Martynenko Oleksandr,
Ph.D., Postdoctoral Researcher,
Department of Philosophy and Culture Studies
Yuriy Fed'kovych Chernivtsi National University
orcid.org/0000-0002-1939-9387

Manchul Bohdana,
Ph.D., Assistant Professor,
Department of Philosophy and Culture Studies
Yuriy Fed'kovych Chernivtsi National University
orcid.org/0000-0002-6937-1403

A READING OF THE LINGUISTIC TURN THROUGH L. WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY

The article examines the role and place of L. Wittgenstein's ideas in the formation of the linguistic turn in philosophy in terms of representative and communicative dimensions. There are contradictions in the explanation of the history of the development of the linguistic turn, unlike in the analysis of another important intellectual event of European philosophy – the Copernican turn. Some researchers interpret the linguistic turn in a representative way, and some – in a communicative way. Nothing of the sort arises in the case of the analysis of the Copernican turn where everything is clear. According to the authors, this situation is due to the nature of the philosophy that had an impact on both events. In the first case, we are dealing with a clear and holistic concept of I. Kant, in the second – with two contradictory theories of L. Wittgenstein.

In this interpretation, L. Wittgenstein appears as the main founder of the linguistic turn. This imposes an obligation on the authors to reveal the content of both of his fundamental books and to show their correspondence to the representative and communicative vector of the development of the linguistic turn.

The main methods used in the research are historical-philosophical and structural-functional. The article is divided into four parts: 1) analysis of the history of interpretations of the development of the linguistic turn; 2) the metaphysical nature of L. Wittgenstein's first book and the anti-metaphysical nature of the second; 3) the representative dimension in the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus"; 4) the communicative dimension in "Philosophical Investigations".

The authors concluded that the linguistic turn should be perceived as a holistic phenomenon, and the communicative turn following it can be considered as a convergence of trends laid down by L. Wittgenstein.

Key words: L. Wittgenstein, the linguistic turn, communicative turn, representation, communication, reference theory of meaning, ordinary language, ideal language, relativism, language game, rules of language game.

Мартиненко Олександр Петрович,
кандидат філософських наук,
докторант кафедри філософії та культурології
Чернівецького національного університету імені Юрія Федьковича
orcid.org/0000-0002-1939-9387

Манчул Богдана Василівна,
кандидатка філософських наук,
асистентка кафедри філософії та культурології
Чернівецького національного університету імені Юрія Федьковича
orcid.org/0000-0002-6937-1403

ПРОЧИТАННЯ ЛІНГВІСТИЧНОГО ПОВОРОТУ В РОЗРІЗІ ФІЛОСОФСЬКИХ ІДЕЙ Л. ВІТГЕНШТАЙНА

У статті досліджується роль та місце ідей Л. Вітгенштайна у формуванні лінгвістичного повороту у філософії в контексті репрезентативного та комунікативного вимірів.

У поясненні історії розвитку лінгвістичного повороту існують суперечності, яких немає, наприклад, при аналізі іншої вагомої інтелектуальної події європейської філософії – коперниканського повороту. Частина дослідників тлумачать лінгвістичний поворот в репрезентативному ключі, частина – в комунікативному. Нічого подібного не виникає у випадку аналізу коперниканського повороту, де все однозначно. На думку авторів, така ситуація зумовлена характером філософії, що стала причиною обох подій. У першому випадку маємо справу з чіткою цілісною концепцією І. Канта, в другому – з двома суперечливими теоріями Л. Вітґенштайна.

У такому трактуванні Л. Вітґенштайн постає головним основоположником лінгвістичного повороту. Це накладає зобов'язання на авторів розкрити зміст обох його фундаментальних творів, показати їх відповідність репрезентативному та комунікативному вектору розвитку лінгвістичного повороту.

Основними методами, використаними у дослідженні, є історико-філософський, змістовний та структурно-функціональний. Стаття поділена на чотири частини, присвячені: 1) аналізу історії інтерпретацій розвитку лінгвістичного повороту; 2) метафізичному характеру першого твору Л. Вітґенштайна і антиметафізичному – другого; 3) репрезентативному виміру у «Логіко-філософському трактаті»; 4) комунікативному виміру у «Філософських дослідженнях».

У висновках автори дійшли думки, що лінгвістичний поворот слід сприймати як цілісний феномен, а наступний після нього комунікативний поворот можна розглядати як конвергенцію тенденцій, закладених Л. Вітґенштайном.

Ключові слова: Л. Вітґенштайн, лінгвістичний поворот, комунікативний поворот, репрезентація, комунікація, референційна теорія значення, ординарна мова, ідеальна мова, релятивізм, мовна гра, правила мовної гри.

Introduction. The linguistic turn became a significant intellectual event in the 20th century, radically shifting the attention of philosophers from subject-object issues to the analysis of language. In terms of its scale, it is only slightly inferior to the Copernican turn carried out by I. Kant. However, if the Copernican turn is associated with the name of the founder of German classical philosophy then in the second case there is no such ambiguity. Such a state of affairs is hardly fair, considering the impact of L. Wittgenstein's philosophical ideas in its emergence.

The contradiction between the representative and communicative vector of development in the history of the linguistic turn creates difficulties in its interpretation. Nothing of the sort arises in the case of the analysis of the Copernican turn. In our opinion, this situation is due to the nature of the philosophy that caused both events. In the first case, we are dealing with Kant's clear and coherent concept, and in the second – with Wittgenstein's two contradictory theories.

The aim and objectives of the article. The article aims to reveal the representative and communicative specifics of the history of the development of the linguistic turn through a meaningful analysis of L. Wittgenstein's philosophy.

Research results. *1. Linguistic turn and interpretations of its emergence.* 1.1. Structural and linguistic. J-M. Rabati notes that the emergence of new technical means of transmitting and receiving messages ensured the interest of 20th-century scientists in the problems of language. It was this wave of interest that made the humanities that traditionally dealt with language and communication, i.e., philosophy, semiotics, sociology, philology, psychology, and the most important among them – linguistics, relevant.

According to the analyst, the so-called "linguistic turn" in philosophy and social theory is connected. This connection ultimately led to the beginning of the most ambitious project in the humanities, known as structuralism (Rabaté, 2003). Due to structuralists, such linguists as F. de Saussure and R. Jacobson turned into philosophers and theorists of culture. One of the key features of structuralism, later adopted by other philosophical trends, was the attempt to philosophize philology, literary theory, linguistics, and other disciplines related to the study of language. Linguistic and philological terms, i.e., lexeme, phoneme, metaphor, metonymy, syntagma, binary opposition, narrative, and discourse, have become common elements in philosophical texts.

1.2. Descriptive metaphysics. A. Synytsia in "Linguistic Turn in Philosophy: a Critical Analysis" connects this event with P. Strawson's contribution. The scientist substantiates this interpretation with the conclusion of the American philosopher G. Bergman which he makes in "Strawson's Ontology" (Bergmann, 1960). G. Bergman, analyzing P. Strawson's work "Individuals: An Essay

of Descriptive Metaphysics" (Strawson, 1959), proposed the term "linguistic turn" (Synytsia, 2017, p. 100). Of course, the appearance of a term does not give an idea of its meaning. H. Bergman believed that the essence of the turn lies in the "rehabilitation of metaphysical issues ... the deep structures of everyday language are revealed ... the demonstration that language has an ontological dimension" (Synytsia, 2017, p. 100). Note that L. Wittgenstein was, according to O. Filipovich, the first to think about the existence of "deep and superficial structures of ordinary language. At the end of the first part of the book "Philosophical Investigations" he puts forward an important position that allows us to get an idea of the concept of language in Wittgenstein's later works: in the use of words, one can distinguish between "surface grammar" and "deep grammar" – what Wittgenstein used to call "logical form" (Filipovich, 2002, p. 1167).

1.3. Representative and communicative dimensions. O. Filipovych's analysis was based on the division of the linguistic turn into two conceptual parts (Filipovych, 2002, p. 553). The first is connected with the transition of the philosophical mainstream from the problem of consciousness to the problem of language. A significant role in this transition is played by the first fundamental work of L. Wittgenstein, as well as the works of M. Husserl, M. Heidegger, and neo-positivist philosophers. At this stage, scientists abstracted from the pragmatic aspects of language use. Their attention focused on the representative function of language, which reached absolute values within the limits of logical positivism. According to O. Filipovych, "Such an approach can be called the metaphysics of language, as it preserves the basic guidelines of the New Age, which starting with Descartes put forward various projects to improve language" (Filipovych, 2002, p. 553).

The second part of the linguistic turn became relevant due to L.Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. This part of history is connected with the strengthening of the positions of pragmatism, the theory of ordinary language, and the rejection of emphasis on the representative function of language: "language improvement projects are replaced by the study and description of different types of language in their ordinary use. ...Late Wittgenstein, as well as Sellars and Quine, developed a pragmatic conception of meaning,

according to which the primary importance was given to the communicative function of language, and the function of representation was understood only as derived from it" (Filipovych, 2002, 553). Therefore, according to O. Filipovych, the linguistic turn owes its progression to L. Wittgenstein.

2. Metaphysical and anti-metaphysical mood of L.Wittgenstein's ideas. Wittgenstein became famous for the fact that, despite the small number of written works, he became the founder of two opposing research trends in the philosophy of language. One can be called classical, based on the desire to bring the language to a formal ideal ("Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" (1922)). The second, based on the opposition to this aspiration, is the result of considerations about the possibilities of ordinary language ("Philosophical Investigations" (1953)) (Gryaznov, 2010, p. 408).

In the first book "the traditional metaphysical instructions were determined by the referential theory of meaning" (Filipovich, 2002, p. 561). In the second "ordinary language and its application becomes the subject of research" (Filipovich, 2002, p. 1159). Therefore, the purpose of his later work was the opposite, one might say – anti-metaphysical.

3. Representative dimension. Tractatus is conditioned by the referential theory of meaning. This is what makes the concept of early Wittgenstein representative. O. Filipovych equates the reference theory with the correspondence theory of truth, which "passes through all currents of Western philosophy and acquires special importance in modern philosophy" (Filipovych, 2002, p. 561). According to M. David (David, 2007), this theory begins with Aristotle's words about "essence", written by him in "Metaphysics": "To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true" (Aristotle, 1976, p. 141). M. David defines the theory as follows: "Strictly speaking, the correspondence theory of truth is a position in which truth is a correspondence with fact, that is, this is the view that Russell and Moore held in the early 20th century" (David, 2007, p. 147). Therefore, it is not surprising that this theory of truth determined the mood of L. Wittgenstein's first book. M.David notes the connection of the theory with "metaphysical realism" as well as Plato's teaching (David, 2007, p. 148).

The next thing that deserves attention is the specifics of L. Wittgenstein's use of the concept

of "fact" in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. In philosophy and science, the concept of "fact" is usually associated with an empirical context. But L. Wittgenstein abstracts from the empirical idea of a fact already in the first aphorism of his Tractatus, declaring that "The world is facts in logical space" (Wittgenstein, 1994, p. 5). O. Filipovych draws attention to the fact that "this intention of Wittgenstein is ignored by the positivist interpretations of Tractatus, which consider his concept as a kind of scientific empiricism that deals with physical objects" (Filipovych, 2002, p. 560).

What is a fact according to L. Wittgenstein? The first expression with which the Tractatus begins is "The world is everything that happens" (Wittgenstein, 1994, p. 5). It suggests that a fact is equated with an event. The second aphorism confirms this: "What happens is a fact, the existence of actions." So, the facts determine everything that is – happens or exists. The difference between them can be perceived through the relation to the object. Fact in action is a "negative or positive reaction" to the fact as an event. A fact in action is atomic (singular), and a fact as an event is contextual (multiple). Together, they are combined into some structure that has a certain content/meaning. A structure was similar to the scheme of I.Kant's "transcendental synthesis of apperception" emerges but in some hidden, implicit form.

The action *per se* is not thought of in isolation from reality which is made up of "objects" which are "logical-semantic formations not related to physical bodies ... logical atoms, the limit of possible analysis of reality" (Filipovich, 2002, p. 560). L. Wittgenstein writes about the object as "objects-things" (Wittgenstein, 1994, p. 5) which creates difficulties in the empirical perception of what is usually considered an object. It is precisely because of this decision that his ideas are also connected with Aristotle's theory of coherent truth: "Aristotle ... talks about the "underlying things" that make statements true, and means that these "things" (pragmatic. – trans.) are logically structured situations and facts" (David, 2007, p. 148).

L.Wittgenstein in "Philosophical Investigations" equates objects to the first elements (arche – Ancient Greek "ἀρχή"): "These first elements were both Russell's "individuals" and also my "objects" (Gegenstände. – trans.)" (Wittgenstein, 1994, p. 100). L. Wittgenstein's objects can be compared with Plato's ideas but cautiously, given the specificity of English realism which is debated with idealism (Hegelian monism). The appropriateness of the comparison with Plato's idea is given by the scientist's quote, taken by him from the dialogue "Theaetetus": "it is impossible to speak about any primary element in an explanatory way because it has nothing at its disposal except the name as such, the name is all that he possesses ... what is obtained by combining these primary elements – even in a vague form, is complex, then the names of these elements in their combinations with each other become the language of description. Because the essence of language is the combination of names" (Wittgenstein, 1994, p. 100). It turns out that the first element (idea or object) cannot be known by itself, even if you give it a name, but it can be known through the combination of names, for example, in discourse. The representation of Plato is not at all the same as the representation of the positivists, since Theaetetus was a work depicting the futility of sensualism on the way to knowledge. L. Wittgenstein repeats Plato but without claiming to create a theory of knowledge – his first work was designed to give some basic picture of the world, and not a way of knowing. (Filipovych, 2002, p. 562).

In the preface to the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, he notes: "The purpose of the book is to draw the line of thinking or, rather, not of thinking, but of the expression of thought: after all, to draw the line of thinking, we would have to have the ability to think from both sides of this line (that is, we would have the ability to think the unthinkable). Therefore, such a limit can be drawn only in language, and what lies beyond it becomes simply nonsense" (Wittgenstein, 1994, p. 3). The desire to establish boundaries and analyze the expression of thought is what unites L. Wittgenstein with Kantian idealism. Another thing is that the subject of L. Wittgenstein's research is a language which was not the main goal for I. Kant. He introduced the dichotomy between analytic and synthetic judgments, meaning almost the same as L. Wittgenstein when he distinguished fact as "the name (act) of a thing" and fact as "the act of a thing." This is actually what the Austrian philosopher considered to be the primary problem of philosophy – when the fact (name) as an action does not coincide with the fact as an action, a different reading occurs. O. Filipovych describes this problem as follows: "The name has no meaning, but it has meaning: it

presents an object, that is, the simplest unit of language corresponds to the simplest unit of reality. Due to the tight connection between the elements of language and reality, a proposition can be analytically dismembered in only one way...there is a possibility of a complete analysis of language to bring it into line with the requirements of logic. The need for such a step is since in ordinary language words are used in various ways that hide the connection between the name and the object, thereby causing fundamental philosophical problems" (Filipovich, 2002, p. 560–561). It is not surprising that in the binary context of the referential theory of the sign, L.Wittgenstein takes steps that are logical for him – he declares the opposition of the "world of ideas" and the "world of shadows" – a formally verified ideal language capable of forever solving the problem of truth, and ordinary language filled with various nonsense.

It appears that ordinary language is a subject of criticism in Tractatus. Its drawback is that similar to Plato's shadows or I. Kant's synthetic judgments rest on the sensory world – it is "a sensory shell of thought, which in many cases hides both the structure of thought and the logic of language itself" (Filipovich, 2002, p. 561). L. Wittgenstein notes: "Ordinary language is a part of the human system and it is no less complex than it. People are unable to directly extract the logic of language from it. Language disguises thoughts. Moreover, so much so that the external form of clothing does not allow us to judge the form of thought dressed in it" (Wittgenstein, 1994, p. 18).

4. Communicative dimension. The main innovation of "Philosophical Investigations" is the transition from the referential theory of the sign to meaning through "application". O. Filipovych emphasizes that "the subject of research is ordinary language and its application connected with the emergence of various paradoxes" (Filipovych, 2002, p. 1159). She further clarifies "Application" is a concept that Wittgenstein puts forward instead of "meaning" which played a key role in neopositivism", – therefore, O. Filipovych concludes, – "The identification of meaning with use means the rejection of the concept of meaning since the use of language is a process, not a static object or state" (Filypovych, 2002, p. 1159–1161). Such a transition in L. Wittgenstein's philosophy is reminiscent of the transition from the genealogy of Parmenides with his "light and darkness"

to the genealogical dialectic of Heraclitus with his thesis of flux (Martynenko, 2021).

The factor of dynamics always changes the situation with stable forms in the direction of variability, therefore, the thesis of relativism is quite fair for evaluating the late stage of the philosopher's work. "The name of the modern Austrian thinker Ludwig Wittgenstein is often mentioned in discussions about relativism. The project of linguistic philosophy developed by him is now perceived as an important source of the formation of the relativistic program, which spread widely in the second half of the 20th century in anthropological studies" (Medvedev, 2018, p. 71).

It is difficult to call L. Wittgenstein a postmodernist, but it was his innovations in the field of language research that led to the strengthening of crisis moments in modern culture and the actualization of postmodernism. This applies both to the concept of "death of the subject" and the concept of "empty sign" with its attributes of infinity. It made the idea of reference in the postmodern era only as a simulation possible (Mozheyko, 2001, p. 642). "Under such conditions, the final "destruction of the last traces of belief in referentiality" is assessed ... as the only possible "path to the truth" (Mozheyko, 2001, p. 642). Thus, Philosophical Investigations opened the way to relativism (atomic pluralism).

The next pair of key concepts which make up the backbone of a philosopher's understanding of the problems of ordinary language in Philosophical Investigations is the "language game" and "rules of the language game". L. Wittgenstein defines the first as follows: "I will also call a single whole: language and the actions with which it is intertwined" (Wittgenstein, 1994, p. 83). Actions in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus were facts, therefore, meaning and the game itself is a context that defines itself. The definition of meaning occurs due to the rules of the language game. Regarding the latter, the philosopher notes the inextricable connection between the game and the rules (Wittgenstein, 1994, p. 83) – one cannot exist without the other. If there is a game, then it must have rules. It turns out that even a "game without rules" is already a game with rules, because there is a rule "without rules" (Wittgenstein, 1994, p. 112). Therefore, understanding in communication is achieved by following the rules of this communication, just as the outcome of a game is made possible by the dedication of the participants to its

rules. You need to know the rules of using a particular word in a particular context (language game) to get the meaning. This is probably why the values obtained as a result of following the rules are "correct". From this generalization of "language and action", "rules and games" L. Wittgenstein move to the idea that all forms of experience and activity, even those that do not traditionally belong to language, are manifestations and are impossible outside of it. Therefore, Wittgenstein notes: "the term "language game" is intended to emphasize that speaking a language is a component of the activity or a form of life" (Wittgenstein, 1994, p. 90). Therefore, "Language is a set of language games that combines a more global context of the activity, practice, and life" (Filipovych, 2002, p. 1159).

Conclusions. Nowadays, the conceptual difference between the representative and communicative functions of language actualized in the two books of the philosopher is most evident. Although L. Wittgenstein focused attention on the problem of language and linguistics in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus it was not related to communication. In Philosophical Investigations the thinker focuses on ordinary language. Linguistic situations in which meaning is constituted analyze a different matter. A communicative situation or language game has turned into a conceptual unit that can be generalized and used to understand the logic of human communication.

The dualistic approach in the meaningful analysis of the linguistic turn explains the integral conditioning that exists in the seemingly contradictory intentions of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations. Both books show signs of a synthesis of ideal and ordinary language. Even though formalism is preferred in the first, and context in the second, there is still a synthetic link that connects one to another. One gets the impression that L. Wittgenstein intended another book devoted to the problems of synthesis which was not published only because of his death.

Therefore, the linguistic turn should be perceived dualistically as a holistic phenomenon. In this case, the next communicative turn can be considered as a convergence of tendencies laid down by L. Wittgenstein. That is, not only as a continuation of communicative intention but also a representative one.

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