партії (більшовиків) України. Оп 2. Спр. 23. Арк. 42

⁷⁴³ Там само.

⁷⁴⁴ Там само. Арк. 43.

⁷⁴⁵ Там само. Арк. 61.

situation at that time with a retrospective of individual consciousness: “I can’t wait for the moment when I’ll go to Poland to finally live in peace and not think about suffering”⁷⁴⁶.

In order to intensify the departure of Poles and the final elimination of the Polish underground in Western Ukraine, the authorities resorted to repression. In January 1945, arrests were made in Lviv. The memorandum of the secretary of the Lviv regional committee of the CP (b) U I. Hrushetsky addressed to M. Khrushchev dated January 13, 1945 stated that in the result of the operation carried out by the KGB as of January 9, 1945, 772 Polish citizens were arrested, including 14 professors, 21 engineers, 6 doctors, and 5 priests⁷⁴⁷. Among those arrested were figures of the Polish nationalist movement – student Tymchuk, shop owner A. Svitalsky, technologist V. Gurko, countess Chesnowska, rector of the Carmelite monastery Petinsky⁷⁴⁸. According to archival materials, as of February 17, 1945, 2,057 Poles were arrested in the Lviv region for political reasons, including 230 people for belonging to the Army Krayova⁷⁴⁹.

The real purpose of these actions – to intimidate the Polish population before the “inevitable” resettlement to Poland was not a secret for ordinary citizens. Thus, the forwarder of the Drohobych bakery, a Polish Pavlyshyn, bitterly remarked: “The Soviet authorities are arresting Poles in order for them to leave for Poland. The arrests will continue if the Poles won’t leave”⁷⁵⁰. On January 6, 1945, the underground newspaper of the Army Krayova “Slovo Polske” stated: “Already today some of the arrested were offered release in exchange for signing a declaration of departure”⁷⁵¹.

The deployment of repression against the Poles contributed to the establishment of an atmosphere of fear and mutual suspicion, which in turn allowed the Soviet punitive authorities to carry out their main task more effectively – to control public opinion and prevent anti-Soviet activities. In such circumstances, more and more Poles agreed for resettlement. By February 15, 1945, 91,702 families (272,202 people) of Polish and Jewish population were registered for departure, but only

⁷⁴⁶ Там само.

⁷⁴⁷ ДАЛО. Ф. П-3. Оп. 1. Спр. 214. Арк. 4.

⁷⁴⁸ ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1. Оп. 23. Арк. 162.

⁷⁴⁹ ДАЛО. Ф. П-3. Оп. 1. Спр. 230. Арк. 65.

⁷⁵⁰ Там само. Ф. П-5001. Оп. 6. Спр. 85. Арк. 22.

⁷⁵¹ Там само. Ф. П-3. Оп. 1. Спр. 214. Арк. 7.

18,231 families (49,985 people) left, including from the territory of Volyn region – 4,971 families (14,965 people), Rivne – 3,783 families (11,937 people), Lviv – 3,996 families (8,474 people), Ternopil – 2,812 families (8,402 people), Drohobych – 2,069 families (4,454 people), Stanislav – 696 families (1,763 people)⁷⁵².

The despair of a large part of the Polish population, which waited almost till the end for the West's help in the accession of Western Ukraine to the restored Polish state, is illustrated by rumors of US and British "sale" of Poles in Western Ukraine to the Soviet Union. "We were sold by England and America. In this situation, we Poles will suffer a lot, but because of us Churchill and Roosevelt will sell their portfolios in the market", – as one of the residents of Lutsk persuaded⁷⁵³.

As a result, the resettlement of Poles from the western regions of Ukraine was largely completed by September 1, 1946. A total of 305,226 families or 873,478 people were registered in the region for resettlement. 301,755 families, or 859,905 people, applied to leave for Poland. 301,755 families, or 789,982 people, left⁷⁵⁴. Regarding resettlement from some regions, numbers were next: 233,617 people were relocated from Ternopil region, 218,711 from Lviv region, 115,278 from Drohobych region, 77,930 from Stanislav region, 69,075 from Rivne region, 64,798 from Volyn region, and 10,573 from Chernivtsi region. The ethnic composition of the immigrants was as follows: Poles – 746,993 people, Jews – 30,408, representatives of other nationalities – 12,581.

Polish researcher P. Eberhardt notes that even before the resettlement of more than 200,000 Poles left Western Ukraine⁷⁵⁵.

However, some Poles stayed in the western regions of the USSR, concentrating mainly in cities, especially Lviv. At the end of 1946, among the 266.5 thousand inhabitants of Lviv, there were about 10,000 Poles⁷⁵⁶. The resettlement of the Polish population continued in the

⁷⁵² ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1. Оп. 23. Спр. 1470. Арк. 32.

⁷⁵³ Сергійчук В. Поляки на Волині у роки Другої світової війни: Документи з українських архівів і польські публікації. Київ: Українська Видавнича Спілка, 2003. С. 484.

⁷⁵⁴ ЦДАГО України. Оп. 23. Спр. 2610. Арк. 191.

⁷⁵⁵ Eberhardt P. *Przyemiany narodowosciowe na Ukraine XX wieku*. Warszawa: Biblioteka "Obozu", 1994. S. 173.

⁷⁵⁶ ДАЛЮ. Ф. П-3. Оп. 1. Спр. 555. Арк. 135.

mid-1950s. In 1956, 718 people left the Lviv region⁷⁵⁷. From the Ternopil region in 1956 – 1957 – more than 10.6 thousand Poles⁷⁵⁸.

It should be noted that the unresolved border problem in post-war Central and Eastern Europe did not allow the Soviet leadership to feel like a complete master in the western Ukrainian region, and therefore it resorted to appropriate foreign policy action. If the legitimate Polish government, which had been operating since the beginning of the war in exile, insisted that after the defeat of Germany, Polish territory should be restored within the borders on September 1, 1939, the PCNL recognized the Curzon Line as Poland's eastern border⁷⁵⁹. The line of the Soviet-Polish border agreed upon at the Crimean Conference of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain leaders was established by the agreement, signed on August 16, 1945 in Moscow by V. Molotov and E. Osobka-Moravsky. In this way, the Polish pro-communist government recognized the entry of Western Ukraine into the USSR in 1939.

Thus, on the basis of the study we can say about the existence in the public consciousness of the Polish population of the western regions of Ukraine at the final stage of World War II several, often opposing ideas about the near future of the region and the projection of their own future, primarily on the basis of individual experience in the realities of the deployment of mass repressions of the Soviet repressive and punitive bodies.

Vasyl Gulay, Nataliia Dmytryshyn

⁷⁵⁷ Там само. Оп. 6. Спр. 82. Арк. 102.

⁷⁵⁸ Державний архів Тернопільської області (далі – ДАТО). Ф. Р-1 Виконавчий комітет Тернопільської обласної Ради депутатів трудящих, оп. 3, спр. 636. Арк. 10.

⁷⁵⁹ Буцко О. В. Українсько-польське переселення 1944 – 1946 рр. (тези доповідей). *Друга світова війна і доля народів України*: матеріали Всеукраїнської наукової конференції, м. Київ, 23–24 червня 2005 р. / ред. кол. І. Ф. Курас (співголова) та ін. Київ: Сфера, 2005. С. 194.

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